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Abstract
This thesis is about environmental competition. The underlying question is whether or 
not countries, or, more specifically, regulators and markets, compete among each other 
by the means of trading-off environmental assets such as clean air for economic 
performance. On the balance of the empirical results, the preliminary answer is yes -  
with some qualifications attached.
After a comprehensive review of the literature on approaches towards the analysis of 
environmental performance across various social sciences, this thesis sets out to 
construct a proxy indicator for environmental performance, based on the relative 
performance across EU countries concerning several air pollutants.
Using that indicator, this thesis classifies 15 EU member states according to their 
empirically observed pollution performance during the period 1990 to 1999. The 
classification produced four distinct clusters: poor and strong pollution performers, as 
well as two transition clusters.
The second part of the thesis evolves around the idea to relate air pollution performance 
to a number of chemical industry performance variables using panel data. The main 
hypothesis to be tested is whether strong pollution performance has an impact on 
chemical industry performance, and if so, what the sign of that relationship would be. 
The three performance variables are production value, employment, and value of intra- 
EU exports.
The results of the regression analysis show that strong pollution performance has a 
negative and significant impact on two of the three chemical industry performance 
variables, namely, on production value and intra-EU exports. On the other hand, this 
study does not produce evidence that strong pollution performance has an impact on the 
employment of the chemical industries in the EU.
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1 A Comparative Study on Environmental Competition
1.1 A popular myth -challenged
The old regulations, let me start o ff by telling you, undermined our goals for  
protecting the environment and growing the economy. The old regulations on the 
books made it difficult to either protect the economy o r —protect the environment 
or grow the economy. Therefore, I  wanted to get rid o f  them. I'm interested in job  
creation and clean air, and I  believe we can do both.
George W. Bush on his Clear Skies Initiative, speaking at the 
Detroit Edison Monroe Power Plant in Monroe, Michigan, on 15 September 2003
This thesis is about environmental competition. The underlying question is whether or 
not countries, or, more specifically, regulators and markets, compete among each other 
by the means of trading-off environmental assets, such as clean air, for economic 
performance. There are examples in the social science literature of similar forms of 
competition, such as fiscal competition, or competition in the field of social security. As 
the above quote illustrates, the notion of environmental competition has long found its 
place in governmental agendas.
However, it seems that the relationship between environmental performance and 
economic competitiveness remains an issue with many unknowns. For one, we have 
considerable difficulties to define what exactly ‘environmental performance’ stands for. 
There are plenty of concepts in social science on the issue, but, as the literature review 
chapter will illustrate, there seems to be no integrating theory with the power to 
combine the approaches distinct academic disciplines.
10
Secondly, scholars have to face severe problems concerning environment-related data. 
Most of these problems fall in two broad categories, which, paradoxically, appear to 
stand in conflict at first sight. On the one hand, there are too little consistent and 
comprehensive environmental indicator data sets. If there are data series, they are often 
not comparable between each other. And yet, on the other hand, the amount of 
environment-related information that is available is incredibly large, and at times 
contradictory. The practical implication of these two constraints is typically that we 
study environmental competition selectively, based on the availability and quality of the 
data at hand.
Arguably, the notion of environmental competition describes a basic dilemma of our 
time: at some point we have to choose between, say, expanding industrial production 
and the preservation of the global climate. Given the enormous implications of such a 
choice, it seems curious how most people have accepted the alleged trade-off -quietly 
and without challenge.
It appears quite evident that both economic growth and environmental protection are in 
the interest of most people. The difficulties start when one has to rate them against each 
other. What is more important to us, economic welfare or environmental protection?
Of course, such a simplistic argument does not reflect the full complexity of the 
dilemma. Hence, there are an infinite number of variations to this theme. One could 
rephrase: what is more important to us, short-term economic gain or the preservation of 
opportunities for future generations? How about the choice between developing the 
means to feed starving children versus the salvation of the black-spotted owl from 
distinction?
The answers to this kind of questions have to come from each one of us, or 
alternatively, from the representatives that take such decisions in our name. Scientific 
analysis plays an important part in this process -by verifying the existence of the 
dilemma, by focusing attention on the choices we have as a society, and, if possible, by 
providing hints about the size of the implications we would have to expect.
My thesis aims to be a contribution to that end. In this spirit, let us get ready to crunch 
some numbers.
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1.2 Set-up of this thesis
Research problem
This study is a comparative analysis with two main objectives. The first objective is to 
provide a workable measure of ‘environmental performance’. To do so, we will resort to 
using a proxy, in the form of an air pollution indicator, which will allow us to compare 
the relative performance among the countries in our sample and along time. The second 
objective is to establish the statistical relationships between that pollution performance 
indicator and a number of data series about the performance of national chemical 
industries.
The underlying research question is whether environmental competition did take place 
among the countries in our sample, and what type of impact such competition had on 
national chemical industries. In order to address this problem, the investigation will 
focus on the two following questions. First, can pollution performance be shown to 
have a statistically significant impact on chemical industry competitiveness? And 
secondly, if there is such a relationship, is strong pollution performance beneficial or 
detrimental to chemical industry performance?
The analysis covers the 15 EU member states before the European Union’s latest round 
of enlargement in 2004, that is, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom. The observations relate to the period between 1980 and 1999.
Aims and objectives o f  the research
The following points summarize the objectives of this thesis:
• Provide an example of a workable quantitative comparative analysis in the field 
of environmental competition. This objective includes the establishment of an 
extensive literature review on the current state of the art in environment-related 
social science, a critical justification of the methods used in this study, and the 
development of a proxy for environmental performance.
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• Based on the findings of the comparative analysis, verify the existence and the 
sign of the impact of environmental competition. Obviously, the verification or 
rejection of the departing hypothesis is a central objective of any scientific 
analysis. However, in the case of this study, there is no ‘preconceived’ result: 
the issue whether or not environmental performance can be shown to have an 
impact on chemical industry competitiveness is very much an open question at 
the outset of the study. For this reason, to find the direction and strength of the 
statistical relationship has to be considered a crucial step in the investigation.
• A further aim of this study is to develop a deeper and more differentiated 
understanding of environmental competition. If the analysis showed that there is 
indeed a relationship between environmental performance and industrial 
activity, this study will attempt to differentiate the observed link. First, does 
environmental performance impact equally across different indicators of 
industrial competitiveness? Are there clusters among EU member states with 
regard to environmental performance? And if so, did the impact of 
environmental performance on industrial activity differ among those clusters?
• Contribute to the empirical literature on environmental competition in the EU. 
Given the huge body of literature around the economy-environment trade-off, it 
seems surprising how few empirical studies so far have compared EU member 
states. As the literature review will illustrate, there are plenty of contributions 
with a comparative approach among U.S. states, many case studies on individual 
EU member states, and some comparative analyses on a selection of EU member 
states.
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Yet, few empirical analyses look at environmental competition among EU 
member states. This appears even more surprising when one considers what an 
interesting object of investigation the European Union currently makes: a 
common market with an increasingly integrated legal system -  but at the same 
time an, in many ways, heterogeneous cluster of nation states, each attempting 
to guard its national interests. Interestingly, industrial and environmental 
policies are two policy fields in which EU member states appear to be especially 
reluctant to transfer powers to Brussels. All in all, it seems a rather fascinating 
setting for a comparative analysis.
General structure and brief overview on each chapter
There are four main parts to this thesis: a literature review that provides the context to 
this analysis, a detailed description on the set-up of the quantitative analysis as well as 
on the dependent and independent variables, the presentation of the findings of the 
analysis, and finally, a concluding section that discusses the findings and relates them to 
the literature context.
First, based on an extensive literature review, chapter 2 will provide the context to this 
analysis. There are two central themes which will be at the heart of the literature review. 
One of them revolves around the notion of environmental performance. This section 
describes how different fields of social science sought to understand and capture the 
complex idea of environmental performance. The final objective of this section is to 
justify why pollution performance may be considered a valid proxy for environmental 
performance at large. The second theme of the literature review aims to highlight 
theories that could help to explain the relationship between environmental performance 
and economic activity, and how those links can be the subject of environmental 
competition among countries.
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Chapter 3 focuses on the presentation of the data used in the subsequent sections. The 
chapter starts off by describing the chemical industry, since it is the dependent variable 
of the regression analysis. It addresses four guiding questions: what is the chemical 
industry? Why is it so important? What have been the drivers of its recent restructuring? 
And finally, what are the links between chemical industry activity and pollution 
performance? The second part of chapter three introduces the independent variables. 
The main independent variable, air pollution performance, is presented in detail and 
used to construct a relative performance indicator. The remainder of the section 
discusses the other independent variables.
Chapter 4 is dedicated to the regression analysis. It starts by presenting the framework 
to the empirical study. It then reports the empirical estimations of the impact of the 
independent variables on chemical industry production, employment, and intra-EU 
exports. It also compares the predicted contribution of the explanatory variables to the 
actually observed figures.
Finally, chapter 5 concludes; after presenting a summary of the main findings, and 
discussing the contribution of the thesis to the literature, it discusses shortly future 
fields of research that may be pursued to follow up this study.
Summary and short discussion o f the results
The research problem at the heart of this investigation is whether or not countries 
compete among themselves by the means of ‘playing’ with their environmental 
performance in order to foster industrial activity. The empirical results presented here 
appear to indicate that, on balance, the preliminary answer to that question is yes -with 
some qualifications attached.
In order to reach this conclusion, the first step is to construct a proxy indicator for 
environmental performance. As the literature review will show, there are several 
approaches to deal with environmental performance in social sciences. After a 
discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of each approach, this investigation will 
rely on a quantitative comparative analysis on air pollution performance patterns.
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Since the frame of reference for this thesis is a closed system (the 15 EU member 
states), the air pollution time series reflect the relative performance of the countries 
within the system. The advantage of this approach is that it is comparative in nature -  
once the indicator is developed, one can easily work out distinct pollution performance 
patterns, rank countries according to their pollution performance, or classify them into 
performance clusters.
Using the air pollution indicator, one finding of this thesis will be the classification of 
EU 15 member states according to their empirically observed pollution performance 
during the period 1990 to 1999. The classification yields four distinct clusters. There 
were two “clear-cut” performance clusters with countries that were either clearly poor 
pollution performers or strong pollution performers. Furthermore, there are two 
‘transitory’ pollution performance clusters. The first of those two clusters comprises 
countries in the process of catching-up: its constituents start from relatively poor 
pollution performance levels, but show convergence towards the EU average. The last 
cluster contains countries that fall behind in terms of pollution performance. These 
countries show strong initial pollution performance levels, but converge downwards 
towards (and in some cases, beyond) the EU average.
The second part of the thesis builds on the idea to relate the pollution performance 
indicator to a number of variables that capture the performance of chemical industries 
using panel data of the 15 countries in the sample along 20 years. The main hypothesis 
to be tested is whether strong pollution performance had an impact on chemical industry 
performance, and if so, what the sign of that relationship was. There will be three 
performance variables: production value, employment, and value of intra-EU exports 
-in  order to stay within the EU as frame of reference.
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The results of the regression analysis show that, with regard to two of the three 
chemical industry performance variables, strong pollution performance has a negative 
and significant impact. This is the case with regard to production value and intra-EU 
exports. This finding is in line with conventional economic and location theory, which 
states that there is a trade-off between economic performance and environmental 
performance. The empirical observations of this thesis lend further support to such 
theories. Hence, it seems that the countries in the sample actually do compete by means 
of environmental performance.
On the other hand, this study does not produce evidence that strong pollution 
performance has had an impact on the employment of the chemical industries in the EU. 
Hence, employment seems to respond to a different set of factors.
17
2 The Context: three basic concepts
This investigation departs from the notion that countries, or, to be more specific, 
regulators and markets, might compete with each other by adjusting their environmental 
performance in such a way that economic actors will be triggered to respond.
The idea that environmental performance plays a role in determining the competitive 
background of economies is not new, and there are a number of policy fields, such as 
fiscal policies (e.g., Bayindir-Upmann 1998; Biswas 2002) or social policies (Brownen 
2003), in which regulative competition between countries is well documented.
The purpose of this literature review chapter is to present the current understanding in 
three fields of research, which are fundamental to the idea of environmental 
competition. The first part will provide an overview on how social scientists understand 
and capture the notion of environmental performance. Building on this outline, the 
second part will present theories on how environmental performance, and in particular 
pollution performance, have an impact on economic activity. Finally, given the 
existence of a link between environmental performance and economic activity, the third 
part will discuss how countries use environmental performance to acquire a 
comparative advantage over other countries.
2.1 Environmental performance
What is environmental performance, and how could we measure it? Judging from the 
wealth of different approaches in social science literature, there is more than just one 
way to address the issue. As this section will show, most contributions concentrate on 
issues like environmental policy, environmental regulation, environmental standards, or 
pollution performance.
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There are many reasons for this variety in approaches towards environmental 
performance. Obviously, most scholars depart from ‘their’ set of theories and methods. 
For this reason, political scientists might rather look at environmental policies and 
compare them between countries, scholars of law may choose environmental regulation 
as their reference, and, as one should expect, environmental economists show a clear 
propensity towards quantifiable measures of environmental standards.
Choosing the conceptual framework that corresponds to each academic specialisation 
appears straightforward, convenient, and efficient. Yet, there is one crucial drawback to 
this multitude of approaches. The body of literature on environmental performance, as 
well as on the impact of environmental performance on economic performance -which 
one could dub the ‘economy-environment trade-off -  appears deeply fragmented.
Thus, the broadness in academic approaches of the field of environmental research may 
be somewhat of a misperception. Although on the face of it, distinct contributions from 
different disciplines focus on the same issue, for instance on environmental regulation, 
they may actually refer to rather incompatible concepts and approaches. The subsequent 
literature review chapter will highlight a number of examples on this point.
However, there is one common denominator across all approaches. One central 
objective of environmental policies is to define the limits to the human use of the 
environment. The rationale behind environmental legislation is to codify and implement 
those policies. Finally, environmental standards may essentially be understood as the 
qualitative or quantitative expression of said limits concerning the human use of the 
environment.
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Many empirical studies on environmental policies typically resort to qualitative 
descriptions in the form of case studies rather than using quantitative indicators. This 
makes the task of comparing their results rather tricky. To put it bold and simple, there 
appears to be no objective way to rate one environmental policy against another, let 
alone to score them. Environmental policies are a central and complicated area of 
current policies, and they affect many neighbouring policy fields such as industry, 
agriculture, or infrastructure. Moreover, every country has its own political culture and 
socio-economic background that could determine the shape and efficiency of 
environmental policies. With some qualification, the same appears to hold true with 
regard to environmental legislation analyses. In fact, the overwhelming majority of 
contributions in comparative environmental law are descriptive in nature.
The great advantage of qualitative studies is their flexibility in describing the observed 
reality; among the drawbacks of that approach can be the danger of implicit normative 
judgements. By contrast, quantitative measures are often focused on some specific 
observation; they could therefore be described as one-dimensional and inflexible. 
Moreover, quantitative measures can also contain implicit normative judgements, 
especially when they are composite indicators. However, one advantage of quantitative 
measures appears to be the fact that if there are implicit normative judgements involved, 
they should be relatively obvious to spot.
The human use of the environment generally manifests itself, inter alia, in the form of 
pollution. Thus, pollution is one important common denominator among the distinct 
scientific approaches that study the economy-environment relationship from a 
quantitative point of view. Looking at pollution performance provides an opportunity to 
compare the outcome from various environment-related theories, irrespective of their 
‘disciplinary’ origin.
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The advantages of focusing on pollution rather than on environmental policies, laws, or 
standards have been stressed in the literature before. For instance, Jahn (1998) argued 
that pollution was determined by structural, economic and political factors. As a result, 
he concluded that environmental policies or specific features of environmental 
regulation could only explain the state of the environment up to some point, but not 
entirely. In line with Crepaz (1995) and Janicke et al. (1996), Jahn contended that 
focussing on the outcomes of environmental policies rather than analysing the policies 
themselves could be one way of overcoming this problem by providing an overview on 
the state of the environment as well as, indirectly, on the quality of environmental 
policies, regulations, and standards.
A considerable number of comparative studies, among them Lundquist (1980), Knopfel 
and Weidner (1985), Henderson (1996), and Becker and Henderson (2000), take air 
pollution performance as one focal point of environmental policies. In fact, Crepaz 
(1995) and Binder (1996) note that the origins of international comparative analysis 
could be identified in this area of research.
Another argument in favour of focusing on pollution performance is the fact that 
pollution is a straightforward and, at least to some point, objective concept. This 
characteristic sets pollution performance indicators apart from measurements on 
environmental policies, environmental laws, or environmental regulation.
2.1.1 The subtle art of naming environment-related issues
One apparently trivial but on second thought fundamental problem in discussing the 
state of the environment is the rather confusing nomenclature around the issue in the 
literature. In economics and political science alone, there are literally dozens of ways to 
name environment-related issues.
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What exactly is the environment?
There could be several reasons for this apparent conceptual vagueness. For a start, there 
are a number of views on how exactly one has to define the term environment. At the 
very least, the environment includes its basic physical components, or environmental 
media, such as water, air and soil (Bimie and Boyle 1992). Some broader definitions 
also include the biosphere, that is, all living things like plants or animals, as well as the 
interaction between the different components of the environment.
Yet, other contributions focus on some specific component of the environment, such as 
the medium air, or on certain environment-related processes, such as pollution. Because 
there is such a multitude of possible investigation foci, ranging from comprehensive to 
very specific, it may be little surprise that the nomenclature of environment-related 
issues consists of a whole range of terms.
Implicit preferences and judgements
A second cause for the wealth of terms on environment-related issues appears to be the 
fact that any reflection on the matter almost automatically involves personal preferences 
or judgements, which could manifest itself in the semantics of terming. The perception 
of environment-related issues and its processing in the way of academic analysis, 
political discourse, or every-day behaviour, seems to depend in no small part on the 
personal values and experiences of the processor. For this reason, there are at times 
several terms for the same environment-related issue. The terms may well describe the 
same observation or concept, but express the perception of the person who reflects on 
the issue.
Take as example the terms environmental regulation, environmental standards, and 
environmental protection. They could be understood to be congruent in describing the 
same thing -  the setting of rules that define limits to the use of the environment. 
However, each of the terms has a distinct ‘flavour’, and may therefore describe a 
slightly distinct concept on the issue.
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The wording environmental regulation appears to be the least specific among the three 
options, both with regard to what kind of rules are being taken and to what objective 
those rules have. ‘Regulation’ seems to be a generic term for all kinds of laws, decrees, 
procedures, policies and the like, and is therefore unspecific with regard to what type of 
environmental rule is meant. Moreover, the term does not provide any clue as to the 
purpose of said regulation. If the term was chosen with care, this vagueness may be 
exactly the intention of the person who uses the term.
The expression ‘environmental standards’, on the other hand, may indeed imply a 
statement on those two points. First, the word ‘standard’ appears to be a much more 
specific description of environmental rules. This could be a hint that the person who 
uses the term has a rather technical understanding of environment-related issues, as one 
would expect of engineers or scientists. More likely than not, ‘standards’ could refer to 
some measurable, and therefore comparable, category.
It may also be perceivable that the phrase ‘standard’ contained an unspoken judgement 
with the quality or purpose of the environmental rule in question, since it is generally 
associated to the notion of higher or lower standards. Most people may instinctively feel 
that higher standards are preferable to lower ones. That implicit value judgement 
becomes even more apparent if the term environmental protection is used to describe 
the setting of environment-related rules. One could argue that the phrase ‘protection’ 
seems to imply that its subject, in other words, the protected, is in need of such action.
Nuances in the wording of environment-related issues do matter not only because they 
may explain the vast number of sometimes congruent notions. They appear noteworthy, 
especially with regard to the academic literature, because the terming of environment- 
related issues can be an expression of concepts or value judgements that formed the 
basis of their analysis.
Different levels o f abstraction
The study of environment-related issues in social sciences takes place on several levels 
of abstraction, and this may be a third reason for the multitude of environment-related 
terms.
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Figure 1 is an attempt to illustrate this point. The concept o f environmentalism is related 
to the public awareness about environmental issues, which in turn may depend on a 
variety o f factors, such as the state of the environment as well as the cultural and socio­
economic background o f the society in question. The only direct way to measure 
environmentalism is through opinion polls. It may therefore be fair to state that 
environmentalism is a rather abstract concept in social science.
The politics o f the environment are related to environmentalism, since the awareness 
about environmental issues among a broader public shapes the political setting. One 
example for this relationship may be the rise o f the green party movements over the 
seventies and eighties across Europe, and the subsequent incorporation o f 
environmental considerations into the political programmes o f mainstream parties. No 
doubt, environmental politics is a rather abstract concept, but it still appears more 
accessible and measurable than environmentalism.
Figure 1 Spectrum o f environment-related concepts in social science
Environmental Performance
Environmental Standards
Environmental Regulation
Environmental Legislation
Environmental Policy
Environmental Politics
Environmentalism
 1
Concrete
Level of abstraction
The next link in the chain is environmental policies, which may be understood as the 
expression o f environmental politics. Again, environmental policies are a somewhat 
more concrete and intelligible concept than environmental politics.
i--------
Abstract
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The remaining environment-related concepts mentioned in the graph follow the same 
logic: environmental legislation is the expression of environmental policies in legal 
terms. Environmental regulation is the institutional expression o f  environmental 
legislation. Environmental standards are the technical expression o f environmental 
regulation. And finally, environmental performance may be understood as the 
objectively perceivable, that is: measurable, expression o f environmental standards.
As a last step, consider that environmentalism depends, among other factors, on the 
perceived state o f the environment, which in turn is a function o f environmental 
performance. One may, therefore, reach the conclusion that the spectrum of 
environment-related concepts laid out above is actually a loop, as depicted in figure 2.
Figure 2 An environmental policy circle 
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The underlying principle of this environmental policy circle (for the lack of a better 
term) is that societies deal with environmental issues in four stages. The first stage 
relates to the formulation of environmental policies: environmental issues are identified 
and undergo “the political process”. The second stage covers the translation of 
environmental policies into law. The third stage represents the actual implementation of 
those laws. Finally, the fourth stage regards the effects of the implemented measures 
and their perception and closes the loop, leading back to the first stage.
2.1.2 Approaches towards the study of environmental performance in social 
science
As mentioned before, literature contributions related to environmental performance 
originate from a range of academic disciplines, most notably from political scientists, 
scholars of jurisprudence, economists, and geographers. Given the enormous number of 
theories and approaches, and especially considering the at times confusing ambiguity of 
the terms they use, the environmental policy circle can be an instrument to put the 
pieces of literature contributions into their proper context.
Each academic discipline has developed a distinct ‘toolkit’ of methods to capture 
environmental performance, and to put it into relation with, for example, economic 
performance. Accordingly, one way to sort the literature is by grouping the 
contributions according to their ‘background’, that is by the academic discipline they 
stem from.
However, the following outline follows a different structure, which reflects the logic of 
the environmental policy circle. There are two advantages to this approach. For one, 
organising literature contributions by their focus on the environmental policy circle, and 
not by their academic provenience or by the terms they use to describe the environment- 
related issue they refer to, may help the reader to keep a better overview on the matter. 
Secondly, the study of environment-related issues is, or at least should be, an 
interdisciplinary field of social science. Sorting literature not by their academic 
background, but by the interdisciplinary contribution they make, may help to appreciate 
their ‘added interdisciplinary value’.
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2.1.2.1 The political level: Environmental policy analysis
One way to capture the environmental performance of countries can be to look at their 
environmental policies. Comparisons can then be drawn both over time, as well as 
across countries. In the first case, a typical research question could be analogous to the 
following: did the subject country strengthen or weaken its environmental policies? In 
the latter case, one would ask how does the environmental policy regime of country x 
compare to the environmental policies of country y?
Focus
Typically, contributions in the field of environmental policy analysis focus on the 
processes which lead to the development, formalisation, and implementation of 
environmental policies. The most commonly used means of environmental policy 
analysis are socio-economic studies, political-economy analyses, or political science 
case studies.
Studies in this research arena often highlight “the genesis” of environmental regulation; 
they are therefore more often than not descriptive or analytic, as well as positive, rather 
than predominantly normative. It appears that this descriptive research approach is one 
of the main distinguishing features of this field of study vis-a-vis other bodies of 
environment-related literature, which focus on the outcome of environmental policies as 
expressed in environmental legislation, environmental standards, or environmental 
performance (for example, Leveque 1996; Leveque and Collier 1997; Leveque and 
Hallett 1997).
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Theories on environmental policy
Approaching the analysis of environmental policies from the perspective of political 
economy, Ciocirlan and Yandle (2003) highlight four possible theories to explain the 
process and drivers of environmental regulation. First, the so-called normative theory of 
environmental regulation is based on an essentially economic understanding of the 
objective of environmental protection, that is, as an exercise of maximising social 
welfare subject to constraints. The overarching objective of the regulatory authority is 
to serve the public interest. Accordingly, politicians following this approach would 
choose instruments to maximise the efficiency of environmental regulation. Unswayed 
by special interest pleadings, publicly-interested politicians pursue long-term goals 
aimed at maximising social welfare. According to economic theory, politicians need to 
calculate the implications of their legislation carefully, and intervene up to the point 
where the incremental costs of environmental intervention just offset the associated 
incremental benefits (Becker 1985; Stavins 1998).
Unfortunately, there is rather little empirical evidence to support this normative theory. 
This has led social scientists to look for alternative theories and models that could 
explain the environmental policy making process.
Second, the capture theory, which is generally attributed to the economic historian 
Gabriel Kolko (1963), states that politicians are sincerely willing to respond to the 
needs of the electorate, but lack essential information on how to do so. Therefore, they 
may have to rely on information and guidance provided by those who have much of it to 
offer, that is, the industry that is to be regulated, or the special interest groups that plead 
to regulate it. Because of this information asymmetry, special interest groups are likely 
to manipulate politicians towards their own interests.
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Third, the special interest theory takes the capture theory one step further to explain 
which one of a number of competing special interests will be successful in gaining 
influence. According to this theory, politicians can be thought of as brokers who auction 
their services to the highest bidder. Taking into account organising and other transaction 
costs, the theory holds that the group that can bid the most is the group that has the most 
to gain or to lose when politicians act (Stigler 1971; Posner 1974; Peltzman 1976; 
Ciocirlan and Yandle 2003).
Fourth, the so-called Bootleggers and Baptists theory (Yandle 1989) departs from the 
notion that both environmental groups, which Yandle dubs ‘Baptists’, and industry (the 
‘bootleggers’), may advocate the pursuit of the same environmental goal. However, the 
motivation behind their action may be very different. Yandle argues that, although 
bootleggers wear the clothing of a special concern towards the environment, the implicit 
goals behind their actions are more related to protecting their market share and 
competitiveness.
Literature examples
There is a host of contributions providing case studies on the political process of 
environmental policy making. In order to illustrate the variety of research approaches, 
consider this small selection of analyses focused on the European Union: The 
contribution of Godard (1996) looked at the process of decision making under scientific 
controversy and at the limits to the applicability of the precautionary principle in the 
political practice. Golub (1996) analysed the process of political bargaining among 
national governments during EU policy making. Taking environmental policy making 
as example, Collier (1996) pointed out how the subsidiarity principle is exploited by EU 
member states in order to protect their national sovereignty.
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Analysing the example of Britain and Germany, Knill and Lenschow (1997) highlighted 
the importance of administrative traditions to the implementation of EU environmental 
policies. Pallemaerts (1998) analysed the development and scope of EU policies on the 
export of hazardous chemicals. Kramer (2002) compared the development of 
environmental policies in the United States and Europe. Departing from a historic 
overview on the different political and legislative traditions in the two regions, he 
described the distinct periods of environmental policy development, which have led to 
fundamental differences in environmental politics today.
Although the majority of environmental policy analyses appear to stem from political 
scientists, there are also a number of interesting interdisciplinary contributions. For 
example, Damania (1999) investigated the impact of political lobbying on the choice of 
environmental policy instrument by means of modelling the rent seeking behaviour of 
the involved actors. The analysis shows that rival political parties have an incentive to 
set the similar or equal emission standards. Moreover, emission taxes are more likely to 
be supported and proposed by parties that represent environmental interest groups.
Scruggs (1999) examined the relationship between national political institutions and 
environmental performance in seventeen OECD countries. His study concludes that 
neo-corporatist societies may experience much better environmental outcomes than 
pluralist systems.
Summary
One of the principal achievements of this field of literature lies in the description of 
national environmental policy traditions, and in highlighting a whole range of different 
special interests that can shape environmental policies. Even if the existence and the 
impact of those special interests could only be captured in a descriptive way, that 
information is important to understand the background to the economy-environment 
trade-off.
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The most obvious advantages of analysing environmental performance through the 
perspective of environmental policies lie in the flexibility of the descriptive method and 
in the fact that no hard quantitative data is needed. However, the complexity of political 
analysis, in particular the existence of “black boxes”, appears to limit the ‘predictive 
power’ in linking policies to environmental outcomes.
2.1.2.2 The legislative level: Environmental legislation analysis
Another way of understanding environmental performance could be through analysing 
the stringency, timing or comprehensiveness of environmental legislation. The research 
emphasis of such an approach is the material content of regulation, as well as, in second 
place, its genesis.
Focus
Contributions on environmental legislation typically revolve around the layout of 
environmental legal and monitoring systems. Theoretical concepts in the environmental 
legislation arena may analyse and discuss the type or allocation of competences in 
environmental legislation and enforcement, which may rest at local, regional, national, 
or supranational level. Empirical studies often investigate and compare different types 
of environmental regulation, such as laws, bylaws, voluntary or negotiated agreements 
between regulators and private parties, as well as international legal regimes.
National traditions in command-and-control regulation
One classic topic among scholars in this field is the discussion on the advantages and 
drawbacks of so-called ‘command and control’ mechanisms. In this tradition, Heritier 
(1995) as well as Ltibbe-Wolff (2001) compared two ‘traditional’ European 
environmental law making approaches, that is, the technical or emission-oriented 
approach, which is sometimes dubbed the German approach, with the quality-oriented 
approach of Britain. The differences between these approaches are not merely of 
academic interest, but have very real implications both to regulators as well as for the 
regulated.
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In practice, emission-oriented pieces of legislation could bear a higher workload for 
monitoring and enforcement agencies, as all emission sources should be monitored on a 
regular basis. Once that technical and administrative problem of monitoring is solved, 
emission-oriented regulation appears rather straightforward to enforce. By contrast, the 
quality-oriented approach to command-and-control legislation does not so much depend 
on individual emission measurements, but stresses the importance that polluters, such as 
industrial plants, meet overall environmental quality goals. One way to implement this 
approach may be through integrated pollution control programmes.
Adding another ‘national’ approach, Gouldson and Murphy (1998) highlight the Dutch 
approach to environmental regulation, which is essentially anticipatory and process 
focused. It is typically associated with a flexible and hands-on approach to 
implementation and with a consultative and consensual enforcement style. One 
characteristic policy tool under this approach is the voluntary agreement that is 
negotiated between regulators and regulated.
With a view to assess the potential use of such measures at supra-national level, 
Khalastchi and Ward (1998) discussed the practicality of voluntary agreements at EU 
level. They conclude that there are a number of open issues, such as transparency or 
equal implementation procedures across member states, which need to be resolved 
before this policy tool could effectively be applied at EU level.
There are many country case studies on environmental legal systems. Among many 
others, Nystrom (2000) highlighted the distinguishing features of the Swedish system of 
integrated operating permits. Delams and Terlaak (2002) compared the institutional 
environment for negotiated environmental agreements in the United States and three 
European Union member states.
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Self-regulation o f industries
Drackrey (1998) added another perspective by highlighting the potential for industrial 
self-regulation schemes. Based on a case study about the “Responsible Care” initiative 
of the German Chemical Industry Association, Druckrey argues that self-regulation can 
be an effective tool to promote ethical conduct among industrial firms. However, she 
notes that such behaviour needs to be supported and acknowledged by the “political and 
social framework”.
I f  customers are prepared to pay back a company’s ethical “investments ” through 
greater demand, or i f  these investments improve the motivation and productivity 
o f employees, morality can also be a part o f increased competitive strength.
Druckrey (1998: 980)
However, the idea that firms may ‘behave ethically’ appears contended by other 
scholars, especially in the economic literature. As a case in point, Altman (2001) stated 
that private economic agents could not be expected to adopt ‘green’ economic policy 
independent of regulations since there need not be any economic advantage accruing to 
the affected firm in becoming greener. Along the same line of argument, Mullin (2002) 
pointed at the often considerable scientific uncertainty under which managers have to 
take environment-related business decisions. Even if companies were firmly committed 
to business ethics, they might not be able to judge the full consequences of their actions 
due to incomplete or contradicting information.
Environmental enforcement and monitoring
Dion et al. (1997) investigated whether plant-level pollution monitoring varies due to 
local conditions. Their data reveals that plants whose emissions are most likely to 
impose high environmental damages are facing a higher probability of being inspected.
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According to Dion et al., the probability of inspection appears to be positively linked to 
the visibility of the plant. Moreover, they note that the inspection probability appeared 
to be a decreasing function of the regional unemployment rate. They conclude that 
environmental regulators do not blindly enforce uniform standards given their 
commonly limited resources, but distribute their resources according to local conditions.
Expanding the results of Deily and Gray (1991), Dion et al. (1997) contend that 
regulators appeared to monitor larger plants for visibility of their actions, thus satisfying 
one subset of their electorate. At the same time, regulators appeared to avoid enforcing 
the regulation for those larger plants, by which they satisfied another subset of their 
electorate.
Focusing on the issue of how infringements against pollution rules are sanctioned, Ogus 
and Abbot (2002) argued that enforcement policies in England and Wales may best be 
described as ‘cautious’, both with regard to seeking conviction in court as well as with 
regard to revoking operating licences of the offending firms. They note that such a lax 
sanction regime is cause for concern, as potential offenders commonly assume the costs 
resulting from punishment to be low, given the small probability of substantial 
imposition. In order to correct this, they argue in favour of other enforcement regimes, 
like the German system of Ordnungswidrigkeiten, which gives environmental agencies 
the power of levying administrative financial charges from offenders, without extended 
legal procedures and onus of proof.
Allocation o f  legislation and enforcement competences
Another topic that is picked up with some regularity in analyses on environmental 
legislation revolves around the question at which level of administration the 
responsibility for environmental legislation and enforcement is allocated best. For 
example, Millimet and Slottje (2002) assessed the impact of uniform changes in 
environmental compliance costs in the United States. They concluded that uniform 
increases in federal environmental standards had little impact on the distribution of 
environmental hazards. Furthermore, they found that uniform legislation could actually 
exacerbate spatial inequalities in this respect. Based on this conclusion, Millimet and 
Slottje called for environmental standards that target specific high pollution locations.
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Gassner and Narodoslawsky (2001) concurred with this finding. They argued that 
national and international environmental standards are necessarily blind to the actual 
ecological impact of, for example, emissions at the regional level. Because 
environmental characteristics, such as climate, soil conditions or vegetation vary from 
region to region, there is the need to establish regional environmental quality standards, 
which should complement national and international ones. Another reason to call for 
regionally adapted standards was the fact that the man-made environment, such as the 
agglomeration of industrial sites causing cumulative pollution, is also region-specific.
Based on a model on optimal environmental policy in a federal system with asymmetric 
information, Ulph (2000) argued that setting environmental policies at federal level 
could be efficient when each state government only knows its local environmental 
damages, and if they do not co-operate. However, this effect wears off, as the welfare 
loss from harmonising environmental policies across states rises sharply with the 
variance in damage costs across states. The cost of setting federal environmental rules 
may erode the benefit of setting policies at the federal level to counter environmental 
dumping.
Summary
In conclusion, one of the most important contributions of the literature on 
environmental legislation is the highlighting of different traditions, approaches, and 
philosophies in environmental law making. To this end, most analyses on environmental 
law making appear to base their discussion of legal issues mainly on the means of 
qualitative analysis and reasoning.
Some contributions from this research arena appear to be highly relevant to our 
analysis, especially when they touch on cultural differences with regard to legal culture 
and enforcement among EU member states. However, analogous to environmental 
policy analyses, studies in the legal field appear to have limited predictive power when 
it comes to actual environmental outcomes.
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2.1.2.3 The technical level: Environmental regulation and standards analysis
There is a broad body of literature that analyses the implementation of environmental 
policies and legislation, which generally uses the means of quantitative modelling. 
Under this perspective, the notion of environmental performance shifts towards the 
question which regulative system could be considered effective, efficient, or in line with 
overall welfare.
Focus
Studies in this research arena are typically rooted in environmental economics; 
theoretical contributions focus on questions around the design and efficiency of 
environmental regulation and standards. Most empirical studies in this field set out to 
test the validity of such theories.
By contrast to most scholars of environmental law, most contributions in environmental 
economics depart from an economic understanding on what environmental standards 
may be. In consequence, environmental economists understand standards not only as 
legally binding regulation, but also include economic instruments’ like taxes or 
marketable pollution rights (Bruckner et al. 2001; Liibbe-Wolff 2001).
Capturing environmental regulation and standards
Xing and Kolstad (1996; 2002) state that capturing environmental regulation or 
standards is no easy task, considering the complexity of a country’s environmental 
regulations. For this reason, empirical studies in environmental economics seldom 
operate with direct measurements relating to the strictness of regulations. Instead, most 
investigations operate with rankings, indexes or other indicators that proxy the number, 
stringency, or comprehensiveness of environmental standards.
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One possible approach to analyse environmental regulation in a quantitative way is to 
use survey data. Dasgupta et al. (2001) develop a cross-country index on environmental 
regulation stringency, which was compiled on the basis of United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development, UNCED, reports. The index considers the state of 
policy and performance in four environmental dimensions: air, water, land, and living 
resources. Proxies for the state of environmental policies included environmental 
awareness, the scope of environmental legislation, and environmental control 
mechanisms. The same index is also applied by Wilson et al. (2002). Van Beers and van 
den Berg (1997) base their analysis on a measure of environmental stringency, which 
was entirely specified by themselves (Xing and Kolstad 2002: 3). It is no big surprise 
that such an approach was criticised by other contributors as “somewhat arbitrary” 
(Xing and Kolstad 2002: 3).
A second strategy to obtain a picture on the stringency or quality of environmental 
regulation is to use proxies, or to combine a number of proxies. For instance, Bartik 
(1988) uses a variety of quantitative measures in order to assess the stringency of 
environmental regulation. All measures used in the study were based on pollution 
abatement and control costs.
Similarly, List and Co (1999) use four different measures regarding the stringency of 
U.S. environmental regulation. The first two measures covered money spent by 
different regulatory agencies to control air and water pollution, and money spent to 
control solid waste disposal. The third measure used firm-level pollution abatement 
expenditures concerning air and water emissions, as well as solid waste disposals. The 
fourth measure was an index that combined local, state and federal government 
pollution efforts with firm-level abatement expenditures to assign a money-value 
ranking for each state in the sample.
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Other literature contributions propose different proxies. Levinson (1996) includes six 
different indexes on the environmental stringency. Two measures on the quality of 
environmental regulation were provided by NGOs: one by the Conservation Foundation 
(Duerksen 1983), and another by the Fund for Renewable Energy and the Environment. 
The other four indicators covered the number of environmental statutes each state had 
from a list of 50 common environmental laws; the number of state employees in charge 
of pollution monitoring; the aggregate pollution abatement cost per state; and the 
industrial pollution abatement cost per state.
Mani et al. (1997) assess the level of environmental regulation by two variables: the 
share of government spending for environment and ecology as reflected in its budget, 
and the total number of environmental cases brought forward by state regulatory 
agencies. Smarzynska and Wei (2001) capture the stringency of a country’s 
environmental standards by looking at its participation in international environmental 
treaties or regimes like the convention on long-range trans-boundary pollution, the 
quality of its ambient air, its water and emission standards, and the observed actual 
reduction in various pollutants.
Finally, another proxy for environmental regulation may be the factor time, as for 
example in Reitenga (2000). In this study on the cross-sectional variation in market 
returns of chemical industry firms following a major environmental accident, there is no 
direct measure on environmental regulation. Instead, Reitenga takes the catastrophe at 
the chemical plant in Bhopal as an external shock, after which environmental regulation 
is assumed to have been tightened. By doing so, he can compare the performance of 
chemical industries before and after the event without the need to apply proxies.
38
The pros and cons o f  different types o f environmental regulation
The focus of environmental economists on market-based instruments seems strong. A 
substantial number of studies compare the utility and efficiency of different 
environmental policy instruments. For example, Jung et al. (1996) evaluate the 
incentive effects of five environmental regulation instruments to promote the 
development and adaptation of advanced pollution abatement technology. They 
concluded that the type of policy, which provided the most incentive for heterogeneous 
industries, were auctioned permits, followed by emission taxes or subsidies, and 
marketable permits. According to their findings, the least incentive policy was to 
establish performance standards.
Sandmo (2002) compares the efficiency of environmental taxes and environmental 
quotas under conditions of imperfect information about the degree of compliance, that 
is, when the regulator cannot be sure whether some firms evade taxes or exceed their 
quota. Sandmo concludes that the properties of the two instruments were more alike 
than was previously assumed in the economic literature.
Alternatives to environmental regulation
Lanoie et al. (1997), Wheeler (1997), as well as Foulon et al. (2000; 2002) investigate 
the impact of public disclosure programmes as a means to enforce environmental 
regulation. Their studies show that public disclosure of environmental performance 
does indeed create additional and strong incentives for pollution control. Moreover, 
Lanoie et al. note that their empirical evidence showed that heavy polluters were more 
significantly affected by mandatory disclosure than minor polluters. A survey on the 
theoretical literature comparing the economic efficiency of non-mandatory and 
mandatory environmental policy instruments can be found in the paper of Khanna 
(2001).
Some contributors, such as Abrego and Perroni (2002) go as far as proposing to 
substitute environmental policy commitment by investment subsidies. Effectively, 
Abrego and Perroni argue that the long-run distortionary effects of subsidies on 
investment choices may be sufficiently large to eliminate the need for environmental 
policies in this context entirely.
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Getting the right mixture o f  environmental regulation and standards
Afsah et al. (1996) criticise the focus of the conventional policy discussion on pollution 
control mechanisms as “too shallow” and “too n a r r o w It is too shallow, because it 
devotes inordinate attention to instrument choice while ignoring the preconditions for 
applying any instrument effectively; and too narrow because it continues to focus on the 
interaction of regulators with firms as the sole determinant of environmental 
performance.
Eskeland and Devarajan (1996) argue that choosing a regulation mix of market-based as 
well as command-and-control approaches may be the most practicable and promising 
approach to environmental regulation. They note that the choice of pollution monitoring 
or equipment evaluation should be made in the light of feasibility and cost. They also 
note that environmental regulation of private sources, such as cars, was much easier 
than of industrial pollution sources, due to their much higher heterogeneity and 
complexity. Keene (1999) concurs with this finding. She notes that there are particular 
circumstances in which neither strict environmental regulation nor market-based 
instruments alone are appropriate or feasible. The challenge to policy makers and 
regulators lies in identifying these situations and determining which pollution 
management tool, or which combination of tools, regulations and market-based 
instruments will be most effective. Keene concludes that, in any case, the success of 
environmental regulation relies largely on a strong institutional and regulatory 
foundation.
Summary
Studies on environmental regulation and standards have contributed to the analysis of 
environmental performance issues in at least two ways: first, environmental economists 
have established an entire set of quantitative methods and indicators to analyse 
environmental issues. Moreover, they have also highlighted a range of market-based 
instruments that could complement or substitute command-and-control environmental 
regulation.
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For these reasons, many contributions from this research arena are important as 
‘background information’ for this study. In an ideal world with complete and 
comparable data on environmental standards in EU member states, a quantitative 
analysis on environmental regulation would have been the method of choice to address 
environmental competition. However, it is precisely the issue of data comparability that 
poses a seemingly unsurpassable obstacle.
Economies, as well as ecosystems, are extremely complex entities which differ between 
each other. The notion that there was one ideal system of environmental standards 
seems highly questionable. Therefore, in a comparative analysis of environmental 
standards, it may be hard to compare one country’s set of regulations to another in an 
objective way. Hence, we are, metaphorically speaking, back to square one -back to 
qualitative statements.
2.1.2.4 Pollution performance analysis
The last cluster of literature contributions in this section does not deal with 
environmental policies, laws, or standards, but with their actual outcome -  that is with 
environmental performance in the stricter sense. The basic rationale behind this 
approach could be summarised as follows:
The world is too complex to predict the detailed environmental consequences o f  
technological changes, or o f  policy initiative in other areas. Thus it is important 
to monitor the state o f the environment on a continuous basis, and to develop 
tools fo r  ascertaining causal relationships.
Ayres (2001: 22)
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There are several reasons why one might choose to look at environmental performance 
rather than at regulation itself. One of them is the straightforwardness of pollution data. 
As mentioned above, it appears that there is no one-to-one measure of the stringency or 
quality of environmental regulation. Instead, one has to resort to proxies, which may be 
difficult to justify. For instance, Xing and Kolstad (2002: 3) argue that proxies like 
pollution abatement costs were “disquietingly ambiguous and potentially imprecise”. 
They argue in favour of using emission data instead, as this information was a more 
accurate mirror to the strictness of overall environmental regulation.
Literature examples
This approach is in line with a number of empirical contributions in the environmental 
economics literature that use pollution data as a basis for their analyses. Among them 
are Lundquist (1980), Crepaz (1995), Janicke et al. (1996; 1997), Henderson (1996), 
Jahn (1998), Becker and Henderson (2000), Khanna (2000), and Neumayer (2001). 
However, one should not ignore the fact that environmental regulation is probably not 
the only determinant of pollution performance. Neumayer (2003) argues that 
geographical factors have often been neglected by economic analysis. His analysis on 
CO2 emission data across 163 countries over the period from 1960 to 1999 shows that 
factors like cold climates, transportation requirements, and the availability of renewable 
energy sources can have an impact on emission performance.
Measuring individual environmental indicators, such as water quality or air pollution, 
can present a technical challenge, especially if the area or timeframe of the 
measurement increases in scale. However, the task of putting together individual 
environment-related observations into a coherent overall assessment appears to be a 
much larger challenge.
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The much discussed book “The Skeptical Environmentalist -  Measuring the Real State 
o f the World’ by Bjom Lomborg (2001) may serve as an indication of the workload 
connected to such an exercise. In an effort that one cannot but wonder at, Lomborg lists 
scores of statistics about the state of the environment. In over more than 500 pages, the 
compilation covers ‘the usual suspects’ like air and water pollution, waste generation, 
biodiversity, and climate change, but also less frequently used environmental indicators 
like food yields, deforestation, energy reserves, commodity prices, and cancer rates. 
Lomborg’s book provoked a heated debate, both on the quality of the data he presents, 
on the methods he employs, and on his conclusion that, looking at the big picture, the 
environmental situation is improving instead of deteriorating.
However, there is another point to make about Lomborg’s contribution that seems more 
relevant in this context: the vast majority of his data is quantitative, yet Lomborg does 
not apply it to quantitative analysis. His final assessment of the environmental situation 
is essentially descriptive and fragmented into the several sub-issues he deals with. 
Lomborg does not attempt to put the pieces of the environmental puzzle together into an 
overall picture.
This apparent inability to generate a comprehensive environmental quality score is 
reflected in virtually the entire body of literature. The vast majority of contributions 
aimed at assessing environmental performance focus on specific aspects of 
environmental quality.
One example for this is the article of Plut (2000), which compares a number of 
environmental trends among EU member states and accession countries. The study uses 
a variety of environmental indicators, such as energy consumption, number of cars, 
various air pollutants, defoliation of conifers, municipal waste generation, waste water 
treatment plant coverage, and number of organic farms. Plut does not endeavour to 
combine these indicators into an overall score, but rather describes and compares each 
indicator across his country sample.
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A different approach is to construct aggregated environmental indexes from a variety of 
sub-indicators. The contributions of Montgomery (1999), as well as of van den Berg 
and van Veen-Groot (2000), are examples of how this could be put into practice. Both 
contributions aim to capture the state of the environment by using several categories of 
sub-indicators. For instance, Montgomery (1999) proposes to develop a matrix of 60 
environmental indicators, which should be divided into 10 sub-categories: air pollution, 
climate change, loss of biodiversity, marine environment and costal zones, ozone layer 
depletion, resource depletion, dispersion of toxic substances, urban environmental 
problems, waste, as well as water pollution and water resources. As promising as such 
an idea may appear one should note that the data for that matrix is not yet completely 
available, as its compilation is a currently ongoing project of the EU’s statistical office, 
Eurostat.
Summary
Contributions in the field of pollution performance analyses have shown that one can 
assess the quality of the environment and countries’ individual performance in that 
regard over time, keeping in mind that there are certain important limitations: Due to 
the complexity of the matter, no study can capture a comprehensive picture of 
environmental performance. Hence, serious research can only process a selection of 
pollution performance indicators. Consequently, studies in this field will generally have 
to resort to proxies, which focus on some limited aspect of the environment.
Furthermore, although the body of literature in this research arena is extensive, one 
recurrent problem of empirical studies appears to be clear, being the lack of comparable 
and complete data sets.
Nevertheless, the great advantage of approaching environmental performance through 
pollution performance is the straightforwardness and objectivity of the method. 
Therefore, in spite of the limitations mentioned above, this thesis will use pollution 
performance data to approximate environmental performance.
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2.2 Links between environmental performance and economic activity
Environmental performance interacts with a country’s economy in a variety of direct 
and indirect ways. Beforehand, the environment is the basis of the natural resource 
endowment of a country. But below that surface, there is a host of literature 
contributions asserting that environmental performance is interacting with, and indeed 
has the power to influence, many of the most basic ‘settings’ of an economy, like 
production costs, trade patterns, industry locations or gains from trade (Jayadevappa 
and Chhatre 2000).
The following section, 2.2, focuses on concepts and theories from environmental 
economics. Its objective is to summarise the existing literature on possible economy- 
environment trade-offs, and more specifically on the linkages between economic 
competitiveness on the one hand, and pollution performance on the other hand. It will 
do so by distinguishing between theories that propose direct links between economic 
performance and pollution on the one hand, and theories that put forward indirect 
interactions between the two factors.
There are a great number of survey articles on the environment-economy nexus, which 
formed an important departing point for this overview. The contribution by Dean 
(1992), focuses on giving an overview on earlier literature about trade and the 
environment without addressing any particular research question. The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD, issued two survey studies. One 
paper published in 1993 (OECD 1993) provides an overview on environmental policies 
and regulations in OECD countries, and discusses the evidence about their 
repercussions on industrial competitiveness. The second study (OECD 1999) is an 
update of the 1993 survey. It focuses on the use of economic instruments for pollution 
control and resource management among OECD countries.
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The contribution by Beghin et al. (1994) highlights the relationship between global 
environmental problems, trade liberalisation, growth and competitiveness. Jaffe et al. 
(1995) focus their literature review on theories and evidence around the issue of U.S. 
manufacturing competitiveness vis-a-vis environmental regulation. Theories and 
evidence regarding the problem of monitoring and enforcement of environmental 
policies were the emphasis of the economic literature survey by Cohen (1998). The 
paper of Jayadevappa and Chhatre (2000) outlines major economic theories around 
international trade and environmental quality. Finally, based on an overview on the 
related literature contributions, Loschel (2002) discusses the significance of 
technological change in economic models of environmental policy.
Although literature surveys are helpful in outlining the main issues in the current 
debate, they also show how hard it is to capture the sheer wealth of contributions in 
environmental economics and related disciplines. The environment-related strands of 
economics are still developing and getting increasingly complex; any catalogue 
concerning their principle research questions risks being incomplete or outdated.
Environmental issues have gained significance in various branches of economics since 
the 1960s. The recognition of environmental issues as subject of economics took place 
gradually in several waves (Jayadevappa and Chhatre 2000). During the early stages in 
the development of this field of studies, the industrial pollution in industrialised 
countries was at the centre of attention. In the late 1970s, a new wave of contributions 
related environmental issues with trade analysis. Triggered by a rising degree of 
environmental awareness in Europe and the United States, trans-boundary 
environmental issues and the concept of sustainability played an increasingly important 
role in the literature around 1980. The notion of differential environmental regulations 
and their importance for the competitiveness of countries or industries gained 
prominence since the 1990s. Lastly, the notion of technological change induced by 
environmental regulation gained in prominence in the second half of the 1990s.
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2.2.1 The link between economic development and pollution performance
There is a substantial body of literature on growth and the environment, which discusses 
the causality between a country’s state of development and the state of its environment. 
As Jayadevappa and Chhatre (2000) and Israel and Levinson (2002) point out, one 
could distinguish a number of different approaches in this field of research.
Jahn (1998) builds his argument on the hypothesis that the degree of pollution depends 
on the physical and industrial structure of a nation. According to this notion, possible 
determinants of pollution could include the territorial size of a country, its population 
density, its climate, the size of the industrial and service sectors, and the development of 
industrial production.
Jahn also mentions that the wealth of a nation or economic growth rates may serve as 
explanatory factors for pollution levels. However, he notes that there are two competing 
hypotheses about the impact of those factors on pollution levels, and that this may make 
it difficult to work out the dominating effect. On the one hand, rich nations with a high 
GNP or with high economic growth might have more financial resources to combat 
environmental problems. On the other hand, those nations might also have higher levels 
of consumption, which could lead to increasing pollution pressure.
The concept of the Environmental Kuznets Curve is one of the most prominent theories 
on the development-pollution relationship. It evolves around the notion of an inverse-U- 
shaped relationship between the wealth of a nation and the pollution intensity of its 
economy (Kuznets 1955). The basic assertion of this concept is that poor economies 
pollute very little. As the economies expand and develop, their pollution intensity 
grows. With a certain degree of development achieved, however, the pollution level 
then decreases again for a variety of possible reasons.
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Pollution as a function o f development
One strand of literature contributions discusses the theoretical underpinnings of such an 
inverse-U-shaped pollution-income path (Thompson and Strom 1996; de Bruyn and 
Heintz 1999). A first approach to explain this relationship is to understand it as “the 
natural progression o f economic development, from clean agrarian economies to dirty 
industrial economies to clean service economies” (Israel and Levinson 2002: 3). 
Connected to this argument is the notion that richer countries would become gradually 
cleaner by substituting environmentally harmful products, as they would import 
products whose manufacture creates the most pollution.
Some scholars produce empirical evidence to support this hypothesis. For example, 
relating sulphur dioxide concentrations in urban areas and dissolved oxygen levels in 
rivers to national income, Xepapadeas and Amri (1998) conclude that the probability of 
having an acceptable environmental quality increases as a country moves to a higher 
state of economic development.
Pollution as a function o f individual preferences
An alternative argument rests on the claim that the environmental Kuznets curve exists 
because of individual preferences. According to this theory, an inverse-U-shaped 
pollution-income path might merely represent a form of non-monotonic income 
expansion path, or so-called Engel Curve. According to this concept, individual 
preferences with regard to environmental quality may change with distinct levels of 
income. In other words, poor people may not have ways to trade the environment for 
other goods, middle-income people would trade clean environments for other goods, 
and rich people may in turn give preference to the environment over other goods (Israel 
and Levinson 2002).
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Pollution as a function o f institutional capacity
The last broad group of theories on the relation between growth and environmental 
quality relies on institutional characteristics of economies. Within this group, one could 
distinguish three different conceptual approaches. First, a number of contributions use 
the notion of technology constraints to explain the poor environmental performance of 
less developed countries. For example, John and Pecchenino (1994) as well as Stokey
(1998) argue that the observed inverse-U shape would represent a Pareto-optimal 
response to technological constraints of poor countries in the sense that it would 
improve the condition of the observed countries without compromising the position of 
other countries.
According to this argument, poor countries would employ the most polluting form of 
production, as, from their point of view, they were endowed with an “excess o f  
environmental quality” (Israel and Levinson 2002: 6). As their economies expand, these 
countries would become both dirtier and richer. Once a country is sufficiently wealthy, 
and in consequence more polluted, the marginal cost of abating pollution becomes 
worthwhile, and less polluting but more expensive technologies are put in place.
A second line of argument builds on the institutional characteristics of economies with 
institutional constraints. This theory asserts that there are obstacles in poor countries 
that prevent them from establishing the social or political institutions necessary to 
regulate pollution. An example of such obstacles could be political-economic barriers, 
as described by Gareth Porter (1999) as well as Jones and Manuelli (2001). Once a 
country is sufficiently wealthy, the fixed costs of implementing the said institutions 
become worth incurring. At that point, institutions like environmental agencies are 
established, and pollution begins to decline with economic growth.
The third group of institutional explanations focuses on returns to scale. This theory 
builds on the notion that as economies expand the marginal cost of abating pollution 
would become cheaper because of returns to scale. Based on this rationale, authors like 
James and Levinson (2001) assert that larger economies abate more than smaller ones.
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An important factor to consider with regard to institutional capacity is corruption. 
Modelling the interaction between the government and a private firm, Lopez and Mitra
(2000) show that corruption is not likely to preclude the existence of an inverted U- 
shaped Kuznets curve, but that the pollution levels corresponding to corrupt behaviour 
are always above the socially optimal level. Further, under corruption, the turning point 
of the Kuznets curve takes place at income and pollution levels above those 
corresponding to the social optimum.
Critique from the scientific community
In spite of numerous theoretical and empirical studies on the concept, a number of 
contributions contend that the notion of an Environmental Kuznets Curve was 
eventually revealed to be deceptive (Beghin et al. 1994; Jayadevappa and Chhatre 
2000). Stem et al. (1996) argue that the problems associated with the concept and the 
empirical implementation of the EKC are such that its usefulness was limited to the role 
of a descriptive statistic.
The ideas that growth per se is good fo r  the environment and that developing 
countries are ‘too poor to be green ’ are incorrect. Further and more 
sophisticated studies [...] would clearly be more valuable than further additions 
to the EKC literature.
Stem (2002: 217)
As further examples of economic analyses that question the validity of the EKC 
hypothesis, Park and Brat (1995) show that global inequality with regard to the state of 
the environment among nations has grown over the period 1960 to 1988, despite an 
international trend of rising incomes. Jayadevappa and Chhatre (2000) note that it is not 
clear whether every country will follow the sequence of stages implied the EKC 
relationship. They go on to argue that, though the concept was intuitively important, it 
“offers no information about the actual chemistry o f  the interactions between 
development and environment that is crucial for policy measures” (Jayadevappa and 
Chhatre 2000: 182).
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Investigating the relationship between economic growth and CO2 emissions in the 
European Union over the period from 1981 to 1995, Bengochea-Morancho et al. (2001) 
observe that there are differences in the individual emissions of states that cannot be 
explained by their level of income alone. The empirical findings of Hill and Magnani 
(2002) appear to point in the same direction.
Ansuategi and Escapa (2002) conclude from their data that the inverted U-shaped 
relationship between economic growth and emissions does not appear to hold with 
regard to greenhouse gas emissions. They provide a number of possible reasons for this 
observation: Greenhouse gases may create global, not local disutility. It is therefore 
problematic to relate them to the growth of individual economies. More important, they 
argue, is the fact that greenhouse gases may have intergenerational effects, as they 
accumulate and impact on income over very long periods of time.
Coondoo and Dinda (2002) conduct a Granger causality test to cross-country panel data 
on per capita income and the corresponding per-capita CO2 emission data. Their results 
indicate that there are three different types of causality relationships holding for 
different country groups: For the developed-country groups of North America and 
Western Europe, the causality was found to run from emission to income. For the 
country groups of Central and South America, Oceania and Japan, causality from 
income to emissions is obtained. Finally, for the country groups of Asia and Africa, the 
causality appeared bi-directional.
As part of their Granger analysis, Coondoo and Dinda established regression equations, 
which indicated that, with regard to the country groups of North America and Western 
Europe, the growth rate of emissions has become stationary around a zero mean, and a 
shock in the growth rate of emissions tends to generate a corresponding shock in the 
growth rate of income. In other words, their results appear to indicate that differences in 
emission levels are positively linked to disparities in income levels.
In conclusion, there are a number of theoretical arguments that could support the notion 
of an Environmental Kuznets Curve. Empirical evidence for the existence of such a 
relationship, however, appears to be -  at best -  mixed.
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2.2.2 Theories on indirect links between the economy and pollution performance
The above mentioned literature contributions have pointed out possible direct links 
between economic indicators and pollution performance. By contrast, the following 
theories and concepts highlight a number of indirect links. Indirect links would exist 
when factors that influence pollution performance also had an impact on other 
economic indicators.
For example, the theories and concepts presented in section 2.2.2.1 establish that 
environmental regulation has certain effects on the competitive position of firms. On the 
other hand, there is evidence that stricter environmental regulation leads to decreased 
pollution emissions (Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw 1999). Hence, one could argue that 
there is a connection between pollution levels and the competitive position of firms in 
so far as the change in emissions could be attributed to environmental regulation.
Along the same line of argument, the second set of indirect effects of pollution 
performance on economic indicators is based on the notion that environmental taxes 
could have an impact on the economy on the one hand, and on pollution performance on 
the other hand. Basic economic theory predicts that there is a link between 
environmental taxes and pollution performance. As one example, Larsen and 
Nesbakken (1997) show that CO2 taxes have had an impact on CO2 emissions in 
Norway.
2.2.2.1 Environmental regulation and innovation
There are several important theories in economics and related sciences that elaborate 
the possible relationship between environmental performance -  or, to be exact, the 
related concept of environmental regulation -  and the competitive position of firms. 
Some theories evolve around the notion that the right type of regulation might stimulate 
innovation or facilitate the spreading of innovation. Other theoretical concepts depart 
from the idea that environmental regulation could provide competitive advantages to 
some firms or industries while disadvantaging others.
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Innovation offsets: the Porter Hypothesis
In their article “Toward a new conception o f  the environment-competitiveness 
relations”, Porter and van der Linde (1995) lay out an approach to frame the impact of 
environmental regulation on competitiveness. One central argument of the article is that 
conventional economic theory inevitably had to conclude that there was a clash between 
the ecology and the economy, because they had a static view of environmental 
regulation. This was because conventional theories ignored the role of environmental 
regulation in the development and dispersion of new technology, the improvement of 
processes, the design of new products, and in changing customer preferences. Such a 
limited conception had led to the establishment of a “static world\ where firms had 
already made their cost-minimising choices, and environmental regulation inevitably 
raised costs. It therefore decreased the competitiveness of companies on the market.
Porter argues that one way to establish a more dynamic understanding of 
competitiveness was to include the concept of innovation into the equation (Porter 
1990; Porter 1991).
Competitiveness at the industry level arises from superior productivity, either in 
terms o f  lower costs than rivals or the ability to offer products with superior value 
that justify a premium price.
(...)
Competitive advantage, then, rests not on static efficiency nor on optimizing 
within fixed constraints, but on the capacity fo r  innovation and improvements that 
shift the constraints.
This paradigm o f dynamic competitiveness raises an intriguing possibility: in this 
paper, we will argue that properly designed environmental standards can trigger 
innovation that may partially or more than fully offset the costs o f  complying with 
them. Such “innovation offsets, ” as we call them, can not only lower the net cost 
o f meeting environmental regulations, but can even lead to absolute advantages 
over firms in foreign countries not subject to similar regulations.
Porter and van der Linde (1995: 97/98)
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At the centre of this dynamic approach to competitiveness rests the assertion that firms 
do not always make optimal choices. According to the argument of Porter and van der 
Linde (1995: 99), the actual process of competition among firms is characterised by 
changing technological opportunities coupled with highly incomplete information, 
organisational inertia and control problems. Taking this point into account, 
environmental regulation could have an important influence on the direction of 
innovation by a variety of paths.
First, environmental regulation may signal companies about likely resource 
inefficiencies and potential technological improvements. Second, regulation with a 
focus on information gathering may raise corporate awareness. Third, once 
environmental regulation is put into force it reduces the uncertainty whether investment 
into environment protection would be valuable in the future. Fourth, regulation may 
create pressure that motivates innovation and progress. Fifth, environmental regulation 
could ensure that one company cannot opportunistically gain position by avoiding 
environmental investments. Finally, if the innovation gains did not offset the cost of 
compliance, or were not perceived by companies to do so, environmental regulation 
could be used to enforce measures to improve environmental quality.
Porter and van der Linde argue that firms innovate in response to environmental 
regulation in two broad forms. First, companies could simply get smarter about how to 
deal with pollution once it occurs or how to reduce the amount of toxic or harmful 
material generated. This sort of innovation would merely reduce the cost of compliance 
with pollution control.
The second form of innovation would address environmental impacts while 
simultaneously improving the affected product or the related processes. The benefits of 
the resulting innovation offsets could exceed the cost of compliance, and thus increase 
industrial competitiveness. Porter and van der Linde divide the potential innovation 
offsets into product offsets and process offsets.
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Accordingly, product offsets could manifest themselves in increased product quality, 
safety, resale value or scrap value. Inversely, product offsets could also decrease 
production or product disposal costs. Production offsets would occur through higher 
resource productivity such as higher process yields, reduced downtime, materials 
savings, an improved utilisation of by-products, lower energy consumption, lower 
handling costs, and the like.
Many economists met the notion that environmental regulations may benefit firms, over 
and above improvements in environmental quality, with considerable scepticism. For 
example, Portney (1994: 22) states “7 disagree fundamentally with the message [that] 
we can avoid painful choices when setting environmental goals”. Portney, and other 
economists like Palmer et al. (1995) or Jaffe et al. (1995), warn policy makers to beware 
of a no-cost paradigm, arguing that new regulations do have costs, which normally 
would not be outweighed by their benefits.
The empirical evidence on the validity of the Porter hypothesis is mixed. Using a 
process analysis framework to consistently account for non-separabilities in pollution 
and pollution abatement practices, Smith and Walsh (2000) conclude that apparent 
productivity gains could appear to be greater with environmental regulation than 
without, even when they are not. Their finding appears to cast doubt on earlier studies 
that found supporting evidence for the Porter hypothesis, since they may be the result of 
inadequacies in the methods used to decompose the influences of productivity change.
Based on the notion that managers can be myopic, that is, that they can take wrong 
investment decisions, Schmutzler (2001) analyses the circumstances under which 
environmental regulation might raise the expected profits of firms. He identified several 
factors pertaining to the likelihood of innovation offsets. First, the type of regulation is 
important. The more flexible regulations are, the more scope they leave for innovation. 
Second, technological factors are important, as benefits from innovations arise mainly 
in the long-run. Third, the market environment needs to be conductive to innovation. In 
other words, there needs to be some market pressure for innovation to overcome 
organisational inefficiencies of the firm. And finally, the firm structure appears most 
important, as innovation in a firm occurs when there is communication and mutual 
learning between different departments and the management.
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Based on empirical data on Mexican industries, Dasgupta et al. (1998) challenge one of 
the basic premises of the Porter hypothesis, arguing that new technology did not appear 
to be significantly cleaner than old one. Once their model took account for other factors 
that might influence environmental performance, Dasgupta et al. do not find evidence 
that plants with newer technology performed better than old ones with regard to 
environmental performance. Instead, they highlight the importance of introducing 
environmental management systems, such as ISO 14000, regulatory enforcement, duties 
to inform the public about environmental performance, employee education, and plant 
size.
Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (1999) tested the standard criticism that economists have 
about the Porter hypothesis, which is the idea that if opportunities existed to improve 
the competitive position through innovation, firms would not have to be triggered by an 
extra cost to take them. Their model confirms this criticism, but also shows that 
downsizing and modernisation of firms subject to environmental regulation increases 
the average productivity. Another positive effect of downsizing and modernisation is 
the marginal decrease of profits and environmental damage.
Rege (2000) introduces a slightly different rationale why environmental regulation may 
improve the competitiveness of domestic industries. She departs from the notion that 
regulators require domestic firms to produce at the environmental standards at which 
they claim to produce, or otherwise impose a penalty on those firms found cheating. 
This would improve competitiveness because firms are forced to provide credible 
information about the environmental qualities of their products. Because such credible 
information will differentiate domestic products from other products on the world 
market and consumers could be more willing to buy them.
Based on their empirical analysis on 53 large Spanish companies, Garces and Galve
(2001) report that command-and-control regulation often binds companies to make 
environmental investments that are not productive in the conventional economic sense. 
They note, however, that their findings do not necessarily disagree with the Porter 
hypothesis, as their investigation considered only the effect of command-and-control 
regulation in the short term.
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Mohr (2002) states results which are consistent with Porter’s hypothesis, by employing 
a general equilibrium framework with a large number of agents, external economies of 
scale in production, and discrete changes in technology. His model shows that 
endogenous technical change makes the Porter hypothesis feasible.
Finally, based on their study on the productivity growth patterns of chemical industries 
at U.S. state level over the period 1988-1992, Domazlicky and Weber (2004) report that 
environmental regulation did show a significant positive correlation with chemical 
industry productivity. In that respect, their findings were inconsistent with the Porter 
hypothesis. However, they also point out that the lack of a significant negative 
relationship suggests that environmental protection measures do not appear to reduce 
productivity growth either.
In conclusion, the academic discussion on the validity and implications of the Porter 
hypothesis has sparked a lively interdisciplinary exchange of opinions. While many 
economists dismiss the idea on the grounds of theoretical considerations, some 
empirical contributions have produced supporting evidence.
The timing o f induced technological change
Based on the basic notion of the Porter Hypothesis, which states that environmental 
regulation may induce technological change, one strand of economic literature 
investigates the issue of how to achieve optimal timing with regard to induced change.
Apparently on the grounds of data availability, many contributions in this research 
arena concentrate on CO2 emissions as example. Nordhaus (1980; 1980b) was the first 
to obtain analytical expressions for the optimal pollution tax trajectory. Further 
contributions include, among others, Ulph and Ulph (1994; 1997), Sinclair (1994), 
Farzin and Tahovonnen (1996), Farzin (1996), Peck and Wan (1996), as well as 
Goulder and Mathai (2000).
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One important consideration in this arena concerns the optimal timing to introduce 
environmental regulation. For instance, Wigley et al. (1996) argue that the prospect of 
technological change justified relatively little current abatement of CO2 emissions. For 
this reason, legislators could wait until scientific advances made such abatement less 
costly. By contrast, Ha-Doung et al. (1996) maintain that the potential for induced 
technological change justifies relatively more abatement in the near term, in light of the 
ability of current abatement activities to contribute to leaming-by-doing.
When governments wait for the optimal moment to implement environmental 
regulations vis-a-vis their competitors, this may result in what is sometimes called 
“leapfrogging” in an international setting (Brezis et al. 1993; Brezis and Krugman 
1997). The idea behind this is that nations that benefit the most from adopting a new 
technology are typically those nations that currently use the worst technologies.
On the firm level, Colby et al. (1995) confirm the strategic importance of timing. They 
argued that the right timing in responding to environmental regulation is critical to the 
success of enterprises, as firms have to decide which strategy they want to pursue. On 
the one hand, being the first out of the blocks with a new process, product, or 
technology may confer an advantage in the form of favourable customer perception or 
the chance to shape regulation. On the other hand, being first could also be expensive, 
with competitors quickly following along the learning curve. There was also the risk of 
governments failing to reward successful innovators, or even putting them at a 
disadvantage. For this reason, Colby et al. (1995) argue that it made sense for firms to 
be opportunistic by leapfrogging a competitor just after it makes a major capital 
commitment into new technologies.
According to the findings of Maglia and Sassoon (1999), strictly economic factors such 
as productivity and the cost of labour, go a long way to explaining the lack of 
competitiveness of chemical industries. They also assert that lagging chemical 
industries cannot afford additional burdens in terms of industry regulation. Hence, they 
seem to dismiss the notion of leapfrogging.
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2.2.2.2 Environmental regulation and barriers to market entry
Conventional economic wisdom implies that the costs connected to environmental 
regulation, for example pollution abatement expenditures, reduce polluters’ profits. 
However, Stigler (1971) was one of the first to argue that regulation could be sought by 
industry because it constituted a barrier to entry. The implication of this hypothesis is 
that compliance costs should in some way increase economic rents. In response to this 
notion, a number of subsequent studies examine Stigler’s contention, among them 
Jordon (1972), Neumann and Nelson (1982), and Bartel and Thomas (1985).
The evidence from these contributions, which were typically event studies of a single 
regulation or a subset of regulations, appears inconclusive. Some studies have 
concluded that compliance costs resulting from technology regulation could create 
barriers to entry and scarcity rents, others have reached the opposite conclusion. In the 
case of environmental regulation, Helland and Matsuno (2003) note that even authors 
examining the same regulatory event have reached opposite conclusions. For instance, 
this was the case with regard to the contributions of Pashigian (1984; 1986) versus 
Evans (1986), as well as to the studies of Maloney and McCormick (1982) versus 
Hughes et al. (1986).
Dean et al. (2000) estimate the effect of environmental regulations on the formation of 
small manufacturing establishments. Their results suggest that a greater intensity of 
environmental regulation is associated with fewer small business formations. Since 
there are no apparent effects on the formation of large establishments, Dean et al. 
conclude that environmental regulations put small entrants at a unit cost disadvantage.
Helland and Matsuno (2003) examine the impact of compliance costs of economic 
profits, using data of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency on environmental 
compliance costs at industry level. Their results indicate that compliance expenditures 
create or increase rents for larger firms in an industry by increasing the barriers to entry. 
Helland and Matsuno note that these results are consistent with the theoretical 
prediction that economic profits are created when economies of scale in pollution 
abatement are coupled with restrictions on output due to environmental standards.
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Empirical findings on the competitiveness and environmental behaviour of the pulp and 
paper industry in India published by Pradhan and Barik (1999) seem to point in the 
same direction. Before the background of lax environmental regulation in India, 
Pradhan and Barik observe that the Indian pulp and paper industry shows signs of 
weakening competing capacity, as it is characterised by a declining technical change 
and diseconomies of scale. This tendency gives an upper hand to rivals in the 
international market. Pradhan and Barik argue that, for these reasons, the industry is 
facing profitability constraints, which prevent it from switching to cleaner technologies. 
In consequence, the industry’s pollution level as well as the use of other material 
continues to be high. Overall, this study appears to show that the lack of appropriate 
environmental regulation may lower the barriers to market entry, and that this was taken 
advantage of by the international competitors of the Indian pulp and paper industry.
Dooley and Fryxell (1999) as well as Hitchens (1999) contribute another view to the 
notion that larger firms could be more capable of complying with higher environmental 
standards than their competitors. Based on an empirical study about the diversification 
of U.S. corporations and the pollution intensity of their subsidiaries, Dooley and Fryxell
(1999) report that chemical plants which were owned by more broadly diversified 
parents pollute on average more than facilities that were owned by more focused 
companies. This could lead to the conclusion that not only the size of firms plays a role 
in determining their capacity to reduce pollution, but also their strategic focus.
It should be noted that a very similar case of establishing entry barriers could also be 
made at macroeconomic level. Modelling the linkages between trade and environmental 
policies, Copeland (2000) states that countries, which import pollution intensive goods, 
may have an incentive to try to link trade agreements with environmental agreements. 
By doing so, they could establish barriers to the entry of the other country’s good into 
their markets. On the other hand, countries that export pollution-intensive goods have 
an incentive to prevent just that -  by trying to obtain binding commitments to free trade 
prior to negotiations over global pollution.
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Lastly, Innes and Bial (2002) introduce the notion of rewarding successful innovators 
by raising their competitors’ costs. Such “post-innovation benefits” could take the form 
of the government adopting the new innovation as the benchmark standard, and to put a 
penalty on all competitors that do not comply with it. Innes and Bial argue that such a 
strategy would introduce efficient incentives for environmental R&D without directly 
taxing or subsidising research.
In conclusion, both theoretical as well as empirical literature seems to point out the 
importance of environmental regulation in the creation of market barriers. Most 
contributions note that established and larger enterprises would gain from 
environmental regulation vis-a-vis their smaller competitors or newcomers on the 
market.
2.2.23 Environmental taxes and the economy
One important strand in the economic literature investigates the interactions between 
environmental policies and the tax system. Surveys on this strand of literature were 
carried out, among others, by Goulder (1995), Oates (1995), Bovenberg and Goulder 
(1998), as well as Parry and Oates (1998).
The theoretical basis of environmental taxation was laid by Arthur Cecil Pigou (1920), 
who introduced the notion of corrective taxes. The Pigouvian theory of taxation, which 
emerges in a discussion on spillover effects that impose costs on non-transacting 
parties, stipulates that appropriately designed taxes could limit polluting behaviour 
while minimizing social costs. However, Pigou later stated that, although corrective 
taxes seemed good in theory, they would not work in practice. He argued that 
environmental taxes were not likely to be set according to their environmental logic, but 
rather for other reasons (Pigou 1938; 1960). Ciocirlan and Yandle (2003) develop this 
notion further and show, based on a political economy model using OECD data, that 
policymakers do not commonly set taxes with a specific concern for the environment 
but that their primary focus is to generate revenue.
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One notion that often forms the basis for investigations on environmental taxes is the 
so-called “double dividend’ hypothesis, which states that environmental taxes may 
simultaneously improve the environment and reduce the economic cost of the tax 
system. The latter effect could seem plausible if revenues from environment-related 
taxes were used to reduce the rates of pre-existing taxes that distort labour and capital 
markets (Parry and Bento 1999; Bye 2002).
Besides the obvious benefit this strategy could bring to labour market, there are some 
additional benefits from environmental taxes that are, in some studies, overlooked. For 
example, Eskeland (2000b) mentions the benefit of environmental protection to 
industrial producers, such as less polluted water sources for brewers, or less congested 
roads for trucks. Not surprisingly, policy makers have been quick in picking-up the 
notion of a double dividend, as it appears to solve a number of hot political issues, like 
unemployment, competitiveness and taxation, at the same time (for example, European 
Commission 1997; 2000).
There are a number of studies that have investigated the conditions under which the 
double dividend hypothesis could hold. They depart from the notion that the hypothesis, 
in its pure form, ignores an important source of interaction between environmental taxes 
and the pre-existing taxes. Since environmental taxes cause the costs and prices of 
products to rise, they tend to discourage labour supply and investment. By doing so, 
environmental taxes exacerbate the efficiency cost associated with tax distortions in 
labour and capital markets. Only if the distortions in the pre-existing tax system are 
high, the introduction of environmental taxes can be a leverage to improve welfare -  
even without considering the improvement in environmental quality (Felder and 
Schleininger 2000).
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Analysing the effect of hazardous waste disposal taxes on employment growth in 
industries that generate hazardous waste in the United States, Levinson (2000) shows 
that such taxes did not impose large employment losses. He notes that this finding was 
in line with most existing literature, but disagrees with the common explanations for 
this lack of measurable economic consequences. Typically, contributions put this down 
to the fact that (1) measures of environmental stringency were poorly quantified, (2) 
compliance costs were modest, (3) variance in compliance costs among jurisdictions 
was small, and (4) cross-section data were insufficient to explore the consequences of 
increasingly stringent standards. Levinson refutes some of these explanations and 
argues that the most compelling explanation left appeared to be that pollution-intensive 
industries are also those that are the least geographically footloose. In this case, 
environmental authorities would find themselves in the favourable position of being 
able to tax the most pollution-intensive industries at the highest rates without worrying 
about capital or labour flight to competing jurisdictions (Levinson 2000: 362).
Therefore, aside from this case, the cost from this so-called tax interaction or tax 
shifting effect might dominate any efficiency benefits from recycling environmental tax 
revenues in other tax reductions. In consequence, an environmental tax reform might 
typically increase rather than decrease the efficiency costs of pre-existing tax 
distortions. Other contributions that found theoretical or empirical evidence to limit the 
applicability of double dividend hypothesis, include Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), 
Kennedy and Laplante (1995; 2000), Bovenberg (1998), de Mooij and Bovenberg
(1998), Ligthart and van der Ploeg (1999), and Eskeland (2000a).
Goodstein (2002) questions the existence of a tax interaction effect altogether. 
Moreover, Goodstein (2003) points out that the entire double dividend debate has so far 
been held within a relatively small circle of environmental economists, arguing that 
their finding are largely uncontested due to a lack of critical mass in the research arena.
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Highlighting the possibility that environmental tax may do bad rather than good, Oates 
and Schwab (1988) consider the joint determination of a tax rate on capital, and the 
appropriate level environmental quality. In their model, a tax on capital is used to raise 
revenue to finance public goods and as a distortion factor. The nature of the tax 
competition in their model is a capital relocation externality; in other words, capital is 
assumed to move to untaxed regions. Based on the model, Oates and Schwab predict 
too few public goods and too low a level of environmental quality relative to the first- 
best optimum.
Using industry-level data regarding four heavily polluting industries, Morgenstem et al.
(2001) show that increased environmental spending did not generally cause a significant 
change in employment levels. They concluded that their data did not support the notion 
of a jobs-versus-the-environment trade-off.
Parry et al. (2003) compare the importance of environmental taxation to policies that 
foster technological innovation by investigating whether welfare gains from 
technological innovation that reduce future abatement costs were larger or smaller than 
welfare gains from optimal pollution control. Modelling welfare gains from innovation 
under a variety of scenarios, Parry et al. argue that such gains depended on three key 
factors: the initially optimal level of abatement, the speed at which innovation reduces 
future abatement costs, and the discount rate. Their analysis shows that welfare gains 
from innovation are in most cases less than the ‘Pigouvian’ welfare gains. Only when 
innovation was assumed to reduce abatement costs substantially and quickly, and when 
the initially optimal abatement level was fairly modest, welfare gains from innovation 
resulted to be greater than from optimal pollution control.
In conclusion, based on the notion of ‘Pigouvian’ taxes, theory holds that some forms of 
taxation have the potential to limit pollution. There also seems to be some theoretical 
basis for the existence of a double dividend. Empirical studies on those issues have not 
produced a coherent picture on the validity of both theories.
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2.3 Environmental competition
Once we have established that there may be a range of basic relationships between 
environmental performance and economic activity, the mental leap towards 
environmental competition appears relatively minor. The following section presents a 
range of theories that reflect the links between the environment and economy by 
‘translating’ them into the logic of competitive advantage analysis.
2.3.1 The trade-off between pollution performance and industrial production
Economic literature highlights the trade-off between economic production and pollution 
performance. A first group of contributions in this field establish the theoretical 
foundation of this relationship. For example, Ayres and Kneese (1969) show that 
pollution is inherent to the production and the consumption of an economy. Their study 
points at a trade-off between production and consumption on the one hand, and 
pollution on the other hand.
Elaborating on this basic link, a number of studies assessed its implications. If higher 
production levels implied increased pollution, environmental regulation that succeeds to 
improve the pollution performance of countries should be expected to affect production 
values negatively.
The issue has gained considerable prominence, since the expected negative impact of 
pollution reduction goals laid down in the Kyoto Protocol was one reason for the U.S. 
administration to withdraw from the process. Isolating that effect, literature on 
technological change seems to show that the cost of pollution abatement could be quite 
significant.
Focussing on the CO2 reduction goals laid down in the Kyoto protocol, Weynant and 
Hill (1999) estimate that the potential losses in terms of GDP among industrialised 
nations -  United States, Canada, Japan, the EU, Australia and New Zealand -  add up to 
approximately 1 percent. In other words, industrialised countries would have to ‘pay’ 
one percent of their GDP to meet the CO2 targets Stipulated in the Kyoto Protocol. A 
later study by Khanna (2001) estimated considerably higher GDP losses in the region of 
approximately 6 percent in average.
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As one might expect, other studies vehemently contested those findings. Krause et al. 
(2002) argue that most studies on the effects of air pollution reduction schemes had 
omitted important cost-reducing policy options. As a result of this, the cost estimates 
that those studies had produced were far too pessimistic. To reason their point, Krause 
et al. put forward the following cost-reducing policy options: emission cap and trading 
programmes, productivity-enhancing market reforms, technology programmes, and tax 
cuts financed from permit auction revenues. The analysis of Krause et al. concludes that 
an integrated least-cost strategy for mitigating greenhouse gas emissions in the United 
States would produce an annual net output gain of roughly 0.4 percent of GDP by 2010 
and of about 0.9 percent in 2020.
In conclusion, economic theory puts forward the notion of a positive link between 
production and pollution levels. The basic notion appears to be widely accepted in the 
literature. However, some contributions argue that while the implied trade-off between 
production and pollution performance may be right, calculations on the potential 
economic loss due to pollution reduction may fall short of covering all economic 
implications.
2.3.2 The impact of environmental regulation on trade
Economists have become aware about the importance of environmental issues primarily 
since the 1970s when many industrialised countries began introducing significant 
environmental control programmes (Bailey 1993). One of the main branches of 
economics that have dealt with environmental considerations was the trade arena.
Because disputes about the linkages between trade and the environment have intensified 
over the last decades, the relationship between environmental standards and trade has 
become an issue at the forefront of policy debate. One example of this were the 
profound differences among the participants of the World Trade Organization Meeting 
in Seattle in 1999 over the issue whether trade agreements should be linked to 
international environmental standard regimes. The dispute could not be resolved, and 
could be considered one of the reasons that led to the failure of the meeting (Wilson et 
al. 2002).
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The basic theory
Grubel (1975) modified the Heckscher-Ohlin model, which states that each country has 
a comparative advantage in the good which is relatively intense in the use of the 
country’s relatively abundant factor. The altered model reveals that if environmental 
costs are not reflected in the domestic production of commodities in the trading 
countries, it will increase the production of goods, which would normally be imported, 
and decrease the production of exports. In other words, by not reflecting environmental 
costs one would distort the market and thus impede trade.
Theories of international trade that build on the Ricardian model (cfi, Blanchard 1997; 
Jayadevappa and Chhatre 2000) use natural resources or climate as potential 
determinants of labour productivity. Such models understand productivity as a function 
of production factors. Some models include environmental variables as production 
factors, like the factor proportion model, which frequently incorporated natural resource 
inputs under the composite heading ‘land’.
One fundamental concept of environmental economics is the notion of an environmental 
externality. An externality exists whenever the welfare of some agent depends not only 
on his or her activities but also on activities under the control of some other agent for 
which he is not monetarily compensated (Tietenberg 2000). The concept applies to 
many environment-related issues. For example, some agents such as polluting industries 
use environmental resources, which in turn may have impact on the welfare of others.
General equilibrium analysis
Studies which use the general equilibrium framework to investigate the determination 
of output take a look at the equilibrium of all three markets, i.e. goods, financial and 
labour (Blanchard 1997). From their perspective, one important question regarding 
pollution control measures is whether the reduction in potential output induced by them 
is symmetrical between trading sectors or not. If the impact of pollution control was 
relatively neutral, a country’s comparative advantage would remain unchanged, 
although the volume and the gains from trade may decline. In effect, the terms of trade 
remain the same while the price of goods increases (Jayadevappa and Chhatre 2000).
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When the impact of pollution control is asymmetrical, the mix of tradable goods would 
be expected to change (Jayadevappa and Chhatre 2000). Capital intensive trade sectors 
should be expected to suffer from expensive environmental control measures more than 
labour intensive trade sectors. The models predict that the volume and gains of trade 
decline more in the capital intensive sectors than in labour intensive branches. 
Therefore, resource diversions into environmental control activities may lead to reduced 
output and consumption of tradable goods. Besides an overall reduction in trade, this 
development would imply a real cost of environmental control to society.
Walter (1974b) shows through a general equilibrium model that environmental costs 
could be increased by demand for environmental quality, and that they would draw 
resources away from exports and imports. As a result, trade declines while the 
production and consumption of environmentally friendlier goods would increase.
Blackhurst (1977) puts forward the notion of environmental assimilative capacity 
(EAC), which is defined as the demand for aesthetic and recreational services which 
also considers the nature’s capacity to absorb waste and the physical endowment. As a 
result, this demand would trigger a flow of environment-related services. The demand 
may vary across nations, since the EAC, the natural endowment of countries, and the 
value accorded to the environment might differ between them (Siebert 1992). Therefore, 
environmental policy of one country could affect the environmental quality in another 
country through specialisation and trade. It should be noted, however, that some studies 
on the impact of EAC on the pattern of trade could not confirm this line of argument 
(Pething 1976).
The impact o f increased trade on the environment
The existing literature provides no conclusive picture regarding the impact of trade on 
the environment (Bhagwati 1993; Daly 1993; French 1993; Jayadevappa and Chhatre 
2000). On the one hand, proponents of a negative impact of trade on the environment 
argue that trade damages natural resources both with regard to stocks as well as to on­
going pollution. Other scholars contend that trade could also have positive effect on the 
environment.
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A standard assertion of trade theory holds that trade enhances economic development. 
Applying this notion to the environment, one may argue that through trade-derived 
income, environmental technologies and management systems could be disseminated. 
Furthermore, trade could provide incentives for more stringent environmental standards, 
and may have the potential to enhance environmental harmonisation among countries. 
For example, using a three dimensional trade model to analyse the effects of pollution 
reduction, Koo (1979) concludes that trade would increase real income, and that some 
of these gains may be in the form of cleaner environment.
Copeland and Taylor (1994) look at the linkage between national income, pollution and 
trade. They show that income gains from trade do affect pollution levels. Free trade, 
they argued, raised real income, but also changed the composition of national output 
and therefore alters the incidence and level of pollution. If the pattern of trade-induced 
specialisation was driven only by differences in pollution policy, then aggregate world 
pollution might rise with trade. If income levels differed between countries, free trade 
would increase world pollution (Copeland and Taylor 1995).
In a later study, Copeland and Taylor (1997) contend that under certain circumstances, 
free trade would increase pollution while reducing real income. Such an observation, 
they argued, would prove their trade-induced environmental degradation hypothesis.
Free trade and the environment
As Jayadevappa and Chhatre (2000) point out, a number of arguments in the literature 
have the potential to weaken the argument for free trade, as they appear to show that 
suitable tariffs might improve world resource allocation. This notion is of course a 
source of controversy.
Some contributions, like the study of d'Arge and Kneese (1972), contend that measures 
to control trade in order to protect the environment did not have significant effects on 
the long-term comparative advantage or efficiency of trading partners nor on the 
balance of payments or domestic incomes in the short term.
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Others, like Anderson and Blackhurst (1992), point out that trade liberalisation may 
have distinct effects on the environmental quality of countries, depending on the size of 
the countries and the trade pattern in which pollution intensive goods are imported and 
exported. They show that industrial countries’ environmental standards have 
implications for poorer countries that engage in trade. If both the production as well as 
the consumption of a good causes pollution, appropriate environmental policies could 
improve welfare and environmental quality when the small country opens for trade. On 
the other hand, Anderson and Blackhurst also argue that in such a situation any trade 
intervention to abate pollution would reduce welfare.
However, if industrial countries produce pollution intensive goods for which there are 
competing imported goods, unilaterally introduced environmental standards would 
improve the terms of trade for poorer countries. As a result, the production of pollution 
intensive goods would be moved from richer to poorer economies, provided that capital 
is internationally mobile.
Conventional trade models suggest that unilateral environmental regulation, or 
harmonisation of environmental regulation, may be damaging to trade performance 
(Ulph 1997; 1998). Ulph notes that, in a textbook trade model of a small open economy 
with a welfare maximising government and no other distortions, national governments 
would wish to pursue free trade and full internalisation of externalities, such as 
environmental damages. If countries were different in terms of endowments of natural 
resources or in terms of their preferences regarding environmental quality, 
harmonisation of environmental policies would be undesirable because it would prevent 
the operation of environmental comparative advantages.
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Ulph (1998) highlights two possible reasons for governments to manipulate their 
environmental policies. First, governments may engage in what Ulph calls ‘strategic 
trade’. If markets are imperfectly competitive, and governments cannot use trade 
instruments, then they will have incentives to alter their environmental policies to gain a 
strategic trade advantage. This practice could, but does not necessarily need to, result in 
environmental dumping. The second reason is in line with concepts of political 
economy, which are based on the notion that governments might not seek to maximise 
welfare but rather maximise a utility function which may include social welfare but also 
reflect the influence of special interest groups. In the context of the European Union and 
based on an endogenous-policy model, Bommer (1996) argues that European 
integration and policy harmonisation make downward competition of national 
environmental standards unlikely.
Interestingly, Schneider and Wellisch (1997) show that ‘the opposite of ecological 
dumping’ may occur as well. Based on a model with international capital mobility and 
local pollution, they argue that in some cases local welfare maximising governments 
may have an incentive to discriminate against polluting industries. This assertion holds 
when the implicit factor reward on pollution, which is the monetary gain from 
exploiting the competitive advantage due to ecological dumping, leaves the country 
because it accrues to foreign owners of mobile capital.
Harris et al. (2002) note that most empirical studies have concluded that the 
contribution of environmental costs to the overall production costs is still very marginal. 
In consequence, they argue that environmental policies have hardly any effect on 
comparative advantage patterns and thus on foreign trade. Ferrer-i-Carbonell et al. 
(2000) estimate the impact of environment-related taxes on prices for energy and 
transport. Their study shows that the demand for energy and transport are generally 
inelastic. The price elasticity was found to be significantly different from zero but 
smaller than 1. That means that a 1 percent increase of prices would lead to a reduction 
in demand of less than 1 percent. In the long run, however, the reduction appeared to be 
larger because economic agents have a wider range of options available for responding, 
such as new techniques, reorganisation, relocation or shifting to other goods or services.
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The notion of environmental costs being marginal was challenged by Beers and van den 
Bergh (1997) who reports that stricter environmental regulation has some negative 
impact on bilateral trade flows between OECD countries. Jayadevappa and Chhatre
(2000) reinforce this argument by stating that the trade and environment literature 
indicates that when a country eliminates some of its internal pollution, it has to allocate 
the required resources. Such measures shift productive capabilities from internationally 
tradable goods to goods that cannot be traded. As a result, in the presence of pollution 
control, import and export levels are expected to be lower than the level they would 
otherwise be.
However, a considerable part of the literature appears not to have found support for 
either of the above mentioned approaches. Jaffe et al. (1995), as well as Harris et al.
(2002), argue that only few studies have produced evidence that environmental 
regulations or control costs could significantly explain the pattern of trade between 
countries. Hence they contend that environmental costs appear to have no real impact, 
neither negative nor positive, on foreign trade.
2.3.3 Competitive advantages in trade through environmental externalities
Siebert (1974) shows that a country which is richly endowed with the resource 
‘environment’ will export commodities with a high pollution content. His study also 
found that the relative abundance or scarcity of environment between countries was a 
determinant of price differences between them. Therefore, environmental factors could 
define comparative advantage of countries through environmental endowment.
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In the same spirit, Siebert (1992) analyses the interaction between national 
environmental endowment and competitiveness. He argued that a country with fewer 
environmental attributes would export less pollution-intensive commodities and vice 
versa. His analysis shows that a small country lacking environmental protection 
measures would produce more pollution-intensive commodities, and that the state of the 
country’s environment would decline as a result. However, if the country put 
environmental measures into place, its competitiveness in pollution-intensive 
commodities would decline. This would lead to a reduction in exports of pollution 
intensive commodities and overall trade.
Interestingly, Siebert also argues that the same set of premises led to different results if 
the observed country was large. In this case, after protection measures are implemented 
the comparative advantage of the large country would be reduced. This could result in 
decreasing exports of high-pollution goods, which in turn may lead to an increase in the 
price of the polluting commodity on the world market.
Bommer (1999) investigates the question whether relocation was always caused by 
reduced competitiveness at home. Using a signalling approach, Bommer shows that 
industrial relocation may happen for purely strategic reasons. Some of the results in the 
study were rather surprising, for instance the finding that the probability of strategic 
capital flight increased with the amount of capital in question. Even more counter­
intuitive, Bommer concluded that strong environmental interest groups helped to avoid 
strategic relocation, as their presence raised the cost of strategic ambitions. This is 
because environmental interest group pressure makes ‘dirty’ technology, which 
Bommer holds necessary for mimicking, less attractive than other technology available.
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2.3.4 Spatial implications of the environment-economy trade-off: location theory
A number of literature contributions use partial equilibrium models to assess the short- 
and long-run effects of environmental externalities on trade. Taking air pollution as 
example, Baumol (1971) and Baumol and Oates (1988) argue that less developed 
countries may specialise in pollution intensive products in anticipation of economic 
growth. This strategy could increase their exports without adding to their employment 
or real earnings.
Through trade, environmentally harmful production may be transferred to countries 
with relatively lax environmental standards, so-called pollution haven countries. 
Contributions by Pething (1976), Siebert (1977), Yohe (1979) and McGuire (1982), put 
forward the theoretical arguments which provide a framework for the so-called 
pollution haven hypothesis. This notion states that countries may receive economic 
gains in exchange for the degradation or depletion of their natural resources. The 
argument therefore implies that trade undercuts existing environmental protection laws. 
Furthermore, trade issues would also affect the design and functioning of international 
environmental agreements.
By modelling non-cooperative games between regions, Markusen et al. (1993) 
demonstrate that environmental policy could determine plant location and market 
structure. Ulph (1994) extends the model, and shows that the importance of 
environmental policy in terms of its impact on location decisions appeared much greater 
than in earlier estimates. Competition between the two governments in the game to 
restrict pollution will result in highly restrictive policies and low levels of pollution and 
trade. Ulph and Valentini (1997) show that under certain circumstances, environmental 
regulation can affect relocation decisions of industries between countries. In a later 
article, Ulph and Valentini (2001) note that competition for location could not generally 
be presumed to lead to greater environmental dumping than competition for market 
share with fixed locations. Thus, competition between non-cooperative governments 
can be greater when legislators set environmental policies after firms decide where to 
locate.
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There are two basic approaches to trace the link between the stringency of 
environmental standards and industry location. One concept evolves around pollution 
havens and the notion of industrial flight from areas with stringent environmental 
regulation. The other approach is the industrial specialisation hypothesis, which centres 
on investigating whether environmental regulation influences foreign direct investment 
decisions (Wilson et al. 2002).
In a theoretical context, Wilson (1996), Ulph (1997), Rauscher (1994; 1997), and List 
and Mason (2001), among others, present a number of scenarios under which local 
environmental regulations may reasonably race to the bottom. Fundamental to these 
theoretical models is the assumption that capital flows respond adversely to more 
stringent environmental regulations (Jeppesen et al. 2002). Cumberland (1979; 1981) 
considers governmental strategies under the assumption of pure competition to alter 
environmental standards, arguing that regions are likely to relax them to attract 
industry. He concludes that this competition would result in too low a level of 
environmental quality.
In the context of developing countries, Wheeler (2001) challenges the notion of 
environmental legislators racing to the bottom for five reasons. First, pollution control 
was not a critical cost factor for most private firms. Second, low income communities 
penalised dangerous polluters even when formal regulation was weak or absent. Third, 
rising income strengthened regulation. Fourth, local businesses controlled pollution 
because pollution abatement reduces costs. Fifth, large multinational firms generally 
adhered to OECD environmental standards in their developing-country operations.
Markusen et al. (1995) develop a two-region model under conditions of imperfect 
competition. They conclude that if  the disutility resulting from industry pollution was 
high enough, the two regions would compete by increasing their environmental taxes or 
standards until the polluting firm was driven from the market. Alternatively, if  the 
disutility from pollution was not as great, the regions will usually compete by 
undercutting each other’s pollution tax rates.
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However, empirical studies have produced mixed evidence regarding the notion of 
pollution havens. Tobey (1990) reports that a qualitative variable describing the 
stringency of environmental controls in 23 countries failed to contribute to net exports 
of the five most pollution intensive commodities. Low and Yeats (1992) conclude that 
on the one hand pollution-intensive industries account for a large and growing share of 
exports in the total manufacture of exports in some developing countries between 1965 
and 1988. On the other hand, however, they note that this share decreased in developed 
countries. The studies of Xu (1999; 2000) focus on bilateral trade and environmental 
standards. They find no evidence that a country with stricter environmental standards 
had lower exports of pollution-intensive goods.
Walter (1974a) and Leonhard (1988) also find little evidence to support the assertion 
that pollution costs have influenced location decisions of multinational firms. Based on 
firm-level data on location choice and pollution abatement costs in the United States, 
Levinson (1996) indicates that there was limited evidence of industry flight towards 
pollution havens. One reason for this appeared to be the fact that firms which had plants 
in several U.S. states followed the most stringent environmental regulation in all 
locations. Markusen (1997) concludes that stringent environmental regulations would 
give multinational companies little incentive either to increase production or to relocate.
In the context of India, Mani et al. (1997) argue against the hypothesis that businesses 
might choose locations in response to differences in the stringency of environmental 
regulation across jurisdictions. Looking at the investment patterns of multinational 
corporations in four developing countries, Eskeland and Harrison (1997) find almost no 
evidence that investors in developing countries are fleeing environmental costs at home. 
Instead, they noted that their evidence suggests that foreign-owned plants are less 
polluting than comparable domestic plants.
By contrast, Henderson (1996; 1997), Gray (1997), Kahn (1997), Keller and Levinson
(1999), as well as Becker and Henderson (2000) report much stronger evidence in 
favour of the hypothesis that environmental regulation affects the location of new firms. 
Coefficients of the environmental regulation variables were often significant and 
negative. For instance, in Henderson (1996), the two measures of environmental 
regulation are significant and negative in seven out of nine regression models.
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Lucas et al. (1990) suggest that the implementation of progressively strict 
environmental regulation in OECD countries may have led to significant migration of 
pollution intensive industries. In a study that investigated industry location decisions of 
new firms in West Virginia, List et al. (1990) show that regulatory expenditures per 
manufacturer and location decisions were inversely related. This finding was confirmed 
in a later study by List and Co (1999). The investigation of Smarzynska and Wei (2001) 
also produces supporting evidence for the industry flight hypothesis using a firm-level 
dataset for 25 transition economies.
Finally, some literature contributions provide possible explanations for the inconclusive 
empirical picture. Gray (1997) notes that empirical evidence of industrial flight towards 
pollution havens was less clear than one might expect. He argued that one reason might 
be that firms generally want to locate in large markets, yet polluted areas may exactly 
offer the opposite, i.e., shrinking markets. In consequence firms may rather be driven 
away from pollution havens than attracted to them.
Grossman and Krueger (1992; 1993) argue that one of the reasons for the difficulties in 
finding statistical evidence that supports the notion of pollution havens or industrial 
specialisation may lie in the fact that are overshadowed by a number of dominant 
determinants. They conclude that endowments like physical and human capital, or 
investments are much more powerful factors in determining a country’s trade pattern. 
From their meta-analysis of 11 empirical studies, Jeppesen et al. (2002) note that 
foreign firms investing in the United States appear to be more influenced by 
environmental regulation than their domestic counterparts.
Emphasising the policy implications of the debate in a study about the effects of 
environmental regulation in regional and global context, McGuire (1982) concludes that 
concerning local environmental damage, relocation of polluting industries was desirable 
from an efficiency standpoint. Differential regulations transfer polluting production to 
regions of low utility cost. The study also found that for inter-country pollution, 
unilateral regulation was inefficient and ineffective.
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Wilson et al. (2002) show that, if country heterogeneity was accounted for, more 
stringent environmental standards may imply lower net exports. They argue that 
environmental regulation could therefore affect export competition. Based on their 
results, they argue that the so-called industrial specialisation hypothesis appeared to 
hold, according to which lax environmental standards could lead to specialisation in 
pollution-intensive industries by creating greater accessibility for industries to air and 
water resources.
In conclusion, a number of contributions seem to support the theoretical notion of a 
direct link between pollution performance and the reduction of competitive advantages 
in trade. Further theoretical extensions on this link established that, in consequence, 
location decisions of firms could be affected. However, the empirical evidence on the 
issue appears mixed and inconclusive.
2.3.5 Synergies between environmental performance and regional development
Regional embeddedness
Golub (1998a) argues that society, governments and private sector actors could 
mutually benefit from environmental performance, as strong environmental regulation 
would strengthen the competitiveness both of the regions and of the enterprises (Porter 
1991; Dooley and Fryxell 1999). By applying the best available techniques for the 
environment, firms could both improve the quality as well as the efficiency of their 
production, because they would strive to produce their goods by using as few natural 
resources as possible. Furthermore, firms could publicly show their commitment to the 
welfare of the region. In other words, through their commitment to environmental 
performance, private sector actors could demonstrate their regional embeddedness 
(Grabher 1993).
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Regional development agencies should support this creation of environmental 
partnerships by explaining and propagating the mutual benefits of environmentally 
sensitive ways of doing business to the private sector (Perrons 1992; Gibbs 1998; Swain 
and Hardy 1998). If the flow of information was efficient and mutual trust contributed 
to the creation of a common agenda between all parties involved, enterprises might be 
convinced that regionally responsible action could indeed be beneficial for their 
business perspectives. Granovetter (1985) argues that firms could thus be encouraged to 
alter their business philosophy in such a way that “economic action must also be seen as 
social action”.
Welford and Gouldson (1993) develop this idea further. They claim that the 
implementation of integrated environmental management systems could be a means 
towards the creation of a comparative regional advantage. Such a management system 
could consist of a negotiated and mutually agreed set of policy instruments, such as 
environmental taxes, pollution control, and the institutionalised exchange of 
environmentally relevant information. It may be based on co-operation and mutual 
commitment of both the private and the public actors, who would jointly set up a 
regional environmental partnership (Biekart 1998). According Biekart, regions and 
firms could both profit from this scheme, since environmental management systems 
would contribute to ensure high environmental and product quality standards. This 
advantage could also be marketed, through the environmental certification or regional 
branding of the goods produced (Taschner 1998; Golub 1998b).
Ecological modernisation
Approaching environmental competition from the perspective of economic and societal 
development, the theory of ecological modernisation goes one step further. This concept 
is discussed, among others, by Simonis (1989), Spaargaren and Mol (1991), Weale 
(1992), Janicke (1992), Gouldson and Murphy (1996), Hajer (1996), and Janicke et al. 
(1997).
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Its basic notion suggests that policies for economic development and environmental 
protection can be combined with synergistic effect. Hence ecological modernisation 
promotes the application of stringent environmental policies as a positive influence on 
economic efficiency and technological innovation. This argument challenges the neo­
classical idea of an ecological market failure.
Economic theory suggests that without government intervention the lack o f  a 
regime o f clear and enforceable property rights leads to the over-exploitation o f  
common property resources and the under-provision o f  public goods. In seeking 
to prescribe an economically efficient response to market failure, the suitability o f  
various policy instruments in different situations is continually assessed. 
However, while neo-classical economics suggests that market failure is at the root 
o f environmental degradation, many political theorists suggest that it is the 
combined inability o f  the market to allocate environmental resources efficiently 
and o f the government to respond efficiently that is to blame (see, for example, 
Panayotou 1992).[...]
Notwithstanding the importance o f market and government failures, modern 
economies cannot be characterized by such an obvious division between the 
market economy on the one hand and the regulating state bureaucracy on the 
other hand. Instead, blame for the impacts o f market and government failure is 
more accurately ascribed to the failings o f  those alliances between the common 
interests o f industry and government that direct the formulation o f policy (see 
Janicke 1986). Consequently, it is neither the failure o f  the market nor o f  
government but the failure o f the state (meaning the bureaucracy-industry 
complex) that is at the root o f the environmental malaise (see Anderson 1994).
Gouldson and Murphy (1996: 12)
Proponents of the ecological modernisation theory argue that it is ultimately the 
institutional, technological, and cultural inertia that restricts the ability of the state to 
correct this market and government failure, and thus to adopt proactive environmental 
policies. To overcome this inertia, they put forward a number of ‘policy themes’. First, 
governments should intervene to combine environment and economy for further 
economic development. Second, environmental policy goals should be integrated into 
other policy areas. Third, alternative and innovative policy measures should be 
explored. And finally, the invention, innovation and diffusion of new clean technologies 
would be essential.
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Gouldson and Murphy (1996) note that, in order to achieve these themes, state and 
market institutions need a driver causing a wish to address the issue (problem pressure), 
the capacity for innovation in both state and market institutions (innovative capacity), 
and the ability to strongly institutionalise environmental policy over a long period 
(strategic capacity).
There are empirical studies in support of the notion of ecological modernisation. For 
example, based on an analysis about the impact of pollution regulation on technological 
innovations, Simila (2002) highlights the importance of environmental regulation to 
foster the diffusion of innovations, particularly with respect to end-of-pipe technologies.
The literature around ecological modernisation theory appears to provide a basis to 
support the claim that economic development may be linked with less pollution. 
Considering that the concept of ecological modernisation is based on the notion of 
socio-economic development, one might argue that this theory is quite independent 
from conventional Environmental Kuznets Curve theories.
In conclusion, there appear to be two distinct theoretical bases that put forward the 
notion of a positive link between the economic or socio-economic development state 
and the pollution performance of a country. The majority of empirical contributions on 
the issue, however, seem to cast some doubt on the validity of this claim.
2.4 Concluding remarks
One of the objectives of chapter 2 was to illustrate that there is no overarching or 
unifying theory on the economic or welfare cost of pollution performance. Looking at 
the example of climate change politics, Bernard and Vielle note that
Measuring the welfare cost o f climate change policies is a real challenge, raising 
difficult issues o f micro- and macro-economics: cost benefit analysis on the one 
hand, foreign trade and international specialisation on the second hand. At the 
domestic level the possible existence o f distortions, in particular in the fiscal 
system, may either increase or alleviate the welfare cost o f  a climate change 
policy, as illustrated by the debate on “double dividend”.
Bernard and Vielle (2003: 199)
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The second goal of this chapter was to present a line of argument that ends with the 
insight that environmental competition is theoretically possible, and indeed to be 
expected if regulators behave rationally by seeking competitive advantages over each 
other.
The following points present a summary of some theoretical predictions which concern 
the impact of strong pollution performance on economic performance. In order to see 
how well these predictions fit with our empirical findings, we will return to them at the 
end of this study.
• Pollution reduction is linked to a fall in production. This prediction is based 
on the notion that pollution is inherent to economic production and 
consumption.
• Pollution reduction narrows the scope to exploit competitive advantages.
This prediction is based on notions put forward by theories around 
environmental externalities and trade.
• Pollution reduction is indirectly associated with the creation of barriers to 
market entry. This prediction is based on the idea that rents from 
environmental regulation may be unevenly distributed among competing 
industries or firms.
• Pollution reduction is indirectly associated with the creation of 
employment. This prediction is based on the notion of a double dividend 
resulting from pollution taxes, as well as on the possible impact of pollution 
performance on industrial production and competitiveness.
2.5 The contribution of this thesis to the literature
This thesis is a contribution to the literature on the trade-off of environmental 
performance and economic competitiveness. It will take the form of a quantitative 
comparative analysis.
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To this end, the first objective of this study is to develop a proxy for environmental 
performance, which will be a pollution performance indicator. Before the background of 
pollution indicators already documented in the literature, this indicator will be 
constructed within a relative framework, that is, the European Union. In other words, 
the pollution indicator captures the relative performance of one country with respect to 
the average of the reference system. Moreover, the quantitative nature of the indicator 
allows us to compare the performance of a large number of countries over a long period.
The large majority of literature contributions on the trade-off between environmental 
performance and the economy focus on the situation in the United States due to much 
better data availability. This study, on the other hand, focuses on the European Union 
before the last round of accession, that is, on the EU 15. Few studies have attempted to 
do so, in spite of the fact that the EU makes a highly interesting case study for a variety 
of reasons. First there is free movement of capital among the EU countries, and hence 
ongoing competition among member states. Second, environmental policy is among the 
top issues on the European political agenda, which should increase the relevance of 
scientific research aimed to understand the consequences of environmental competition. 
Third, and maybe most importantly, the EU is an entity which is still under 
development in terms of political and economic integration. For this reason, it seems 
interesting to capture the development of a policy field that has potentially important 
implications on both the political as well as on the economic situation of the EU’s 
member states.
Last but not least, the quantitative set-up of our analysis allows to assess the 
applicability of two fundamental theories in the area of environmental competition to 
the case study at hand: On the one hand, the conventional economic and location theory, 
which predicts a negative link between pollution performance and economic 
competitiveness, and the Porter hypothesis on the other hand, which is based on the 
notion of positive implications of environmental regulation through spill-over effects.
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3 Data: Dependent and Independent Variables
The following chapter sets the foundation for the subsequent regression analysis, in 
which the relation between pollution performance and chemical industry 
competitiveness is tested. However, before arriving to that point, the first part of the 
chapter, section 3.1, will provide an introduction to the actual subject of the 
comparative analysis, that is, the chemical industry in the European Union. After that, 
section 3.2 will provide details on a range of indicators which will later be used as 
independent variables in the regression analysis. Obviously, since pollution 
performance will be the lead explanatory variable of this study, that indicator will be 
highlighted in considerable depth.
3.1 The dependent variables: EU chemical industry performance
3.1.1 What do we mean by chemical industry?
In general, the terms ‘chemical industry’ and ‘chemical industries’ are used 
synonymously. This may not seem a big issue, but to the author’s best knowledge, the 
chemical sector is probably the only industry class which can be addressed both in 
singular as well as in plural form. Why is that?
The reason seems obvious: it is not quite clear whether the chemical sector is one 
industry or in fact a cluster of more or less similar industries. This ambiguity is rooted 
in the historical development of the business. Few other industries have such a long 
history of technological progress, which resulted in the development of increasingly 
independent sub-sectors (for example, organic and inorganic chemistry), and few 
industrial sectors occupy such central function in modem economies.
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Definition
The smallest common denominator across all firms in the sector is that chemical 
industries produce their products exclusively or primarily by the conversion of 
substances (Fleischer et al. 2000). The goal of chemistry, in this definition, is the 
substitution of natural substances, or the creation of new substances.
This can either be achieved by the conversion of natural substances, or by the synthesis 
of organic or inorganic base materials. Practically, chemical industries combine organic 
or inorganic materials from the earth with heat, air, and water to make chemicals to be 
used by other chemical producers to make other chemicals, or by other industries to 
make a broad range of products that are used in everyday life.
Industries whose treatment of substances is done exclusively by (or connected with) 
physical processes, such as mixing, emulsifying or extracting, are also often considered 
to be part of the chemical industry (Fleischer et al. 2000).
Approaches towards the classification o f chemical sub-sectors
There are several basic approaches to break down the chemical sector into sub-sectors. 
First, one could differentiate certain chemical industries by their production volume or 
the added value their transformation processes generate. The resulting classification into 
bulk chemicals and speciality chemicals is a fundamental criterion with, as we shall see 
later, a number of important practical implications.
Bulk chemicals are high quantity and low value-added products characterised by low 
differentiation. By contrast, speciality products such as dyes, paints, food additives, and 
photographic material are more differentiated and sophisticated products. Closely 
related industries, such as the pharmaceutical sector, could also be counted as speciality 
chemical industries. Typically, speciality chemicals are produced in lower volumes than 
bulk chemicals, and sold for higher prices (Cook and Sharp 1992; European 
Commission 1998d; Cesaroni et al. 2001).
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Second, an alternative way to differentiate chemical industries is by asking whether 
they produce intermediary or finished goods, hence the distinction between basic 
chemistry and parachemistry. According to the definition of the Federation of the 
Belgian Chemical Industries (1999a), basic chemical products are commonly 
intermediary goods or simple bulk consumer goods. Petrochemical goods, plastics and 
synthetic rubbers make up the class of basic organic chemical goods. By contrast, acids 
and alkalis, their derivatives as well as minerals and metallic salts are basic inorganic 
products.
Parachemistry, on the other hand, comprises chemical consumer products, industrial 
chemicals, and agricultural chemicals. The group of consumer products contains paints, 
vanish, inks and colours, wood-protection products, pharmaceuticals, soaps, detergents 
and cosmetics. Among the parachemicals for industrial use are gases, glues, oils, 
explosives, dyes, biocides and cleaning products. Parachemicals for agricultural use are 
compound fertilisers, phytopharmaceutical products, and some biotechnological goods.
Third, one could also differentiate chemical industries by the position they take in the 
production chain. Within this system, the chemical production chain covers the 
transformation of raw materials via primary industries and chemical industries into 
products that meet consumer needs. The most common raw materials for chemical 
industries are oil and gas, minerals and agricultural raw products. Following that logic, 
there is the group of primary (non-chemical) industries, the cluster of basic chemical 
industries, and the class of advanced chemical industries. One proponent of such a 
classification is the European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC 2000a).
Primary industries process raw materials. Thus, refinery of crude oil and gas yields 
petrochemical primary products. Crushers and renders turn agricultural raw products 
into oleochemical primary products.
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The chemical industry processes those primary products further through a sequence of 
hierarchical production steps. One major production sequence covers the transformation 
of oil and gas into petrochemical products, which can then be used as primary material 
for plastics and polymers, which may in turn be used as primary products fibre or 
transformer production. A second important production sequence involves the 
transformation of minerals into inorganic bulk chemicals, such as acids and alkalis. 
These are then used as primary material for speciality and fine chemistry (e.g., coatings, 
adhesives, photographic products), or pharmaceuticals. Finally, agricultural raw 
products are turned into oleochemical products, which are then processed further into 
detergents or cosmetics.
Classification o f  chemical sub-sectors
At this point it should be apparent that there is no method to differentiate chemical sub­
sectors that is in itself methodologically superior to others. All three approaches 
mentioned above appear to suit a certain perspective on the issue well, all are intuitively 
useful. However, this situation bears a great disadvantage: in practice, this spells the 
lack of a coherent standard to classify chemical industries, both within the chemical 
sector (what sub-sectors are there?) as well as vis-a-vis other industrial sectors (are 
primary industries, such as refineries, part of the chemical industry?).
Table 1 illustrates that problem. It is a comparison between different chemical industry 
classification systems. On the one hand, it represents the chemical sub-sectors as 
defined by one of the most widely used industrial classification standards, NACE rev. 1. 
On the other hand, it shows how a range of other institutions with considerable 
expertise in the area of chemical industries solve the problem. Column ‘a’ follows the 
method used by the European Commission (1998d). This approach clusters chemical 
industries by product groups. Column ‘b’ corresponds to the above mentioned approach 
of the Federation of Belgian Chemical Industries (1999). Finally, column ‘c’ shows the 
chemical sub-sectors according to the European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC 
2000a).
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NACE Industrial Classification
Industrial g a s e s I24.12 D yes an d  Pigm ents24.13 O ther inorganic basic  chem icals24.1 Basic chemicals 24.14 O ther organic basic chem icals24.15 Fertilizers and  nitrogen com pounds24.16 P lastic in prim ary form
Synthetic rubber in prim ary form s24.17
24.2 Pesticides and other agro-chemical products
24.3 Paints, varnishes, similar coatings, printing inks, mastics
Basic pharm aceutica l products24.4 Pharmaceuticals, medical chemicals, botanical products
24.42 P harm aceu tical p repara tions
Soaps & detergents, cleaning & polishing preparations, perfumes S oap , de te rgen ts , cleaning p repara tions
& toilet preparations 24.52 P erfum es and  toilet p repara tions
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The table illustrates that, especially with regard to the basic chemical sector, there is 
little congruence among the classification methods. At the later stages of the chemical 
production chain, when the production steps add higher value to the products (and 
hence require superior skills), the classification methods seem to converge.
The two faces o f chemical industry: cost leadership vs. specialisation
In summary, all three differentiation methods point at the fact that there is a transition in 
the production chain from the rather simple production of bulk chemicals to the 
knowledge-intensive small-scale manufacture of specialised chemical goods. Typically, 
raw materials are turned into primary products in large-scale facilities that operate on a 
relatively low technological level. In each subsequent stage of production, the 
knowledge intensity of the operation is increasing, while the scale of the producing 
facilities tends to decrease.
Obviously, this implies that the individual chemical industries, which perform those 
distinct production stages, operate very differently and hence follow different business 
strategies. Arora (1997) states that large-scale low-tech facilities are likely to draw their 
profits from economies of scale of their production. They could require a relatively less 
skilled work force, as mature production processes are, more or less simply, applied.
Inversely, speciality chemical industries typically run small-scale but high-tech plants, 
as well as research-intensive operations. In consequence, their work force needs to meet 
higher requirements in terms of skills. Speciality chemical industries have to compete to 
stay at the forefront of technological development.
Given the very profound differences between bulk and speciality chemicals production 
and their different business approaches, one might wonder why the chemical industry is 
commonly perceived as one industrial sector. Probably the most important reason to this 
lies in the chemical production chain. Given their strong horizontal and vertical 
integration, chemical industries exhibit a marked tendency for organisational and spatial 
concentration (Hudson 1997). In other words, due to their dependence on each other, 
chemical sub-industries show a tendency to produce within the same firm, or in clusters 
of firms.
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Implications on the competitive strategy o f  chemical industries
The chemical sector’s heterogeneity on the one hand, and its tendency to concentrate 
different sub-industries in terms of organisation and space on the other hand make it a 
complex subject to analyse. Cesaroni et al. (2001) note that the strategies of individual 
chemical firms are, inter alia, dependent upon the characteristics of the branch of 
industry in which they operate. Product heterogeneity leads chemical firms to follow 
two fundamentally distinct business strategies: cost leadership on the one hand, and 
specialisation on the other hand. The choice of strategy depends on the product range of 
the chemical firm.
Firms that operate in areas characterised by price competition, as it is the case with 
regard to basic chemicals, are likely to opt for cost leadership strategies (Porter 1985). 
The empirical study by Albach et al. (1996) shows that European firms in commodity 
chemicals commonly focus on cost leadership strategies. Firms that pursue cost 
leadership typically concentrate on their core business areas. They may also choose to 
engage in strategic alliances with other companies in order to generate synergies. By 
contrast, firms in the speciality chemicals sector tend to pursue so-called specialisation 
strategies. Important features of the specialisation approach is the emphasis on product 
differentiation and customisation, and the attempt to establish higher profit margins 
(Cesaroni et al. 2001).
Internal structure o f the EU chemical sector
Now that we have some idea about chemical sub-sectors, what is their relative 
importance? Figure 3 provides some information on the relative size and the 
development of key chemical industries in the EU between 1997 and 2001. According 
to data provided by the European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC 2000a), the 
biggest EU chemical sub-sector in terms of production value was the pharmaceutical 
industry, which accounted for approximately one quarter of the overall chemical 
industry. The graph also reveals that the pharmaceutical sector was growing over the 
period. The second biggest sub-sector was specialty chemicals with around 21% of 
overall production volume, followed by the plastics and polymer industry with some 
15% production share.
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Figure 3 EU chemical industry production by sector
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In terms of sales, if  one sticks to the definition o f chemical sub-sectors used by the 
European Commission (1998d), speciality chemicals was the most important chemical 
sub-sector with sales that accounted for 34% o f overall chemical industry sales. The 
next largest sub-sectors were petrochemicals with 31% and life sciences with 26%. All 
other chemical sub-sectors (inorganic chemicals, fertilisers, man-made fibres, and 
industrial gases) together accounted for the remaining 9%.
Since these three large sub-sectors make up the lion’s share o f the chemical sector 
between themselves, let us have a closer look at them. The following characterisation of 
the three main chemical sub-sectors is based on findings reported in the European 
Commission report (1998d).
■  1997 ■  1998 0 1 9 9 9  0 2 0 0 0  0 2 0 0 1
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Speciality chemicals
The specialities segment consists of those chemical industry firms that take raw material 
from the basic chemicals segment, such as petrochemicals or inorganics and convert 
them into ‘active’ ingredients for use in consumable products. The segment could be 
further split into fine chemicals and performance chemicals. The general characteristic 
of fine and performance chemicals is that they tend to be produced in small volumes. As 
a result, the capital intensity of this sub-sector is comparatively low.
So-called fine chemicals are active chemical compounds for use in areas such as the 
pharmaceutical industry. They are typically produced on the basis of exact chemical 
descriptions of the product required by the customer. For this reason, the main value- 
added by producers of fine chemistry is their internal technical knowledge to produce 
the product. Fine chemical companies mainly compete on the quality of their product 
and the cost of their production. As they have little influence on the end use to which 
the chemicals are put, there is a tendency for the products to behave like commodity 
chemicals. In effect the producers act as an outsourced manufacturing capability for the 
customer.
Performance chemicals on the other hand are chemical compounds produced to satisfy 
well-defined performance requirements. As the name implies, these chemicals are 
critical to the performance of the end products in which they are used. To achieve this 
performance the chemicals are often developed for a specific customer, with the 
speciality chemical producer having a strong influence in the design of the end product.
Considerable effort needs to be put into technical service to ensure that the customers 
keep their competitive advantage, which can be a significant cost item. As the speciality 
segment consists of a wide range of different products, it is characterised by having a 
larger number of small companies than other segments in the chemical industry. In 
many instances companies in the segment are based on a single product line, for which 
they have developed a leading technology position.
Increasingly this fragmented market of small companies is rationalising as speciality 
conglomerates are created. These conglomerates allow the companies to reduce the cost 
of common items in the business process such as branding and management systems.
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Another important driver has been the reduction in the number of major customer 
organisations due to global consolidation. As this occurs the customers instigate world­
wide supply initiatives to cut down the number of suppliers that they use, and as a result 
the speciality companies have had to reorganise on the same international basis. The 
new speciality companies are then able to develop product development partnerships 
with these large customers, where they add value through their ability to innovate new 
performance chemicals that enhance the performance of consumable products.
In spite of this consolidation however, the sector still includes a large number of small 
producers as the focus on product performance and the relatively small volumes mean 
that there are many niche markets.
Petrochemicals
The petrochemicals segment covers the areas of chemical processing that are 
downstream of the oil refining industry. The majority of the chemicals produced in this 
sector are intermediates, which are then further processed both within the petrochemical 
segment and also in others such as specialities.
The petrochemical sector can be characterised by its high capital intensity and large 
economies of scale. Petrochemical producers have to carry out very large investments in 
their production sites. The competition among petrochemicals takes place at global 
level, and is essentially cost-based. There is significant inter-regional trade between the 
major trading blocks Europe, North America and South-East Asia. Feedstock costs take 
a dominant position in the balance sheets of petrochemical producers. In other words, 
relative differences in the price of oil and gas primary products can offer a substantial 
competitive advantage.
The R&D expenditures in the petrochemical sector are relatively low in relation to 
sales. This seems to indicate that the petrochemical sector is relatively less knowledge- 
intensive that the other two major chemical sub-sectors speciality chemistry and 
pharmaceuticals.
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The petrochemical sector is dominated by a number of very large multi-national 
companies. One could therefore argue that the petrochemical sector is one of the most 
global economic sectors in terms of company activities and markets.
There are relatively low overall margins in the petrochemical sector, which is a 
reflection of the cost based competitive environment, of the large numbers of producers 
in the market, and of the relative openness of international markets. The cyclicality of 
earnings appears to be high.
As a result of these industry characteristics, the petrochemical industry is currently 
experiencing a major trend towards industry rationalisation and restructuring.
Pharmaceuticals
The life sciences segment encompasses both pharmaceutical and crop protection 
products such as herbicides and pesticides. The total market is dominated by 
pharmaceuticals, which represented seven times the sales that were achieved in 
agrochemicals in 1997 (European Commission 1998d).
The dominant issues at pharmaceutical production facilities relate to quality control. As 
the products are for use in the body it is essential that the products do not contain 
impurities. The emphasis is on preventing contamination, with a large fraction of the 
installed equipment being concerned with cleaning systems. This requirement adds a 
cost that is not often encountered in other chemical sectors.
The facilities have far greater flexibility than is the case in typical petrochemical plants 
-  little modification is generally needed to make a different product. Therefore, though 
individual production lines can be expensive especially when measured against volume 
of product produced, an investment in plant does not tie a company to producing a 
given product. As such, the industry can be viewed as being less capital intensive than 
segments such as petrochemicals. Research and development costs are extremely high, 
however.
As with the specialities segment, the range of possible products means that there are a 
large number of players in the market. Even the largest company by sales in Europe in 
1998, GlaxoWellcome, only gained a 5.6 percent market share.
94
Rationalisation in the pharmaceuticals market is likely to be caused by the cost of new 
drug development. A typical new treatment takes up to nine years to develop, with 
many potential compounds failing to make it through to successful product. It is the 
costs associated with this development that are forcing companies to merge in order to 
achieve economies of scale.
3.1.2 Importance and performance of the chemical sector
So far, this chapter aimed to provide some insights on the nature of the chemical sector 
by ‘looking inside’ the industry. In contrast, the following pages will present the 
performance of the chemical sector as a whole and put it into relation with the overall 
economy. The underlying question that this section intends to address is why the 
chemical sector makes a worthwhile case study from an economic point of view. Later, 
section 3.1.4 will provide reasons why the chemical sector also is a meaningful object 
of study from an environmental point of view.
Strategic importance
Historically, the chemical sector has acted both as a focus and a motor for scientific and
tli tlitechnological development of industrialising economies. In the late 19 and early 20 
century, innovations in the field of chemistry and the subsequent development of 
chemical technologies have been regarded crucial national assets. They were therefore 
jealously guarded by national governments. For instance, Arora (1997) quotes the 
example of the German chemical industries, which were carefully shielded national 
scientific-industrial complexes until the end of World War I. This helped the German 
economy to outgrow other industrialising nations at the time. Later, as part of 
Germany’s World War I compensations, its chemical industries were made to give up 
their technological advantage by voiding their patents, such as the rights on Aspirin. 
Through this, German chemical industries had lost much of strategic competitive 
advantage.
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Naturally, the role of the sector in catalysing economic development has changed over 
the last century. Chemical industries have lost much of their national strategic 
importance due to the fact that they, as all other economic sectors, have been subject to 
globalisation. Many of the leading chemical enterprises today are huge multinational 
corporations that conduct their business as well as their research and development 
activities on an international scale (Chapman and Edmond 2000).
Linkages with consumers and other industries
Chemical industries produce intermediate and consumer goods that serve a wide range 
of consumer needs. In fact, as figure 4 shows, chemical products can be found in almost 
every industrial product that we use on a day-to-day basis. Civilisation, the functioning 
of industrialised economies and societies, seems plainly unthinkable without the 
amenities provided by chemical industries (Chapman and Edmond 2000).
To name but a few examples of possible applications, chemicals are used for textile 
production, packaging, electrical and electronic components, the automotive industry, 
the building industry, health care, food products, home care and personal care. 
Furthermore, people tend to underestimate the importance of chemicals in modem 
agriculture, but according to CEFIC (2001b) data, chemicals account for 30 percent of 
all material input in agriculture.
The chemical industry is highly forward linked with other industries both in terms of 
economic and technology impact and in terms of environmental issues, such as 
production processes or environmental techniques and services. For this reason, the 
chemical industry has a crucial and central role within the manufacturing sector (Maglia 
and Sassoon 1999).
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Figure 4 Material input o f chemistry in the manufacture o f selected consumer
goods
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More than 50 percent o f chemical products are intermediate goods, which are in turn 
processed by a wide variety o f industrial sectors. In Europe alone, more than 70,000 
products like paints and coatings, fertilisers, pesticides, solvents, plastics, synthetic 
fibres and rubber, explosives and many others are building blocks at every level of 
production and consumption in agriculture, construction, manufacturing, and in the 
service sector (Cesaroni et al. 2001).
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Figure 5 EU domestic consumption o f chemical products by economic sector,
1995'
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Figure 5 shows the split o f domestic chemical consumption by EU economic sectors. 
While some 30 percent o f the total chemical industry production in 1995 reached the 
final consumer, around 70 percent were used by other sectors o f the economy: that is, 
agriculture, industries and the service sector.
Accounting for some 16.4 percent o f total chemicals consumption, the biggest non-final 
consumer o f chemical goods appears to be service and administration sector. Metal 
processing and electrical engineering, agriculture, and the textile industry were also 
among the most important customers of chemical industries.
1 Percentage shares were calculated by taking into account the re-allocation of domestic consumption to 
downstream consumers of chemicals, self-consumption and consumption by the rubber and plastic 
processing industries.
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As impressive as these numbers may be, one should not lose sight of another reason for 
the importance of chemical industries in modem economies: that is, the role of the 
chemical sector in transmitting innovation. Product or process improvements in the 
chemical sector may have positive effects in downstream industries. Since the chemical 
industry provides goods and engineering services to a host of other industries 
simultaneously, innovation in the field of chemical engineering may have the potential 
to create multiple spillover effects (Cesaroni and Arduini 2001; Cesaroni et al. 2001).
3.1.2.1 The contribution of chemical industries to GDP
The output of chemical industries makes up a substantial part of the total manufacturing 
production in all EU member states. As figure 6 shows, the country with the highest 
proportion of chemical industry production value in the manufacturing total in 1997 was 
Belgium. In fact, the country’s industrial sector produced goods that valued more than 
one third of the entire manufacturing sector. The Dutch and Irish chemical industries 
follow with some distance. On the other end of the spectrum appears Austria, where 
chemical industry production accounted for little more than five percent of the total 
manufacturing production value.
When one considers the evolution in the percentage of chemical industry production 
over the observation period, it appears that some countries exhibit significant changes, 
while the position of the chemical sector did not change much in others. The country 
with the most pointed development is clearly Ireland.
The share of the Irish chemical industry in the total manufacturing production appears 
to have doubled between 1990 and 1997. The size of this movement is remarkable and 
might cause some suspicion regarding the quality of the underlying data. In response, an 
extensive check of various data sources on the indicator was carried out. Its findings, as 
well as the overall performance of the Irish economy in general and of its chemical 
industry in particular (Murphy 2000), appear to confirm the validity of the observation. 
A more detailed discussion on the plausibility of Irish chemical industry production data 
follows at the end of this section.
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Figure 6 Chemical industry production value as percent o f total manufacturing 
production
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Besides Ireland, some other EU member states seemed to exhibit significant changes: 
the proportion of chemical industry production decreased in Austria and the 
Netherlands, and increased in Greece and Luxembourg. All other EU member states did 
not appear to have experienced major changes.
Production value as the first chemical industry performance indicator
The first dependent variable for the subsequent regression analysis in chapter 4.2 will 
be the value o f chemical industry production in the EU member states. This data series 
is expressed in U.S. Dollars at 1995 prices.
The raw data for the time series was provided by the European Chemical Industry 
Council. CEFIC provides a range o f data series on EU chemical industries as part of 
their comprehensive chemical industry database ESCIMO, or in the form of annual 
figures in their statistical yearbooks.
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Among the data series provided by that organisation are data points on EU chemical 
industry production value; absolute data were available for the years 1997, 1998 and 
1999. The figures were taken from CEFIC’s statistical yearbooks (CEFIC 1998b; 
1999b; 2000b). Originally, the production value was reported in €; the data was 
converted into U.S. Dollars using the annual exchange rates provided by U.S. Federal 
Reserve Bank (2000) and deflated to reflect constant prices o f 1995.
Figure 7 Chemical industry production value (absolute)
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The remaining years 1980 to 1996 were extrapolated from a chemical industry 
production index, which was also provided by CEFIC as part of its ESCIMO database. 
The base year of the index was re-calculated to 1995. Since both the index data series as 
well as the absolute production values in U.S. Dollars provided values for 1997, it was 
possible to extrapolate the missing absolute production values in U.S. Dollars (1980 to 
1996) by combining the two data series. The result of this operation is recorded as table 
36 in the appendix.
Figure 7 represents the production value of EU chemical industries in 1980 and 1999. 
The diagram shows that all European chemical sectors have increased their production 
volume over the observation period. It also shows that the rate of increase varied 
considerably across the EU.
Of the fourteen countries in the sample, the production volumes of thirteen chemical 
sectors grew by more or less comparable ratios. The most different evolution in 
chemical industry production value among the countries in this ‘mainstream group’ can 
be observed in Greece and Denmark. The smallest increase occurred in Greece with 36 
percent; Denmark marked the biggest increase in chemical industry production volume 
with 160 percent.
Yet, the increase in production volume of the chemical sector in Ireland clearly stands 
out from the rest of the EU. Over the observation period, the value of chemical industry 
production in Ireland grew by the factor 23. While the Irish chemical sector was the 
smallest of all 14 countries in the sample in terms of production value in 1980, the 
country ranked eighth in 1999. Indeed, the production value of the Irish chemical 
industry in 1999 was bigger than the production of the three following countries -  
Sweden, Denmark and Finland- taken together.
2 The index was labeled ‘Production Index, Chemical Industry (kind-of-activity index)’. Further 
explanations or details on its methodology were not available. The CEFIC statistical yearbooks 
mention that the definition of chemical industry varies across countries. This may explain why CEFIC 
had to resort to its particular kind-of-activity definition of the chemical sector.
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The evolution of the absolute chemical industry production value appears to be an 
interesting and telling dependent variable if one wants to investigate the sector’s 
competitiveness. The production value provides a clear idea on which national chemical 
sector has grown most in terms of absolute output. From this angle, the outstanding 
increase of production value in Ireland is a remarkable fact in itself. It poses the 
question in what way the background for development of the Irish chemical sector 
differs from the rest of the EU. The regression model will test whether Ireland’s 
chemical industry production performance is connected to the differences among EU 
countries with regard to taxation, fuel prices, productivity, and pollution performance.
Yet, the outstanding development of the Irish chemical industry production value also 
appears to hint at the fact that there are additional important aspects that might help in 
the interpretation of production values. It is a well documented fact that the Irish 
economy and its manufacturing sector in particular have grown much stronger than the 
European average over the observation period.
Chemical industry production value /  GDP
Before this background, it appears reasonable to compare the increase of chemical 
industry production value with the overall growth of the economy (GDP). The 
following dependent variable will pick up this line of argument. Therefore, as a 
complement to the above data set on production values in absolute terms, the second 
dependent variable will be the ratio of chemical industry production to GDP.
Chemical industry production value / GDP provides a distinct take on the 
competitiveness of the chemical sector, because it reflects developments in the 
production value of the chemical industries in relation to the growth of the rest of the 
economy. Hence, the evolution of this indicator over time shows whether the chemical 
industry production value has grown faster or slower than the overall economy.
The basic data on chemical industry production values is identical to the dependent 
variable introduced above. In addition, the production value is put into relation to 
national GDP data drawn from the OECD and the World Bank.
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For the period from 1980 to 1996, the GDP data was taken from the OECD’s National 
Accounts database. For the years 1997 to 1999, it was sourced from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators database. The GDP figures are quoted in U.S.$ at 1995 
prices. The data set is recorded as table 37 in the appendix.
Figure 8 Chemical industry production value /  GDP at 1995 prices
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Figure 8 represents chemical industry production / GDP figures in 1980 and 1999. The 
picture illustrates that in twelve o f the fourteen countries in the sample the ratio was 
more or less at a comparable level. In 1980, Austria had 1.5 percent of GDP contributed 
by the chemical sector, which is the lowest ratio o f this mainstream group. The highest 
value could be found in Germany with 4.3 percent.
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In 1999, the country with the lowest chemical industry production value / GDP ratio 
was Greece with 2.0 percent; the Netherlands showed the highest ratio with 6.3 percent. 
Most countries in this group showed a moderate increase in their production value / 
GDP ratios; two notable exceptions were Greece and Portugal, where the chemical 
sector lost some of its importance compared to the overall economy.
There are two countries that do not appear to fit into the EU mainstream. First, Belgium 
exhibited a significantly higher share of chemical industry production value in total 
GDP both at the beginning and at the end of the observation period. In 1980, the 
production value of the chemical sector amounted to 6.3 percent of the GDP; this ratio 
almost doubled to 12.5 percent in 1999. The data appears to indicate that the Belgian 
chemical industry is much more important in the context of the overall economy than in 
most other EU countries.
This observation also holds true for Ireland, which is the second outlier among the EU 
member states. The production value / GDP ratio for the Irish chemical sector grew 
from 2.4 percent in 1980 to 21.9 percent in 1999.
One should note that this rise, which corresponds roughly to an increase by the factor 9 
-as impressive as it may appear-, is well below the observed increase in absolute 
chemical industry production value in Ireland, which grew 23-fold. In other words, not 
only the chemical sector in Ireland grew considerably, so did the Irish economy as a 
whole. Yet, the growth rate of the chemical industry production value exceeded the 
growth of the general economy by far. In consequence, according to the data, the Irish 
chemical sector accounted for almost 22 percent of the country’s GDP in 1999.
The correlation coefficient between the chemical industry production value in absolute 
terms and as a ratio of GDP is 0.15. This low coefficient indicates that the two data 
series are to a large degree independent. Based on this observation, the two dependent 
variables appear to capture different aspects of chemical industry competitiveness. The 
first indicator -the absolute production value- captures the increase or decrease of 
chemical industry output. The second indicator -the production value relative to the 
GDP- reflects the relative importance of chemical industry production value in the 
context of the national economy.
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On the plausibility o f  the Irish production value figures
The ratio of Irish chemical industry production value to GDP appears suspiciously high. 
In response to this, the data series that were used for the construction of this variable 
have been carefully checked for consistency and plausibility, and were compared to 
other data sources. The data was discussed with experts of the statistical office of the 
European Commission, Eurostat, as well as with representatives of the Irish Central 
Statistics Office. Alternative data series provided by (1) the Irish Development Agency 
IDA, (2) the Irish Pharmaceutical & Chemical Manufacturers Federation, (3) the Irish 
Business and Employers Confederation IBEC, and (4) the Chemical & Engineering 
News, appear to show comparable proportions and evolution over time. Taking the 
feedback from various sources into account, there appear to be no grounds to question 
the validity of the data.
One possible explanation for the particularly high percentage in Ireland may lie in the 
fact that the definition of “chemical industry” by the Irish Central Statistics Office 
includes the pharmaceutical industry, a chemical sub-sector that appears to have had 
particularly high growth rates in Ireland over the last decades (IBEC 2001). This 
practice is, in itself, no reason to suspect that the Irish data is biased, as including 
pharmaceutical industries appears to be common practice across most EU member 
states. However, one should note that each EU member state’s statistical office has 
some degree of liberty in defining its industry definition. For this reason, one needs to 
be cautious in comparing that indicator between countries. However, since the primary 
focus of this investigation is the evolution over time of the indicator, and since the 
regression analysis incorporates country dummy variables, the use of the data series 
may be justifiable.
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According to data obtained from Eurostat and the Central Statistics Office of Ireland, 
the manufacturing share of GDP in 1995 stood at 26.9 percent. By virtue of this figure, 
the Irish manufacturing sector represented the largest share in GDP of all EU 
manufacturing sectors. On the other hand, the production value of the Irish chemical 
industries grew almost exponentially in the subsequent years from 1995 to 1999. These 
two observations taken together may also support to the notion of such a high chemical 
industry production value/GDP ratio.
According to information by the Irish Pharmaceutical & Chemical Manufacturers 
Federation (IBEC 2001), there was a massive influx of greenfield inward development 
into the Irish chemical sector during the 1980s and early 1990s. 16 of the top 20 
pharmaceutical companies in the world opened plants in Ireland. According to IBEC 
(2001: 4), the exports by the Irish chemical industry grew between 1974 and 1995 by a 
massive 17,974 percent. Since the early 1990s, the growth of the industry was in its 
majority organic, based on existing company extensions. Due to the fact that the Irish 
chemical industry is dominated by fine chemical and pharmaceutical companies, and 
taking into account that most plants were constructed after 1970, Ireland possesses a 
very modem high-tech chemical sector that lack some of the negative characteristics of 
older EU chemical industries such as massive scale intrusions on local communities and 
pollution problems.
3 Note that the data points of Ireland as well as of all other EU member states were extrapolated from an 
index with regard to the years 1980 to 1996, and taken directly from CEFIC’s Eskimo data base for the 
years 1997 to 1999. In the case of Ireland, there appears to be a break in the time series from 1996 to 
1997. That break is probably due to a change in the definition of chemical industry. In order to assess 
the impact of this break, the subsequent analysis will present two sets of regression models: one 
including Ireland, and another one excluding the country. With regard to all other EU countries but 
Ireland, the extrapolated and the original data points seem to correspond well.
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Last but not least, the strength and relative importance of the Irish chemical industry has 
been highlighted in a number of previous empirical studies. For example, Maglia and 
Sassoon (1999) point out the economic strength of the Irish chemical sector relative to 
other EU chemical industries, and most notably in relation to the German chemical 
sector. For instance, their analysis illustrates that the Irish chemical sector has 
outperformed the rest of the EU with regard to profitability, profit growth, and foreign 
direct investment. Murphy (2000: 15/16) notes that among the five leading high-tech 
industries in Ireland -computers, software, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and cola 
concentrates- the net output per person in the chemical sector clearly surpassed the 
other sectors.
In conclusion, although there is no evidence that the data set on the Irish chemical 
industry production value is systematically or materially wrong, there may remain some 
intuitive doubt about whether ‘they can be true’. For this reason, the subsequent 
regression analysis will report two sets of models: one including and another one 
excluding Ireland.
3.1.2.2 Chemical industries and labour markets
As figure 9 shows, chemical industries provide a significant source of employment in 
the European Union. In 1998, EU chemical industries provided jobs for 0.98 percent of 
the total workforce, compared to 0.75 percent in the United States and 0.56 percent in 
Japan (CEFIC 2001a).
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Figure 9 Employment in chemical industries as percent o f total workforce, 1998
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One should note that the percentage of employment to the total workforce varies 
considerably across EU member states. The two countries with by far the highest 
proportion of chemical industry jobs in 1998 were Belgium and Denmark. In both 
countries, the chemical sector provided employment for more than two percent o f the 
occupied population. Ireland, Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands also exhibited 
more jobs in the chemical sector than the EU average. The EU member states with the 
lowest proportion o f chemical industry employment in 1999 were Greece and Portugal, 
followed by Finland and Spain.
unweighted average
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Chemical industry workforce as the second performance indicator
Given the importance o f the chemical sector as employer and the socio-economic 
importance of job creation over the recent years in the EU, the second chemical industry 
performance indicator will be the number o f chemical industry employees. As in the 
case o f the first dependent variable, chemical industry employment will be used in 
absolute terms as well as in relation to the total employment.
The data for this indicator was obtained from the European Chemical Industry Council 
(CEFIC) and Eurostat. Data covering the number o f employees in the national chemical 
sectors was provided by CEFIC as part o f its ESCIMO data base. The time series was 
obtained through the CEFIC homepage in 2001. It is recorded in the appendix as table
38.
Figure 10 Chemical industry employees (absolute)
600
tAT3
Cra
(A
3O
& 400
(As0>o
a
E0)
■  1980 
□  1999
200  —
Unweighted average 1980
Unweighted average 1999
fi gr ie pt s e  a t dk nl b e  e s  it uk fr de
Data source: CEFIC, ESCIMO Database (2001)
110
The figures, which are represented in figure 10, suggest that in the five countries with 
the largest chemical sectors in the EU, i.e. Germany, France, Britain, Italy and Spain, 
the absolute number of chemical industry employees has decreased over the observation 
period. This process appeared to be especially significant in the UK, where the 
workforce of the chemical sector was almost cut in half between 1980 and 1999. On the 
other hand, the largest chemical sector in the EU, Germany, seemed to experience a 
much less dramatic cut in employment.
Among the fourteen countries in the sample, only three experienced an increase in 
chemical industry employment. These three countries were Ireland, Denmark and 
Belgium. With regard to Ireland and Belgium, that development appears plausible, since 
absolute chemical production as well as production relative to the GDP also increased 
significantly over the observation period (cf. figure 11).
It should be noted, however, that the very significant increase in chemical industry 
employment in Denmark cannot be fully explained by simultaneous increases in 
production volumes. The data shows that Denmark experienced a slow and relatively 
constant increase over the observation period, with the exception of 1987/1988 when 
the ratio of chemical industry employment to occupied population almost doubled.
The most likely explanation for this sudden shift may be a break in the time series 
between 1987 and 1988. Such a break could have been introduced by a re-definition of 
the chemical sector. Unfortunately, the ESCIMO data base does not provide further 
information that could clarify this point.
I l l
Chemical industry employment /  total workforce
The fourth dependent variable in the regression analysis will be the ratio of chemical 
industry employment to the total workforce. The corresponding data on the overall 
workforce of EU member states4 was provided by Eurostat as part of its Newcronos 
data base (2001). The original data set covers the period from 1980 to 1997. The 
missing years 1998 and 1999 were extrapolated as a linear projection on the basis of the 
available data. The final data set on chemical industry employment / total workforce is 
recorded as table 39 in the data appendix.
The chemical industry employment/overall workforce indicator appears useful for the 
assessment of chemical industry competitiveness, because it may show whether the 
sector has outperformed the overall economy in terms of job creation, or whether the 
sector has indeed provided proportionally less jobs than the rest of the economy. 
Inversely, in times of economic decline or stagnation, the ratio of chemical industry 
employees to the total occupied population could reveal whether the chemical industry 
lost proportionally more or less jobs than other sectors of the economy.
Across countries, the ratio could also tell something about the relative importance of the 
chemical sectors as employers within the national job markets. As figure 11 illustrates, 
national chemical industries had very different shares in the overall workforce. The 
highest ratio could be found in Belgium, where approximately 2.5 percent of the 
workforce was employed by chemical industry employers. In Belgium, this ratio 
increased slightly over the observation period.
4 The data set was originally labelled “total occupied population (paid and unpaid)”.
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Figure 11 Chemical industry employees /  total workforce
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By contrast, Greece exhibited the lowest percentage o f chemical industry employment 
relative to the total occupied population. Approximately 0.5 percent o f the workforce 
found jobs in the chemical sector. That ratio decreased by around 0.1 percent over the 
observation period.
Eleven o f the fourteen countries in the sample experienced a decrease in chemical 
industry employment in relative terms. This appears to indicate that in a majority o f EU 
member states, the chemical industry lost some o f its importance on the national labour 
markets. Only Ireland, Denmark and Belgium exhibited an increase in chemical 
industry employment relative to the total.
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If one puts the chemical production value/GDP in relation to the percentage of national 
workforce employed by chemical industries, one may conclude that the chemical sector 
appears highly productive relative to the rest of the economy. For example, in the UK in 
1999, the chemical sector produced goods at the value of 3.0 percent of the GDP while 
using only 0.82 percent of the UK workforce. This pattern appears to be generally 
consistent across all EU member states. However, some countries such as Belgium or 
Ireland exhibit an especially large difference in productivity between the chemical 
sector and the rest of the economy.
3.1.2.3 Chemical industries and trade
For chemical industry stockholders, one of the most relevant business figures is 
probably the market share of their company, as it helps to judge the competitive success 
of their products and their marketing. All other factors being equal, the evolution of 
market share could serve as a sign whether the company is offering competitive 
products at appropriate prices vis-a-vis its competitors. If it decreased, this might be a 
hint at strategic or structural problems that the company experiences on the market.
With some qualifications, a similar argument could be applied to entire chemical 
sectors. Obviously, one cannot simply argue that aggregate entities such as entire 
economic sectors would commit clear-cut strategic mistakes such as over-pricing or the 
like. Other factors, such as tax levels, productivity, or market size, which will be 
captured by the independent variables in the regression analysis, could play a role in 
determining the market share of economic sectors.
As this focus of the comparative analysis lies on the performance of national chemical 
industries relative to each other, the EU common market appears to be the most relevant 
reference basis. Following that logic, the best suited unit to compare the ‘sales volume’ 
of chemical sectors would have to be intra-EU exports. Hence, chemical industry intra- 
EU exports will serve as the third dependent variable. Again, the variable will be 
expressed in absolute terms and as a ratio of intra-EU exports to GDP.
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According to the above argument, the evolution o f intra-EU exports o f national 
chemical sectors should tell which chemical industries had relatively more favourable 
structures to compete on the EU common market, and which ones had not.
Once more, the data for this dependent variable came from the European Chemical 
Industry Council as part o f its ESCIMO data base. The data was downloaded from 
CEFIC’s internet homepage in 2001. Unfortunately, this time series does not cover the 
entire observation period. Twelve o f the fifteen countries in the sample had data points 
covering the period from 1990 to 1998.
Figure 12 Chemical industry intra-EU exports (absolute)
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The Irish time series relates to 1990 to 1997; the missing data point was projected on 
the basis of the available data points using an exponential function, which was the one 
fitting best to the existing cloud of observations. The Swedish data set provided 
information only for the period 1990 to 1994. Since the evolution of the Swedish intra- 
EU exports appeared to follow a linear trend, the missing values were filled in as a 
linear projection of the available data points. The data series is recorded as table 40 in 
the appendix.
Figure 12 shows that the absolute value of chemical industry intra-EU exports- 
measured in € million- has grown in all EU member states. The diagram illustrates that 
the highest increase over the observation period 1990 to 1998 took place in Ireland, 
where it more than quadrupled in less than a decade. The second highest growth rate 
was experienced by Belgium, where intra-EU exports more than doubled. With roughly 
25 percent, Greece experienced the lowest augment.
Furthermore, the graph also shows relatively high intra-EU export figures for countries 
like Belgium and the Netherlands. In terms of absolute intra-EU export value in 1999, 
the two countries rank second and fourth respectively among all EU member states. As 
such, their chemical industry intra-EU exports are larger than the ones of Britain, Italy 
or Spain.
Intra-EU chemical industry exports /  GDP
When one puts the intra-EU export figures in relation to the national GDP,5 this 
observation becomes even more evident. As figure 13 illustrates, relative to the size of 
their national economies, the intra-EU exports of the Belgian, Irish and Dutch chemical 
industries were much higher than in the rest of the European Union member states.
5 The data set regarding national GDP values corresponds to the ones used as independent variable and as 
normalizing factor in section 3.2.2. Please refer to that chapter for details on the data source and 
construction of the time series.
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Figure 13 Chemical industry intra-EU exports /  GDP
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Data Sources: Table 41 in the appendix
The share o f Belgian chemical industry intra-EU exports in GDP more than doubled 
over the observation period from 4.3 percent in 1990 to 8.8 percent in 1998. An even 
more significant increase took place in Ireland, where the ratio grew almost threefold.
All EU member states experienced increases in relation to that indicator. The intra-EU 
exports o f some chemical sectors, for example in Finland, Denmark, Sweden or Spain, 
grew by comparable magnitudes. However, the data also shows clearly that these raises 
took place on a much lower level.
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3.1.3 Restructuring of the chemical sector in the European context
So far, this description of the chemical sector has focussed on two issues. The first 
section, 3.1.1, was an attempt to define the sector and discuss its internal structure. The 
second section, 3.1.2, presented a number of indicators on the economic performance of 
the chemical industry. The following section takes another perspective: its central issue 
will be to show the structural differences of the chemical industries across EU member 
states, and to discuss the drivers of the current restructuring processes.
3.1.3.1 Structural differences among EU member states
Various indicators draw a vivid picture on the structural differences between the 
national chemical industries among the 15 EU member states. These differences could 
be summarised into three distinct aspects: the average size of chemical companies, the 
share of ‘low-tech’ chemical industries, and the knowledge intensity of chemical 
sectors.
Average size o f chemical companies
To begin with, figure 14 reveals one very fundamental difference across national 
chemical industries: the average number of employees per chemical industry enterprise. 
The country with the, in average, largest chemical enterprises among EU member states 
is Germany, where the average enterprise size was around 430 employees in 1996. With 
in average more than 300 employees, the Dutch chemical enterprises appeared to be 
already significantly smaller in terms of enterprise size. Given the enormous size of 
some German and Dutch chemical industry conglomerates, such as Bayer or Royal 
Dutch/Shell, these numbers appear plausible. However, the German and Dutch chemical 
sectors exhibit a significant difference in average size relative to their counterparts in 
the United Kingdom and France -  countries that also have a number of major chemical 
industry players.
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Figure 14 Average number o f employees per chemical industry enterprise, 1996
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At the other extreme of the spectrum appears Portugal with an average chemical 
enterprise size o f only 25 employees. The cluster o f EU member states with relatively 
small chemical enterprises also includes Spain, Finland, Ireland, and Greece. This 
observation appears to hint at the fact that chemical firms in central and more developed 
EU economies tend to be bigger than their counterparts in relatively more peripheral 
markets. Furthermore, the data also seems to suggest that chemical firms in 
Mediterranean countries are relatively smaller than the EU -15 average.
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Complementing the point before, figure 15 reports the absolute number o f chemical 
industry enterprises across EU member states. Obviously, the figures should not be 
compared across member states, as they are not normalised. However, looking at the 
data, one observation could safely be made: considering the relative size o f the Spanish 
and Portuguese economy, the absolute number o f chemical industry enterprises in those 
countries appears remarkably high. As a result, judging from the information on the 
average size and absolute number o f chemical industry enterprises, the two Iberian 
chemical sectors seem to stand out for their large number o f small chemical firms, 
whereas the chemical sector in countries like Germany or the UK appears much more 
concentrated.
Figure 15 Absolute number o f  chemical industry enterprises, 1996
4000
unweighted average
Data source: Eurostat / Newcronos (2001)
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Share o f basic chemical industry
Figure 16 shows the ratio of the basic chemical industry (cf. chapter 3.1.1) relative to 
the fine and performance chemical industries in terms of its production value. The 
diagram illustrates that the significance of the basic chemicals vis-a-vis the more 
knowledge intensive and value-added speciality chemistry varies greatly across EU 
member states.
In 1998, Ireland exhibited the highest share o f basic chemicals, amounting to 
approximately 70 percent. The sub-sector also appeared to be relatively more important 
in countries like the Netherlands and Finland than in the rest o f the European Union. By 
contrast, the basic chemical industry was markedly underrepresented in Denmark and 
Italy, where it accounted for approximately 11 and 23 percent o f total chemical 
production respectively.
Figure 16 Basic chemicals production as percentage o f total chemical production 
(basic chemistry and specialities)
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Note: DK / IE / SE refer to 1990 and 1998; AT refers to 1991 and 1998
Data source: Eurostat / Newcronos (2001)
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Furthermore, the graph shows that, between 1988 and 1998, the share of basic 
chemicals in total chemical production shrank in most EU member states. The only 
exception to this trend was apparently Ireland, where, starting from an already high 
level, the basic chemicals sector increased its relative weight.
Last but not least, one interesting observation may be that the relative importance of the 
basic chemicals industry in the Mediterranean EU member states appears to be rather 
lower than EU average. This fact is surprising, since one often-heard topic about the 
regional distribution of chemical industries states that southern European countries had 
a higher share of ‘primitive’ basic chemical industries than northern ones.
Education o f  the workforce and R&D intensity
The great importance of innovation on the development and competitiveness of 
chemical industries is a common theme among most studies on the sector. For example, 
Cesaroni et al. (2001) highlight the chemical industry’s long tradition in innovation and 
R&D activities as one key characteristic of the sector. Since its origins in the second 
half of the nineteenth century with British and German dyestuff manufacturers, the 
chemical sector appears to be science-based and science-driven. Moreover, Cesaroni et 
al. note that, more than in other industries, innovation in the chemical industry derives 
from the interaction between the academic world, individual firms, government policies, 
and historical events.
For this reason, the average education level of the chemical industries’ workforce may 
provide an important insight into the competitive position and strategy of national 
chemical sectors. As figure 17 shows, there are significant differences across EU 
chemical industries with regard to the highest degree of their workforce. Judging by the 
percentage of employees with secondary or higher degrees, the chemical sectors in 
Denmark, the Netherlands, and Germany appear to have the workforce with the highest 
average skills. It may be worth noticing that it is exactly this group of countries that also 
have in average the largest chemical industry enterprises. By contrast, the chemical 
industry’s workforce in Portugal, Italy, The United Kingdom, and Spain exhibits a 
distinctly smaller percentage of secondary or higher education.
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Figure 17 Highest education degree o f the chemical industry workforce, 1995
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Data source: Eurostat / Newcronos (2001)
As noted above, the production o f bulk chemicals is regarded as less R&D intensive and 
sophisticated than the production of speciality chemicals (Cook and Sharp 1992; 
Cesaroni et al. 2001). Based on this notion, one might expect that chemical sectors with 
a high percentage o f basic chemicals production have a lower-skilled workforce.
However, comparing the information contained in figures 16 and 17, there is no 
apparent relation on first sight. In the case o f Denmark, the observed relationship 
corresponds to what one might expect: the chemical sector with the lowest percentage 
o f basic chemicals production does indeed have the highest-skilled workforce. Yet, with 
regard to Italy, the expected relationship does not hold. Italy’s chemical sector exhibits 
the second lowest percentage o f basic chemicals production as well as the second 
lowest-skilled workforce. An inverse but similarly counter-intuitive relationship appears 
to apply to the Dutch chemical sector as well.
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Figure 18 Patent applications (organic & inorganic chemicals) /  chemical 
industry employees, 1995
unweighted average
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Data Sources: patent applications -  Eurostat / Newcronos (2001) 
Chemical industry employees -  CEFIC Eskimo database (2001)
Among the possible explanations for this inconclusive relationship could be the fact that 
chemical production, irrespective o f whether it regards basic or speciality chemicals, 
requires a generally high average level o f skill. Furthermore, mentioned before, due to 
the integrated chemical production chain, basic and speciality chemicals production 
facilities are commonly found in close neighbourhood to each other. The workforce o f a 
chemical plant typically operates both types o f chemical production. Finally, it may be 
that the type o f chemical production is not the key determinant to the average skill o f 
the chemical industry workforce, but the R&D intensity of the national chemical 
sectors, as illustrated in figure 18.
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3.1.3.2 Drivers and trends of the restructuring
Global market pressures
On a global level, according to the European Commission (1998d), the key challenges 
to European chemical industry restructuring lie within the large diversified groups that 
have commodity petrochemicals as a significant component of their current portfolio. 
These are the main product areas where Europe is under the most global competitive 
pressure, and where the legacy of prior government and national influence has created a 
structure most disadvantaged compared to the key competitor region of North America.
First, Europe has had too many producers of the main individual petrochemicals and 
polymers, a legacy of national focus in prior years. The cost burden that this imposes is 
reducing rapidly, as restructuring occurs in response to global competitive pressures. 
The European Commission expects this process to continue as the global pressures are 
currently still intensifying.
Second, different chemical industries are -  appropriately -  responding in different ways 
to the competitive environment. All are seeking to reduce unit costs and improve 
customer focus, but radically different business models are being adopted to achieve 
this. These range from a complete shift to different businesses (e.g. ICI), to adherence to 
the virtues of integration and a broad portfolio while attacking costs at all levels (e.g. 
BASF). In between, many companies are choosing to focus upon the core products and 
competencies that they see as representing their strongest competitive position. There is 
as yet no compelling financial evidence that one of these models is broadly superior to 
others. It is clear however that some form of strong and continuous improvement is 
essential by all European producers, in the face of global pressures.
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Third, European-based companies achieve lower levels of profitability than their US- 
based competitors. This reflects the lower margins in their home markets, to which all 
producers are heavily linked. Possible reasons for this lower profitability in European 
operations include relatively lower plant scales, excessive numbers of producers, less 
access to advantaged feedstock situations, higher unit labour costs (and lower labour 
flexibility), higher utility costs (particularly electric power and natural gas, due to cost 
and competition factors), higher capital costs (mainly due to higher unit labour costs), 
less effective integration and logistics, and less homogeneous markets.
Some of the above points are being addressed by industry consolidation and 
restructuring; some are being improved by the move to increasingly unified markets and 
price transparency; utility and feedstock costs may be addressed by efforts for de­
regulation and more supplier competition. Most of the labour-related (including capital 
cost) penalties are due to national legislation, which varies widely between countries, 
with Germany normally cited as having the biggest comparative disadvantages.
Fourth, there are efforts among EU chemical sectors to improve their industry structure 
and efficiency via “strategic alliances”. However, full mergers among major chemical 
companies are still rare in the EU, due to the reluctance of national governments to ‘sell 
out’ their strategic economic sectors. This practical constraint prompts chemical 
industries to seek “virtual restructurings” as second best solutions in terms of the 
desired competitiveness improvements (European Commission 1998d).
The competitiveness gap between American and European chemical industries
Maglia and Sassoon (1999) highlight a number of ‘competitiveness gaps’ between 
European and U.S. chemical industries, which causes the profitability of the European 
chemical sector to be steadily lower than U.S. levels. First, the capital intensity of EU 
and U.S. chemical is different, with EU investment levels being consistently lower. In 
the 1990s, capital spending as a ratio of sales increased in the U.S., after a short 
decrease during the recession of the early 1990s. By contrast, capital spending levels 
remained low and constant among EU chemical industries over that period.
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Second, Maglia and Sassoon argue that a comparison of the human capital structure 
shows that the EU chemical industry is a disadvantageous position: the average skill 
level of an employee in the American chemical industry is higher than in Europe. In 
addition there is a greater polarization of skills in the U.S. chemical sector: in the U.S. 
there seems to be a relatively higher proportion of higher level skills and low skills, 
whereas in Europe, employees with intermediate skills represent a greater proportion.
Further reasons for the competitiveness gap may also be found in structural differences 
between the two chemical sectors. According to Maglia and Sassoon (1999), the 
European chemical industry differs from the American one with regard to a relatively 
higher concentration of low-value-added activities, and thus in relatively lower overall 
productivity. Furthermore, the production scale of European chemical industries is 
relatively smaller and hence their ability to exploit economies of scale.
Finally, Maglia and Sassoon also report that R&D expenditures relative to sales 
volumes are higher than in the U.S., but doubt that this indicator is a valid proxy for the 
competitiveness of R&D efforts. The findings of Fleischer et al. (2000) appear to lend 
support to this suspicion, as they report that EU chemical industries exhibit lower R&D 
productivity, lower patent productivity, less polymer patents, and a lower number of 
new chemicals notifications than their U.S. and Japanese counterparts.
With a special emphasis on knowledge-related drivers of the current restructuring 
processes, Cesaroni et al. (2001) state that knowledge linkages become increasingly 
important. First, networks play an ever more important role in the business. Second, the 
division of labour at the industry level between chemical companies and technology 
suppliers is increasing. Third, the depth of the relationships between chemical producers 
and their customers is growing in order to better specify the characteristics of chemical 
products. Finally, knowledge and R&D take an ever more important role as a source of 
competitive advantage and growth.
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Competitive pressures within the EU
Obviously, these competitive pressures do not only exist on a global level, but should 
also have an impact on the competitive position of national chemical sectors within the 
EU. In fact, there is ample literature evidence of an increasing competition between EU 
chemical industries (for example, Pintelon and Geeroms 1997; BDI and VCI 1999; VCI 
1999). The completion of the EU common market may have played an important role in 
this development: the removal of trade barriers and the harmonisation of tax 
regulations, labour laws and environmental laws may have levelled the playing field 
among national chemical sectors.
As Chapman and Edmond (2000) illustrate, there has been a profound restructuring 
process among chemical industries in the European Union since the mid-1980s. In fact, 
a significant proportion of the worldwide merger and acquisition activities in the 
chemical sector took place within EU, where it was stimulated by economic and 
political integration. Moreover, Chapman and Edmond argue that through the 
restructuring process in the EU chemical industry, a systematic transfer of corporate 
control took place, as companies based in northern Europe acquired a substantial 
number of competitors in southern Europe.
3.1.4 Evidence on the link between chemical industries and pollution 
performance
Given the variety regarding its constituting sub-sectors, its economic importance, and 
the size of its structural differences across EU member states, it should be apparent at 
this point why the chemical industry makes a fascinating subject to this comparative 
analysis. However, the last, obvious, and maybe crucial question that remains to be 
answered concerns the logical link between the activities of the chemical sector and 
pollution performance.
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3.1.4.1 The impact of chemical industry activity on pollution performance
Capturing the impact of chemical industry activity on pollution is not as straight 
forward as it may look, and there is only limited ‘hard evidence’ in the form of chemical 
industry pollution statistics, especially with regard to the EU. There are two reasons that 
may explain this difficulty. First, pollution statistics for EU member states do not 
disaggregate pollution sources below the level of the manufacturing sector. Secondly, 
even if data on the pollution output of the chemical industry was available, the question 
remains whether this information would actually represent its ‘true’ pollution 
performance.
The reason for this, at first sight paradoxical, twist lies in the nature of the chemical 
industries’ business. Most economic activities produce pollution as a by-product of their 
actual products or services. Many of the chemical industries’ products, however, are 
pollutants in themselves. One good example for this ‘indirect’ form of pollution is 
ammonium nitrate (N H 4N O 3), which is produced by agrochemical firms in great 
quantities as a high-nitrogen fertilizer. Once the fertilizer is applied to the soil, a part of 
it is decomposed into ammonia (N H 3) -which is an air pollutant. For that reason, 
statistics show that by far the biggest source of ammonia pollution in Europe is the 
agricultural sector. This observation is certainly correct, but also somewhat superficial. 
Depending on the perspective one chooses, both farmers and the agrochemical 
companies could be considered producers of ammonia pollution. Moreover, one could 
reasonably expect that any change in ammonia pollution performance at macro level 
(for example, through tougher environmental standards) would affect both farmers and 
agrochemical producers.
However, even its own right (that is, even if one only looks at the pollution that is 
generated as a by-product of chemical production), the chemical industry is a significant 
polluter. As an example, figure 19 shows the percentage of chemical industry CO2  
emissions relative to the total CO2 emissions of the industrial sector.
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Figure 19 Major industrial CO2 sources, 1996
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The diagram illustrates how dependent the share o f chemical industry emissions is on a 
country’s industrial structure. Notwithstanding, the chemical industry generally appears 
to be one among several major industrial polluters -  along with the metal industry, the 
cement producing industry (which, in the classification used in the graph, forms part of 
the glass, pottery, and building materials industry), and the paper and pulp industry.
Literature evidence
Most empirical studies that specify the quantity o f chemical industry pollution focus on 
the situation in the United States. The reason for this appears to be rather simple -the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency compiles a toxic release inventory that is far 
more detailed in terms of source location as well as industrial classification than any 
reference for the European Union. However, there seems little reason to suspect that the 
pollution contribution of American chemical industries may vary greatly from its 
European counterpart -a t least not with regard to the order o f magnitude.
100%
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Using data from the U.S. toxic release inventory (TRI) system, Wilson et al. (2002) 
note that the chemical industry emitted 33 percent of all industrial discharges to the air, 
water and soil in 1993. They note that this finding is consistent with historical data, as 
the chemical industry consistently surpassed other industries in TRI releases.
Also based on data from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Domazlicky and 
Weber (2004) report that chemical industries accounted for 36% of all toxic releases 
generated by the U.S. manufacturing sector in 1993. Between 1988 and 1993, toxic 
releases by the chemical industry declined by 7.1% annually, which is less than the 
annual decline of 8 .6 % in the overall manufacturing sector. Over the same period, the 
chemical industry share in manufacturing pollution abatement operating costs increased 
from 22.9% to 24.8%.
Earlier empirical literature has used various definitions as to which industrial sectors 
may be considered pollution-intensive. One approach to this issue is to look at the 
amount of money industries have to spend to reduce their pollution, i.e., their pollution 
abatement cost. This approach formed the basis for the study by Grossman and Krueger 
(1993) who investigate the environmental intensity of industrial sectors by the ratio of 
pollution abatement costs to the total amount of value added. Low and Yeats (1992) 
follow the same rationale of using abatement costs as a measure for pollution intensity. 
They defined pollution-intensive goods as products of industries that incurred 
abatement costs of approximately 1 percent or more of the total value of sales. Based on 
this definition and using data for 1988, they identified four industries as pollution­
intensive: iron and steel, metal manufacturing, cement, and agricultural chemicals.
Along the same line of argument but using different thresholds, Tobey (1990) considers 
industries pollution-intensive when direct and indirect abatement costs were equal or 
greater than 1.85 percent of total costs. By this standard, metal mining, primary 
nonferrous metals, pulp and paper, primary iron and steel, as well as the chemical 
industry were found to be pollution-intensive sectors. In a later study, Wilson et al. 
(2 0 0 2 ) also followed this definition.
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Technological advances in the area o f chemical processes
Cesaroni and Arduini (2001) note that innovation in the chemical sector is especially 
relevant to environmental innovation as a whole, as European environmental patents are 
mostly developed by the chemical industry. They argue that the European chemical 
industry has the leadership role in the development of environmental technologies. 
Furthermore, chemical industries and chemical engineering firms are very active in 
offering their technologies to provide environmental products and services. In this 
sense, the impact of environmental innovation in the chemical sector could be 
multiplied through applying them in other industrial sectors.
Over time, the pollution intensity of chemical industries has been shown to decrease due 
to technical progress. Chemical engineering is constantly developing new production 
processes, especially in the field of new chemical reaction concepts. Such technical 
advances could have the potential to create environmentally friendlier processes in the 
middle and long term. Pereira (1999) notes that the long-term goal is to develop 
chemical processes, which posses a raw material utilisation rate of 100 percent. In other 
words, those processed would use the entire material input to produce new goods. With 
time, Pereira expects a shift in the focus of chemical production, from mere compliance 
with environmental standards to a point where environmentalism, like safety, was fully 
integrated into the corporate culture.
3.1.4.2 The impact of environmental performance on chemical industry activity
There are a significant number of literature contributions that report findings about the 
impact of pollution performance on the economic performance of chemical industries. 
One broad strand of contribution focuses on the cost of pollution reduction, which could 
take the form of capital expenditure. A second group of contributions investigates the 
impact of environmental regulation on chemical industry innovation and productivity 
changes. Finally, there is a branch of investigations on the impact of environmental 
performance on various other indicators of chemical industry competitiveness such as 
exports or FDI.
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Pollution abatement expenditures
Based on data provided by the U.S. Department of Commerce (1993), the chemical 
sector had the highest pollution abatement capital expenditures {PACE) of all industries 
in the sample. Hence, changes in environmental regulation could imply significant 
changes in the cost structure of the industry. For example, in 1991, the pollution 
abatement costs in the production of chemicals and allied products accounted for 12.9 
percent of total capital expenditures. That figure was even higher for related chemical 
sectors, such as the production of paper and allied products, where PACE made up 13.7 
percent of total capital expenditures, and petroleum and coal production. In that 
industry, pollution abatement costs accounted for 24.8 percent of total capital 
expenditures. The average PACE of all U.S. industries was 7.5 percent (Jaffe et al. 
1995).
Moreover, the United States Department of Commerce (1993; also Jaffe et al. 1995), 
also published data on the percentage value of pollution abatement cost (PAC) relative 
to the total value of shipments in 1991. The figures appear to vary greatly across 
industrial sectors. The mean percentage in the sample was 0.62 percent; in other words, 
the U.S. industrial sectors in the sample spent on average 0.62 percent of the value of 
their shipments on pollution abatement measures in 1991. However, some industrial 
sectors in the sample spent significantly less on pollution abatement than the average. 
For example, printing and publishing invested a mere 0.15 percent an PAC, followed by 
machinery (0.24 percent), furniture and fixtures (0.32 percent), electrics and electric 
equipment (0.42 percent), rubber and plastics (0.44 percent), and fabricated metal 
products (0.54 percent).
Among the industries that were found to have high pollution abatement costs were 
paper and pulp production (1.27 percent), chemicals (1.38 percent), primary metal 
products (1.51 percent), and petroleum and coal products (1.8 percent). In conclusion, 
this data seems to indicate that the chemical industry spends more on pollution 
abatement than most other industrial sectors.
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Productivity
Based on their analysis covering various industrial sectors and the period between 1970 
and 1980, Barbera and McConnell (1990) show that environmental regulation has had a 
modestly adverse impact on chemical industry productivity. According to their results, 
the total percentage change in productivity due to environmental regulation amounted to 
approximately -10 percent. As a result of this, total factor productivity appeared to 
decline due to environmental regulation.
Berman and Bui (1998) examine the effect of air quality regulation on the productivity 
of some of the most heavily regulated manufacturing plants in the United States, the oil 
refineries of the Los Angeles air basin. They used direct measures of local air pollution 
regulation in this region to estimate their effects on abatement investment, and 
compared the sample to refineries not subject to local environmental regulations over a 
period between 1979 and 1992.
Despite the high costs associated with the environmental regulations, productivity in the 
Los Angeles Air Basin refineries rose sharply during 1987-1992, a period of generally 
decreasing levels of productivity in the refinery business in other regions. The evidence 
appears to show that stringent air quality regulation could increase productivity levels in 
petroleum refining. Berman and Bui conclude that abatement investments are 
productive, as productivity levels appear to increase due to air quality regulation.
Based on their study on productivity growth among chemical industries at U.S. state- 
level over the period 1988-1993, Domazlicky and Weber (2004) state that they found no 
evidence that environmental protection measures reduced productivity growth. At the 
same time, they conclude that their result is inconsistent with the Porter hypothesis that 
tougher regulation foster innovation.
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Furthermore, according to the estimates of Domazlicky and Weber (2004), the U.S. 
chemical industry lost some U.S. $540 million in 1988 from regulatory constraints and 
threats of lawsuits which kept it from being able to freely dispose of pollution. This 
figure increased over time to U.S. $ 1,112 million in 1993. These numbers appear to 
correspond in broad terms with the estimate of Konar and Cohen (2001), who found 
pollution-related losses of U.S. $ 989 million in 1989 related to U.S. chemical 
industries.
Innovation
As an empirical example of the advantages to the development of innovative 
technology, Porter and van der Linde (1995) refer to the Scandinavian pulp and paper 
producers. This industry was among the first to introduce new environmentally friendly 
production processes. Porter and van der Linde argue that, as a result of this leadership 
position, pulp and paper equipment suppliers have made major gains on the world 
market for innovative bleaching equipment.
Focussing on quality management and pollution reduction, Sheridan (1992) reports the 
example of Dow Chemicals, one of the first global chemical industry producers to 
institutionalise the link between quality improvement and environmental performance. 
Statistical process control mechanisms were established to serve two purposes. First, 
they reduced the variance in production processes. Secondly, they also helped to lower 
the amount of waste generated through these processes. After Dow Chemicals 
implemented these innovative measures, quality management and pollution control has 
become common practice in the chemical sector. Today, it is standard industry practice 
to concentrate the responsibility for environmental, safety, health and quality issues in 
one joint department.
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Overall competitiveness
The European Commission (1998a; 1998b; 1998c) issued a major study on the impact 
of environmental regulation on the competitiveness of the EU chemical industry. The 
study concentrated on six factors of competitiveness: net exports of the EU, the share of 
the EU in world chemical production, outward and inward direct investment, gross 
fixed capital formation, annual turnover, and labour productivity. The main variables to 
proxy the strictness of environmental regulation were pollution abatement costs and 
expenditures (PACE), as well as the ratio of PACE to value added by the chemical 
sector.
The study asserts that, despite facing stricter environmental regulation, the chemical 
industry has performed better than other manufacturing sectors. Based on this finding, 
the investigation team concluded that business decisions of the chemical sector are not 
based on the strength of environmental regulation.
On the other hand, based on correlation estimations between the six competitiveness 
indicators and the proxies for environmental regulation regarding Germany and the 
Netherlands, the study found no correlation between the competitiveness of the 
chemical industry and the severity of environmental regulation.
Wilson et al. (2002) conducted an empirical study on the impact of environmental 
regulation on exports of five pollution-intensive sectors in 6  OECD and 18 non-OECD 
countries. The industrial sectors under observation include metal mining, nonferrous 
metals, iron, steel and chemicals. Wilson et al. concludes that, if country heterogeneity 
is accounted for, more stringent environmental standards imply lower net exports.
An empirical study on the effect of the laxity of environmental regulation on FDI by 
Xing and Kolstad (1996; 2002) shows that environmental regulation is a highly 
significant determinant of FDI into chemical industry and primary metals. Thus, lower 
foreign direct investment seems to be related to the strictness of environmental 
regulation. On the other hand, the analysis also concludes that environmental regulation 
is insignificant for variations in FDI into less polluting sectors.
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Concluding remarks
As the evidence from the data and the literature shows, there are numerous sources of 
evidence of a two-way relationship between environmental performance and chemical 
industry activity. Both observations are important for the theoretical basis of this study.
On the one hand, the link between chemical industry activity and environmental 
performance, and in particular pollution performance, is a fundamental assumption to 
the following analysis. Unfortunately, the data evidence on this point in the context of 
the EU is far from comprehensive. There are, however, two lines of argument that could 
make up for the lack of a clear statistical proof. First, and most importantly, there is the 
analogy with the situation in the United States, where numerous studies have produced 
empirical evidence on the chemical industry-pollution link. Second, chemical industry 
products contain or are -by their nature- pollutants which might be released to the 
environment by subsequent users. For this reason, statistics that show only the amount 
of chemical industry pollution which is generated as a by-product of their production 
process, might fall short of the sector’s real contribution anyway.
On the other hand, there is a host of literature evidence on the link between 
environmental performance and the different aspects of chemical industry performance. 
Since this study is also a contribution to this arena, its results will have to be reflected 
with those earlier observations.
3,2 The independent variables
One o f the most important effects o f  increased state involvement in environmental 
affairs will be the new competitive disparities it will produce. There are already 
significant geographical differences in environmental costs in such industries as 
petroleum, chemicals, and pulp and paper. [...]
In addition to labor availability, access to raw materials, and energy costs, state 
environmental regulation is likely to become a key criterion in siting new 
production facilities in the future.
Christensen (1995: 150)
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The choice of independent variables is one of the critical steps that determine the 
quality of a regression model. The independent variables need to meet a number of 
criteria. First, they should have an intuitive and straight forward causal relation to the 
dependent variable. Second, they need to be sufficiently independent from each other in 
order to minimise the risk of collinearity. Yet, taken together, the explanatory factors 
have to account for as much of the evolution of the dependent variable as possible. Last 
but not least, the data sets need to be available, consistent and comprehensive.
Given the research question at hand, pollution performance will obviously be one of the 
independent variables; the other explanatory factors need to be chosen according to the 
requirements mentioned above.
The first question to be answered here is which factors other than pollution performance 
may have an impact on the economic performance of EU chemical industries. One of 
the most obvious places to look for answers is certainly the chemical industry itself.
The European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC) has published a series of position 
papers, called Barometers o f Competitiveness, in which it highlights and analyses issues 
that it believes are of importance to the competitive position of the European chemical 
sector. Over the last years, this series included position papers on the following topics:
• the profitability and productivity gap between the U.S. and European chemical 
sectors (CEFIC 1998a)
• the tax burden on EU chemical industries (CEFIC 1999a)
• regulation as an inhibitor of innovation (CEFIC 2000c)
• the EU policy towards chemicals’ regulation (CEFIC 2001b)
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Three of the independent variables introduced below aim to reflect these issues. First, 
the variable ‘taxes on import and production’ aims to proxy different taxation systems 
or taxation levels. Second, the variable ‘productivity of the manufacturing sector’ 
should serve as a proxy for differences in labour productivity between national chemical 
sectors. Third, ‘fuel price’, reflects one very important cost factor for chemical industry 
production. Moreover, the GDP evolution of EU member states will serve as a technical 
independent variable to account for the size of the economy in regression estimations 
where the dependent variables are expressed in absolute terms.
Finally, and most important in the context of this thesis, the lead independent variable 
will be environmental performance. The following sections will provide a 
comprehensive overview on each of these independent variables. Let us start by looking 
at environmental performance, which will be proxied by relative pollution performance.
3.2.1 Air pollution performance
3.2.1.1 Methodology
Every quantitative analysis on the pollution performance of states or of industries has to 
deal with considerable practical and methodological challenges. Most of them may be 
summarised by two keywords -  availability and suitability.
At first sight, the issue of data availability appears to be the more obvious and 
immediate difficulty. The scarceness of consistent, comparable data series that cover 
sufficiently large periods of time is a well documented problem in the field of 
environmental analysis (Jahn 1998). Yet, in practice data suitability may pose the much 
more demanding obstacle to the work of empirical researchers. In particular, questions 
on data significance, data comparability, and the selection of a meaningful observation 
period need to be addressed.
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In his book The Sceptical Environmentalist, Bjom Lomborg (2001) argues that many 
statistical analyses on environmental status-quo or performance have failed to provide 
satisfactory answers to the above mentioned concerns. Lomborg states that the failure 
might sometimes have been due to the fact that environmental statistics or their analyses 
are ideologically biased. In other instances, data sources might have been inadequate or 
statistical techniques flawed.
The heated and at times bitter debate about Lomborg’s contribution illustrates how 
difficult it is in practise to overcome the practical and methodological problems 
connected to pollution performance analysis. The question still stands whether it may be 
even impossible to solve them. Nevertheless, from a more positive angle, this ongoing 
battle of arguments and approaches also shows that, despite all criticism, quantitative 
environmental analysis is a lively and interesting field for empirical research.
This study will look at air pollution as a proxy for the pollution at large. This approach 
is in line with a large number of empirical contributions in the environmental 
economics literature, for example, Lundquist (1980), Crepaz (1995), Janicke et al. 
(1996; 1997), Henderson (1996), Jahn (1998), Becker and Henderson (2000), and 
Khanna (2000).
Data basis
Before this background, the importance of commenting the source and type of data that 
will be used in the following analysis is obvious. At the core of this investigation are 
three indicators, which aim to reflect the pollution performance of the EU economies. 
The indicators are based on air pollution data series, which were provided by two 
research centres, EMEP and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
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EMEP, the Co-operative Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation o f  Long Range 
Transmissions o f Air Pollutants in Europe, is an international research project under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (EMEP and CORINAIR 
1999; UNECE 1999; cf. Roca et al. 2001). Its principal objective is to compile reliable 
and internationally standardised data series on a number of air pollutants. For our 
purposes, this data source is especially valuable, since the first international convention 
on long range air pollution was adopted in Geneva in 1979 -a t a time when some 
European countries did not even have designated environmental ministries. Therefore, 
the EMEP database provides a valuable insight into the development of environmental 
performance, as some data series provide continuous information from 1980 onwards.
The Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Centre (CDIAC) of the U.S. Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory offers an even more extensive time series. Its database also 
contains estimates of historical carbon dioxide emission data. Some national data sets 
reach back as far as 1751. However, for the purpose of the present investigation, it is 
sufficient to utilize emission data reaching back to 1980.
This investigation will draw on EMEP and CDIAC data regarding anthropogenic 
emissions at national level for 15 member states of the European Union -that is, 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom- over 
the period from 1980 to 1999.
Analytical framework
One fundamental characteristic about the research approach taken in this study is that it 
deals with pollution performance indicators, which are computed within a relative 
system. Put differently, the indicators that this study is about to develop are designed to 
compare national pollution levels within the framework of all countries in the data set. 
Hence, the pollution of each EU member state is compared to the other EU nations.
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A second basic feature of the subsequent pollution performance indicators is that they 
are computed over a period of several years. Hence, one can compare the pollution 
intensity within the relative system between several points in time. The development of 
the indicators may therefore describe relative changes in a nation’s pollution 
performance over the observation period.
Third, one should note that the indicators are composed from up to seven sub­
indicators, each of which represents a particular type of anthropogenic air pollutant: 
ammonia (NH3), carbon monoxide (CO), carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), non­
methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOC), nitrogen dioxide (NO2) and sulphur 
dioxide (SO2).
The pollution performance indicators will incorporate some or all of these sub­
indicators. Each sub-indicator contributes to the final pollution performance indicator at 
equal weight. Note however that in some cases, indicators will be composed of less than 
all seven sub-indicators. This is due to data constraints.
The principle that governs the transformation of the raw pollution data into the sub­
indicators applies equally to all pollutants. For the sake of clarity, the following section 
will focus on sulphur emissions as an example.
Figure 20 captures the development of national sulphur emissions in the 15 EU member 
states from 1980 to 1999 in absolute values. The data in this chart is not normalised; as 
a result, the information it provides cannot be used as a basis for cross-country 
comparisons. However, several initial observations are readily apparent. Overall, the 
amount of sulphur emissions in the EU has declined over the observation period. This 
reduction was especially pointed in Germany and the United Kingdom. 6 After 1989, the 
widespread rapid degradation of the East German industrial landscape as well as the 
proliferation of other types of domestic heating caused a swift decrease in sulphur 
emissions.
6 There appears to be a striking rise of sulphur emissions in Germany between 1989 and 1990. However, 
this increase was probably a direct result of the German reunification. The German data series refers to 
West Germany until 1989 and to reunited Germany from 1990 onwards.
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Figure 20 Anthropogenic sulphur (SO2)  emissions in EU member states
6000
5000 -
de
i .(04>>1 4000
c2
o
<0■oc<0
<03
3000 -
eso
£ 2000 -
1000 -
in h-coO)
CM CO
s 3 3 inCM so>CO01 8
Data source: EMEP (2001)
In order to compare pollution values across the countries in the sample, the 'raw' 
pollution data will be normalised, i.e., the analysis will account for the size of the 
country or its economy.
There is a range of potential normalising factors, among them territory, population or 
economic size. From a geographic point of view, territorial size may be the first and 
most intuitive choice of normalising factor. However, with regard to the statistical 
question at hand, this normalising method appears less appropriate than the latter 
factors. By definition, anthropogenic, i.e. man-made, pollution is fundamentally linked 
to human presence and its economic activity. By contrast, territorial size is not 
dynamically linked to population or economic presence.
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In the European Union at large, as well as within its member states, population and 
economic activity are not equally distributed. Consequently, in large countries with a 
relatively low population and economic density like Sweden, the amount of pollution 
per area unit would be downward biased. Inversely, in countries with relatively high 
population and economic density figures, such as the Netherlands, pollution per area 
values would be upward biased.
For this reason, pollution per capita values seem to be the appropriate starting point for 
an investigation into pollution performance. It will be used as an example in the 
following explanation on the methodological background of the indexes. Sections 
3.2.1.2, 3.2.1.3, and 3.2.1.4 will develop these indexes in detail.
Following this, the normalised value of a country's pollution N  \AP/t ) could be 
calculated as follows:
/  \  A P j
(3.1.1) N i i P j ) --------- ---------
populationit
where i indexes the country, t the year and j  the pollutant.
In this context, APj stands for the amount of air pollution with regard to country /, year
t and pollutant j .  The result of this operation yields the national average value of 
pollutant j  per capita. In other words, this normalisation function computes the average 
annual pollution load, expressed for instance in grams of sulphur emissions per capita.
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Table 2 Anthropogenic SO2 emissions per capita
Anthropogenic S 0 2 emissions (g / cap.)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
be 0.084 0.072 0.070 0.057 0.051 0.040 0.038 0.037 0.036 0.033 0.037 0.033 0.032 0.029 0.025 0.024 0.024 0.022 0.021 0.018
dk 0.088 0.072 0.074 0.063 0.060 0.067 0.057 0.050 0.050 0.039 0.036 0.047 0.036 0.030 0.030 0.028 0.034 0.021 0.015 0.011
de 0.051 0.049 0.046 0.043 0.042 0.039 0.036 0.031 0.020 0.015 0.067 0.050 0.041 0.036 0.030 0.024 0.017 0.014 0.011 0.010
gr 0.041 0.043 0.045 0.047 0.048 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.054 0.054 0.053 0.050 0.053 0.052 0.051 0.051 0.051
es 0.076 0.073 0.072 0.073 0.066 0.062 0.059 0.055 0.046 0.055 0.053 0.053 0.052 0.049 0.048 0.044 0.038 0.039 0.037 0.035
fr 0.060 0.047 0.044 0.036 0.032 0.027 0.024 0.024 0.022 0.024 0.023 0.024 0.021 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.013 0.014 0.012
ie 0.065 0.056 0.045 0.041 0.040 0.040 0.046 0.049 0.043 0.046 0.053 0.051 0.048 0.045 0.049 0.045 0.040 0.045 0.047 0.042
it 0.067 0.059 0.050 0.043 0.037 0.033 0.034 0.035 0.034 0.032 0.029 0.027 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.021 0.018 0.018 0.016
lu 0.066 0.057 0.047 0.038 0.041 0.044 0.043 0.042 0.041 0.040 0.039 0.039 0.038 0.038 0.032 0.022 0.019 0.014 0.009 0.009
nl 0.035 0.033 0.028 0.022 0.021 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.014 0.014 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.006
at 0.051 0.044 0.042 0.031 0.028 0.025 0.023 0.020 0.015 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.005
pt 0.027 0.028 0.029 0.031 0.025 0.020 0.023 0.022 0.020 0.028 0.036 0.035 0.041 0.036 0.034 0.037 0.033 0.034 0.038 0.035
fi 0.122 0.111 0.100 0.077 0.075 0.078 0.067 0.067 0.061 0.049 0.052 0.039 0.028 0.024 0.022 0.019 0.020 0.019 0.017 0.017
se 0.059 0.052 0.045 0.037 0.036 0.032 0.032 0.027 0.027 0.019 0.014 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.006 0.006 0.007
uk 0.087 0.079 0.075 0.069 0.066 0.066 0.069 0.069 0.067 0.065 0.065 0.062 0.059 0.053 0.046 0.040 0.034 0.028 0.026 0.020
AVG 0.065 0.058 0.054 0.047 0.045 0.043 0.041 0.040 0.037 0.035 0.039 0.036 0.034 0.031 0.029 0.027 0.025 0.022 0.021 0.020
COV 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.16
Note: AVG Weighted average (weights according to the ratio national vs. total population)
COV Coefficient of variation
Emission data (except C 0 2) from EMEP (2002, es/gr/pt: 2000)
C 0 2 emission data from CDIAC (2002)
Population data from Eurostat (2001)
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Table 2 shows the empirical results with regard to sulphur emissions; the complete 
results for all seven covered air pollutants can be found in the appendix as table 27.
Figure 21 illustrates to which considerable extent the average sulphur pollution load of 
EU countries varied. In 1980, Finland had the highest sulphur emission levels with 
0.122g per capita. On the other hand, Portugal had the lowest figure with 0.027g per 
capita. The average value across all fifteen EU member states, which was composed 
from national values that were weighted according to the countries’ population 
numbers, amounted to 0 . 6 6  grams of sulphur emissions per capita per annum.
Figure 21 Anthropogenic sulphur emissions per capita, selected EU member
states
0.14
0.12
0.06 - Weighted Average (EU15)
0.04 -
0.02
0.00
3 o> CO in 00CM io>
Emission data from EMEP (2002) 
Population data from Eurostat (2001)
146
On the first look, the above graph tells a fairly straight-forward story: over the 
observation period, sulphur emission levels have decreased considerably in most of the 
15 states that currently constitute the European Union. The weighted average has 
declined to 0.035g and 0.020g per capita in 1989 and 1999 respectively. As mentioned 
earlier, the rise in the average sulphur pollution level in 1990 may be explained by the 
inclusion of Eastern Germany.
The picture also illustrates that some countries have managed to cut their sulphur 
emission levels more than others. Both Finland and the United Kingdom exhibit a 
significant reduction. Sulphur emission levels in Greece and Portugal have risen 
significantly over the observation period. After 1994, Greece had the highest sulphur
n
emission level per capita in the sample.
On the basis of this graph, one might be tempted to conclude that a downward 
harmonisation of sulphur emission levels took place across the EU15 countries. This 
would correspond to the observations that the weighted average has decreased over the 
observation period and that the differences between the highest and the lowest sulphur 
emission figures per capita have also decreased in absolute terms.
However, such an assessment would tell only half the story. Since the average is 
changing over the observation period, the development regarding the differences 
between the highest and the lowest sulphur emission figures must be assessed in relative 
terms. One way to do this is by calculating the so-called coefficient of variation (COV).
The COV is a statistical tool to compare the variability of data measured across the 
observed years (Neumayer 2001). It is computed for a certain year t as follows:
(3.1.2) COV. = N i
ZC*i; - X,Y
i = i
7 The reasons behind this observed change in pollution load may differ from country to country; possible 
explanations could include a shift to cleaner technologies, a shift in industrial structure, or the 
expansion or contraction of economies. Although this would be interesting background information, 
highlighting the individual factors for each country in the sample would exceed the scope of this 
thesis.
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where N is the number of countries (in this case, the 15 EU member states), jc, is the 
sulphur emission load per capita with regard to country i at time t, and x t is the 
weighted average at time t.
Figure 22 graphically displays the results of this calculation (cf. table 2). While the 
weighted average is decreasing, the COV is increasing over time. This seems to indicate 
that the relative differences in sulphur emission between EU member states have 
actually increased while the overall level of sulphur emissions has decreased over the 
observation period.
Figure 22 Anthropogenic sulphur emissions per capita (EU15): coefficient of 
variation and weighted average
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This observation corresponds in principle to the findings presented by Neumayer 
(2001). Using a different data source and a slightly different calculation method, 
Neumayer showed that between 1985 and 1996, sulphur emission levels in the EU have 
decreased in average, but diverged within the sample.
This conclusion is important because it represents the rationale behind the theoretical 
approach to the further development of the environmental performance indicators: 
Looking at the development of emission levels in absolute terms certainly reveals one 
specific aspect of statistical reality. Such an approach may well be best suited for 
analyses into the pollution performance of particular states or economies on a stand 
alone basis. However, if the focus is on the pollution performance within a set of 
countries over time, the method of choice must be to look at the relative development of 
emission figures.
For this reason, this study will analyse pollution performance indicators which are 
computed within a relative system. With regard to the research question at hand, the 
pollution performance indicators need to compare the relative development of air 
pollutant emission levels across the EU and relate them to chemical industry 
performance. Thus, the fifteen European Union member states jointly represent the 
relative system that forms the focal point of the study. The scope of analysis is restricted 
to the relative differences within the system; the overall or absolute development of EU 
pollution levels as well as the EU pollution performance relative to other economies 
will not be the object of this analysis.
Note that this set-up inherently implies that the European Union constitutes a valid 
relative system. In other words, the study assumes that the EU member states to form a 
sufficiently homogeneous group of countries.
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Air pollution time series
As mentioned before, the pollution performance indicators will be aggregates of up to 
seven sub-indicators. The sub-indicators capture the following anthropogenic air 
pollutants:8
• Methane (C H 4) is an integral component of the greenhouse effect, second only 
to CO2 as a contributor to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. Methane is 
mainly produced by anthropogenic sources, such as landfills, natural gas and 
petroleum systems, agricultural activities, coal mining, stationary and mobile 
combustion, wastewater treatment, and certain industrial processes. In the 
chemical industry, methane is a raw material for the manufacture of methanol, 
formaldehyde, nitro methane, chloroform, carbon tetrachloride, and Freon.
• Carbon monoxide (CO) is a colourless, odourless, tasteless and toxic gas 
produced as a by-product of combustion. Any fuel burning appliance, vehicle, 
tool or other device produces carbon monoxide gas. Carbon monoxide inhibits 
the blood's ability to carry oxygen to body tissues including vital organs such as 
the heart and brain.
• Carbon dioxide (CO2) is one of the gases in our atmosphere, being uniformly 
distributed over the earth's surface.
8 Information on air pollutant characteristics in this section was obtained through the several internet 
sources Columbia University Press (2001). The Columbia Encyclopaedia. 12 May 2002, European 
Environment Agency (2002). EEA Multilingual Glossary. 12 May 2002;
http://glossary.eea.eu.int/EEAGlossary, Ontario Ministry of Environment and Energy (2002). Air 
Quality Ontario. Pollutants. 12 May 2002, Shakhashiri (2002). Chemical of the week. 12 May 2002; 
http://scifun.chem.wisc.edu/chemweek, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2002). EPA Global 
Warming Site: National Emissions. 12 May 2002; 
www.epa.gov/globalwarming/emissions/national/index.html..
150
Energy-related activities account for almost all CO2 emissions. The dominant 
contributor is carbon dioxide from fossil fuel combustion. As fossil fuels are 
combusted, the carbon stored in them is almost entirely emitted as CO2 . The 
amount of carbon in fuels per unit of energy content varies significantly by fuel 
type. For example, coal contains the highest amount of carbon per unit of 
energy, while petroleum has about 25 percent less carbon than coal, and natural 
gas about 45 percent less.
Some CO2 emissions are also produced as by-products of various non-energy- 
related activities. Such production processes include cement manufacture, lime 
manufacture, limestone and dolomite use, e.g. in iron and steel making, as well 
as soda ash manufacture and consumption. Commercially, CO2 finds uses as a 
refrigerant as dry ice, in beverage carbonation, and in fire extinguishers.
• Ammonia (NH3) is a colourless gas that is about one half as dense as air at 
ordinary temperatures and pressures. It has a characteristic pungent, penetrating 
odour. Ammonia forms a minute proportion of the atmosphere. It also takes part 
in many chemical reactions.
Ammonia is prepared commercially in vast quantities. The major method of 
production is the so-called Haber process, in which nitrogen is combined 
directly with hydrogen at high temperatures and pressures in the presence of a 
catalyst. It is obtained as a by-product of the destructive distillation of coal.
Ammonia solutions are used to clean, bleach, and deodorize; to etch aluminium; 
to saponify (hydrolyze) oils and fats; and in chemical manufacture. The 
ammonia sold for household use is a dilute water solution of ammonia in which 
ammonium hydroxide is the active cleansing agent. The major use of ammonia 
and its compounds is as fertilizers. Ammonia is also used in large amounts in the 
Ostwald process for the synthesis of nitric acid; in the Solvay process for the 
synthesis of sodium carbonate; in the synthesis of numerous organic compounds 
used as dyes, drugs, and in plastics; and in various metallurgical processes.
Ammonia can attack the skin and eyes. The vapours are especially irritating, as 
prolonged exposure and inhalation cause serious injury and may be fatal.
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• Non-methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOC) include such compounds 
as propane, butane, and ethane. They are emitted primarily from transportation, 
industrial processes, and non-industrial consumption of organic solvents. The 
main source of NMVOC is the combustion of fossil fuels.
• Nitrogen dioxide (NO2) results from the combustion of fossil fuels, contributing 
to both smog and acid precipitation. NO2 is hazardous to human health and the 
environment. It contributes to acid rain, which harms aquatic ecosystems (rivers, 
lakes and wetlands) as well as forests and crops.
Nitrogen dioxide is a component of smog and ground level ozone primarily 
produced by the combustion of fossil fuels -  mainly by vehicles, electricity 
generation and industrial processes. The health impacts of exposure to smog 
include impaired lung function in the short term as well as accelerated 
deterioration in lung function over the long term.
• Sulphur dioxide (SO2) is a colourless gas. It can be oxidized to sulphur trioxide, 
which in the presence of water vapour is readily transformed to sulphuric acid 
mist. SO2 can be oxidized to form acid aerosols. SO2 is a precursor to sulphates, 
which are one of the main components of respirable particles in the atmosphere.
Health effects caused by exposure to high levels of SO2 include breathing 
problems, respiratory illness and cardiovascular disease. It also damages trees 
and crops. SO2 , along with Nitrogen Oxides, are the main precursors of acid 
rain. This contributes to the acidification of lakes and streams, accelerated 
corrosion of buildings and reduced visibility. SO2 also causes formation of 
microscopic acid aerosols, which have serious health implications as well as 
contributing to climate change.
An important source of SO2 emissions are smelters and utilities. Other industrial 
sources include iron and steel mills, petroleum refineries, and pulp and paper 
mills. Small sources include residential, commercial and industrial space 
heating.
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Besides being greenhouse gases, all seven air pollutants have in common that they are 
strongly linked to human economic activity. With the exception of methane and N H 3, 
the emission of the listed pollutants is, to varying degrees, the product of fossil fuel 
combustion.
Table 3 illustrates the availability of complete data sets regarding the seven air 
pollutants. All data sets are complete from 1990 onwards. The data series on CO2 , NO2 
and SO2 are complete from 1980 onwards. CO2 values for 1999 have been estimated on 
the basis of a linear projection.
Table 3 Air pollution data availability (national level)
O e o 0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0 0 © \ © s 0 \ ® 0 s 0 \ ® 0 \ ®  Os
cu, ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
co ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
C02 ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ □
n h 3 ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
NMVOC ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■  ■
N0 3 ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
S 0 2 ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
■ Complete data set 
□ Values projected (linear projection)
Because the observation periods vary from pollutant to pollutant, this study will look at 
two types of pollution performance indicator time series: One time series will cover the 
period between 1990 and 1999 and comprise all seven air pollutants at equal weight. 
The second time series will cover an extended observation period (1980 to 1999) at the 
trade-off of comprising only three air pollutants (CO2 , NO2 and SO2) at equal weight.
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3.2.1.2 Population-based Pollution Load Index (PLI)
The first indicator will be called Pollution Load Index (PLI). It compares the 
development of national air pollution levels per capita to the development of the 
weighted EU average. The weight of country i (w) in year t is derived as a function of 
its population size relative to the European Union as a whole:
(3.2.1) Wu=_Popuhtion^ ^  i  = b ed k  >uk
y  population kt
k=be
The overall weighted average with regard to pollutant j ,  W \EU 15)/, is composed as 
follows:
v k
(3.2.2) W (Et/15); = Y .A P I  • wkt where AP stands for air pollution
k=be
To avoid distorted results, the weighted average will exclude country i when analysing 
its pollution performance relative to the average:
uk
(3.2.3) W (El/15 - iX = Y j Api  ■ wk< with k „ i
k=be
The Pollution Load Index of country i with regard to pollutant j  ( PLIJit) is thus 
constructed as follows:
(3.2.4) PLIJit = {tv- UPj )/W \EU\5 -/,)]• 10o|- 100
or,
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A p J  /  uk
' H a P ’ ■ wkl
populationit /  £^e
•KXU-lOO
with k „ i
where N(AP) stands for normalised per capita air pollution.
In plain words, this operation compares the national air pollution performance per 
capita to the weighted EU average. The PLI therefore stands for the difference of 
national air pollution levels relative to the EU average in percent.
Figure 23 Pollution load index (SO2 emissions): Finland and Greece
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Emission data from EMEP (2002) 
Population data from Eurostat (2001)
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Table 29 in the appendix reports the outcome of this calculation comprehensively, both 
with regard to sulphur emissions, as well as with regard to the other air pollutants. The 
following graph also illustrates the outcome of this operation. As in the previous 
section, sulphur emission figures serve as examples (cf. figure 2 1 ).
As the graph illustrates, the PLI projects national pollution load levels onto a scale that 
ranges from [-1 0 0 ,+ 0 0). On this scale, the value -100 would indicate zero emissions. 
Index value 0 would indicate that national pollution load levels were equal to the EU 
average, whereas positive PLI values point at national pollution load levels being higher 
than the average.
Looking at the development of the PLI values regarding the sulphur emissions of 
Finland and Greece, the very different sulphur pollution performance of the two 
countries becomes apparent. Finland has managed to reduce its sulphur pollution load 
from an index value that was roughly twice the EU average in the first years of the 
observation period to below-average values from 1991 onwards. 9
Inversely, Greece’s sulphur pollution load indicator has increased almost steadily, with 
the exception of the years 1989/1990. Note that this break may well be explained by the 
external shock of German reunification due to which the East German states were 
incorporated into German sulphur emission figures from 1990 onwards. Since Germany 
has the biggest weight in the weighted EU average, this had a significant impact on the 
average from 1990 onwards (cf. figure 22). Given that the indicator is constructed in 
relation to the EU average, that external shock introduces a break into the indicator time 
series.
9 Cf. footnote 7 on page 147.
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3.2.1.3 GDP-based General Pollution Intensity (GPI)
As mentioned earlier, population is not the only feasible normalising factor for national 
air pollution. Hence, the second pollution performance indicator will be GDP-based. 
Normalising a country's pollution with its economic size, expressed in GDP, yields how 
much pollution per unit of GDP occurs. In other words, this method reveals how much 
pollution an economy produces in the process of generating a unit of GDP, for instance 
a million Euro worth of GDP. The basic idea of the indicator is comparable to the 
approach of Zaim and Taskim (2000).
The General Pollution Intensity (GPI) index builds on this idea. Methodically, the GPI 
is constructed much in the same way as the first indicator. The main difference is that 
economic size, as expressed by GDPu, replaces population both in the normalising as 
well as in the weighting function:
(3.3.1) GPI!, =
uk
GDP
• 100^-100
it / k =be
GDP.
with =it uk
I
k=be
T g d p„,
and k „ i
The following table 4 displies the results of this calculation for sulphur emissions. The 
complete results for all pollutants can be found as table 30 in the appendix.
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Table 4 Anthropogenic SO2 emissions /  GDP
A n th ro p o g en ic  S 0 2 em issions /  G D P  (tonnes / m illion  €) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
be 9.60 8.06 7.91 6.13 5.07 3.75 3.27 2.98 2.71 2.29 2.42 2.05 1.83 1.61 1.28 1.16 1.12 1.01 0.93 0.79
dk 9.71 7.43 6.92 5.31 4.60 4.68 3.63 3.03 2.89 2.16 1.87 2.39 1.77 1.38 1.31 1.14 1.31 0.78 0.52 0.36
de 5.41 4.91 4.24 3.61 3.27 2.87 2.45 1.97 1.20 0.87 4.46 2.84 2.16 1.80 1.43 1.09 0.77 0.61 0.48 0.43
gr 11.07 10.22 9.11 9.62 9.27 9.63 10.54 10.54 9.21 8.31 7.69 7.53 7.22 6.96 6.26 6.15 5.52 4.99 4.98 4.57
es 18.64 16.79 15.07 15.75 12.59 10.99 9.43 8.24 6.00 6.02 5.19 4.71 4.50 4.61 4.55 3.94 3.21 3.20 2.89 2.59
fr 6.68 4.80 4.28 3.36 2.80 2.15 1.81 1.73 1.50 1.58 1.36 1.44 1.20 1.00 0.89 0.80 0.76 0.63 0.63 0.51
ie 16.67 12.22 8.75 7.47 6.98 6.33 6.79 7.12 5.79 5.60 5.84 5.33 4.74 4.38 4.35 3.69 3.01 2.91 2.87 2.30
it 11.57 9.16 7.00 5.30 4.07 3.42 3.16 3.11 2.79 2.37 1.94 1.68 1.51 1.61 1.51 1.61 1.28 1.07 1.00 0.85
lu 6.05 4.86 3.47 2.58 2.52 2.38 2.16 2.04 1.87 1.63 1.43 1.30 1.23 1.14 0.91 0.59 0.51 0.38 0.23 0.21
nl 3.97 3.61 2.84 2.12 1.87 1.52 1.45 1.40 1.29 0.98 0.91 0.74 0.70 0.62 0.52 0.48 0.43 0.37 0.31 0.28
at 6.86 5.52 4.58 3.09 2.58 2.18 1.80 1.50 1.08 0.89 0.73 0.61 0.44 0.39 0.35 0.32 0.30 0.28 0.25 0.21
Pt 13.20 11.66 11.52 12.20 9.70 6.79 7.09 6.17 5.02 5.90 6.68 5.51 5.62 5.05 4.59 4.58 3.83 3.86 3.97 3.42
fi 16.06 12.06 9.56 6.92 5.84 5.52 4.74 4.39 3.50 2.42 2.52 2.05 1.79 1.79 1.44 1.03 1.10 0.96 0.83 0.76
se 5.47 4.23 3.69 2.99 2.48 2.05 2.05 1.66 1.48 0.94 0.68 0.51 0.48 0.57 0.51 0.47 0.44 0.26 0.25 0.31
uk 12.62 9.60 8.47 7.45 6.72 6.19 6.83 6.53 5.60 5.02 4.99 4.43 4.28 3.88 3.12 2.79 2.21 1.44 1.29 0.95
AVG 10.24 834 7.16 6.26 536 4.70 4.48 4.16 3.46 3.13 3.25 2.87 2.63 2.45 2.20 1.99 1.72 1.52 1.43 1.24
COV 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.27
Note: AVG Weighted average (weights according to the ratio national vs. total GDP)
COV Coefficient of variation
Emission data (except C 0 2) from  EM EP (2002, es/gr/pt 2000)
C 0 2 emission data  from CDIAC (2002)
GDP data  from Eurostat (2001)
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Figure 24 graphically displays selected results of the first calculation step, the 
normalising operation. The average has been constructed by weighting the 15 EU 
member states according to their economic size (GDP), calculated on an annual basis.
The figures reveal that Spain and Greece generated relatively more sulphur emissions 
(“used up more clean air”) to produce goods and services than other EU economies had 
to. In other words, the Spanish and Greek economies were more pollution intense than 
the EU average. Inversely, the data also show that the Netherlands were comparatively 
less pollution intense than other EU countries.
Figure 24 Anthropogenic sulphur emissions /  GDP, selected EU member states
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Following the operation outlined in equation 4.3.1 above, one can transform the 
normalised emission figures into the GPI indicator. Figure 25 graphically represents the 
indicators for Greece, Spain and the Netherlands of this operation. With regard to 
sulphur emissions in 1980, the GPI was 123 in Spain and 23 in Greece. In 1999, that 
index was 256 in Spain and 474 in Greece. Thus, both countries’ pollution intensity 
increased dramatically compared to the EU average over the observation period. By 
contrast, the general pollution intensity in the Netherlands decreased from -57 in 1980 
to - 6 8  in 1999.
Figure 25 General pollution intensity (SO2 Emissions): Greece, Netherlands and 
Spain
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3.2.1.4 GDP-based Manufacturing Pollution Intensity (MPI)
The third pollution performance indicator is aimed at capturing specifically the 
pollution performance of the manufacturing sector. Whereas the GPI indicator is a tool 
to capture inefficiency differences on the level of the general economy, the 
Manufacturing Pollution Intensity (MPI) indicator looks at the industrial pollution 
performance.
This approach is based on the notion that some economic sectors are more 
environmentally hazardous than others. In this respect, the manufacturing sector is an 
especially interesting case, because it produces a significant amount of pollution. One 
might hypothesize that manufacturing sectors are therefore especially sensitive to 
changes in pollution performance. The MPI indicator is constructed as follows:
(3.4.1)
MPIjt
manufacturingAPJ ,--------------------------- / > manufacturingAPI •
manufacturingGDPj( /
100M 00
with w;, =
manufacturingGDPit
y  manufacturingGDPkt
k=be
and k „ i
Although the basic method of construction of this indicator remains the same as for the 
other two indicators, in practice, its calculation is a more difficult task. The raw data for 
the computation of the MPI has to be more specific, as the indicator puts the amount of 
manufacturing emissions ( manufacturingAPj) in relation to the manufacturing GDP 
( manufacturingGDPjt).
The results of this operation applied to the case of sulphur emissions is recorded in table 
5. The complete results for all pollutants are appended as table 31.
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Table 5 Manufacturing SO2 emissions / manufacturing GDP
S 0 2 Emissions by Combustion, Manufacturing Sector (tonnes) / Manufactoring GDP (million €)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
be 10.73 8.46 7.76 8.45 7.86 4.03 4.14
dk 10.57 6.46 5.18 4.29 2.89 2.85 2.88 2.41 2.05 2.02 1.49
de 10.12 8.70 7.47 5.56 3.79 2.81 2.12 1.50 1.22
gr 31.33 25.33 23.33 21.60 18.41 18.54 16.84 14.33 13.90 12.95 12.84
es 53.63 51.75 39.31 33.22 25.66 22.10 20.06 18.68 18.96 15.14 14.72 13.84 12.58 13.24 12.12 10.12
fr 3.23 3.28 2.75 2.36 2.27 1.89
ie 10.57 8.34 7.31 7.50 7.71 5.52
it 45.72 34.63 25.07 20.11 13.14 8.90 7.62 6.24 5.84 5.13 4.41 4.03 3.73 2.96 2.29 2.08
lu 23.45 15.68 16.48 15.74 15.30 11.73 6.58
nl 7.74 2.86 2.34 2.09 1.95 1.77 1.62
at 35.88 29.31 23.64 13.16 7.88 6.27 4.98 4.00 2.80 1.84 1.78 1.16 0.77 0.63 0.50 0.58
Pt 17.14 13.38 13.52 12.01 11.15 11.39
fi 12.06 6.12 3.40 2.23 2.17 1.42
se 1.25 0.99 0.75 0.82 0.64 0.52
uk 31.65 24.36 20.31 16.28 12.76 10.57 11.50 9.42 9.34 7.53 5.84 5.49 5.49 5.33 4.32 3.08
AVG 8.33 7.11 6.41 6.02 5.14 4.30
COV 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.24
Note: AVG W eighted average (weights according to the ratio national vs. total manufactoring GDP)
COV Coefficient of variation
Emission data from EM EP (2002, es/gr/pt: 2000)
GDP data  from  E urostat (2001)
Data on the GDP share of the m anufactoring sector:
All countries except Ireland and Luxembourg: OECD (2000)
Ireland— data extrapolated from  C entral Statistics Office, Ireland (2001)
Luxembourg— Eurostat (2001)
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As table 5 and the following graph illustrate, data scarcity restricted the compilation of 
a comprehensive data set to the period from 1990 to 1995. The average has been 
constructed by weighting the 15 EU member states according to the size o f their 
manufacturing sector (manufacturing GDP in absolute terms), calculated on an annual 
basis. Since the country weights, which are necessary for the calculation o f the 
weighted average, require complete data sets for all 15 EU member states, the weighted 
average could only be computed for the five years with complete data sets.
Figure 26 Manufacturing SO2 emissions /  manufacturing GDP, EU member
states
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The variance of observations appears high, and, as in the case of the other two 
indicators, there appears to be a trend towards downward harmonisation across the EU 
in absolute values. However, as was the case concerning the normalised sulphur 
emission figures mentioned earlier, this impression is misleading. The rising coefficient 
of variation (cf. equation 4.1.2) clearly indicates that the internal difference relative to 
the average has increased significantly. The empirical COV in the above graph has 
increased from 0.18 in 1990 to 0.24 in 1995 (table 5).
3.2.1.5 Interpreting air pollution performance patterns
So far, based on the air pollution data series introduced above, this study has laid the 
foundation to the calculation of three different pollution performance indicators. The 
first indicator, called PLI (Pollution Load Indicator, cf. section 3.2.1.2) compares 
national air pollution levels per capita to the weighted EU average.
The second indicator, called GPI (General Pollution Intensity, cf. section 3.2.1.3) 
compares national air pollution levels per unit of GDP to the weighted EU average. 
Finally, the MPI (Manufacturing Pollution Intensity, cf. section 3.2.1.4) puts air 
pollution generated by the manufacturing sectors of EU member states in relation to the 
manufacturing GDP and compares that figure to the weighted EU average.
The following section will introduce and discuss the empirical pollution performance 
indicators.
Scope o f  the indicators
At first sight, all three indicators may appear rather similar in design and content. This 
may well be connected to the fact that the numerator of the three indicators is identical, 
i.e., an air pollution time series. Yet, each of the indicators has distinct features, which 
are summarised in table 6 .
The table aims to illustrate that each indicator mirrors pollution performance from a 
different angle, and that therefore each of them has a significant analytical value.
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Table 6 Advantages and disadvantages o f  the pollution performance indicators
Indicator Advantages / Disadvantages
Pollution Load
(air pollution per capita)
the focus of the indicator is pollution per capita, which is 
the most intuitive and least economic of the three 
indicators
population is a relatively static denominator (with the 
exception of German reunification). Hence changes in 
the indicator are mainly due differences in pollution.
time series for all seven air pollutants from 1990 to 1999; 
a long-term time series from 1980 to 1999 covers three 
pollutants
General Pollution • the indicator reflects pollution performance from the
Intensity perspective of the general economy
(air pollution per unit • GDP is a more volatile denominator; economic cycles
GDP) have an impact on the indicator
• time series for all seven air pollutants from 1990 to 1999;
a long-term time series from 1980 to 1999 covers three
pollutants
Manufacturing Pollution 
Intensity
(air pollution per unit of 
manufacturing GDP)
the indicator is specific to the manufacturing sector
reduced data availability and consistency
time series cover only two air pollutants from 1990 to 
1995
Nevertheless, for consistency and transparency, the subsequent regression analysis laid 
out in chapter six will build on one primary pollution performance indicator. The 
overview on the indicator featured in table 6  should provide some answers to the 
question, which indicator could be suited best to proxy the impact of pollution 
performance on chemical industry performance.
Although the PLI indicator appears to be the most straight-forward index that is easiest 
to understand by intuition, the other two GDP-based indicators may be closer to 
economic reality. Since the purpose of this study is to compare the economic 
performance of an industrial sector to pollution performance, the indicator of choice 
should incorporate the concept of economic dynamism.
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This reasoning would favour GPI or MPI as lead indicator for the subsequent analysis. 
Between the two of them, the MPI indicator would obviously be the better-suited 
candidate, since it is specifically designed to reflect the pollution performance of the 
manufacturing sector of which the chemical industry forms part.
However, there is one very important drawback to the use of the MPI as lead indicator: 
complete and consistent pollution data on the manufacturing sector is limited to the 
period of 1990 to 1995 and to two pollutants. Given that some GPI time series cover a 
period of twenty year from 1980 to 1999, the MPI data constraint is an important 
argument. Key parts of the subsequent analysis are based on quantitative methods. 
Therefore, the number of observations is an important practical consideration, as it 
determines, for example, the reliability of regression estimates.
Long-term and short-term indicators
At this point, the reader should recall once more that the three pollution performance 
indicators are aggregate indicators, which are composed of several sub-indicators. As an 
example, the ‘global’ GPI indicator is composed of GPI sub-indicators, each of which 
covers one specific pollutant. Thus, there are GPI sub-indicators for ammonia (NH3), 
carbon monoxide (CO), carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), non-methane volatile 
organic compounds (NMVOC), nitrogen dioxide (NO2) and sulphur dioxide (SO2). The 
‘global’ pollution performance indicators are averages of those sub-indicators at equal 
weight.
However, some pollution time series were more comprehensive than others. As 
mentioned before, manufacturing pollution was complete only between 1990 and 1995. 
National pollution time series were complete from 1980 to 1999 for CO2 , NO2 and SO2 . 
The other data sets were complete on national level from 1990 to 1999 (cf. table 3).
For this reason, two PLI and GPI indicators series may be constructed. The first set of 
indicators would consist of all seven sub-indicators. These PLI 7 and GPI 7 indicators 
account for all available pollution data. However, these comprehensive pollution 
performance indicators are short-term time series, since they cover only the ten years 
1990 to 1999.
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By contrast, if the indicators were composed only by the CO2 , NO2 and SO2 sub­
indicators, they covered the period from 1980 to 1999. Thus, PLI 3 and GPI 3 indicator 
series could serve as long-term indicators.
Indicator correlation
The following section will discuss the empirical pollution performance indicators by 
taking Denmark and Spain as examples. Tables 29 to 31 in the appendix provide all 
empirical pollution performance indicators for those two countries, both by pollutant as 
well as on an aggregate level.
Figure 27 represents the empirical results of Denmark. Because the CO2 , NO2 and SO2 
pollution data sets allowed the compilation of a long-term time series covering the 
period from 1980 to 1999, there are two PLI and GPI sets. Thus, the PLI 3 and GPI 3 
indicators cover the three above mentioned pollutants over a period of twenty years. 
Inversely, the PLI 7 and GPI 7 time series are short-term indicators, covering only ten 
years from 1990 to 1999 but all seven air pollutants. As mentioned before, air pollution 
data on the manufacturing sector was only complete over the period from 1990 to 1995 
and with regard to two pollutants, SO2 and NO2 . For this reason, the manufacturing 
pollution intensity is marked MPI 2.
Note that the PLI 3 and GPI 3 time series are broken between 1989 and 1990. Again, 
this is due to the external shock of German reunification. The indicator values up to 
1989 cannot be compared to the figures thereafter, because the relative system on which 
the indicators are based has shifted.
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Figure 27 Empirical pollution performance indicators, Denmark
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There are a number o f observations one may draw from the Danish example. First, the 
PLI and GPI long-term time series appears to be highly correlated to the short-term time 
series. This holds true both with regard to the absolute value of the indicators as well as 
with regard to their evolution over time.
Second, the three indicators also appear to be correlated with regard to their evolution 
over time. The correlation between PLI and GPI appears to be relatively higher than the 
correlation o f each of these indicators with the MPI figures.
Third, there are clear and persistent differences with regard to the absolute indicator 
values. In the case o f Denmark, the PLI indicator is considerably higher than the GPL In 
other words, the pollution load per capita in Denmark is clearly above the EU average, 
whereas the pollution intensity o f the Danish economy as a whole is more or less equal 
to the EU average. The pollution intensity of the Danish manufacturing sector is 
consistently below the EU value.
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A correlation analysis of the long-term and short-term pollution performance indicators 
reveals the very high degree of association between the two time series in most EU 
member states.
Table 7 Correlation coefficients between pollution performance indicators
PLI3 / PL I7 GPI 3 / GPI 7 PLI 3 / GPI 3 GPI 3 / MPI 2 PLI 3 / MPI 2
be 0.98 0.98 0.75 -0.23 0.36
dk 0.96 0.88 0.87 0.75 0.69
de 0.98 0.99 0.83 0.97 0.91
gr 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.92 0.94
es 0.99 1.00 0.74 0.98 0.94
fr 0.72 0.94 0.86 0.01 0.10
ie 0.98 -0.05 0.82 0.39 0.58
it 0.62 0.95 0.64 -0.79 -0.59
lu 0.98 0.99 0.75 0.63 0.86
nl 0.25 0.89 0.42 -0.16 -0.05
at 0.80 0.86 0.97 0.75 0.79
Pt 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.99 0.93
fi 0.95 0.98 0.12 -0.64 0.83
se 0.80 0.98 0.80 -0.47 -0.20
uk 0.99 1.00 0.88 0.44 -0.08
AVG 0.87 0.89 0.76 0.30 0.47
The correlation coefficients between PLI 3 and PLI 7, GPI 3 and GPI 7, as well as 
between PLI 3 and GPI 3 appear to be consistently positive except in one instance. The 
average coefficients are well above 0.75, which seems to indicate a very high degree of 
correlation.
The notable exception is the correlation coefficient between GPI 3 and GPI 7 in Ireland, 
which is very close to nil. That observation seems to indicate an almost complete 
independence between the two data sets. Figure 28 illustrates how the GPI 3 and GPI 7 
indicators appear to converge instead of running more or less parallel. As the 
correlation analysis shows, Ireland is the only country in the sample that exhibits this 
behaviour.
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Figure 28 Empirical pollution performance indicators, Ireland
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One reason for this peculiar conduct appears to lie in the development o f the Irish GPI 
indicator concerning SO2 emissions. Unlike the other six Irish GPI indicators, which are 
generally stable or decreasing between 1990 and 1999, the SO2 pollution intensity 
increases significantly from 86 in 1990 to 173 in 1999. Since this SO2 sub-indicator 
accounts for one third of the aggregated GPI 3 indicator but only for one seventh o f the 
GPI 7 indicator, the GPI 3 is much more sensitive to this distinct behaviour.
The empirical GPI results indicate that this sharp increase o f the SO2 GPI indicator is 
not an exclusively Irish phenomenon. One can observe similar patterns with regard to 
Greece, Portugal and Spain. However, in contrast to Ireland, the other pollution 
indicators also increase in those three countries, which means that the SO2 GPI 
development is more accentuated but generally in line with the other pollutants.
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Lastly, the results represented in table 7 show that the average correlation coefficient 
between PLI 3 and MPI 2 is 0.47; the figure is 0.30 with regard to GPI 3 and MPI 2. 
This observation indicates that the MPI indicator is positively linked to the other two 
pollution performance measures, although its degree of correlation is small. This may 
be due to the fact that the PLI and GPI indicators are based on the same emission data 
aggregated on national level, whereas the MPI indicator uses a completely different and 
less aggregated data set.
One may draw two basic conclusions from the above discussion. First, the three 
pollution performance indicators are sufficiently different with regard to their scope and 
data basis to stand alone as individual indicators. For this reason, one part of the 
subsequent empirical analysis will use all three indicators to categorise EU member 
states according to their pollution performance. For this, the fact that the three 
indicators address the same issue from different angles should be rather an advantage.
On the other hand, as the correlation analysis has shown, the indicators are clearly 
linked to each other. This should improve the efficiency of quantitative analyses, when 
one of the indicators could stand as proxy for the two others. Taking all aspects into 
consideration, this proxy would best be the long-term general pollution intensity (GPI 
3) indicator, as it combines economic focus with the largest available pool of 
observations.
Indicator interpretation
Figure 29 provides an example of how pollution performance indicators develop over 
time: in this instance, with regard to the GPI 3 indicators in Germany and Britain. The 
graph illustrates the point that the interpretation of the indices can be tricky. In both 
countries, the GPI 3 indicator decreased over time indicating an improvement in 
environmental performance.
With regard to Germany, that indicator decreased by 46 points, from 17 in 1990 to -29 
in 1999. In the United Kingdom, the index apparently declined at a higher rate; from 59 
to 6  over the same period of time. Thus, the British pollution intensity went down by 
53.
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Figure 29 GPI 3, Germany and United Kingdom, 1990 to 1999
100
GPI 3
&
(A
C
C
co
3
O0.
15>_Q)
C<1>O
de
-100
§ Sityi 3 stn5
However, this observation does not necessarily indicate that Britain has a better 
pollution performance than Germany. The reason for this at first sight surprising fact is 
that the UK is improving its index from a considerably higher starting level. As Britain 
is catching up to approach the EU average, Germany appears to expand its lead over the 
EU average from 1992 onwards. Due to the way the pollution performance indicators 
are constructed, (-100) is an asymptote, because pollution values cannot be more than 
100 percent less than the EU average. Thus, the closer observed indicator values get to 
(-100), the slower indicator values are going to continue decreasing.
For this reason, any comparison o f pollution performance indicators between countries 
must account for both the indicator development over time as well as for the indicators’ 
overall position relative to the EU average. The former may be achieved by looking at 
the trend o f an index in absolute numbers as compared to the EU average, normalised to 
zero. In other words, the first task would be to assess whether the indicator shows a 
statistically significant trend over time.
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A second step needs to calculate the overall position of the indicator compared to the 
EU average. Measuring the deviation of the index-average (taken across all years in the 
observation period) from zero could achieve this objective.
As a conclusion to the empirical pollution performance chapter, this section will 
compare how the European Union member states have presented themselves with 
regard to the three pollution performance indicators over the period from 1980 to 1999. 
The aim of this empirical study is to develop some sort of categorisation or ranking that 
tells which countries exhibited a generally strong pollution performance and which ones 
have shown a generally weak one.
In this context a ‘strong pollution performance’ indicates a better-than-EU-average 
pollution indicator development, that is, it flags countries where air pollution has gone 
down relative to the EU average. Inversely, ‘weak pollution performance’ countries 
would show a worse-than-average pollution performance; their pollution figures would 
have increased relative to the EU level.
3.2.1.6 A pollution performance ‘ranking’ of EU member states
At this point, the obvious question most people would ask is “so, who is polluting the 
most?”, or “how is my country doing?” Let us have a look.
This categorisation exercise will compare the PLI, GPI and MPI indicator of the EU 
member states. As mentioned earlier, since the reunification of Germany in 1989/1990 
introduced an external shock into the relative system on which the pollution 
performance indicators are based, it would be methodically unsound to compare 
indicator values before and after this time mark. Therefore, the analysis will only 
compare the pollution performance indicators after 1990.
The upside of this time restriction is that the comparative analysis can use the more 
comprehensive short-term indicators PLI 7 and GPI 7, as well as the MPI 2 indicator. 
This allows comparing national pollution performances on the broadest available range 
of air pollutants.
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As mentioned before, a comparative analysis will need to take into account both the 
development as well as the relative position towards the average of the pollution 
performance indicators. The categorisation exercise will therefore assess the following 
dimensions:
• P LI 7 trend over the observation period 1990 to 1999. The trend values correspond 
to the coefficient of the time dummy in a regression where the dependent variable is 
PLI 7.
This observation captures the relative evolution over time of the pollution load 
indicator compared to the EU average. An upward PLI 7 trend indicates an increase 
in the aggregated national pollution load, as measured in pollution per capita, has 
grown relative to EU average. Hence, the country's pollution performance has 
under-performed the EU average. Inversely, a downward PLI trend would point at 
stronger-than-average pollution performance.
• P LI 7 deviation, written Dev (PLI 7), indicates whether the average value of the PLI 
indicator across the observation period is above or below the EU average, which is 
normalised to zero. This measure mirrors the long-term per capita pollution level of 
a country. If Dev(GPI) has a value that is larger than zero, the country has a higher 
per capita pollution load over the period than the EU average. The reasons for this 
structural difference may be of economic nature, such as the development level of a 
country, or due to other factors such as climate. Inversely, if  Dev(GPT) shows a 
value smaller than zero, it would indicate that the country has structurally less 
average per capita pollution over the observation period than the EU as a whole.
• The GPI 7 trend over the observation period captures the relative pollution 
performance at the level of the general economy compared to the EU average. An 
upward GPI 7 trend would indicate that the economy's pollution intensity has 
increased relative to EU average. Hence, the country would have a worse pollution 
performance with regard to the general economy than the EU. A downward GPI 7 
trend would stand for a stronger-than-average pollution performance.
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• The GPI 7 deviation, Dev (GPI 7), shows whether pollution intensity of a member 
state’s economy has been, in average over the observation period, above or below 
the EU level. This figure reflects the overall economic structure and pollution 
efficiency. If Dev(GPI 7) has a value larger than zero, the economy is structurally 
more pollution intense than the average. In other words, that economy ‘needs 
consume in average more clean air’ than other EU economies to produce the same 
amount of GDP over the observation period. Inversely, lower than zero Dgv(GPI) 
values would indicate that the economy is less pollution intense, and is thus 'greener' 
than the average.
• The M PI 2 trend focuses on the pollution intensity of a country’s manufacturing 
sector relative to the EU average. It echoes the relative pollution performance of the 
relative pollution performance of industries and other production sectors. If the MPI 
2  trend is upwards, the pollution intensity of the national manufacturing sector has 
grown relative to the EU. Therefore, the manufacturing pollution performance 
would be considered worse-than-average. On the other hand, a downward MPI 2 
trend value would hint at a better-than-average pollution performance of the 
manufacturing sector.
• Lastly, the deviation of a country's M PI 2 average, Dev (MPI 2), indicates whether 
a country's manufacturing sector is over the observation period more or less 
pollution intense than the EU average. If Dev (MPI 2) is shown to be above zero, 
the manufacturing sector is historically over the observation period more pollution 
intense, and therefore less efficient, than the EU average. Hence, the manufacturing 
sector would structurally under-perform the EU average, because it generally 
generates more air pollution than the other EU manufacturing sectors while 
producing the same value of goods. Inversely, a Dev (MPI 2) value below zero 
would indicate better-than-average pollution intensity structure.
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Pollution performance scenarios
Before we can go on to classify the European Union member states according to their 
pollution performance based on the above mentioned six observations, there needs to be 
a definition of performance scenarios. The pollution performance trend and deviation 
provides information on two sorts of dimensions: the deviation reveals whether the 
country starts from a relatively high or low initial pollution levels, whereas the trend 
reveals the evolution of the pollution performance indicator. If these two dimensions are 
combined, there are four potential scenarios:
Table 8 Pollution performance scenarios
Poor pollution 
performers
Catching-up
countries
Falling-behind
countries
Strong
pollution
performers
Deviation
High initial 
pollution levels
High initial 
pollution levels
Low initial 
pollution levels
Low initial 
pollution levels
Trend
Lack of 
convergence
Convergence Convergence
Lack of 
convergence
Poor pollution performers
The first country cluster consists of Greece, Spain and Portugal. The observed data 
suggests for these countries a very weak pollution performance over the observation 
period. The graphic representation of the pollution performance indicators in figure 30 
illustrates that the country cases in this cluster possess a number of common features:
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First, with regard to all countries and to all pollution performance indicators, the trend 
values are upward and, as noted in table 9, highly significant. In other words, the 
pollution performance o f the countries in this group clearly deteriorated relative to the 
EU average over the observation period. Secondly, in all cases, the deviation o f the 
three observed pollution performance indicators was above zero. This indicates that the 
said deterioration o f the pollution performance captured by the upward trend values 
took actually place in countries that were already doing worse than EU average.
Figure 30 Pollution trends: poor pollution performers
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Based on these observations, it appears fair to conclude that Greece, Spain and Portugal 
showed a poor pollution performance pattern relative to the rest of the European Union 
over the period from 1990 to 1999. One should note that this poor pollution 
performance was particularly pointed with regard to the manufacturing sector. As the 
trend values in table 9 reveal, the manufacturing pollution performance deteriorated 
much more rapidly than the other two pollution performance indicators.
Table 9 Pollution performance indicators: poor pollution performers
Greece Spain Portugal
PLI 7 Trend +6 .1 ** +5.3** +5.2**
Dev (PLI 7) + 1 1 + 2 2 + 1 0
Overall
performance
Poor Poor Poor
GPI 7 Trend +7.8** +10.9** +6.3**
Dev (GPI 7) +124 +90 +144
Overall
performance
Poor Poor Poor
MPI 2 Trend +2 1 .6 * +25.2** +18.9**
Dev (MPI 2) +168 +213 +175
Overall
performance
Poor Poor Poor
* Significant at 90% level
** Significant at 99% level
Overall, the similarities between Greece, Spain and Portugal with regard to their 
pollution performance indicators seem remarkably strong. Besides their particularly 
pollution intensive manufacturing sectors, all three countries were more or less EU 
average with regard to per capita pollution intensity at the beginning of the 1990s. The 
indicators have since deteriorated at roughly the same rate, i.e. at five or six index 
points per year. The countries’ GPI indicator also appears to follow this pattern.
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In conclusion, the empirical figures seem to indicate that Greece, Spain and Portugal 
form a remarkably clear cut and homogenous pollution performance cluster. This could 
of course be due to rather obvious factors, as those Southern European countries share 
to some degree a comparable economic, cultural and geographic setting.
However, the empirical data indicates a much lower degree of similarity with regard to 
other pollution performance clusters. As the other results below will show, this holds 
true even to groups of countries of which one might expect similar pollution 
performance patterns, such as the Nordic states or the Benelux countries.
Countries that catch-up
The second cluster comprises Ireland, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom. The 
pollution performance of those countries may be characterised as ‘poor but improving’. 
In other words, although the pollution performance of the countries in this cluster was 
overall below EU average, at least one of their performance indicators improved over 
the observation period.
Just by looking at the graphs represented in figure 31, one probably gets the intuitive 
impression that this country cluster is much less homogeneous that the one presented 
earlier. The pollution indicators of the UK appear to lie very close to zero, which 
represents the EU average. In contrast, both Ireland and Luxembourg exhibit much 
greater pollution index deviations. There are, however, also some common trends 
among the three countries in this group, as table 1 0  illustrates.
First, the general pollution intensity (GPI 7) indicator is decreasing significantly across 
all three countries. In other words, their economies appear to become more pollution 
efficient over time.
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Figure 31 Pollution trends: countries that catch-up
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Second, the manufacturing pollution intensity (MPI 2) across all three countries has 
been less consistently above the EU average. Furthermore, the fact that all three MPI 2 
trend values appear to be insignificant seems to indicate that the Irish, Luxembourgian, 
and British manufacturing sectors remain relatively more polluting than the EU average.
Third, the pollution load index (PLI 7) in Luxembourg and the United Kingdom 
decreased significantly over the observation period, whereas it appeared to increase 
significantly in Ireland. This seems to be a reflection o f Ireland’s extraordinary 
economic growth in the 1990s. In other words, although the pollution efficiency of the 
Irish economy increased, the overall pollution load actually increased due to the very 
high growth rates in economic activity.
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Table 10 Pollution performance indicators: countries that catch-up
Ireland Luxembourg UK
PLI 7 Trend +5.2** -9.1** -2.1**
Dev (PLI 7) +80 +75 +7
Overall
performance
Poor Catching-up Catching-up
GPI 7 Trend -2.9* -5.0** -4.3**
Dev (GPI 7) +150 -14 +19
Overall
performance
Catching-up Strong Catching-up
MPI 2 Trend +3.8 +0 . 2 +3.0
Dev (MPI 2) +51 +359 +17
Overall
performance
Poor Poor Poor
* Significant at 90% level
** Significant at 99% level
In conclusion, the pollution performance patterns of Ireland, Luxembourg and the 
United Kingdom seem to convey the overall picture of economies that are on their way 
towards increased pollution efficiency. This country group appears much less 
homogeneous than other pollution performance clusters, which may be explained by at 
least two reasons. First, the cluster includes Luxembourg, which may exhibit some 
rather freakish performance indicator behaviour, due to its small size and, in particular, 
due to its industrial structure. Second, this cluster also includes Ireland, which 
experienced a period of extraordinary economic growth over the observation period. 
One might suspect that, once this boom is over, Ireland’s pollution performance should 
fall into line with the British performance pattern.
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Falling-behindpollution performers
The third pollution performance cluster is made up of countries that come from a 
position of relatively strong pollution performance, but appear to lose their lead. There 
are five countries in this category: Belgium, France, Finland, Italy, and Sweden. 
Their performances are graphically represented in figure 32.
The big common denominator among those five EU member states is that all of them 
appear to have a general economy that was -in  average over the observation period- 
more pollution efficient than the EU average, but shows clear signs of deterioration. In 
fact, as table 11 shows, the GPI 7 indicators of almost all countries in this cluster 
exhibit a significant upward trend, with the only exception being Finland that shows an 
upward trend which is below the 90% significance level.
This overall trend towards increasing pollution levels also appears to manifest itself 
with regard to the overall pollution load. The PLI 7 indicators of all five countries in the 
cluster exhibit upward trends, although this development appears to be statistically 
significant only with regard to Belgium and France.
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Figure 32 Pollution trends: countries that fa ll behind
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One interesting observation may be that the pollution performance o f the manufacturing 
sector is not at all homogeneous among the countries in this cluster. The manufacturing 
sectors o f Sweden and Finland show a statistically significant trend towards improving 
their pollution efficiency. The Italian manufacturing sector is also exhibiting a 
downward MPI 2 indicator; however, the trend does not appear to be sufficiently 
significant. This behaviour contrasts with the performance of the manufacturing sectors 
in Belgium and France, where the MPI 2 indicator appears to be trending upwards.
As seems to be the case with regard to the other ‘transitory’ pollution performance 
cluster (that is, with regard to the catching-up countries), the falling-behind-cluster is an 
assortment o f countries with rather different characteristics. On the one hand, there are 
Belgium and France. Those two countries seem to exhibit a consistent overall 
performance pattern which clearly fits the definition o f this cluster.
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Table 11 Pollution performance indicators: countries that fa ll behind
Finland Belgium France Italy Sweden
PLI 7 Trend +0.4 +1.5** +0.4* +0.7 +0.4
Dev (PLI 7) +5 + 1 +3 - 2 -14
Overall
performance
Poor Poor Poor Falling
behind
Falling
behind
GPI 7 Trend +1.7 +0.8* +0.7* +2.6* +2.2*
Dev (GPI 7) - 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 -3 -29
Overall
performance
Falling
behind
Falling
behind
Falling
behind
Falling
behind
Falling
behind
MPI 2 Trend -13.0* +4.8 +1.6* -6 . 2 -1.1*
Dev (MPI 2) +14 +82 -40 + 6 - 6 6
Overall
performance
Catching-
up
Poor Falling
behind
Catching-
_ up__
Strong
Significant at 90% level 
Significant at 99% level
On the other hand, there are three countries, Finland, Italy and Sweden, where the 
trends of the three pollution performance indicators do not exhibit the same sign. In 
other words, the pollution performance trend of the manufacturing sector in those 
countries appears downwards, whereas the to the overall pollution trend points upwards. 
One possible explanation of this behaviour may be that the major part of the overall 
pollution increase in those countries does not originate from the manufacturing sector 
but from other sources, such as road traffic or private households.
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Strong pollution performers
The fourth and final performance cluster consists of strong pollution performers. 
According to the observed performance pattern, this group consists of Austria, 
Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands. To qualify as a strong pollution performer, 
countries need to exhibit low average pollution levels in combination with a lack of 
convergence. They therefore retain, or even expand, their pollution efficiency lead over 
the observation period.
Table 12 Pollution performance indicators: strong pollution performers
Austria Denmark Germany Netherlands
PLI 7 Trend +0 . 0 -0 . 6 -3.9** - 1 .0 **
Dev (PLI 7) - 1 1 +30 - 1 0 - 6
Overall
performance
Strong Catching-up Strong Strong
GPI 7 Trend -0.5 - 1 .6 * -3.8** -1.7**
Dev (GPI 7) -26 - 6 -29 -14
Overall
performance
Strong Strong Strong Strong
M PI 2 Trend -1.9* +0 . 0 -5.9* -0 . 0
Dev (MPI 2) - 6 8 -44 -37 -7
Overall
performance
Strong Strong Strong Strong
Significant at 90% level 
Significant at 99% level
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Figure 33 Pollution trends: strong pollution performers
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Figure 33 graphically illustrates this high degree of homogeneity. The only exception to 
this rule is Denmark, where the overall pollution load index (PLI 7) shows a positive 
deviation and a negative but insignificant trend. One might wonder whether this 
observation would make Denmark a candidate for being part of the catching-up country 
cluster. However, the development of the other two pollution indicators clearly points in 
the direction of Denmark being a strong pollution performer, as the pollution 
performance of both the general economy and of the manufacturing sector appear to be 
consistently better than EU average. On balance, there seem to be valid reasons why the 
country should be considered a part of the strong pollution performer cluster, rather than 
of the catching-up cluster.
Conclusion
The overall results of the categorisation exercise are reported in table 13. Looking at the 
big picture, the two clusters at the ends of the spectrum appear to be not only rather 
homogeneous with regard to the observed pollution performance pattern, but also with 
regard to the geographic location.
Table 13 Empirical pollution performance clusters
Pollution Performance
In transition
Poor Strong
Catching up Falling behind
Greece
Spain
Ireland
Luxembourg
Belgium
France
Finland
Austria
Denmark
Germany
Netherlands
Portugal United Kingdom Italy
Sweden
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With Austria, Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands, the strong pollution performer 
appears to be composed of countries that have a comparable degree of economic 
development as well as a similar cultural and technological background. The same 
could be said about the poor pollution performance cluster, which consists of three 
Mediterranean countries.
It is the two country clusters ‘in the middle’ that seem to have less clear cut, but 
arguably more interesting country combinations. On the one hand, there is the group of 
countries that catch-up to the EU average in terms of pollution performance, in which 
the United Kingdom and Ireland are by far the most important constituents. It seems an 
interesting empirical observation that both countries appear to share the same pollution 
performance ‘disposition’ in spite of their quite distinct economic development over the 
last decades.
On the other hand, the cluster of countries which fall behind in terms of relative 
pollution performance seems to be an assembly of two rather different sub-groups. First, 
there are France and Belgium which appear to exhibit a quite analogous pollution 
performance pattern. Second, there is Sweden and Italy, with Finland apparently in 
between. It may seem odd, but Finland appears to share some pollution performance 
characteristics with each of the two countries mentioned before.
In terms of overall pollution performance (as expressed by the PLI and GPI indicators), 
Finland seems to exhibit a pattern that is by and large comparable to the Swedish one. 
Yet, as it is the case with regard to Italian manufacturing sector, the Finnish 
manufacturing industry has improved its pollution efficiency by a considerable margin 
up to a point at the end of the observation period when it was in line with the EU 
average.
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3.2.1.7 GPI 3 as lead pollution performance indicator
For the subsequent regression analyses, the General Pollution Intensity based on three 
air pollutants (GPI 3) will be used as proxy for pollution performance. Among the three 
pollution performance indicators developed for the purpose of this investigation, the 
GPI 3 indicator appears to represent the best compromise between long-term data 
availability and comprehensiveness with regard to different types of air pollutants. A 
more extended discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of the three indicators 
can be found above in section 3.2.1.5. The complete data set can be found as table 35 in 
the appendix.
As figure 34 illustrates, the variation between indicator values has increased over the 
observation period. In 1980, pollution indicator extremes were -30 of Sweden and +55 
of Finland. The pollution intensity figures of all 15 countries in the sample were 
relatively close to the weighted average. The variation amounted to 85 indicator points. 
By contrast, at the end of the observation period in 1999, the variation was 281 
indicator points. Austria had with -45 the lowest GPI, while Greece’s pollution intensity 
indicator stood at +236.
This increase in variation appears to imply that the difference in pollution intensity 
between EU member states has gone up significantly over the observation period. In ten 
of the 15 countries in the sample, GPI 3 figures have decreased; four countries exhibited 
an increase of their pollution intensity indicator. The Netherlands scored the same GPI 3 
value in 1980 and 1999.
194
Figure 34 General pollution intensity indicator (GPI 3)
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One should keep in mind that the GPI 3 indicator mirrors the relative difference in 
pollution intensity between EU member states on the one hand and the weighted EU 
average on the other hand. A majority o f countries in the sample, including the biggest 
EU economies, managed to decrease their pollution indicator scores. In other words, 
their absolute pollution figures have decreased at a higher rate than the EU average. For 
this reason, the increase in GPI 3 figures in Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece does not 
necessarily mean that these countries have increased their absolute amount o f pollution. 
The rising indicator values merely indicate that the national pollution values decreased 
at a lower rate than the weighted EU average.
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3.2.2 Taxes on imports and production
In its position paper on taxation, the European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC 
1999a) argued that the “gloomy tax environment featured by the European Union” was 
one of the main competitive disadvantages of chemical industries. According to that 
report, in 1997, the total tax revenues in Europe summed up to 41% of the GNP, 10 while 
that figure stood at 28% in the United States.
Apart from this gap in tax burden, CEFIC went on to argue that the structure of tax 
revenues also distorted the competitive position of EU chemical production. According 
to the analysis of CEFIC, social contribution accounted for 39 percent of total tax 
revenues in Europe compared to 25 percent in the United States. In turn, the tax level on 
labour income and corporate profits were more substantial in the U.S., where it made up 
44 percent of total tax revenues in 1997 against 24 percent in the EU.
With regard to tax rates on chemical industry production factors, the CEFIC study 
estimated the comparative tax levels as follows.
Table 14 Tax rates on chemical industry production factors
European Chemical ¥T  ^ . . . .  , .5 , . . U.S. Chemical industriesIndustries
Taxes on corporate 
profits
Employers’ social security 
charges
Non-refundable taxes on 
motor fuels
Non-refundable taxes on 
heating fuels
^ ^ — ~ S o u r c e :  CEFIC (1999a)
10 CEFIC calculated that number on the basis of a weighted average for Germany, France, UK, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Belgium.
45%
31 %
126%
5%
21 %
23%
37%
3%
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One should keep in mind that the said position paper was clearly aimed to carry a 
political message to the EU administration, and that this comparative analysis focused 
solely on the differences between European and U.S. tax levels, and not on differences 
between European Union member states. Nevertheless, this study illustrates the 
importance of taxation on the competitive position of chemical sectors, be it at the level 
of the European Union or at national level.
At present, although there appears to be some political thrust towards harmonisation in 
some states, there seem to be as many different tax systems across the EU as there are 
member states. It is therefore impossible to single out one kind of tax that is comparable 
and equally important to chemical industries across all member states.
For this reason, this investigation has to resort to some kind of proxy based on an 
aggregate indicator. The chosen proxy is called taxes on production and imports. It is 
compiled by Eurostat as part of its Newcronos database. The indicator is defined as 
follows:
Taxes on production and imports consist o f  taxes payable on goods and services 
when they are produced, delivered, sold, transferred or otherwise disposed o f by 
their producers plus taxes and duties on imports that become payable when goods 
enter the economic territory by crossing the frontier or when services are 
delivered to resident units by non-resident units; they also include other taxes on 
production, which consist mainly o f taxes on the ownership or use o f  land, 
buildings or other assets used in production or on the labour employed, or 
compensation o f employees paid.
Eurostat, System of National Accounts (SNA) 1993, par. 7.49 
from Eurostat Concepts and Definitions Database (CODED)
The time series covers all European member states over the period from 1980 to 1999. 
Some data points were estimated by Eurostat. In order to obtain a basis for the 
comparison of the tax burden across countries, the tax figures are represented as a 
percentage of GDP. The data is recorded as table 32 in the appendix.
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Figure 35 Taxes on production and imports as % o f GDP
Data Source: Eurostat, Newcronos Database (2001)
According to the Eurostat figures, Denmark was the one EU member state with the 
highest tax burden on production and imports both at the beginning as well as at the end 
o f the observation period. Its tax burden was at 18.6 percent o f the GDP in 1980 and at 
18.9 percent in 1999. By contrast, the Spanish taxes on production and imports were the 
lowest among EU countries both in 1980 and 1999. Note that the Spanish tax burden 
was 6.6 in 1980 and 11.8 in 1999; hence, it has almost doubled over the observation 
period.
Overall, the data suggests that the tax levels in EU member states on production and 
imports converged significantly over the observation period, as figure 35 illustrates. The 
Mediterranean countries generally increased their tax burden. In some cases, such as 
Spain and Italy, that tax increase appears to have been quite significant. Inversely, 
Britain and Ireland achieved a notable reduction o f their tax burden over the observation 
period. One rather surprising aspect contained in the Eurostat data may be that in 1999, 
Germany had the second lowest tax burden on production and imports.
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3.2.3 Fuel price
According to the European Chemical Industry Council, one of the biggest factors in the 
cost of chemical production is the price of energy. In 1999, EU chemical industries 
spent 9 percent of their sales value on direct energy costs. This percentage was even 
higher with regard to the sub-sector of basic chemicals. In that industry branch, energy 
costs accounted for no less than 51 percent of the total sales value (CEFIC 2000b).
Figure 36 illustrates the importance of energy cost on the overall chemical producing 
cost using crude oil prices as example. The picture shows that, especially with regard to 
the period between 1990 and 1995, the price circles of crude oil and chemical producer 
price developed in a quite synchronised way. The correlation coefficient between the 
two series was 0.51.
Figure 36 EU chemicals producer price vs. crude oil price, U.S.$, Indexed
(1990=100)
150
EU Chemicals Producer Price, US$, 
Indexed (1990=100)
100
Crude Oil Price, US$, 
Indexed (1990=100)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Data Source: CEFIC (2000b)
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One could therefore make the case that relative differences in the cost of fuel should 
prove to be an important determinant of competitiveness of chemical industries. The 
regression model will take this into account by including the cost of high sulphur fuel 
oil for industrial customers as an energy-related independent variable.
This time series was constructed from two data sets that were provided by the 
International Energy Agency. The basis for the data set used in this analysis is a time 
series on the real (constant) value of oil products for industrial customers. The series is 
an index with the base year 1995. It covers all EU member states over the period from 
1980 to 1999.
In order to calculate absolute values, the index increments were combined with the 
absolute price of high sulphur fuel oil in U.S.$ per tonne (at PPP) for industrial 
customers. With regard to nine of the fifteen EU member states, 1995 data was 
available. For the rest, 1995 values had to be extrapolated using the index. 11 The index 
on prices of oil products was provided by the International Energy Agency Data 
Services in April 2001. The absolute prices of high sulphur fuel oil are of July 2002. 
Both data series are part of the energy price database of the International Energy 
Agency. The time series can be found in the appendix as table 33.
The data represented in figure 37 appears to suggest that over the observation period, 
fuel prices for industrial customers have decreased in twelve of the fifteen EU member 
states. The reduction in fuel price was particularly significant in Ireland, the UK, 
Austria and Germany. By contrast, fuel prices appeared to increase in the Netherlands, 
Italy and Spain.
11 Absolute prices for high sulphur fuel were available for Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. 1990 prices were available for Finland, 
Germany, Greece and Luxembourg. The latest data point with regard to Denmark was 1988 and with 
regard to Sweden 1984.
200
Figure 37 Price o f  high sulphur fuel oil for industrial customers, U.S.$ at 1995
prices
■  1980 
□  1999
Data Source: International Energy Agency, 
Fuel Price Database, April 2001 /July 2002
The data shows that some countries have undergone particularly significant changes. In 
1980, Ireland had the highest fuel price for industrial customers of all EU member 
states. In 1999, the highest prices could be found in Portugal, Greece, Spain and Italy, 
where prices were roughly twice as high as in the cheapest country, i.e., Austria.
Over the observation period, industrial fuel prices in the Netherlands increased relative 
to the rest o f the EU. In 1980, Dutch fuel prices were the second lowest o f all fifteen 
countries in the sample. By contrast, the Netherlands were ranking in the EU midfield in 
this respect in 1999.
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3.2.4 Productivity of the manufacturing sector
In one of its annual Barometers o f Competitiveness (CEFIC 1998a), the European 
Chemical Industry Council argued that the European Union appeared to be a less 
attractive location for the manufacture of chemicals than the U.S. because of the 
following vicious circle: Weaker profits in the EU triggered lower investments, which 
in turn slowed down progress in labour productivity and energy efficiency. The lower 
investment relative to the U.S. with regard to labour productivity and energy efficiency 
impaired the cost competitiveness of EU chemical sectors, which closed the vicious 
circle.
CEFIC supported this line of argument with data from the OECD-STAN database and 
its own analyses, which showed that the hourly labour productivity of EU chemical 
industries from1990 to 1994 were 25 percent lower than in the United States.
The data series used in the subsequent regression analysis was provided by Eurostat in 
2001 as part of its Newcronos database. The data set is titled labour productivity in the 
manufacturing sector. It comprises figures on the labour productivity of national 
manufacturing sectors in thousands of € per year at market exchange rates.
The data set is complete for the 15 EU member states over the period from 1985 to 
1995. The German data series covers Western Germany only. With regard to seven 
countries, that is, Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Luxembourg, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom, there are also data points for the year 1996. For all other countries, as 
well as for the years of the observation period 1980 to 1999 that are not covered by the 
data series, missing values were computed by linear projection.
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Figure 38 Labour productivity o f the manufacturing sector,
thousands o f € at constant prices
Data Source: Eurostat, NewCronos Database (2001) 
Original data description: Labour productivity, level (at market exchange rate)
This appeared appropriate because the available figures seemed to follow a linear 
evolution. The regression model was constructed both with the original data set as well 
as with the data set including the projections. The regression coefficients were generally 
robust and coherent with regard to both data sets. The data set is recorded as table 34 in 
the appendix.
The figures represented in figure 38 indicate that the manufacturing sectors o f EU 
member states have increased their labour productivity between 1985 and 1995. Over 
that observation period, Sweden has experienced the largest rise in labour productivity -  
amounting to 88 percent. Inversely, with 16 percent, manufacturing labour productivity 
grew least in Greece.
Overall, the differences among EU member states were considerable both in 1985 as 
well as in 1995. At both points in time, the highest value in the sample was more than
4.5 times the lowest one.
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In 1995, the countries with the highest manufacturing labour productivity in the EU 
were Finland, Sweden, Ireland and Italy. The last places in that ranking were taken by 
Portugal and Greece. Spain has improved its manufacturing labour productivity 
considerably between 1985 and 1995. One interesting aspect of the overall productivity 
pattern might be the very high figures with regard to Ireland both in 1985 and 1995.
3.2.5 GDP
A time series on the GDP of EU member states will be included in a number of 
regression models. This is for technical reasons mainly. The function of this 
independent variable will be to account for the size of the national economies in 
regressions where the dependent variables are expressed in absolute terms.
The data set was taken from the OECD’s National Accounts database, which contained 
data points regarding the period 1980 to 1996. For the years 1997 to 1999, the 
information was obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
database. The composed data set was checked for consistency. There appeared to be no 
break in the time series.
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4 Regression Analysis
4.1 The framework to the regression analysis
4.1.1 Research hypotheses
The purpose of the following regression analysis is to assess whether and in what way 
the relative air pollution performance of EU member states -  which is used as a proxy 
for environmental performance -  has actually had an impact on the economic 
performance of their chemical industries. More formally expressed, the investigation 
will attempt to verify the following principal hypothesis:
Ho: Chemical industry performance does not react to variations in pollution
performance.
Hi: Chemical industry performance reacts to variations in pollution
performance.
If the empirical data showed with a sufficient degree of statistical security that changes 
in pollution performance have had a significant impact on the performance of the 
chemical sector, Ho could be rejected and Hi could be considered true.
The first hypothesis, however, represents only the initial research question. If Ho was 
ruled out, the analysis would then move on to assess a number of follow-up hypotheses:
H u : Chemical industry performance deteriorates in response to strong
pollution performance.
Hu: Chemical industry performance improves in response to strong pollution
performance.
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Hjj :  Chemical industry performance reacts inconclusively to strong pollution
performance.
One underlying rationale behind the secondary hypotheses is to test the applicability of 
the conventional economic and location theories (cf. sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.4) and of the 
so-called Porter hypothesis (cf. section 2.2.2.1) to the particular case of EU chemical 
industries. These two basic approaches have distinct views on how pollution 
performance and economic performance interact.
Hypothesis 1.1 corresponds to the expectations of conventional economic and location 
theory. It bases on the assumption that rational economic agents that produce substantial 
amounts of pollution, such as the chemical sector, seek out regulative environments 
where pollution performance is relatively weak. They would tend to avoid pollution 
regimes that forced them to internalise pollution reduction costs into their own profit 
calculations.
By contrast, hypothesis 1.2 builds on the principal notion of the Porter hypothesis, 
which asserts that industries gained competitive advantages from reducing their 
emissions through innovation offsets (Porter and van der Linde 1995). In the case at 
hand, that approach would suggest that chemical sectors in EU member states with a 
strong air pollution performance would gain competitiveness through innovation 
offsets. The argument implies that countries with a strong pollution performance might 
attract or foster the development of more competitive economic sectors, because their 
strong pollution regime would force industries to employ technologies that secured 
them an advantage over competitors or newcomers in the market.
Lastly, hypothesis 1.3 implies that some national chemical sectors react more positively 
to strong pollution performance than others. If this hypothesis was true, the objective of 
the analysis would be to specify distinct reaction patterns and to look for explanations.
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4.1.2 Theoretical model
The apparent conflict between the two principal concepts may surprise at first, and 
could pose the question how this investigation aims to reconcile them. How could a 
particular pollution performance pattern be either positive or negative with regard to 
chemical industry performance -o r  inconclusive, or even both at the same time? 
Furthermore, how could the regression analysis unite the two opposite implications of 
hypothesis 1.1 and 1.2 under one theoretical framework?
Reduced theoretical model
In order to bring together these two seemingly conflicting notions, one needs to think 
about the theoretical connection between pollution performance and chemical industry 
performance. The very basic theoretical model represented in figure 39 may serve as a 
starting point.
Figure 39 Reduced theoretical model
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Performance
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The proposed theoretical model asserts that the link between pollution performance and 
chemical industry performance is a causal relationship. Hence, it implies that pollution 
performance had a significant impact on chemical industry performance, and that 
therefore Hi is valid. The rationale behind this assertion is documented in section 
3.1.4.1.
Based on this set-up, there are three possible ways in which pollution performance may 
be linked with chemical industry competitiveness. First, pollution performance could 
carry negative repercussions for chemical industry performance. Second, pollution 
performance might have positive implications on the chemical sector competitiveness.
However, it is also conceivable that both effects may take place at the same time. In this 
case, the outcome of a particular pollution performance on chemical industry 
performance would be a mixture between positive and negative implications. 
Obviously, this would be the most complicated of the three constellations, as it would 
indicate that both hypothesis 1 . 1  and hypothesis 1 . 2  were true to some degree at the 
same time.
Extended theoretical model
The extended theoretical model represented in figure 40 explains further how the causal 
relationship between pollution performance and chemical industry performance may 
function. Following the broad lines of argument of the principal theories around 
pollution and competitiveness, one might therefore find out empirically that strong 
pollution performance could indeed bring about both negative as well as positive 
implications for chemical industries.
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Figure 40 Extended theoretical model
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On the one hand, chemical sectors could suffer in strong pollution performance regimes, 
as they would have to spend more money for pollution abatement measures than their 
competitors in less strong pollution performance regimes. On the other hand, however, 
chemical industries in strong pollution performance regimes might also have a 
competitive advantage, due to innovation offsets, e.g. more efficient technologies, or 
through consumer preferences.
The regression analysis will have to answer which one o f the two arguments stands in 
the case of EU chemical industries. If the negative implications o f strong pollution 
performance dominated the equation, one would expect chemical industries to perform 
relatively worse than in countries with relatively poorer environmental performance. 
This outcome is marked in the picture as alternative 1.
Inversely, if  mainly positive implications o f strong pollution performance were true, 
one should expect the chemical industry to perform better than in the other countries. In 
this case, alternative 2 in the picture was valid.
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Yet, if  both positive and negative implications took effect, the performance of the 
chemical industry should be somewhere between the two before mentioned options. The 
implications of strong pollution performance would therefore be neither purely positive 
nor negative, but mixed, as alternative 3 suggests.
4.1.3 The regression model
O f course, pollution performance is probably not the only determinant o f chemical 
industry performance. Hence, the very simple theoretical model above could well be a 
theoretical starting point for the forthcoming regression analysis, but not an accurate 
blueprint.
Figure 41 Layout o f the regression framework
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The aim of the regression analysis is to estimate the strength and the direction of the 
impact that the independent variables exercise on the dependent variable. With regard to 
the research question at hand, the regression analysis should estimate to which degree 
and in what way chemical industry performance depends on a number of explanatory 
factors. Figure 41 graphically represents that basic layout of the regression analysis.
The picture illustrates that the regression analysis used in this study is based on the 
working assumption that four lead independent variables constitute the ‘performance 
background’ of EU chemical industries. These four factors are pollution performance, 
tax burden, labour cost, and energy cost. Furthermore, GDP will be introduced into 
some regressions as a further control variable.
As dependent variables, the regression framework operates with three chemical industry 
performance indicators, i.e. production, employment and exports. The three dependent 
variables will be expressed in both relative and absolute terms. This aims to estimate the 
impact of the independent variables on chemical industry performance in relation to the 
rest of the economy as well as in itself.
The regression model
The regression model uses pooled data from fourteen EU member states to account for 
changes in chemical industry performance. Note that Luxembourg was excluded from 
the analysis, as some of its data sets were incomplete. Therefore, the sample will 
comprise 14 country cases; the following investigation will refer to this country cluster 
as the EU 14 sample.
The following regression model will be estimated:
CIPit = ct +dt + (TAXES it) + f i2 (FUELPit) + f i  ^ PRODUCTIVITYit) + fi4(POLLUit) + eit
211
where CIP„ is the dependent variable (chemical industry production, employment, or 
intra-EU exports) for country i at time t. Moreover, c, and d t are country and time
1 9dummies respectively to account for unobserved variations across countries and 
unobserved shocks over time. Finally, sit is the error term.
The main independent variables are tax burden on industrial production and imports 
{TAXES), fuel price (FUELP), productivity of the manufacturing sector 
{PRODUCTIVITY), and pollution performance (POLLU). The size of the national 
economy {GDP) will be included in the regression estimations only when dependent 
variables are used in absolute terms.
The data used in the regression model was monotonically transformed into natural log 
form. For this reason, the computed coefficients stand for percentage-changes (Gujarati 
1978, 1995). For example, a coefficient of 1.5 would indicate that a one-percent-change 
in the independent variable triggers a 1.5 percent change in the dependent variable.
Panel data can be estimated using either a fixed effect model or a random effect model. 
The random effects assumption include all the fixed effects assumptions plus the 
additional requirement that the unobserved effect is independent of all explanatory 
variables in all time periods (Wooldridge 2000: 449). If that assumption is met, random 
effect models are preferable to fixed effect models because the estimators they deliver 
are more efficient (i.e., with smaller variance).
In order to determine whether random effects can be used to estimate the coefficients 
from the expression above, a Hausman specification test has been run for each 
dependent variable. As can be seen in the appendix 3, almost all tests confirm that 
random effects can be used, the exception being the regression explaining chemical 
industry employment in absolute terms (cf. table 48 and table 49). Therefore, random 
effects will be used to explain all dependent variables but employment in absolute terms 
where fixed effects will be used instead.
12 The country dummies cover all 15 EU member states except Luxembourg and the UK. The UK is used 
as reference category Dougherty, C. (1992). Introduction to Econometrics. New York and Oxford, 
Oxford University Press..
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A subsequent inspection of the residuals confirms the presence of first-order 
autocorrelation. Please refer to appendix 3 for a graphical and numerical test of 
autocorrelation. Heteroskedasticity, on the other hand, does not seem to be a problem in 
all regressions. For a graphical test for heteroskedasticity, please refer to appendix 3.
Consequently, the regression model that will be reported in the main part of this study 
will be a random effect GLS (general least squares) model correcting for first-order 
autocorrelation. There is one exception to this, namely the regression on absolute 
employment, which will use a corrected fixed effects model instead of a random effects 
one.
4.2 Regression Results
The purpose of chapter 3 was to set the foundation of the subsequent regression analysis 
by introducing and discussing the variables that will be used in the models. The 
following chapter highlights the findings of the regression analyses, which produced a 
substantial amount of information.
Regression models were estimated for each of the three dependent variables, both in 
absolute and relative terms. In addition, since there was some doubt about the reliability 
of the chemical industry production value data regarding Ireland (cf. section 3.1.2.1), 
two sets of regression models were run: one including Ireland, and another one 
excluding the country. By doing so, one should be able to assess the sensitivity of the 
regression estimates towards the inclusion of the Irish data set.
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4.2.1 Models on chemical industry production
Table 15 presents the regression estimations with regard to the first dependent variable, 
that is, chemical industry production value. As explained earlier, the variable is 
represented both in relative terms (regression models 15.1 and 15.2) as well as in 
absolute terms (estimations 16.1 and 16.2). One should therefore remember that the first 
two regression estimations do not include ‘GDP’, because the dependent variable 
‘production value/GDP’ is already normalised with a measure of the size of the 
economy. In contrast, the latter two regressions contain ‘GDP’ as independent variable 
in order to account for the size of the economy in the model.
The first set of regression models focus on chemical industry production performance 
relative to the rest o f  the economy. Therefore, the question to be answered by this set of 
estimations is whether the chemical sector reacts to the independent variables in a way 
that is distinct from the rest of the economy.
By contrast, regression models 16.1 and 16.2, where production value is expressed in 
absolute terms, is aimed at understanding the immediate impact of changes in the 
independent variables on production value. In other words, this set of regressions seeks 
to shed light on the question whether chemical industry production increases or 
decreases in reaction to changes in pollution performance and other independent 
variables.
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Discussion o f the regression results
The discussion of the regression results starts by looking at model 15.1, which reports 
the impact of the independent variables on chemical industry production value divided 
by GDP. In a first step, this regression was estimated using a fixed effects model. After 
that, a random effects GLS model was computed. In order to assess whether the random 
effects model could safely be used, the regression coefficients of both models were 
tested for systematic differences using the Hausman specification test. Since the 
Hausman test showed that there are no systematic differences in the coefficient values, 
it seemed reasonable to use the results of the random effects model that delivers more 
efficient coefficients, which are presented below in models 15.1. The complete set of 
regression estimations including the Hausman test can be found as table 42 in appendix 
3.
Two out of the four independent variables show significant regression coefficients. 
This, in connection with the fact that the R2 and chi2 values seem to be sufficiently large 
to indicate a fair amount of reliability, appears to indicate that the explanatory variables 
are well chosen.
One interesting observation is that R2-within is clearly larger than R2-between. This 
points out that the development of the independent variables over time has a larger 
explanatory power on the evolution of the dependent variable than the differences 
between countries with regard to the independent variables.
Moving on to revising the regression coefficients, one could state with a high degree of 
confidence that the value of chemical industry production is positively associated with 
air pollution. Thus, countries that experienced relatively weak air pollution 
performances seemed to exhibit relatively higher chemical industry production. Hence, 
if one understands absolute chemical industry production as a measure of the sector’s 
competitiveness, national chemical industries appeared to profit from relatively higher 
levels in air pollution.
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Table 15 Regression estimates on Cl production value /  GDP
Cl production (15.1) (15.2)
value / GDP IE included IE excluded
TAXES -0.4 (0.00) -0.4 (0.01)
FUEL PRICE +0.0 (0.70) +0.1 (0.10)
PRODUCTIVITY +0.1 (0.33) +0.1 (0.13)
GDP — —
POLLUTION +0.2 (0.00) +0.2 (0.00)
(Constant) -3.9 (0.00) -4.5 (0.00)
within 0.47 0.63
R2 between 0.22 0.18
overall 0.26 0.25
Wald chi2 604.71 (0.00) 688.13 (0.00)
N 280 260
Residual DF 243 224
Note: Random effects GLS regression, corrected for first-order autocorrelation.
Group variable: country; year dummies included.
P-values in brackets.
The regression coefficients estimated by model 15.1 further indicate that ‘taxes’ are 
negatively linked to chemical industry production and significant. In contrast, ‘fuel 
price’ and the ‘productivity’ of the manufacturing sector appear to be positively linked 
to chemical industry production, but were found to be not significantly different from 
zero.
All findings seem to correspond well to theoretical expectations. The variable ‘taxes’ 
aims to reflect differences in the taxation o f production and imports; it seems obvious 
that differences in tax levels over time or across countries should have negative 
repercussions on chemical industry competitiveness. Furthermore, since the type of 
taxes covered by this indicator affects the manufacturing sector -  such as the chemical 
industry -  relatively more than the general economy, the empirically observed negative 
impact seems intuitively justifiable.
216
Superior manufacturing productivity may, on the other hand, be a hint at technological 
advantages or beneficial structural differences. Countries with relatively higher 
productivity seem to have a competitive advantage, which in turn should increase their 
chemical industry’s production. For this reason, the observed positive link, although not 
statistically significant, also appears in line with theoretical expectations.
Finally, the computed regression coefficients of model 15.1 also show that differences 
in the price of fuel have had virtually no perceivable impact on the value of chemical 
industry production.
Last but not least, based on these findings, the regression results provide grounds to 
refute the null hypothesis stated in section 4.1.1 with regard to relative chemical 
industry production as dependent variable and the EU 14 country cluster as reference 
framework. The estimations seem to confirm that pollution performance has a 
significant and considerably large impact on the development of chemical industry 
production value. For this reason, the regression results would verify hypothesis 1.1, 
which states that chemical industry performance deteriorates in response to strong 
pollution performance.
Regression model 15.2, in which Ireland is excluded from the sample, confirms the 
above findings. Again, the result of the Hausman test justifies the reporting of the 
random effect model results (cf. table 43 in appendix 3). The coefficients of all 
independent variables are almost identical in both estimations. One could, therefore 
conclude with some confidence that the regression results are robust towards the 
exclusion of Ireland from the sample.
Regression models 16.1 and 16.2 estimate the impact of the independent variables -  this 
time, including ‘GDP’ -  on chemical industry production in absolute terms. Once more, 
the two models reported are random effects estimations (cf. table 44 and table 45 in 
appendix 3). In broad terms, they appear to confirm once more the direction and size of 
the regression coefficients observed before. The only exceptions to this rule are shown 
in model 16.2 where Ireland is excluded from the sample. In that regression estimation, 
‘productivity’ shows up to be significant at 1 0 % significance level, and ‘pollution’ is 
found to be not significantly different from zero.
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Table 16 Regression estimates on Cl production value, absolute terms
Cl production (16.1) (16.2)
value, abs. terms IE included IE excluded
TAXES -0.4 (0.00) -0.4 (0.00)
FUEL PRICE +0.0 (0.95) +0.1 (0.12)
PRODUCTIVITY +0.1 (0.46) +0.1 (0.06)
GDP +0.7 (0.00) +0.6 (0.00)
POLLUTION +0.1 (0.01) +0.1 (0.24)
(Constant) -0.2 (0.84) + 1.6 (0.12)
within 0.65 0.75
R2 between 0.90 0.90
overall 0.88 0.88
Wald chi2 267.47 (0.00) 311.99 (0.00)
N 280 260
Residual DF 242 223
Note: Random effects GLS regression, corrected for first-order autocorrelation.
Group variable: country; year dummies included.
P-values in brackets.
The newly introduced independent variable ‘GDP’ has the largest coefficient and is 
shown to be highly significant. Again, this behaviour seems in line with theoretical 
expectations - i t  seems obvious that the production volume of chemical industries 
depends in no small part on the absolute size o f the economy. This observation and the 
observation that the R2-between value in models 16.1 and 16.2 is relatively higher than 
in models 15.1 and 15.2 respectively, seems to suggest that differences between 
countries concerning the independent variable ‘GDP’ explain a good part o f the 
development of the dependent variable.13
13 Obviously, the explanatory variables are held in different units, and, as a result o f this, their 
coefficients cannot be directly compared. However, since all variables were transformed into natural 
log form, the results reported here indicate that a change of x percent in the explanatory variable 
appears to have an impact of y percent in the development of the dependent variable (cf. section 4.1.3).
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Considering what has been said about, for example, the Irish economic boom and its 
impact on the development of the Irish chemical industry, this observation appears 
plausible.
Actual versus predicted change
Based on the results of the regression models presented above, it is now possible to 
compare the actual development of the dependent variable to the predicted changes by 
the model. Using the computed regression coefficients of estimation 15.1, one can 
estimate the individual contribution of each independent variable to the overall 
predicted change.
To do this, the actual change of each independent variable is multiplied by its estimated 
coefficient. In other words, the computed regression model renders an estimation of the 
individual impact of each independent variable, which can be compared to the actual, 
empirically observed, change. Taken together, the individual impacts of all independent 
variables will add up to the overall predicted change of the dependent variable. Table 17 
reports the results of this exercise with regard to regression model 15.1, which 
established an estimation using the relative chemical industry production value as the 
dependent variable.
In order to compare the differences in the impact of the independent variables across the 
pollution performance clusters (cf. section 3.2.1.6), the countries are ordered by poor 
pollution performers, catching-up countries, falling-behind countries, and strong 
pollution performers.
219
Table 17 Actual and predicted changes: Cl production value /  GDP
Chemical Industry Production / GDP, 1980-1999
J Poor pollution performers 1 8r es Pt AVG
Actual Change -3% 4% -16% -5%
Predicted Change 61% 38% 62% 54%
contribution to the predicted change
TAXES -18% -30% -14% -21%
FUEL PRICE -1% 0% -1% -1%
PRODUCTIVITY 1% 10% 5% 5%
POLLUTION 26% 10% 19% 18%
(year) 53% 49% 53% 51%
[Countries that catch" up ie uk AVG
Actual Change 815% 20% 417%
Predicted Change 76% 54% 65%
contribution to the predicted change
TAXES 11% 6% 8%
FUEL PRICE -2% -1% -2%
PRODUCTIVITY 6% 5% 6%
POLLUTION 6% -7% -1%
(year) 55% 52% 53%
|Countries that fall behind be fr fi it se AVG
Actual Change 99% 67% 22% 4% 111% 61%
Predicted Change 52% 55% 52% 29% 53% 48%
contribution to the predicted change
TAXES -2% -1% -5% -25% -14% -10%
FUEL PRICE -1% -1% -1% 0% -1% -1%
PRODUCTIVITY 7% 7% 12% 9% 19% 11%
POLLUTION -3% -1% -6% -2% -2% -3%
(year) 51% 52% 51% 47% 51% 50%
|Strong pollution performers 1 ^ dk de nl AVG
Actual Change 37% 85% 0% 74% 49%
Predicted Change 52% 50% 56% 50% 52%
contribution to the predicted change
TAXES 0% -1% 1% -7% -2%
FUEL PRICE -2% -1% -2% 0% -1%
PRODUCTIVITY 12% 10% 9% 6% 9%
POLLUTION -9% -8% -4% 0% -5%
(year) 51% 51% 52% 51% 51%
Calculations based on regression model 15.1
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Taking Belgium as an example, regression model 15.1 would predict a proportional 
increase in relative chemical industry production of 52 percent. The actual increase, 
however, was 99 percent, which indicates that the regression model predicts around half 
of the actual increase in chemical industry production.
With regard to the impact of the distinct independent variables on absolute chemical 
industry production, table 17 disaggregates the overall predicted change into the 
individual contributions of ‘taxes’, ‘fuel price’, ‘productivity’, ‘GDP’, ‘pollution’, and 
the time-dummies ‘year’.
According to the regression estimations, and keeping Belgium as an example, the actual 
development in ‘taxes’ over the observation period 1980 to 1999 has contributed a 
predicted decrease of -2 percent in relative chemical industry production. In other 
words, since the tax burden with regard to production and import taxes has gone up in 
Belgium over the observation period, and since this variable is negatively associated 
with the development of the absolute production value, the evolution of ‘taxes’ in itself 
would imply a negative development in the dependent variable. The input to the 
predicted change by the independent variable ‘fuel price’ appeared to be - 1  percent. 
Last but not least, changes in ‘pollution’ have contributed some -3 percent to the 
development of the chemical industry production value / GDP over the observation 
period.
These negative contributions of ‘taxes’, ‘fuel price’ and ‘pollution’ were partly set off 
by the developments of the other explanatory factors. The increase in ‘productivity’ in 
the Belgian manufacturing sector contributed a predicted increase of +7 percent to the 
overall development of chemical industry production. However, the biggest projected 
contribution clearly comes from the auxiliary independent variable ‘year’, which is a 
dummy variable that captures all unidentified time shocks that have hit the EU countries 
in the sample.
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Based on the information contained in the regression model, one could only speculate as 
to what unobserved trends or developments hide behind the dummy variable ‘year’. 
Possible explanations might include external shocks such as the accession of new EU 
member states or the reunification of Germany, or a general increase in European and 
world trade activity.
Looking at the bigger pattern of actual and predicted changes across the countries in the 
sample, there seem to be considerable differences both among individual countries as 
well as among country clusters. To start with, the model predicts very accurately the 
actual change in chemical industry production among strong pollution performers and 
among countries that fall behind. On the other hand, chemical industry production in 
poor pollution performance countries, and in catching-up countries, does not appear to 
be comprehensively explained by the independent variables in this model.
With regard to the poor pollution performers’ cluster, one can observe that some 
countries experienced a negative actual change. In other words, the production value of 
the chemical sector in Greece and Portugal did not grow as much as the general 
economy over the course of the observation period. Thus, judging from this 
development, the Greek and Portuguese chemical sectors were less competitive than the 
rest of the economy.
Turning to the contribution of the independent variables, and focusing first on the 
variable of our interest, that is, pollution performance, we observe that across the poor 
air pollution performers’ cluster, in average, ‘pollution’ contributed +18 percent to the 
predicted increase in relative chemical industry production. In other words, relative 
chemical industry production in this cluster has profited very much from the poor 
pollution performance among the three Mediterranean countries.
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Overall, the results of the regression model seem to suggest that the predicted 
contribution of ‘pollution’ among poor pollution performers was very considerable, 
only second to ‘taxes’ with an average predicted contribution of -21 percent. In Greece 
and Portugal, ‘pollution’ appears to be even the single largest independent variable 
covered in this analysis. The other two explanatory factors appear to have a much 
smaller average impact. However, one should also keep in mind that the average 
predicted contribution of the time-dummies was +51 percent.
If one considers the strong air pollution performers Austria, Denmark, Germany and the 
Netherlands, ‘pollution’ has had the opposite effect: its average contribution to relative 
chemical industry production was -5 percent. In other words, the relatively strong 
pollution performance of those countries has had a perceivable negative impact on their 
chemical industries, as the sector’s production value relative to the GDP decreased over 
the observation period.
Again, pollution performance was the second biggest contributor after ‘productivity’. It 
may be worth taking note that the biggest contributing factor varies between poor and 
strong pollution performers: productivity is positively associated with the dependent 
variables for the strong performance cluster, and much less so with regard to the poor 
pollution performers.
Adding up the positive contribution of ‘pollution’ among poor pollution performers 
(+18%) to its negative contribution among strong pollution performers (-5%), one 
arrives to the conclusion that distinct pollution performance patterns among EU 
member states accounted for 23 percent of the difference in the development of their 
chemical industry production value / GDP.
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Table 18 Actual and predicted changes: Cl production value, absolute terms
Absolute Chemical Industry Production, 1980-1999
|Poor pollution performers 1 es Pt AVG
Actual Change 36% 60% 81% 59%
Predicted Change 118% 104% 205% 142%
contribution to the predicted change
TAXES -20% -34% -19% -24%
FUEL PRICE 0% 0% 0% 0%
PRODUCTIVITY 1% 9% 5% 5%
GDP 38% 46% 105% 63%
POLLUTION 21% 8% 19% 16%
(year) 78% 75% 95% 83%
|Countries that catch up ie uk AVG
Actual Change 2219% 75% 1147%
Predicted Change 282% 130% 206%
contribution to the predicted change 
TAXES 16% 7% 11%
FUEL PRICE -1% 0% 0%
PRODUCTIVITY 7% 5% 6%
GDP 145% 44% 94%
POLLUTION 6% -6% 0%
(year) 109% 81% 95%
|Countries that fall behind be fr fi it se AVG
Actual Change 125% 97% 68% 48% 122% 92%
Predicted Change 85% 95% 113% 86% 73% 90%
contribution to the predicted change 
TAXES -2% -1% -6% -29% -14% -10%
FUEL PRICE 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
PRODUCTIVITY 6% 6% 11% 8% 15% 9%
GDP 13% 17% 35% 37% 5% 21%
POLLUTION -2% -1% -4% -2% -1% -2%
(year) 72% 74% 77% 72% 69% 73%
jStrong pollution performers at dk de nl AVG
Actual Change 100% 162% 43% 118% 106%
Predicted Change 126% 118% 126% 95%; 116%
contribution to the predicted change
TAXES 0% -1% 1% -8% -2%
FUEL PRICE 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
PRODUCTIVITY 11% 9% 8% 5% 8%
GDP 43% 39% 40% 23%| 36%
POLLUTION -7% -7% -3% o%; -4%
(year) 80% 78% 80% 73% 78%
Calculations based on regression model 16.1
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Moving on to table 18, the dependent variable now changes to be expressed in absolute 
terms. The figures represented in this table seem to differ from what has been said 
before in a number of ways. The actual changes are much bigger in absolute terms than 
in relative terms. This could be explained by the fact that the relative production value 
captured the chemical industry growth in excess of the (generally positive) growth of 
the general economy. Since the absolute production value indicator reports the chemical 
sector’s development on a ‘stand-alone’ basis, these figures should be higher. In other 
words, an explanation for this difference is the fact that ‘GDP’ is now included as a 
separate independent variable.
With regard to the contribution of each independent variable, the predicted impact of 
‘GDP’ is the most important contributing factor among all independent variables, 
followed by ‘taxes’ and ‘pollution’. Again, this observation could serve as one more 
confirmation that the overall evolution of the economy is the major explanatory factor 
for the development of the chemical industry production volume.
The importance of the dummy variable ‘year’ has increased across all countries in the 
sample. Thus, the importance of unidentified time shocks is bigger with regard to 
chemical industry production in absolute terms than with regard to chemical industry 
production value in relative terms.
Finally, the contribution of ‘pollution’ to absolute chemical industry production is 
smaller than to production in relative terms. This could be an indication that the 
production performance of the chemical sector relative to the general economy is more 
sensitive to differences in pollution performance than the chemical production in 
absolute terms.
Chemical industry production and pollution performance: an interim conclusion
The regression models presented in this section have produced a quite robust picture 
about the relationship between chemical industry production and the independent 
variables.
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In general, ‘taxes’ appear to be significant and negatively linked to chemical industry 
production. Moreover, they are among the most important contributing factors, along 
with ‘productivity’ and ‘pollution’, irrespective of whether the dependent variable is 
expressed in absolute or relative terms. The finding that differences in ‘productivity’ are 
positively linked to chemical industry production value seems equally robust. Finally, 
the regression estimations have consistently shown that ‘pollution’ has a positive impact 
on the dependent variable.
Overall, the contribution of ‘pollution’ to the development of chemical industry 
production was shown to be considerable vis-a-vis the other explanatory variables. This 
observation is in line with the literature, which generally notes that environment-related 
factors are typically not the biggest, but one among the most important determinants of 
economic competitiveness.
In terms of the overall difference in chemical industry production that is caused by 
distinct pollution performance patterns of EU member states, the impact of pollution 
performance appears to be very significant. With regard to production value relative to 
GDP, the overall impact seemed to make a difference of up to 35 percent, ranging from 
+26 percent in the case of Greece, to -9 percent regarding Austria. In absolute terms, the 
overall impact appeared to be somewhat smaller with 28 percent.
4.2.2 Models on chemical industry employment
The following set of regression models establishes the relationship between the 
independent variables and chemical industry employment. The basic structure of the 
regression models and of the tables in which they are presented here is the same as in 
the previous section.
Table 19 shows the estimated impact of the independent variables on relative chemical 
employment, that is, the percentage of chemical industry employees in the total 
workforce of a country. Model 19.1 includes Ireland into the sample, while model 19.2 
reports the results of the regression estimation when we exclude the country. Later, 
models 2 0 . 1  and 2 0 . 2  will report regression coefficients for absolute chemical industry 
employment as the dependent variable.
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The Hausman specification test failed to confirm that a random effect model could 
safely be used with regard to regression estimations 20.1 and 20.2. Therefore, the 
results reported in the main part o f this thesis for these two models are first-order 
autoregressive fixed effect regressions. The detailed results of the regression analysis 
can be found as table 48 and table 49 in appendix 3.
Table 19 Regression estimates on Cl employment /  total workforce
C l employment / (19.1) (19.2)
total workforce IE included IE excluded
TAXES -0.1 (0.54) -0.0 (0.84)
FUEL PRICE -0.0 (0.75) -0.0 (0.55)
PRODUCTIVITY +0.1 (0.10) +0.1 (0.06)
GDP — —
POLLUTION -0.0 (0.88) -0.0 (0.83)
(Constant) +0.2 (0.68) +0.2 (0.74)
within 0.16 0.22
R2 between 0.42 0.46
overall 0.25 0.30
Wald chi2 24.04 (0.46) 28.57 (0.24)
N 280 260
Residual DF 243 224
Note: Random effects GLS regression corrected for first-order autocorrelation.
Group variable: country; year dummies included.
P-values in brackets.
The first fundamental observation, which will set the general tone o f the subsequent 
discussion o f the regression results on chemical industry employment, must be a word 
of caution: the chi2 values o f regression models 19.1 and 19.2, as well as the F values o f 
estimations 20.1 and 20.2, are too low to reject the hypothesis that all coefficient are 
zero. In other words, the statistical relationships between the explanatory variables and 
the development o f chemical industry employment are not strong enough to establish 
underlying causalities with a sufficiently high degree o f certainty.
227
Table 20 Regression estimates on Cl employment, absolute terms
Cl employment, (2 0 .1 ) (2 0 .2 )
absolute terms IE included IE excluded
TAXES -0.0 (0.79) +0.0 (0.89)
FUEL PRICE +0.0 (0.46) +0.0 (0.76)
PRODUCTIVITY +0.1 (0.12) +0.1 (0.12)
GDP +0.0 (0.59) +0.0 (0.83)
POLLUTION -0.0 (0.68) -0 .0  (0.62)
(Constant) +3.0 (0.00) +3.5 (0.00)
within 0.09 0 .1 0
R2 between 0.56 0.33
overall 0.42 0 .2 2
F 0.97 (0.50) 1.06 (0.40)
N 280 260
Residual DF 229 211
Note: Fixed effects regression corrected for first-order autocorrelation.
Country dummies and year dummies included.
P-values in brackets.
Therefore, one could only make a couple o f limited observations regarding the 
regression results. First o f all, the R2-between values o f all regression models appear to 
be higher than the R2-within values. This might be taken as an indication that the 
observed differences regarding the independent variables between countries has more 
explanatory power than the development of the independent variables over time. In 
other words, structural differences between countries seem to have a bigger impact on 
the development o f chemical industry employment than changes in the explanatory 
variables over the observation period. That observation is consistent with the notion that 
employment is caused by institutional factors, which vary greatly across countries but 
not so much across time.
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Second, the only explanatory variable that appears to have some significance with 
regard to chemical industry employment is ‘productivity’. In model 19.2, this factor was 
shown to be significant at 10 percent significance level. With regard to the three other 
models, the P-values appeared to be just below that threshold. Therefore, one could 
state with some moderate degree of confidence that differences in the productivity of 
the manufacturing sector were positively linked to chemical industry employment 
levels, especially when the dependent variable is measured in relative terms. As 
mentioned above, such behaviour appears to be in line with theoretical expectations.
Third, and most importantly in the context of this study, the regression coefficient of the 
‘pollution’ indicator turns out to be not significantly different from zero in all four 
models. Based on this observation, the null hypothesis of this study cannot be rejected. 
In other words, the empirical analysis does not provide any evidence that differences in 
pollution performance among EU member states have had an impact on the employment 
performance of their chemical industries.
Concluding remarks
One could sum up the findings in this section into three points: first, the regression 
models do not seem satisfactory in terms of reliability and robustness. Second, they 
might show that ‘productivity’ is positively linked to chemical industry employment, 
while all other explanatory variables fail to achieve significance. Finally, the regression 
results appear to indicate that pollution performance has little impact on the creation or 
destruction of jobs in the EU chemical sector, which seems to be more related to the 
existing labour market institutions in each country.
These findings correspond to earlier results of Levinson (2000) and Morgenstem et al. 
(2 0 0 1 ), which show that increased environmental taxes or spending, respectively, did 
not generally cause a significant change in employment levels. Both studies conclude 
that their data does not support the notion of a jobs-versus-the-environment trade-off.
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4.2.3 Models on intra-EU chemical industry exports
The third and final set of regression models tests the impact of the independent 
variables on intra-EU chemical industry exports. Again, the system in which the results 
are presented here corresponds to the earlier two sections.
Table 21 presents the results of the regression estimations relating to intra-EU chemical 
industry exports as a percentage of GDP. Models 21.1, 21.2 and 22.1 were estimated as 
random effects models, while model 22.2 -  which refers to intra-EU exports in absolute 
terms excluding Ireland -  failed to pass the Hausman specification test. Therefore, that 
estimation was based on a fixed effects regression. Based on the observed R2, chi2 or F 
values, all estimations appear to exhibit a high level of significance concerning the 
overall set of independent variables. For details on the regression analysis, please refer 
to annex 3.
With regard to all four regression models, the R2-within value was the highest observed 
indicator among all R2 values. This seems to indicate that the development of the 
independent variables over time has had a higher explanatory power than structural 
differences between countries.
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Table 21 Regression estimates on C l intra-EU exports /  GDP
Intra-EU exports /  (21.1)______________________(2U2)
GDP IE included IE excluded
TAXES -0.2 (0.39) -0.1 (0.81)
FUEL PRICE -0.2 (0.29) -0 .3  (0.06)
PRODUCTIVITY +0.4 (0.02) +0.5 (0.00)
GDP — —
POLLUTION +0.3 (0.01) +0.2 (0.03)
(Constant) -6.3 (0.00) -6.2 (0.00)
within 0.79 0.78
R2 between 0.26 0.24
overall 0.23 0.25
Wald chi2 189.47 (0.00) 163.16 (0.00)
N 126 117
Residual DF 100 92
Note: Random effects GLS regression corrected for first-order autocorrelation.
Group variable: country; year dummies included.
P-values in brackets.
Regression model 21.1 indicates that there are two independent variables with a 
statistically significant impact on the development o f intra-EU chemical industry 
exports in relative terms. One o f them is ‘productivity’, which is positively linked with 
exports. The other one is ‘pollution’, which is also shown to have a positive impact on 
chemical industry exports relative to the general economy.
In other words, our lead independent variable appears to have a very sizeable impact on 
the export performance of chemical industries, second only to the impact o f 
‘productivity’. Considering that productivity differences translate into production costs, 
and given the paramount importance of price as a competitive advantage in the global 
market, the impact o f ‘productivity’ on export levels may not come as a big surprise. 
The empirically observed importance o f ‘pollution’, however, is remarkably large.
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The coefficients of the two other independent variables, ‘taxes’ and ‘fuel price’, were 
not significantly different from zero. Thus, neither differences in taxation nor 
differences in the price of fuel appeared to make a difference with regard to the export 
performance of chemical industries.
By and large, regression model 21.2, where Ireland is excluded from the sample, 
confirms the above conclusions. The only major finding that differs from the earlier 
regression model concerns the independent variable ‘fuel price’, which is reported to be 
significant and negatively linked to relative chemical industry exports. Given that a 
large proportion of chemical industry raw materials are petrochemicals, this finding 
appears in line with theoretical expecatations.
Moving to regression models 22.1 and 22.2, which report the impact of the independent 
variables on intra-EU exports of chemical industries in absolute terms, the picture 
seems to change in a number of ways. First, the R2-between values of the regression 
estimations increase. This could be an indication that structural differences across 
countries have a larger impact on chemical industry exports in absolute terms than on 
exports in relative terms.
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Table 22 Regression estimates on Cl intra-EU exports, absolute terms
Intra-EU exports, (2 2 .1 ) ( 2 2 .2 )
absolute terms IE included(,) IE excluded(2)
TAXES -0.3 (0.32) +0.3 (0.21)
FUEL PRICE -0.1 (0.33) -0.2 (0.13)
PRODUCTIVITY +0.4 (0.01) +0.1 (0.50)
GDP +0.6 (0.00) +0.2 (0.36)
POLLUTION +0.1 (0.32) -0.1 (0.59)
(Constant) -0.9 (0.70) +6,5 (0.00)
within 0.85 0.76
R2 between 0.66 0.68
overall 0.66 0.62
Wald chi2 275.35 (0.00)
F 21.09 (0.00)
N 126 104
Residual DF 99 79
Note: (1) Random effects GLS regression corrected for first-order autocorrelation.
Group variable: country; year dummies included.
(2) Fixed effects regression with robust standard errors corrected for first-order autocorrelation.
Country dummies and year dummies included.
P-values in brackets.
Second, with regard to model 22.1, ‘productivity’ remains significant and positively 
linked to absolute chemical industry production, while ‘pollution’ is not statistically 
different from zero. In other words, while productivity is still shown to be a competitive 
advantage in terms o f absolute chemical exports to the EU, differences in the pollution 
performance of countries appear to lose their importance. However, we have to take this 
result with caution, as table 22 casts some doubt on the regression model explaining 
absolute exports as a whole. The reason for this is that the estimation results do not 
appear to be robust to the exclusion of Ireland.
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Table 23 Actual and predicted changes: Cl intra-EU exports /  GDP
Chemical Industry Intra-EU Exports / GDP, 1980-1999
|Poor pollution performers 1  Kr es P* AVG
Actual Change 1% 114% 21% 45%
Predicted Change 81% 96% 91% 89%
contribution to the predicted change 
TAXES -1% -4% -3% -2%
FUEL PRICE -2% -3% 1% -1%
PRODUCTIVITY 9% 21% 17% 16%
POLLUTION 15% 20% 13% 16%
(year) 60% 63% 62% 62%
|Countries that catch up 1 uk AVG
Actual Change 174% 51% 112%
Predicted Change 83% 48% 65%
contribution to the predicted change 
TAXES 4% -2% 1%
FUEL PRICE 1% -2% 0%
PRODUCTIVITY 12% 9% 10%
POLLUTION 5% -10% -3%
(year) 60% 54% 57%
|Countries that fall behind be fr fi it se AVG
Actual Change 105% 85% 200% 99% 122% 122%
Predicted Change 72% 75% 100% 80% 117% 89%
contribution to the predicted change
TAXES -2% -1% 1% -10% 1% -2%
FUEL PRICE -1% -2% 3% -2% 7% 1%
PRODUCTIVITY 15% 13% 23% 21% 34% 21%
POLLUTION 2% 6% 9% 11% 8%' 7%
(year) 58% 59% 64% 60% 66% 61%
|Strong pollution performers 1 at dk de nl AVG
Actual Change 60% 125% 23% 23% 58%
Predicted Change 80% 60% 53% 57% 63%
contribution to the predicted change
TAXES -1% -2% 0% -3% -2%
FUEL PRICE 1% -10% 1% -4% -3%
PRODUCTIVITY 19% 18% 16% 11% 16%
POLLUTION 1% -2% -18% -3% -5%
(year) 60% 56% 55% 56% 57%
Calculations based on regression model 23.1
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Actual and predicted changes
Table 23 reports the actual and predicted changes with regard to the dependent variable, 
intra-EU chemical industry exports expressed in relative terms, while table 24 relates to 
absolute export figures. Overall, both the actual as well as the predicted changes are 
smaller when the dependent variable is expressed in relative terms. Based on this 
observation, one might conclude that the value of chemical industry exports to the 
European common market grew at a lesser rate than the respective national economies.
With regard to the lead independent variable, ‘pollution’, table 23 reveals at least two 
important findings. First, in Greece (+15%) and the United Kingdom (-9%), pollution 
performance is predicted to be the single most important contributing factor to the 
development of chemical industry exports, while it shows to be the second most 
important factor across all other countries. Second, the importance of ‘pollution’ as 
contributor to the predicted development of the dependent variable varies considerably 
across countries and across country clusters. Among poor pollution performers, 
‘pollution’ contributes with +16 percent in average, which is the same average 
contribution as ‘productivity’, while in other country clusters, the relative importance of 
‘productivity’ appears more accentuated.
The predicted contribution to the overall development of chemical industry exports in 
relative terms ranged from +20 percent in Spain, to -18 percent in Germany. Hence, 
pollution performance appeared to make a cumulative difference of 38 percent. This 
finding is indeed a strong indicator for the importance of relative pollution performance 
to chemical industry competitiveness.
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Table 24 Actual and predicted changes: C l exports, absolute terms
Chemical Industry Intra-EU Exports, absolute terms, 1990-1998
|Poor pollution performers 1  8r es Pt AVG
Actual Change 25% 114% 64% 67%
Predicted Change 104% 90% 131% 108%
contribution to the predicted change 
TAXES -1% -4% -3% -3%
FUEL PRICE -1% -3% 1% -1%
PRODUCTIVITY 9% 20% 20% 16%
GDP 19% 0% 30% 17%
POLLUTION 7% 8% 6% 7%
(year) 71% 69% 76% 72%
|Countries that catch up 1 «e uk AVG
Actual Change 335% 83% 209%
Predicted Change 154% 84% 119%
contribution to the predicted change 
TAXES 6% -3% 1%
FUEL PRICE 1% -2% 0%
PRODUCTIVITY 14% 10% 12%
GDP 49% 17% 33%
POLLUTION 3% -5% -1%
(year) 81% 67% 74%
jCountries that fall behind be fr fi it se AVG
Actual Change 120% 89% 141% 83% 95% 105%
Predicted Change 87% 82% 76% 69% 103% 84%
contribution to the predicted change 
TAXES -2% -1% 1% -11% 1% -2%
FUEL PRICE -1% -2% 2% -1% 6% 1%
PRODUCTIVITY 15% 14% 22% 20% 34% 21%
GDP 6% 2% -19% -7% -12% -6%
POLLUTION 1% 3% 4% 4% 3% 3%
(year) 68% 67% 66% 64% 71% 67%
[Strong pollution performers 1 - dk de nl AVG
Actual Change 78% 147% 48% 42% 79%
Predicted Change 102% 82% 97% 84% 91%
contribution to the predicted change
TAXES -1% -3% 0% -4% -2%
FUEL PRICE 1% -9% 1% -4% -3%
PRODUCTIVITY 21% 19% 18% 13% 18%
GDP 10% 8% 17% 13% 12%
POLLUTION 0% -1% -9% -1% -3%
(year) 71% 67% 70% 67% 69%
Calculations based on regression model 24.1
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Based on the coefficients that were estimated by model 21.1, table 24 compares the 
actual to the predicted changes with regard to absolute intra-EU chemical industry 
exports. As was the case with regard to chemical industry production as well, the 
observed actual changes in chemical industry exports were bigger in absolute terms than 
in relative terms. Considering that these relative numbers reveal the chemical industry 
performance in excess of the general economic performance, this observation seems in 
line with what would be expected.
Secondly, the contribution of ‘pollution’ appears, with regard to the development of 
chemical industry exports in absolute terms, smaller than in relative terms. This may be, 
on the one hand, explained by the before-mentioned “increased sensibility” of relative 
chemical industry export figures to environmental performance. Another possible 
explanation is the inclusion of the auxiliary independent variable ‘GDP’.
Nevertheless, the importance of pollution performance is considerable, even when one 
looks at absolute export figures. Its predicted contribution to the overall development of 
chemical industry exports ranged from +8 percent in Spain, to -9 percent in Germany. 
Hence, pollution performance appeared to make a cumulative difference of no less than 
17 percent.
Interim conclusion
The regression analysis on the link between intra-EU chemical industry exports and the 
independent variables clearly shows that pollution performance is one of the main 
determining factors. In general, ‘pollution’ is positively linked to chemical industry 
exports. For this reason, the results of this regression analysis seem to reject the null 
hypothesis and to lend support to hypothesis H u , which states that chemical industry 
performance deteriorates in response to strong pollution performance. This is consistent 
with the findings of the regression analysis concerning chemical industry production 
value.
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The size o f the predicted contribution from pollution performance to chemical industry 
exports varies across countries, but appears in general remarkably high. Based on the 
findings o f this regression analysis, the factor ‘pollution’ contributed a cumulative 
difference o f 38 percent to the development o f chemical industry exports in relative 
terms, and of 17 percent to absolute export figures. Hence, pollution performance seems 
to have a large impact on the chemical industry competitiveness, which is driving the 
sector’s exports.
4.2.4 Summary of the empirical observations
Table 25 summarises the significant coefficients across the three dependent variables. 
‘Productivity’ and ‘pollution’ were found to be the most important variables to explain 
the development o f the chemical sector’s performance. Both variables were found to be 
positively linked to production value and intra-EU exports. Taxes, on the other hand, 
were very significant and negative only with regard to chemical industry production 
value.
Table 25 Summary o f regression results
Taxes Fuel price Productivity Pollutionperformance
Production value ----- + + +
Employment +
Intra-EU exports + + + +
Note: Based on regression models 15.1, 19.1, and 21.1
+ Positive and significant at 10% significance level
++ Positive and significant at 5% significance level
+++ Positive and significant at 1% significance level
Negative and significant at 10% significance level 
Negative and significant at 5% significance level 
— Negative and significant at 1% significance level
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Looking at the tables that report the predicted contribution of each independent 
variable, there are at least two interesting observations. First, the cluster of poor 
pollution performers has suffered from increases in taxes over the observation period 
1980 to 1999. Looking at the development of this independent variable over time (table 
32), it seems reasonable to assume that this increase in taxes was related to the 
accession of Greece, Portugal and Spain to the European Community in the 1980s. On 
the other hand, the pollution load on these countries also increased over the period, from 
below-EU-average levels towards the average (and beyond, as table 29 shows). Hence, 
one could talk about a double convergence, in taxes and pollution, among these 
accession countries.
The net effect of this double convergence appears to be almost a zero-sum-game, as the 
predicted contributions in table 17 and table 18 illustrate.
Secondly, the predicted contribution of ‘productivity’ to all chemical industry 
performance variables appears to be larger among countries in the strong pollution 
performance cluster and the falling-behind pollution performance cluster (which could 
be considered the cluster of formerly strong pollution performers). Hence, the findings 
of the regression analysis could lend some support to the Porter hypothesis on 
innovation offsets.
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5 The scope of environmental competition: some conclusions 
from this study
5.1 Summary of the main findings
This thesis was about environmental competition. The research problem at the heart of 
the analysis was the question whether countries compete among themselves by the 
means of ‘playing’ with their environmental performance in order to foster industrial 
activity. On the balance of the empirical results, the preliminary answer is yes -  with 
some qualifications attached.
In order to reach this conclusion, the first step was to construct a proxy indicator for 
environmental performance. There are several approaches to deal with environmental 
performance in social sciences. Since one of the initial objectives of this research was to 
carry out a quantitative comparative analysis, the approach of choice was pollution 
performance analysis. Pollution performance is too broad a concept to be workable in 
practice, so this study had to narrow the concept of pollution performance to air 
pollution performance. Therefore, the basis of the indicator was an average of several 
air pollutants.
Since the frame of reference for this thesis was a closed system (the EU 15), the air 
pollution time series were transformed into a relative performance indicator across the 
countries within the system. The advantage of this approach is that it is comparative in 
nature -  once the indicator is developed, one can easily work out distinct pollution 
performance patterns, rank countries according to their pollution performance, or 
classify them into performance clusters.
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Therefore, using the air pollution indicator, the first contribution of this thesis, is the 
classification of EU 15 member states according to their empirically observed pollution 
performance during the period 1990 to 1999. The classification produced four distinct 
clusters. There were two “clear-cut” performance clusters with countries that were 
either clearly poor pollution performers or strong pollution performers. Countries in the 
first cluster were Greece, Portugal and Spain. They exhibited poor initial performance 
levels with respect to the EU average and a lack of convergence. Inversely, strong 
pollution performers, such as Austria, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands were 
characterised by strong initial pollution levels with regard to the other countries, and 
also a lack of convergence. Furthermore, there were two ‘transitory’ pollution 
performance clusters. The first of those two clusters comprises countries in the process 
of catching-up: its constituents start from relatively poor pollution performance levels, 
but show convergence towards the EU average. This group is comprised of Ireland, 
Luxembourg and the United Kingdom. The last cluster contains countries that fall 
behind in terms of pollution performance, such as Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, and 
Sweden. These countries show strong initial pollution performance levels, but converge 
downwards towards (and in some cases, beyond) the EU average.
The second part of the thesis evolved around the idea to relate the pollution 
performance indicator to a number of variables that capture the performance of 
chemical industries using panel data of 15 EU countries along 20 years. The main 
hypothesis to be tested was whether strong pollution performance had an impact on 
chemical industry performance, and if so, what the sign of that relationship was. There 
were three performance variables: production value, employment, and value of intra-EU 
exports -  in order to stay within the EU as frame of reference.
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The results of the regression analysis show that, with regard to two of the three 
chemical industry performance variables, strong pollution performance has a negative 
and significant impact. This is the case with regard to production value and intra-EU 
exports. This finding is in line with conventional economic and location theory, which 
states that there is a trade-off between economic performance and environmental 
performance. The empirical observations of this thesis lend further support to such 
theories. Hence, it seems that the countries in the sample actually do compete by means 
of environmental competition.
On the other hand, this study did not produce evidence that strong pollution 
performance has had an impact on the employment of the chemical industries in the EU. 
Hence, employment seems to respond to a different set of factors.
Besides the pollution performance indicator, this study produced a number of 
interesting results on the effect of other explanatory variables on the evolution of 
chemical industries. First, the contribution of manufacturing productivity to both 
chemical industry production value and exports was remarkably large within the strong 
pollution performance cluster as well as to the falling-behind country cluster. Moreover, 
manufacturing productivity was shown to be the only significant and positive 
explanatory variable in the employment regression.
Second, taxes on production and imports had a negative impact on chemical industry 
production value. The contribution of this explanatory factor was especially significant 
within the poor pollution performer cluster, which is comprised of Greece, Portugal and 
Spain. It seems that all three countries experienced a “double convergence” during their 
accession process to the European Community during the 1980s. On the one hand, the 
three countries had to adjust their tax level upwards to meet EC standards, which 
harmed their chemical industries’ production. On the other hand, pollution performance 
also converged from low initial levels towards European averages (and beyond), which 
had a positive impact on chemical industry production levels. According to the results 
of the regression analysis, the overall outcome of this double convergence was, more or 
less, a zero-sum-game.
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5.2 Directions for future research
One of the hottest issues in the news concerns the relocation of industries to the newly 
acceded EU countries. Given the fact that, due to data constraints, this study only 
covered the EU-15 member states, one obvious field for future research would be to 
include all EU-26 countries, or to include further transition economies. In particular, it 
would be very interesting to see whether these countries also experience what was 
called a double convergence. Or, in other words, are these countries currently 
attempting to compete -  among others -  on the basis of their environmental 
performance?
Another promising field for future research seems to originate from one of the by­
products of this study, which is the observation that countries in the strong pollution 
performer cluster and the falling-behind pollution performance cluster (that is, in a 
sense, the cluster of formerly strong pollution performers), benefit consistently from 
higher contributions of the ‘productivity’ variable to chemical industry performance. 
This could suggest that the returns from investing in strong pollution performance are 
achieved and harvested in the long term.
The explanatory variables used in the regression analysis did not explain the 
employment performance of chemical industries. Hence, one interesting research 
question could be to identify the ‘missing link’, that is the determinants of employment 
in such a special industry.
Last but not least, another promising research question could be to expand the frame of 
reference beyond the European Union, with the United Sates or Japan as the obvious 
candidates for inclusion.
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5 .5  Cost and benefits o f environmental protection: some policy 
implications from this study
To conclude this investigation, let us take a step back and assess its implications ‘in the 
big picture’ in terms of policies, business strategies, and further academic research. 
Obviously, one needs to be very cautious to point out once more that there are important 
constraints that should prevent the reader from taking its results as generally valid. First, 
this study was set-up as a case study, which uses the 15 EU member states as a closed 
frame of reference. Second, it used air pollution performance as a proxy for 
environmental competition. Third, the analysis is limited to the period of 1980 to 1999. 
Given the broadness and complexity of the academic arenas that link into the notion of 
environmental competition, the narrow scope of this investigation will obviously limit 
the degree to which it could be taken as generally applicable.
Fourth, and maybe most importantly, in order to keep the analysis within a manageable 
scope, we had to focus on testing one specific set of hypotheses. Although there is a 
range of what one might consider interesting ‘collateral’ findings, this thesis can merely 
point at the apparent existence of those additional findings and recommend further 
investigation. However, if we allow ourselves to relax this strict standard of objectivity 
for a moment and permit some degree of ‘educated’ speculation, an intriguing set of 
policy implications emerges.
A puzzle o f three pieces
This investigation has produced three sets of observations on how relative air pollution 
performance among EU member states may have shaped the competitiveness of their 
chemical industries. The first set of insights highlights the correlation between air 
pollution performance and chemical industry competitiveness indicators. The second set 
of observations highlights the predicted contribution from the factors ‘pollution 
performance’ and ‘taxes’ on chemical industry competitiveness, and how the observed 
differences vary among the four pollution performance clusters. Finally, the third set of 
observations focuses on the differences in the contribution of the independent variable 
‘productivity’ among the four pollution performance clusters. Like a puzzle, taken 
together these three sets of insights seem to fit into one consistent overall picture.
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Trading-off air pollution performance fo r  chemical industry competitiveness does work
The first insight of this investigation is the notion that there seems to be a trade-off 
between chemical industry production value as well as market share on the one hand, 
and air pollution performance on the other hand. Furthermore, this investigation showed 
no apparent link between pollution performance and chemical industry employment 
levels.
The policy implications from this set of observations seem to be straight forward: 
governments have certain scope for environmental competition. In other words, there 
seems to be the possibility to trade pollution performance for chemical industry 
production value and market share. The possibility of trading pollution performance for 
jobs in the chemical industry sector seems much less certain. Hence, this investigation 
lends some support to the notions of environmental externalities and of the 
environmental Kuznets curve.
At this point, one should recall that the regression models did not use time lags between 
dependent and independent variables. Hence, the trade-off between pollution 
performance and chemical industry competitiveness appears to occur in a relatively 
short term. From a policy point of view, this may be an important consideration: the 
results of this research seem to point at the opportunity to realize relatively quick 
economic gains through the reduction of environmental performance. Therefore, if 
governments are pressed to generate economic wealth within a limited period of time, 
pursuing a strategy of “selling o ff’ pollution performance, may appear an appealing 
option. The medium and long term implications of such a strategy are, however, not 
covered by this first set of insights, but rather by the subsequent two.
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Double convergence: avoid trading-offpollution performance for the adjustment o f  tax 
levels among accession countries
The second insight of this investigation is related to what has been called the 
phenomenon of “double convergence”. Based on the predicted contributions to 
chemical industry competitiveness by the factors ‘pollution’ and ‘taxes’, one could 
conclude that the chemical industries of Greece, Portugal and Spain have at the same 
time profited and suffered from the accession to the EU and its common market. On the 
one hand, the three countries appear to have succeeded in trading some of their 
pollution performance for chemical industry competitiveness within the European 
market. On the other hand, it seems that at the same time, while converging to European 
standards, the tax regimes of those countries changed to the disadvantage of chemical 
industries. In the end, competitiveness gains due to weak environmental performance 
were to a large degree compensated by changes in the tax regime.
This notion could be relevant with regard to how to manage the accession of further 
countries to the European Union. If we accept the notion of a “double convergence”, 
one might speculate whether limiting the rate of upward adjustment of tax levels in the 
accession countries could actually reduce the pressure on national governments to trade­
off pollution performance in order to compensate for the implied loss of chemical 
industry competitiveness.
Productivity increases through environmental innovation offsets: the jury is still out
The third insight of this investigation concerns the indirect impact of pollution 
performance on productivity levels. Due to the focus of this study, the results do not 
present any definite endorsement or negation to the Porter hypothesis, which claims that 
strong environmental regulation induces innovation offsets, which, in the medium and 
long run would increase productivity levels. Yet, at the least, our empirical data seems 
to show circumstantial evidence that the Porter Hypothesis could hold. If so, policy 
implications would be important.
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First of all, it would open the possibility for governments to justify a policy of pollution 
performance leadership by pointing at the long term economic benefits. The biggest 
advantage of such a policy would be its sustainability, not only in the environmental 
sense but more importantly in the economic sense, as higher levels of innovation and 
productivity are genuine competitive advantages, which are difficult for competitors to 
match. In comparison, although selling-off pollution performance for short-term 
increases in wealth is possible in the short-run, such policies do not create genuine 
competitive advantages, since relaxing pollution performance levels is a strategy that 
can be matched by any competitor.
The second important policy implication concerns the design of environmental 
regulation. If innovation offsets originate from pollution policies, governments need to 
design regulations that enable the creation and spread of innovations across industrial 
sectors. In this context, policies aimed at the chemical industry would be key, as this 
sector is generally seen as a generator and multiplier of environmental innovation across 
a range of connected industries. Therefore, governments should seek to design policies 
that encourage the development of pollution-reducing technologies within the chemical 
industry, as well as the multiplication of such technologies across connected industrial 
sectors. For this reason, environmental policies that aim to enable the Porter Hypothesis 
to hold should not only consist of setting strict pollution standards, but also of 
supporting measures such as subsidising R&D, protecting intellectual property, as well 
as facilitating the exchange of knowledge across industry networks or local knowledge 
clusters.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Pollution performance indicators 
Table 26 Anthropogenic emissions per capita
A nthropogenic  C H 4 em issions (g / cap.)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
be 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.058 0.058 0.057
dk 0.064 0.065 0.065 0.064 0.064 0.062 0.061 0.059 0.058 0.059 0.054 0.055 0.054 0.055 0.054 0.054 0.053 0.051 0.054 0.051
de 0.080 0.078 0.076 0.075 0.074 0.076 0.075 0.073 0.071 0.070 0.070 0.063 0.058 0.053 0.049 0.048 0.044 0.042 0.041 0.040
gr 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.042 0.043 0.044 0.043 0.044 0.044 0.044
es 0.030 0.030 0.033 0.033 0.034 0.034 0.037 0.039 0.039 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.043 0.044 0.045 0.046 0.048 0.049 0.050 0.051
fr 0.052 0.053 0.052 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.052 0.048 0.047 0.045
ie 0.172 0.172 0.172 0.172 0.173 0.174 0.174 0.175 0.172 0.170
it 0.039 0.038 0.038 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.040 0.040 0.041 0.040 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.042 0.044 0.044 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033
lu 0.063 0.059 0.059 0.063 0.054 0.056 0.058 0.057 0.054 0.055
nl 0.069 0.061 0.061 0.070 0.072 0.081 0.072 0.071 0.069 0.070 0.087 0.086 0.083 0.080 0.078 0.076 0.079 0.071 0.068 0.065
at 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.067 0.065 0.064 0.062 0.061 0.060 0.058 0.057 0.056
Pt 0.064 0.065 0.064 0.063 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.063
fi 0.060 0.056 0.050 0.045 0.044 0.044 0.042 0.040 0.038 0.037
se 0.038 0.038 0.037 0.037 0.035 0.034 0.034 0.029 0.029 0.034
uk 0.069 0.069 0.070 0.070 0.057 0.066 0.069 0.068 0.067 0.065 0.064 0.063 0.061 0.055 0.050 0.050 0.049 0.047 0.045 0.047
AVG 0.065 0.064 0.063 0.062 0.060 0.060 0.059 0.058 0.057 0.057
COV 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.14
Note: AVG Weighted average (weights according to the ratio national vs. total population)
COV Coefficient of variation
Emission data (except C 0 2) from EMEP (2002, es/gr/pt: 2000) 
COz emission data from CDIAC (2002)
Population data from Eurostat (2001)
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A nthropogenic C 0 2 em issions (g / cap.)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
be 3.64 3.36 3.20 2.76 2.83 2.82 2.72 2.70 2.47 2.65 2.75 2.87 2.82 2.70 2.79 2.85 2.90 2.79 2.71 2.80
dk 3.35 2.90 2.98 2.79 2.83 3.37 3.29 3.26 2.92 2.53 2.69 3.33 2.87 2.99 3.20 2.91 3.76 3.04 2.75 3.15
de 3.38 3.15 3.00 2.99 3.06 3.04 3.03 2.97 2.97 2.89 2.32 3.04 2.92 2.85 2.93 2.77 2.87 2.77 2.74 2.88
gr 1.46 1.42 1.45 1.54 1.57 1.65 1.61 1.71 1.81 1.97 1.94 1.78 1.95 1.94 2.01 2.02 2.15 2.14 2.21 2.23
es 1.46 1.44 1.44 1.40 1.30 1.35 1.23 1.26 1.29 1.47 1.49 1.51 1.57 1.44 1.51 1.62 1.62 1.70 1.71 1.72
fr 2.44 2.19 2.09 1.98 1.90 1.86 1.77 1.68 1.65 1.72 1.72 1.84 1.73 1.68 1.55 1.64 1.74 1.60 1.72 1.85
ie 2.02 2.00 1.97 1.93 1.93 1.98 2.21 2.31 2.34 2.22 2.32 2.58 2.42 2.43 2.53 2.53 2.64 2.72 2.81 2.76
it 1.80 1.76 1.71 1.64 1.68 1.71 1.66 1.73 1.76 1.85 1.89 1.90 1.92 1.84 1.82 1.92 1.88 1.90 1.93 1.90
lu 7.91 6.74 6.34 5.93 6.36 6.48 6.36 6.11 6.31 6.69 7.07 7.47 7.48 7.40 6.89 5.54 5.53 5.12 4.91 4.66
nl 2.95 2.76 2.14 2.22 2.39 2.55 2.43 2.48 2.39 2.72 2.74 2.73 2.67 2.77 2.55 2.69 2.98 2.84 2.85 2.87
at 1.89 2.03 1.94 1.87 1.94 1.95 1.92 1.94 1.86 1.89 2.03 2.11 1.95 1.92 1.94 1.96 2.01 2.06 2.16 2.08
P* 0.75 0.70 0.80 0.82 0.78 0.83 0.81 0.87 0.89 1.12 1.17 1.17 1.30 1.26 1.29 1.39 1.32 1.38 1.50 1.48
fi 3.25 2.84 2.59 2.35 2.26 2.67 3.05 3.00 2.80 2.91 2.90 2.84 2.60 2.67 2.89 2.80 3.25 3.10 2.82 3.04
se 2.34 2.24 1.99 1.85 1.80 1.97 1.94 1.87 1.85 1.76 1.55 1.60 1.62 1.50 1.56 1.44 1.67 1.47 1.50 1.51
uk 2.81 2.67 2.66 2.65 2.51 2.65 2.69 2.71 2.69 2.72 2.70 2.75 2.59 2.56 2.54 2.52 2.63 2.49 2.50 2.46
AVG 2.76 2.55 2.42 2.31 2.34 2.46 2.45 2.44 2.40 2.47 2.49 2.63 2.56 2.53 2.53 2.44 2.60 2.47 2.45 2.49
COV 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08
Note: AVG Weighted average (weights according to the ratio national vs. total population)
COV Coefficient of variation
Emission data (except C 0 2) from EMEP (2002, es/gr/pt: 2000)
C 0 2 emission data from CDIAC (2002)
Population data from Eurostat (2001)
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A n thropogen ic S 0 2 em issions (g  /  cap .)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
be 0.084 0.072 0.070 0.057 0.051 0.040 0.038 0.037 0.036 0.033 0.037 0.033 0.032 0.029 0.025 0.024 0.024 0.022 0.021 0.018
dk 0.088 0.072 0.074 0.063 0.060 0.067 0.057 0.050 0.050 0.039 0.036 0.047 0.036 0.030 0.030 0.028 0.034 0.021 0.015 0.011
de 0.051 0.049 0.046 0.043 0.042 0.039 0.036 0.031 0.020 0.015 0.067 0.050 0.041 0.036 0.030 0.024 0.017 0.014 0.011 0.010
gr 0.041 0.043 0.045 0.047 0.048 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.054 0.054 0.053 0.050 0.053 0.052 0.051 0.051 0.051
es 0.076 0.073 0.072 0.073 0.066 0.062 0.059 0.055 0.046 0.055 0.053 0.053 0.052 0.049 0.048 0.044 0.038 0.039 0.037 0.035
fr 0.060 0.047 0.044 0.036 0.032 0.027 0.024 0.024 0.022 0.024 0.023 0.024 0.021 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.013 0.014 0.012
ie 0.065 0.056 0.045 0.041 0.040 0.040 0.046 0.049 0.043 0.046 0.053 0.051 0.048 0.045 0.049 0.045 0.040 0.045 0.047 0.042
it 0.067 0.059 0.050 0.043 0.037 0.033 0.034 0.035 0.034 0.032 0.029 0.027 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.021 0.018 0.018 0.016
In 0.066 0.057 0.047 0.038 0.041 0.044 0.043 0.042 0.041 0.040 0.039 0.039 0.038 0.038 0.032 0.022 0.019 0.014 0.009 0.009
nl 0.035 0.033 0.028 0.022 0.021 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.014 0.014 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.006
at 0.051 0.044 0.042 0.031 0.028 0.025 0.023 0.020 0.015 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.005
P* 0.027 0.028 0.029 0.031 0.025 0.020 0.023 0.022 0.020 0.028 0.036 0.035 0.041 0.036 0.034 0.037 0.033 0.034 0.038 0.035
fi 0.122 0.111 0.100 0.077 0.075 0.078 0.067 0.067 0.061 0.049 0.052 0.039 0.028 0.024 0.022 0.019 0.020 0.019 0.017 0.017
se 0.059 0.052 0.045 0.037 0.036 0.032 0.032 0.027 0.027 0.019 0.014 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.006 0.006 0.007
uk 0.087 0.079 0.075 0.069 0.066 0.066 0.069 0.069 0.067 0.065 0.065 0.062 0.059 0.053 0.046 0.040 0.034 0.028 0.026 0.020
AVG 0.065 0.058 0.054 0.047 0.045 0.043 0.041 0.040 0.037 0.035 0.039 0.036 0.034 0.031 0.029 0.027 0.025 0.022 0.021 0.020
COV 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.16
Note: AVG Weighted average (weights according to the ratio national vs. total population)
COV Coefficient of variation
Emission data (except C 0 2) from EMEP (2002, es/gr/pt: 2000)
C 0 2 emission data from CDIAC (2002)
Population data from Eurostat (2001)
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A n thropogen ic N 0 2 em issions (g  /  cap .)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
be 0.045 0.043 0.040 0.038 0.035 0.033 0.032 0.034 0.035 0.036 0.034 0.033 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.033 0.031 0.030 0.031 0.029
dk 0.053 0.047 0.052 0.050 0.053 0.057 0.063 0.059 0.058 0.054 0.053 0.061 0.052 0.051 0.052 0.048 0.055 0.047 0.044 0.040
de 0.043 0.041 0.041 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.040 0.038 0.035 0.034 0.031 0.029 0.027 0.025 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.020
gr 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.036 0.034 0.036 0.036
es 0.027 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.024 0.025 0.026 0.027 0.029 0.030 0.031 0.032 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.030 0.032 0.033 0.033
fr 0.037 0.035 0.034 0.034 0.033 0.033 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.034 0.033 0.031 0.030 0.029 0.029 0.028 0.027 0.026
ie 0.021 0.025 0.025 0.024 0.024 0.026 0.028 0.032 0.035 0.036 0.034 0.034 0.037 0.033 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.032 0.033 0.032
it 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.030 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.034 0.034 0.035 0.034 0.031 0.030 0.030 0.028 0.027 0.025
lu 0.063 0.062 0.060 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.058 0.059 0.060 0.061 0.060 0.061 0.063 0.063 0.057 0.051 0.053 0.043 0.040 0.037
nl 0.041 0.040 0.039 0.039 0.040 0.041 0.040 0.041 0.041 0.039 0.039 0.038 0.037 0.035 0.033 0.032 0.032 0.029 0.027 0.026
at 0.030 0.029 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.027 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.024 0.022 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021
Pt 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.019 0.014 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.032 0.034 0.036 0.035 0.035 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.037 0.038
fi 0.062 0.058 0.056 0.054 0.053 0.056 0.056 0.058 0.059 0.061 0.060 0.058 0.056 0.056 0.055 0.051 0.052 0.051 0.049 0.048
se 0.049 0.050 0.049 0.048 0.049 0.051 0.052 0.052 0.051 0.049 0.039 0.039 0.038 0.037 0.038 0.034 0.034 0.031 0.029 0.029
uk 0.046 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.043 0.045 0.046 0.048 0.049 0.049 0.048 0.046 0.044 0.041 0.039 0.036 0.034 0.031 0.029 0.027
AVG 0.040 0.038 0.038 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.038 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.037 0.036 0.035 0.035 0.033 0.032 0.031
COV 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06
Note: AVG Weighted average (weights according to the ratio national vs. total population)
COV Coefficient of variation
Emission data (except C 0 2) from EMEP (2002, es/gr/pt: 2000)
C 0 2 emission data from CDIAC (2002)
Population data from Eurostat (2001)
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A nthropogenic  N M V O C  em issions (g / cap.)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
be 0.070 0.060 0.054 0.048 0.041 0.036 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.030 0.029 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027
dk 0.040 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.040 0.038 0.039 0.039 0.038 0.038 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.031 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.026 0.025 0.024
de 0.041 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.039 0.037 0.041 0.035 0.032 0.029 0.027 0.025 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.020
gr 0.062 0.057 0.052 0.047 0.042 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.034 0.034 0.035 0.036 0.037 0.038 0.038
es 0.069 0.067 0.066 0.067 0.067 0.068 0.068 0.069 0.070 0.071 0.072 0.070 0.068 0.064 0.069 0.067 0.064 0.068 0.068 0.068
fr 0.043 0.043 0.042 0.039 0.037 0.035 0.034 0.033 0.032 0.030
ie 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.030 0.030 0.029 0.030 0.031 0.031 0.025
it 0.039 0.037 0.037 0.036 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.036 0.037 0.038 0.038 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.041 0.033 0.032 0.030 0.028
lu 0.041 0.043 0.045 0.047 0.048 0.050 0.048 0.047 0.045 0.045 0.039 0.038 0.036 0.030 0.035
nl 0.035 0.034 0.033 0.036 0.032 0.034 0.031 0.029 0.026 0.025 0.024 0.023 0.020 0.019 0.018
at 0.047 0.047 0.046 0.047 0.048 0.047 0.049 0.049 0.050 0.048 0.045 0.040 0.035 0.034 0.032 0.032 0.031 0.030 0.029 0.029
Pt 0.020 0.023 0.027 0.031 0.035 0.038 0.041 0.044 0.045 0.045 0.047 0.044 0.050 0.049 0.050
fi 0.043 0.043 0.044 0.042 0.041 0.040 0.038 0.037 0.036 0.034 0.034 0.033 0.032
se 0.066 0.064 0.061 0.060 0.056 0.055 0.054 0.052 0.052 0.047 0.047 0.047
uk 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.043 0.044 0.044 0.045 0.046 0.047 0.047 0.046 0.045 0.043 0.041 0.040 0.038 0.037 0.035 0.032 0.029
AVG 0.043 0.041 0.040 0.039 0.038 0.037 0.036 0.035 0.034 0.033
COV 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10
Note: AVG Weighted average (weights according to the ratio national vs. total population)
COV Coefficient of variation
Emission data (except C 0 2) from EMEP (2002, es/gr/pt: 2000)
COz emission data from CDIAC (2002)
Population data from Eurostat (2001)
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A nthropogenic  C O  em issions (g / cap.)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
be 0.112 0.112 0.113 0.109 0.104 0.102 0.099 0.093 0.095 0.092
dk 0.187 0.210 0.219 0.186 0.207 0.194 0.195 0.199 0.183 0.195 0.137 0.139 0.133 0.128 0.119 0.116 0.119 0.107 0.113 0.102
de 0.179 0.163 0.154 0.149 0.151 0.147 0.146 0.141 0.135 0.127 0.142 0.119 0.104 0.095 0.087 0.082 0.076 0.071 0.065 0.060
gr 0.131 0.134 0.128 0.127 0.126 0.128 0.132 0.134 0.142 0.136
es 0.098 0.094 0.092 0.093 0.092 0.090 0.091 0.094 0.099 0.103 0.100 0.103 0.105 0.099 0.099 0.088 0.093 0.099 0.099 0.100
fr 0.292 0.276 0.266 0.257 0.257 0.252 0.243 0.238 0.229 0.218 0.190 0.187 0.178 0.167 0.155 0.152 0.142 0.134 0.129 0.121
ie 0.114 0.112 0.111 0.098 0.092 0.085 0.084 0.085 0.086 0.076
it 0.134 0.132 0.133 0.131 0.133 0.135 0.133 0.134 0.132 0.134 0.136 0.138 0.138 0.133 0.130 0.133 0.119 0.114 0.108 0.103
lu 0.458 0.587 0.520 0.550 0.359 0.261 0.248 0.190 0.120 0.115
nl 0.095 0.086 0.081 0.080 0.076 0.076 0.068 0.065 0.063 0.059 0.058 0.058 0.048 0.046 0.043
at 0.227 0.217 0.209 0.205 0.212 0.204 0.217 0.211 0.204 0.194 0.169 0.165 0.152 0.147 0.143 0.130 0.127 0.127 0.120 0.107
Pt 0.113 0.120 0.130 0.128 0.125 0.121 0.119 0.115 0.110 0.115
fi 0.112 0.110 0.095 0.090 0.087 0.085 0.090 0.092 0.088 0.106
se 0.141 0.141 0.136 0.132 0.130 0.123 0.122 0.109 0.113 0.104
uk 0.136 0.135 0.135 0.131 0.131 0.127 0.127 0.127 0.128 0.131 0.124 0.120 0.114 0.106 0.100 0.094 0.093 0.088 0.084 0.080
AVG 0.150 0.157 0.148 0.145 0.128 0.117 0.115 0.107 0.101 0.097
COV 0.15 0.19 0.18 0.20 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.06
Note: AVG Weighted average (weights according to the ratio national vs. total population)
COV Coefficient of variation
Emission data (except C 0 2) from EMEP (2002, es/gr/pt: 2000)
C 0 2 emission data from CDIAC (2002)
Population data from Eurostat (2001)
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A n thropogen ic N H 3 em issions (g  /  cap .)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
be 0.0090 0.0094 0.0097 0.0101 0.0104 0.0107 0.0093 0.0092 0.0096 0.0095 0.0096 0.0097 0.0097 0.0100 0.0101
dk 0.0244 0.0240 0.0234 0.0233 0.0225 0.0264 0.0264 0.0256 0.0249 0.0250 0.0249 0.0240 0.0233 0.0225 0.0216 0.0201 0.0191 0.0189 0.0190 0.0181
de 0.0093 0.0090 0.0092 0.0094 0.0096 0.0096 0.0095 0.0094 0.0091 0.0090 0.0097 0.0084 0.0081 0.0079 0.0078 0.0078 0.0078 0.0076 0.0077 0.0076
g r 0.0078 0.0076 0.0073 0.0072 0.0070 0.0081 0.0070 0.0068 0.0070 0.0069
es 0.0106 0.0101 0.0108 0.0108 0.0109 0.0109 0.0113 0.0123 0.0123 0.0126 0.0121 0.0120 0.0120 0.0115 0.0120 0.0119 0.0132 0.0128 0.0130 0.0131
fr 0.0139 0.0138 0.0135 0.0133 0.0134 0.0134 0.0136 0.0137 0.0137 0.0136
ie 0.0319 0.0326 0.0330 0.0328 0.0333 0.0335 0.0336 0.0335 0.0342 0.0338
it 0.0085 0.0084 0.0082 0.0089 0.0084 0.0085 0.0086 0.0087 0.0087 0.0084 0.0081 0.0078 0.0076 0.0077 0.0079 0.0079 0.0074 0.0076 0.0075 0.0076
lu 0.0183 0.0181 0.0178 0.0176 0.0173 0.0171 0.0168 0.0166 0.0164 0.0169
nl 0.0165 0.0168 0.0170 0.0170 0.0171 0.0171 0.0177 0.0176 0.0161 0.0156 0.0151 0.0151 0.0119 0.0125 0.0108 0.0094 0.0094 0.0120 0.0108 0.0111
at 0.0104 0.0105 0.0105 0.0107 0.0108 0.0107 0.0107 0.0106 0.0104 0.0104 0.0103 0.0101 0.0097 0.0095 0.0095 0.0092 0.0090 0.0089 0.0089 0.0087
P* 0.0106 0.0101 0.0108 0.0100 0.0094 0.0103 0.0100 0.0101 0.0103 0.0100
fi 0.0076 0.0079 0.0081 0.0077 0.0073 0.0069 0.0068 0.0074 0.0073 0.0068
se 0.0064 0.0062 0.0060 0.0059 0.0070 0.0070 0.0069 0.0069 0.0069 0.0067 0.0067 0.0062
uk 0.0063 0.0062 0.0059 0.0059 0.0059 0.0058 0.0057 0.0058 0.0059 0.0059
AVG 0.0129 0.0126 0.0123 0.0122 0.0120 0.0119 0.0117 0.0119 0.0119 0.0118
COV 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
Note: AVG Weighted average (weights according to the ratio national vs. total population)
COV Coefficient of variation
Emission data (except C 0 2) from EMEP (2002, es/gr/pt: 2000)
C 0 2 emission data from CDIAC (2002)
Population data from Eurostat (2001)
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Table 27 A nthropogenic emissions /  GDP
A nthropogenic  C H 4 em issions / G D P (tonnes / m illion €) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
be 3.839 3.652 3.413 3.248 3.023 2.815 2.783 2.712 2.609 2.480
dk 7.050 6.673 6.085 5.423 4.931 4.341 3.903 3.559 3.405 3.300 2.854 2.782 2.640 2.560 2.352 2.153 2.041 1.922 1.935 1.729
de 8.408 7.841 7.010 6.230 5.759 5.592 5.034 4.603 4.272 3.989 4.669 3.567 3.035 2.607 2.331 2.129 1.949 1.897 1.772 1.677
gr 6.659 6.032 5.716 5.567 5.309 5.093 4.630 4.292 4.291 3.918
es 7.290 6.937 6.816 7.231 6.438 6.021 5.912 5.804 5.108 4.573 4.114 3.789 3.721 4.105 4.257 4.114 4.055 4.050 3.944 3.810
fr 3.145 3.106 2.974 2.891 2.758 2.664 2.544 2.296 2.179 2.027
ie 18.907 18.017 16.823 16.659 15.306 14.295 12.996 11.276 10.370 9.325
it 6.699 5.977 5.287 4.806 4.244 4.015 3.731 3.542 3.329 2.979 2.756 2.607 2.553 2.974 3.041 3.117 2.037 1.959 1.893 1.817
lu 2.291 1.977 1.889 1.897 1.536 1.518 1.542 1.513 1.349 1.321
nl 7.875 6.815 6.157 6.616 6.488 6.946 5.761 5.558 5.274 5.014 5.818 5.553 5.076 4.597 4.251 3.860 3.933 3.435 3.119 2.891
at 9.427 8.769 7.697 6.959 6.592 6.189 5.661 5.270 5.018 4.692 4.298 3.936 3.572 3.273 3.037 2.780 2.686 2.585 2.421 2.291
P‘ 11.844 10.195 8.734 8.736 8.594 7.933 7.498 7.199 6.705 6.227
fi 2.885 2.942 3.202 3.340 2.808 2.398 2.265 2.025 1.812 1.644
se 1.847 1.729 1.741 2.110 1.886 1.750 1.566 1.346 1.311 1.489
uk 10.113 8.478 7.897 7.596 5.842 6.202 6.879 6.493 5.567 5.058 4.884 4.505 4.389 3.972 3.447 3.464 3.139 2.424 2.164 2.239
AVG 5.387 4.959 4.632 4.569 4.262 4.006 3.711 3.395 3.192 2.992
COV 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.18
Note: AVG Weighted average (weights according to the ratio national vs. total GDP)
COV Coefficient of variation
Emission data (except C 0 2) from EMEP (2002, es/gr/pt 2000)
C 0 2 emission data from CD1AC (2002)
GDP data from Eurostat (2001)
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A nthropogenic  C 0 2 em issions / G D P  (tonnes / m illion €) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
be 415.3 374.7 359.3 298.3 283.3 261.3 233.3 217.4 187.6 185.1 178.6 176.5 163.5 147.9 142.9 136.5 137.3 130.7 121.7 121.2
dk 368.8 297.6 278.9 235.0 218.0 234.7 209.5 196.3 169.9 141.8 141.8 169.7 139.5 139.3 139.1 116.8 144.8 113.6 98.4 107.6
de 355.8 317.0 275.9 249.0 237.5 224.9 203.4 187.3 179.8 165.4 154.3 172.9 153.7 141.2 138.1 123.9 128.2 124.2 119.0 121.3
gr 390.9 336.8 295.4 318.5 301.8 316.9 338.2 359.0 333.6 327.2 299.7 249.9 261.5 253.9 250.0 236.1 230.1 210.4 214.6 199.2
es 358.8 329.7 298.8 303.2 248.5 237.8 196.5 187.1 167.8 161.2 146.4 135.4 135.4 135.0 143.9 145.7 136.4 140.4 134.9 128.0
fi­ 274.1 225.9 202.2 183.7 165.3 149.7 132.6 122.4 113.8 110.9 104.2 108.9 97.9 92.0 81.2 81.9 84.4 76.8 79.0 82.5
le 515.8 437.6 378.8 356.5 335.5 316.4 328.6 334.1 314.9 269.8 255.3 269.2 236.5 235.7 224.3 207.8 196.4 175.0 170.0 151.7
it 312.5 274.2 237.7 201.1 183.9 175.5 155.7 151.9 143.9 136.2 128.2 119.7 120.1 129.2 125.7 136.4 116.7 111.3 109.3 103.7
lu 727.0 570.5 472.9 399.2 391.4 353.7 320.1 296.6 285.8 271.0 257.9 250.7 241.0 223.6 194.3 149.7 147.8 135.8 122.9 112.0
nl 338.6 306.1 214.8 209.4 215.5 218.1 194.1 193.0 181.8 194.6 184.2 175.6 164.3 159.1 138.7 136.9 147.6 136.9 131.6 127.0
at 255.0 253.6 213.5 183.4 179.5 169.6 152.5 145.0 132.5 126.6 125.5 122.9 106.9 98.7 94.6 89.6 90.4 91.5 91.9 84.9
Pt 366.6 290.8 314.3 325.4 301.0 286.4 245.3 246.4 217.2 234.8 214.8 184.4 176.9 175.2 172.6 172.6 155.0 154.7 157.7 145.2
fi 426.8 308.2 247.0 212.6 175.5 189.0 215.2 197.7 160.5 143.3 139.8 150.1 166.7 196.9 185.8 153.7 174.6 155.3 133.9 136.8
se 216.9 183.1 164.5 150.6 125.8 126.5 122.1 113.9 103.2 88.2 75.5 73.2 76.2 85.8 85.5 74.9 77.7 67.4 68.0 66.4
uk 409.6 326.0 301.1 287.3 256.6 248.2 266.8 258.0 224.2 210.6 206.4 197.4 186.2 186.4 173.4 175.4 169.8 129.0 121.5 117.6
AVG 382.2 322.1 283.7 260.9 2413 233.9 220.9 213.7 194.4 184.5 174.2 170.4 161.7 160.0 152.7 142.5 142.5 130.2 125.0 120.3
COV 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Note: AVG Weighted average (weights according to the ratio national vs. total GDP)
COV Coefficient of variation
Emission data (except C 0 2) from EMEP (2002, es/gr/pt 2000)
C 0 2 emission data from CDIAC (2002)
GDP data from Eurostat (2001)
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A nthropogenic  S 0 2 em issions /  G D P  (tonnes / m illion €) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
be 9.60 8.06 7.91 6.13 5.07 3.75 3.27 2.98 2.71 2.29 2.42 2.05 1.83 1.61 1.28 1.16 1.12 1.01 0.93 0.79
dk 9.71 7.43 6.92 5.31 4.60 4.68 3.63 3.03 2.89 2.16 1.87 2.39 1.77 1.38 1.31 1.14 1.31 0.78 0.52 0.36
de 5.41 4.91 4.24 3.61 3.27 2.87 2.45 1.97 1.20 0.87 4.46 2.84 2.16 1.80 1.43 1.09 0.77 0.61 0.48 0.43
gr 11.07 10.22 9.11 9.62 9.27 9.63 10.54 10.54 9.21 8.31 7.69 7.53 7.22 6.96 6.26 6.15 5.52 4.99 4.98 4.57
es 18.64 16.79 15.07 15.75 12.59 10.99 9.43 8.24 6.00 6.02 5.19 4.71 4.50 4.61 4.55 3.94 3.21 3.20 2.89 2.59
fr 6.68 4.80 4.28 3.36 2.80 2.15 1.81 1.73 1.50 1.58 1.36 1.44 1.20 1.00 0.89 0.80 0.76 0.63 0.63 0.51
ie 16.67 12.22 8.75 7.47 6.98 6.33 6.79 7.12 5.79 5.60 5.84 5.33 4.74 4.38 4.35 3.69 3.01 2.91 2.87 2.30
it 11.57 9.16 7.00 5.30 4.07 3.42 3.16 3.11 2.79 2.37 1.94 1.68 1.51 1.61 1.51 1.61 1.28 1.07 1.00 0.85
lu 6.05 4.86 3.47 2.58 2.52 2.38 2.16 2.04 1.87 1.63 1.43 1.30 1.23 1.14 0.91 0.59 0.51 0.38 0.23 0.21
nl 3.97 3.61 2.84 2.12 1.87 1.52 1.45 1.40 1.29 0.98 0.91 0.74 0.70 0.62 0.52 0.48 0.43 0.37 0.31 0.28
at 6.86 5.52 4.58 3.09 2.58 2.18 1.80 1.50 1.08 0.89 0.73 0.61 0.44 0.39 0.35 0.32 0.30 0.28 0.25 0.21
Pt 13.20 11.66 11.52 12.20 9.70 6.79 7.09 6.17 5.02 5.90 6.68 5.51 5.62 5.05 4.59 4.58 3.83 3.86 3.97 3.42
fi 16.06 12.06 9.56 6.92 5.84 5.52 4.74 4.39 3.50 2.42 2.52 2.05 1.79 1.79 1.44 1.03 1.10 0.96 0.83 0.76
se 5.47 4.23 3.69 2.99 2.48 2.05 2.05 1.66 1.48 0.94 0.68 0.51 0.48 0.57 0.51 0.47 0.44 0.26 0.25 0.31
uk 12.62 9.60 8.47 7.45 6.72 6.19 6.83 6.53 5.60 5.02 4.99 4.43 4.28 3.88 3.12 2.79 2.21 1.44 1.29 0.95
AVG 10.24 8.34 7.16 6.26 5.36 4.70 4.48 4.16 3.46 3.13 3.25 2.87 2.63 2.45 2.20 1.99 1.72 1.52 1.43 1.24
COV 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.27
Note: AVG Weighted average (weights according to the ratio national vs. total GDP)
COV Coefficient of variation
Emission data (except C 0 2) from EMEP (2002, es/gr/pt 2000)
C 0 2 emission data from CDIAC (2002)
GDP data from Eurostat (2001)
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A n thropogen ic N 0 2  em issions /  G D P  (ton n es /  m illion  €)  
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
be 5.124 4.744 4.511 4.082 3.552 3.051 2.748 2.745 2.642 2.516 2.206 2.059 1.978 1.849 1.729 1.584 1.473 1.407 1.373 1.238
dk 5.867 4.877 4.823 4.230 4.067 3.976 3.996 3.573 3.350 3.025 2.782 3.114 2.522 2.395 2.260 1.929 2.135 1.769 1.566 1.352
de 4.471 4.151 3.772 3.485 3.298 3.083 2.799 2.510 2.269 1.975 2.268 1.774 1.502 1.338 1.181 1.076 1.025 0.972 0.903 0.839
gr 7.984 7.119 6.145 6.296 5.893 5.891 6.587 6.716 5.988 5.497 4.956 4.565 4.339 4.179 4.071 3.809 3.863 3.390 3.525 3.212
es 6.698 5.732 5.182 5.464 4.771 4.289 3.979 3.863 3.461 3.206 2.928 2.779 2.737 2.886 2.946 2.786 2.561 2.665 2.576 2.470
fr 4.190 3.633 3.313 3.129 2.916 2.641 2.390 2.352 2.226 2.124 1.991 2.001 1.865 1.682 1.563 1.463 1.404 1.335 1.247 1.154
ie 5.481 5.475 4.762 4.470 4.129 4.113 4.191 4.703 4.650 4.394 3.706 3.556 3.585 3.234 2.857 2.639 2.460 2.069 1.986 1.742
it 5.043 4.414 3.945 3.405 3.070 2.904 2.771 2.773 2.633 2.451 2.282 2.164 2.172 2.404 2.126 2.157 1.847 1.662 1.539 1.375
lu 5.802 5.212 4.493 3.865 3.529 3.128 2.939 2.881 2.726 2.465 2.196 2.063 2.020 1.897 1.606 1.386 1.414 1.135 0.997 0.894
nl 4.728 4.478 3.950 3.639 3.578 3.476 3.224 3.180 3.101 2.818 2.610 2.426 2.252 2.011 1.802 1.639 1.598 1.402 1.245 1.145
at 4.062 3.636 3.161 2.800 2.616 2.489 2.230 2.057 1.891 1.698 1.540 1.465 1.296 1.125 1.103 0.968 0.924 0.949 0.901 0.861
Pt 8.235 7.243 7.192 7.652 5.236 3.291 3.331 3.281 3.002 2.783 5.893 5.301 4.874 4.792 4.670 4.481 4.201 4.082 3.906 3.682
fi 8.110 6.232 5.355 4.859 4.081 3.973 3.970 3.851 3.400 2.987 2.904 3.058 3.609 4.112 3.567 2.774 2.810 2.532 2.318 2.148
se 4.500 4.095 4.096 3.928 3.441 3.284 3.255 3.172 2.862 2.465 1.927 1.803 1.785 2.130 2.060 1.773 1.592 1.398 1.316 1.291
uk 6.671 5.416 4.995 4.806 4.445 4.188 4.575 4.562 4.057 3.756 3.661 3.267 3.169 2.946 2.646 2.479 2.213 1.617 1.421 1.289
AVG 5.798 5.097 4.646 4.407 3.908 3.585 3.532 3.481 3.217 2.944 2.923 2.760 2.647 2.599 2.413 2.196 2.101 1.892 1.788 1.646
COV 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.13
Note: AVG Weighted average (weights according to the ratio national vs. total GDP)
COV Coefficient of variation
Emission data (except C 0 2) from EMEP (2002, es/gr/pt 2000)
C 0 2 emission data from CDIAC (2002)
GDP data from Eurostat (2001)
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A nthropogenic  N M V O C  em issions /  G D P  (tonnes / m illion €)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
be 6.458 5.175 4.337 3.607 2.868 2.303 1.924 1.805 1.686 1.542 1.386 1.277 1.241 1.219 1.149
dk 4.359 3.990 3.634 3.324 3.100 2.678 2.465 2.338 2.219 2.124 1.733 1.656 1.520 1.423 1.260 1.127 1.072 0.967 0.904 0.823
de 4.309 4.000 3.675 3.331 3.140 2.970 2.700 2.510 2.334 2.112 2.699 1.989 1.656 1.421 1.251 1.107 1.035 0.985 0.911 0.847
gr 11.820 11.911 10.872 8.606 6.946 5.078 4.634 4.417 4.393 4.250 4.043 3.843 3.606 3.663 3.363
es 16.907 15.418 13.747 14.501 12.732 11.913 10.902 10.318 9.110 7.822 7.067 6.286 5.847 5.966 6.545 6.036 5.395 5.621 5.356 5.062
fr 2.626 2.527 2.362 2.151 1.927 1.768 1.660 1.564 1.456 1.345
ie 3.455 3.289 3.144 2.935 2.659 2.386 2.255 1.999 1.872 1.391
it 6.708 5.831 5.097 4.399 3.861 3.585 3.310 3.198 3.017 2.832 2.605 2.502 2.527 2.832 2.792 2.889 2.049 1.860 1.703 1.547
lu 2.234 2.160 2.174 2.108 1.951 1.814 1.603 1.519 1.366 1.257 1.056 1.028 0.945 0.762 0.829
nl 2.962 2.685 2.575 2.771 2.258 2.259 1.974 1.774 1.522 1.375 1.201 1.155 0.981 0.877 0.791
at 6.297 5.812 5.076 4.603 4.407 4.132 3.914 3.700 3.543 3.213 2.756 2.346 1.947 1.732 1.574 1.478 1.392 1.352 1.246 1.163
Pt 6.822 7.117 7.664 7.554 7.232 7.063 6.511 6.000 6.225 5.994 5.780 5.184 5.642 5.117 4.946
fi 2.808 2.472 2.144 2.023 2.173 2.580 2.844 2.378 1.989 1.814 1.685 1.582 1.461
se 3.676 3.185 2.999 2.750 2.631 3.175 2.975 2.693 2.415 2.159 2.115 2.083
uk 6.136 5.099 4.794 4.631 4.455 4.082 4.419 4.337 3.880 3.631 3.529 3.219 3.093 2.982 2.740 2.629 2.366 1.798 1.573 1.402
AVG 3.334 3.026 2.855 2.844 2.701 2.505 2.263 2.160 2.024 1.880
COV 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.19
Note: AVG Weighted average (weights according to the ratio national vs. total GDP)
COV Coefficient of variation
Emission data (except C 0 2) from EMEP (2002, es/gr/pt 2000)
C 0 2 emission data from CDIAC (2002)
GDP data from Eurostat (2001)
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A nthropogenic  C O  em issions / G D P  (tonnes / m illion €)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
be 7.24 6.89 6.56 5.99 5.33 4.87 4.70 4.36 4.25 4.00
dk 20.54 21.56 20.51 15.64 15.95 13.52 12.40 11.95 10.65 10.93 7.21 7.11 6.46 5.94 5.19 4.64 4.57 4.01 4.06 3.48
de 18.80 16.38 14.17 12.36 11.72 10.89 9.81 8.91 8.15 7.25 9.40 6.77 5.45 4.71 4.10 3.65 3.40 3.18 2.82 2.54
gr 20.19 18.77 17.12 16.63 15.58 14.97 14.16 13.19 13.84 12.15
es 24.12 21.44 19.24 20.16 17.53 15.96 14.66 13.99 12.85 11.34 9.87 9.17 9.00 9.33 9.36 7.90 7.86 8.17 7.81 7.41
fr 32.74 28.47 25.72 23.85 22.39 20.26 18.20 17.27 15.81 14.05 11.50 11.03 10.11 9.17 8.11 7.63 6.90 6.42 5.96 5.41
ie 12.59 11.68 10.89 9.51 8.17 6.98 6.29 5.47 5.18 4.17
it 23.36 20.58 18.50 15.99 14.60 13.84 12.47 11.75 10.77 9.89 9.21 8.73 8.60 9.37 8.97 9.46 7.38 6.68 6.10 5.60
lu 16.71 19.71 16.75 16.62 10.12 7.06 6.62 5.04 2.99 2.77
nl 8.15 6.88 6.33 6.07 5.46 5.14 4.38 3.98 3.61 3.21 2.94 2.88 2.32 2.12 1.91
at 30.51 27.14 22.92 20.12 19.53 17.78 17.23 15.76 14.54 12.98 10.45 9.61 8.37 7.58 6.99 5.96 5.72 5.64 5.12 4.36
P* 20.71 18.94 17.66 17.79 16.71 15.04 13.96 12.93 11.58 11.31
fi 5.41 5.82 6.07 6.66 5.62 4.69 4.83 4.62 4.16 4.76
se 6.90 6.45 6.38 7.55 7.11 6.41 5.70 4.98 5.14 4.57
uk 19.77 16.51 15.31 14.25 13.42 11.86 12.56 12.09 10.63 10.13 9.50 8.64 8.24 7.67 6.85 6.52 6.01 4.55 4.07 3.83
AVG
COV
10.80
0.11
10.25
0.12
9.44
0.12
9.21
0.12
8.09
0.12
7.25
0.12
6.73
0.12
6.10
0.13
5.68
0.14
5.22
0.14
Note: AVG Weighted average (weights according to the ratio national vs. total GDP)
COV Coefficient of variation
Emission data (except C 0 2) from EMEP (2002, es/gr/pt 2000)
C 0 2 emission data from CDIAC (2002)
GDP data from Eurostat (2001)
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A n thropogen ic  N H 3 em issions /  G D P  (ton n es /  m illion  €) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
be 0.835 0.806 0.780 0.766 0.726 0.696 0.572 0.530 0.526 0.485 0.457 0.461 0.455 0.449 0.437
dk 2.684 2.466 2.191 1.958 1.730 1.837 1.677 1.541 1.451 1.403 1.309 1.224 1.134 1.049 0.937 0.807 0.736 0.707 0.681 0.617
de 0.977 0.909 0.843 0.780 0.743 0.714 0.638 0.592 0.551 0.512 0.641 0.479 0.423 0.390 0.370 0.347 0.347 0.341 0.334 0.320
gr 1.201 1.069 0.974 0.947 0.869 0.949 0.746 0.667 0.683 0.615
es 2.603 2.318 2.243 2.342 2.081 1.929 1.809 1.826 1.596 1.381 1.196 1.075 1.033 1.075 1.141 1.070 1.109 1.060 1.021 0.975
fr 0.844 0.816 0.767 0.729 0.699 0.672 0.663 0.656 0.632 0.607
ie 3.518 3.408 3.227 3.180 2.957 2.753 2.501 2.157 2.068 1.859
it 1.475 1.307 1.140 1.084 0.925 0.876 0.812 0.761 0.709 0.615 0.549 0.492 0.476 0.543 0.546 0.562 0.456 0.443 0.423 0.415
iu 0.668 0.607 0.575 0.531 0.489 0.462 0.450 0.441 0.411 0.405
nl 1.898 1.869 1.715 1.600 1.536 1.464 1.417 1.370 1.221 1.120 1.017 0.974 0.729 0.718 0.587 0.480 0.466 0.582 0.500 0.491
at 1.398 1.309 1.150 1.055 1.000 0.935 0.849 0.789 0.740 0.698 0.639 0.591 0.530 0.491 0.461 0.421 0.405 0.397 0.379 0.354
Pt 1.945 1.595 1.466 1.392 1.255 1.274 1.175 1.137 1.090 0.978
fi 0.368 0.417 0.521 0.570 0.471 0.378 0.367 0.370 0.348 0.306
se 0.358 0.310 0.291 0.271 0.331 0.401 0.380 0.359 0.322 0.306 0.302 0.272
uk 0.485 0.447 0.427 0.429 0.404 0.400 0.368 0.299 0.287 0.280
AVG 1.024 0.936 0.876 0.865 0.803 0.760 0.705 0.668 0.640 0.595
COV 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.17
Note: AVG Weighted average (weights according to the ratio national vs. total GDP)
COV Coefficient of variation
Emission data (except C 0 2) from EMEP (2002, es/gr/pt 2000)
C 0 2 emission data from CDIAC (2002)
GDP data from Eurostat (2001)
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Table 28 Manufacturing emissions / manufacturing GDP
S 0 2 Emissions by Combustion, Manufacturing Sector (tonnes) / Manufactoring GDP (million €)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
be 10.73 8.46 7.76 8.45 7.86 4.03 4.14
dk 10.57 6.46 5.18 4.29 2.89 2.85 2.88 2.41 2.05 2.02 1.49
de 10.12 8.70 7.47 5.56 3.79 2.81 2.12 1.50 1.22
gr 31.33 25.33 23.33 21.60 18.41 18.54 16.84 14.33 13.90 12.95 12.84
es 53.63 51.75 39.31 33.22 25.66 22.10 20.06 18.68 18.96 15.14 14.72 13.84 12.58 13.24 12.12 10.12
fr 3.23 3.28 2.75 2.36 2.27 1.89
ie 10.57 8.34 7.31 7.50 7.71 5.52
it 45.72 34.63 25.07 20.11 13.14 8.90 7.62 6.24 5.84 5.13 4.41 4.03 3.73 2.96 2.29 2.08
lu 23.45 15.68 16.48 15.74 15.30 11.73 6.58
nl 7.74 2.86 2.34 2.09 1.95 1.77 1.62
at 35.88 29.31 23.64 13.16 7.88 6.27 4.98 4.00 2.80 1.84 1.78 1.16 0.77 0.63 0.50 0.58
Pt 17.14 13.38 13.52 12.01 11.15 11.39
fi 12.06 6.12 3.40 2.23 2.17 1.42
se 1.25 0.99 0.75 0.82 0.64 0.52
uk 31.65 24.36 20.31 16.28 12.76 10.57 11.50 9.42 9.34 7.53 5.84 5.49 5.49 5.33 4.32 3.08
AVG 8.33 7.11 6.41 6.02 5.14 4.30
COV 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.24
Note: AVG  W eighted average (weights according to the ratio national vs. total manufactoring GDP)
COV Coefficient o f  variation
Emission data from  EM EP (2002, es/gr/pt: 2000)
GDP data from Eurostat (2001)
D ata on the GDP share o f the m anufactoring sector:
All countries except Ireland and Luxembourg: OECD (2000)
Ireland— data extrapolated from  Central Statistics O ffice, Ireland (2001)
Luxembourg— Eurostat (2001)
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Emissions by combustion in manufacuring industry (Snap 3) of N 02 (tonnes) / manufactoring GDP (million €)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
be 3.45 4.18 3.77 4.17 4.13 3.82 3.43
dk 2.34 2.06 1.83 1.56 1.40 1.41 1.40 1.28 1.15 1.06 0.83
de 3.17 2.86 2.47 1.98 1.80 1.55 1.44 1.33 1.27
gr 3.45 3.05 3.06 3.10 2.86 3.11 3.05 2.80 2.94 2.95 3.14
es 14.63 14.35 12.67 10.52 8.28 7.03 6.41 6.21 6.18 5.21 5.06 5.09 4.56 4.61 4.34 3.76
fi­ 1.56 1.49 1.34 1.24 1.23 1.05
le 2.94 2.47 2.08 2.08 1.91 1.60
it 9.98 9.11 8.10 7.28 6.34 5.58 5.10 4.75 4.39 3.93 3.40 3.66 3.31 2.56 1.88 1.77
lu 17.02 13.44 14.03 13.32 12.96 10.73 8.80
nl 6.48 3.48 3.32 2.96 2.59 2.43 2.12
at 7.99 6.61 5.47 3.86 3.02 2.85 2.35 2.04 1.73 1.39 1.34 1.06 0.95 0.80 0.72 0.72
Pt 4.66 4.28 4.36 4.36 4.24 3.83
fi 2.84 2.58 3.37 2.84 2.53 1.95
se 1.30 1.26 1.04 1.03 0.83 0.70
uk 9.29 7.97 7.52 7.34 6.39 5.18 5.03 4.59 4.21 3.56 2.73 2.39 2.19 2.10 2.06 1.73
AVG 3.56 3.44 3.29 3.12 2.80 2.45
COV 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.21
Note: AVG W eighted average (weights according to the ratio national vs. total manufactoring GDP)
COV Coefficient o f  variation
Emission data from EM EP (2001)
GDP data from Eurostat (2000)
Data on the GDP share o f the manufactoring sector:
All countries except Ireland and Luxembourg: OECD (2000)
Ireland— data extrapolated from Central Statistics O ffice, Ireland (2001)
Luxem bourg— Eurostat (2000)
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Emissions by combustion in manufacuring industry (Snap 3) of NMVOC (tonnes) / manufactoring GDP (million €)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
be 1.18 0.26 0.17 0.23 0.17 0.16 0.14
dk 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.15 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.05
de 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04
gr 1.72 1.45 1.39 1.34 1.19 1.25 1.18 1.05 1.06 1.03 1.07
es 0.92 0.86 0.78 0.63 0.51 0.47 0.42 0.40 0.39 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.28 0.22
fr 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07
ie 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02
it 0.38 0.35 0.31 0.28 0.24 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.07
lu 0.76 0.50 0.90 1.21 1.52 0.33 0.20
nl 0.40 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.14 0.11 0.20
at 0.30 0.26 0.23 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.03
Pt
fi
1.71 1.54 1.48 1.46 1.44 1.18
ii
se 0.34 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.26 0.21
uk 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05
AVG 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.29 0.25
COV 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.34 0.36 0.36
Note: AVG W eighted average (weights according to the ratio national vs. total manufactoring GDP)
COV Coefficient o f  variation
Emission data from EM EP (2002, es/gr/pt: 2000)
GDP data from Eurostat (2001)
Data on the GDP share o f the m anufactoring sector:
All countries except Ireland and Luxembourg: OECD (2000)
Ireland— data extrapolated from Central Statistics O ffice, Ireland (2001)
Luxem bourg— Eurostat (2001)
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Pollution load index
980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
2 6 8 13 15 16 22
51 48 47 29 34 30 28 27 17 21 32 25 27 24 29 31 28
31 25 30 16 12 -5 -9 -8 0 -7 -17 -17 -14 -12 -17 -11 0
21 19 13 7 0 -7 -11 -6 -4 -1 -6 -6 -2 2 7 9 4
59 37 21 5 -9 -21 -27 -25 -22 -22 -23 -23
-19 -15 -10 -8 -7 -6 -4
-16 -13 -11 -4 0 4 -7 -5 1 0 2 4
- 4 - 6 - 3 0 1 2 4
980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 -1 -9 -14 -15 -15 -13
33 24 18 9 6 23 43 41 32 33 38 23 16 22 32 28 43
91 93 86 57 67 85 63 67 72 41 17 -4 -24 -27 -25 -31 -13
67 61 59 53 50 61 59 62 65 69 68 64 64 70 77 67 76
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -5 -5 -3 -6 -4 -2 -2 -4 -3 -4
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -18 -16 -24 -24 -22 -21 -13
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -27 -21 -16 -19 -23 -27 -28
11 6 1 1 3 0 7
G e rm a n y
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
c h 4 57 54 49 43 54 45 41 37 34 32 29 15 7 0 -5 -8 -13 -12 -14 -16
c o 2 51 49 47 52 59 52 55 51 53 42 13 44 42 42 47 36 35 35 32 37
s o 2 -24 -19 -19 -14 -9 -11 -15 -26 -50 -62 74 33 16 12 2 -13 -33 -40 -51 -48
n o 2 18 18 19 23 26 23 21 11 4 -6 -7 -16 -21 -22 -25 -25 -28 -29 -30 -30
NM VO C -13 -14 -13 -13 -12 -13 -12 -14 -19 -22 -11 -22 -28 -32 -37 -39 -40 -42 -43 -43
CO 6 0 -4 -5 -4 -3 -2 -4 -7 -12 5 -12 -21 -24 -27 -29 -31 -33 -37 -39
n h 3 -15 -16 -15 -16 -13 -12 -16 -19 -18 -18 -9 -19 -20 -21 -21 -21 -22 -24 -23 -24
PLI 7 13 3 -4 -7 -9 -14 -19 -21 -24 -23
G reece
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
c h 4 -26 -24 -22 -20 -17 -15 -11 -7 -4 A
c o 2 -41 -39 -35 -29 -27 -25 -26 -21 -15 -10 -8 -24 -13 -12 -8 -8 -6 -3 -1 -2
s o 2 -37 -27 -18 -5 6 19 21 26 41 44 12 35 49 62 72 99 126 153 172 211
n o 2 -20 -17 -16 -15 -13 -13 -13 -12 -11 -9 -12 -9 -7 -4 4 7 21 21 32 37
NM VO C 40 28 16 3 -7 -27 -23 -20 -15 -12 -8 3 7 14 19
CO -4 2 2 8 13 19 29 37 52 52
n h 3 -26 -24 -25 -25 -27 -14 -27 -30 -27 -28
PLI 7 -13 -10 -5 -1 3 11 19 25 34 41
S p a in
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
c h 4 -54 -52 -47 -47 -43 -45 -41 -37 -35 -31 -30 -27 -23 -19 -14 -11 -1 5 10 13
c o 2 -43 -40 -38 -38 -42 -41 -46 -44 -42 -36 -32 -37 -32 -37 -33 -28 -31 -25 -25 -27
s o 2 19 30 38 57 54 55 49 45 33 67 20 36 50 56 72 73 74 107 107 126
n o 2 -30 -33 -33 -32 -32 -34 -33 -31 -29 -22 -20 -14 -9 -8 -2 2 1 14 20 28
NM V O C 68 69 66 67 66 65 67 70 68 74 74 78 79 75 96 98 103 124 134 146
CO -46 -46 -45 -43 -45 -43 -41 -39 -34 -30 -29 -24 -18 -17 -13 -20 -11 0 5 11
n h 3 3 0 6 3 5 4 7 17 22 27 19 24 28 24 31 31 46 40 42 44
PLI 7 0 5 11 11 19 21 26 38 42 49
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France
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
c h 4 -12 -8 -5 0 3 5 9 3 3 -1
c o 2 0 -6 -6 -9 -13 -17 -20 -25 -26 -25 -21 -23 -26 -26 -33 -29 -27 -31 -26 -22
s o 2 -10 -23 -22 -30 -33 -41 -46 -45 -44 -34 -54 -43 -47 -49 -47 -45 -38 -41 -34 -38
n o 2 0 -2 -4 -6 -6 -8 -12 -13 -13 -11 -11 -6 -6 -8 -6 -5 -5 -3 -3 -3
NMVOC -3 0 1 0 -5 -6 -3 -6 -6 -7
CO 106 102 99 97 95 98 93 89 85 76 50 54 55 54 49 53 47 45 46 42
n h 3 43 49 52 51 53 55 57 57 56 56
PLI 7 -1 3 3 3 2 4 6 3 5 4
Ireland
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
c h 4 202 212 221 234 243 249 269 284 283 280
c o 2 -18 -13 -11 -10 -9 -10 3 8 10 1 10 12 8 11 16 15 16 23 27 21
s o 2 1 -4 -17 -18 -12 -7 10 23 20 32 19 27 33 36 65 66 72 119 143 143
n o 2 -43 -31 -31 -32 -33 -27 -21 -11 -5 0 -7 -5 6 1 2 5 10 12 18 19
NMVOC -30 -27 -22 -23 -23 -23 -14 -10 -7 -21
CO -16 -15 -11 -17 -18 -22 -18 -14 -10 -17
n h 3 214 235 251 254 260 265 265 261 268 265
PLI 7 56 63 69 71 78 79 86 97 103 99
Italy
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
c h 4 -40 -39 -40 -38 -35 -39 -38 -37 -35 -35 -34 -30 -29 -22 -17 -16 -36 -32 -31 -31
c o 2 -30 -27 -26 -27 -25 -25 -26 -22 -20 -18 -12 -21 -17 -18 -20 -15 -20 -16 -15 -19
s o 2 3 1 -9 -14 -21 -25 -22 -14 -6 -10 -40 -38 -38 -35 -31 -19 -15 -14 -12 -12
n o 2 -26 -24 -24 -25 -24 -23 -20 -15 -13 -10 -8 -4 0 4 -3 -1 -1 -1 -3 -6
NMVOC -19 -20 -22 -24 -26 -26 -25 -23 -22 -18 -16 -9 -2 3 5 10 -6 -9 -11 -13
CO -25 -23 -20 -19 -18 -12 -12 -10 -10 -6 -1 7 12 16 19 29 19 19 16 16
n h 3 -24 -23 -27 -22 -26 -25 -25 -26 -22 -25 -25 -25 -24 -21 -19 -19 -25 -24 -25 -23
PLI 7 -20 -17 -14 -10 -9 -4 -12 -11 -12 -12
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Luxembourg
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
c h 4 8 5 7 19 6 10 19 22 17 20
co2 224 193 187 176 199 197 197 185 197 206 236 224 234 239 215 152 143 132 121 105
so2 1 -1 -15 -22 -10 3 3 5 15 14 -12 -4 4 13 8 -19 -19 -32 -53 -49
n o 2 69 71 69 62 63 63 63 63 66 68 66 72 81 90 80 68 77 49 44 40
NMVOC -8 -4 0 2 7 12 12 14 15 15 4 10 4 -8 8
CO 236 349 317 367 222 142 140 92 26 27
n h 3 77 82 85 85 83 82 79 75 72 78
PLI 7 89 106 106 119 90 63 64 49 31 33
The Netherlands
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
c h 4 19 7 7 23 34 44 25 25 23 24 52 57 54 55 55 52 69 55 50 45
co2 22 21 -3 3 13 18 14 16 13 25 31 19 20 28 17 24 32 30 29 27
so2 -48 -45 -49 -55 -56 -59 -58 -56 -54 -62 -71 -72 -70 -69 -69 -66 -64 -65 -66 -65
n o 2 11 13 11 9 13 16 13 13 13 9 7 6 6 6 5 6 8 1 -3 -3
NMVOC -23 -26 -27 -21 -31 -25 -29 -31 -33 -35 -38 -34 -42 -44 -45
CO -38 -43 -46 -45 -47 -45 -49 -49 -48 -48 -48 -45 -53 -53 -54
n h 3 69 76 76 70 72 70 75 71 60 57 49 56 24 33 15 0 0 28 14 17
PLI 7 0 -2 -6 -4 -9 -10 -5 -6 -10 -11
Austria
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
c h 4 21 23 23 23 31 24 22 22 24 24 20 20 19 21 21 20 24 25 24 23
co2 -23 -12 -12 -14 -9 -11 -11 -10 -13 -14 -4 -9 -14 -13 -12 -11 -12 -7 -3 -9
so2 -22 -25 -24 -37 -39 -42 -46 -50 -58 -63 -74 -74 -79 -78 -77 -75 -73 -70 -71 -71
n o 2 -19 -19 -20 -20 -20 -19 -22 -25 -27 -30 -32 -30 -32 -34 -29 -31 -32 -26 -24 -21
NMVOC 3 5 5 6 7 7 11 11 9 7 0 -6 -14 -14 -17 -14 -12 -12 -12 -11
CO 34 34 32 34 37 37 48 46 44 39 24 26 23 25 29 21 24 29 27 18
n h 3 1 3 2 2 3 2 0 -3 -1 1 0 2 0 0 0 -2 -5 -6 -7 -9
PLI 7 -9 -10 -14 -13 -12 -13 -12 -10 -10 -11
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>99
-27
-34
-60
11
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-35
-11
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
11 16 18 20 25 26 33 38
-70 -70 -64 -63 -64 -62 -63 -60 -59 -50 -45 -50 -43 -43 -42 -37 -43 -38
-59 -53 -47 -38 -45 -54 -45 -46 -44 -20 -19 -13 14 10 15 36 39 68
-56 -52 -49 -47 -62 -73 -70 -69 -67 -64 -12 -6 4 5 10 19 20 28
-56 -48 -40 -33 -24 -14 -3 8 15 16 25 27 48
-18 -8 4 9 12 13 15 17
2 2 13 6 -1 9 6 6
-14 -9 2 3 5 13 14 24
980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
3 -1 -9 -14 -15 -15 -13 -14
33 24 18 9 6 23 43 41 32 33 38 23 16 22 32 28 43 41
91 93 86 57 67 85 63 67 72 41 17 -4 -24 -27 -25 -31 -13 -8
67 61 59 53 50 61 59 62 65 69 68 64 64 70 77 67 76 78
-5 -5 -3 -6 -4 -2 -2 -4 -3 -4 -2
-18 -16 -24 -24 -22 -21 -13 -7
-27 -21 -16 -19 -23 -27 -28 -23
11 6 1 1 3 0 7 10
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
-35 -34 -33 -31 -34 -35 -31 -38
-4 -3 -10 -15 -16 -10 -10 -13 -14 -20 -27 -31 -28 -32 -29 -35 -27 -34
-9 -11 -19 -26 -22 -26 -22 -33 -26 -47 -69 -73 -73 -70 -69 -68 -61 -73
31 41 40 37 41 46 46 45 43 37 9 11 10 13 20 12 14 7
47 43 39 42 37 43 42 40 50 39
4 7 9 12 17 15 19 10
-40 -41 -43 -41 -27 -27 -27 -27 -27 -30
-18 -17 -15 -13 -12 -14 -9 -17
U n ite d  K in g d o m  
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
c h 4 26 29 30 29 5 20 25 24 23 20 12 14 14 4 -2 -3 0 0 -4 2
c o 2 18 20 26 29 22 27 32 33 33 30 35 23 19 21 19 18 18 16 15 10
so2 43 45 48 52 58 75 90 99 126 121 59 71 83 81 69 61 58 42 43 18
n o 2 29 29 30 31 29 34 37 40 44 44 41 35 34 28 28 20 17 11 6 1
NMVOC -10 -8 -6 -5 -3 -3 0 2 3 5 4 6 5 5 4 1 6 1 -3 -10
CO -24 -21 -18 -18 -19 -18 -17 -16 -13 -9 -11 -10 -10 -12 -12 -15 -12 -13 -14 -14
n h 3 -43 -41 -43 -42 -42 -43 -44 -43 -42 -42
PLI 7 14 14 15 12 9 6 6 2 0 -5
Note: PLI 7 based on all seven pollutants
Em ission data (except C 0 2) from  EM EP (2002, es/gr/pt: 2000) 
C 0 2 em ission data from  C DIAC (2001)
Population data from  Eurostat (2000)
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Table 30 General pollution intensity 
Belgium
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
c h 4 -7 -1 -1 -2 -3 -6 3 10 12 11
c o 2 23 30 41 28 33 28 23 21 13 18 20 18 16 7 8 7 8 12 8 9
s o 2 7 10 25 14 11 -7 -12 -12 -4 -10 -24 -22 -21 -24 -30 -28 -15 -8 -7 -8
n o 2 -1 4 9 5 0 -8 -14 -11 -7 -4 -14 -12 -10 -12 -10 -11 -12 -7 -3 -5
N M V O C 49 25 10 -1 -14 -28 -32 -31 -33 -35 -37 -35 -32 -28 -27
CO -26 -20 -17 -20 -22 -23 -19 -17 -12 -10
n h 3 -18 -14 -13 -4 1 -5 -12 -13 -13 -16 -17 -12 -10 -8 -6
G P I7 -12 -12 -11 -14 -15 -16 -12 -8 -5 -5
G P I3 10 15 25 16 14 4 -1 -1 0 1 -6 -6 -5 -9 -11 -11 -6 -1 -1 -1
Denmark
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
c h 4 -16 -11 -11 -15 -12 -22 -26 -28 -25 -20 -31 -25 -24 -23 -25 -28 -25 -23 -17 -23
c o 2 9 2 8 0 1 14 10 8 2 -11 -5 13 -1 1 5 -9 14 -3 -13 -4
s o 2 8 1 9 -1 0 17 -2 -11 3 -15 -41 -9 -24 -35 -28 -29 0 -30 -49 -58
n o 2 14 7 16 9 14 20 26 17 18 16 9 34 16 15 19 9 29 17 11 4
N M V O C -34 -32 -32 -33 -33 -40 -42 -41 -40 -36 -45 -41 -42 -43 -47 -49 -45 -47 -47 -48
CO -12 6 13 -5 4 -1 -3 0 -2 11 -26 -17 -18 -21 -24 -27 -21 -24 -16 -22
n h 3 89 89 83 73 67 88 86 79 88 101 81 91 90 77 66 49 42 42 42 34
G P I7 -8 7 0 -4 -5 -12 -1 -10 -13 -17
G P I3 10 3 11 3 5 17 11 5 7 -3 -13 13 -3 -6 -1 -10 14 -5 -17 -19
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G e rm a n y
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
c h 4 2 7 5 -3 6 2 -6 -9 -7 -5 19 -4 -15 -28 -32 -36 -35 -29 -30 -31
c o 2 6 12 9 8 14 12 9 4 10 6 4 20 12 3 6 -4 1 9 7 12
s o 2 -47 -39 -39 -39 -35 -34 -40 -49 -64 -71 61 11 -9 -19 -27 -39 -50 -52 -60 -57
n o 2 -17 -11 -12 -13 -10 -9 -15 -23 -25 -30 -14 -29 -38 -44 -46 -48 -46 -43 -43 -43
N M VO C -46 -42 -41 -43 -41 -41 -44 -45 -44 -44 -18 -35 -43 -51 -55 -58 -55 -53 -53 -53
CO -25 -25 -28 -31 -30 -26 -29 -32 -31 -32 -4 -26 -38 -45 -48 -50 -49 -46 -49 -50
n h 3 -48 -46 -45 -47 -43 -41 -44 -46 -41 -39 -16 -32 -37 -43 -43 -45 1^1 -39 -38 -38
GPI 7 5 -14 -24 -32 -35 -40 -39 -36 -38 -37
GPI 3 -19 -13 -14 -15 -10 -10 -15 -22 -26 -32 17 1 -11 -20 -22 -30 -32 -29 -32 -29
G reece
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
c h 4 64 65 68 69 72 73 74 75 86 76
c o 2 15 16 15 36 41 55 79 100 102 110 103 67 87 86 91 87 83 82 93 81
s o 2 23 39 44 81 105 145 192 218 237 237 148 194 222 242 258 304 341 378 428 474
n o 2 55 58 49 64 67 79 110 121 113 113 96 98 101 103 116 118 136 128 156 152
NM VO C 176 194 183 141 113 62 67 72 79 84 88 100 102 121 119
CO 112 122 121 127 135 143 152 158 195 181
n h 3 65 66 62 59 53 75 43 33 42 33
GPI 7 93 97 105 109 116 127 133 137 160 159
GPI 3 31 38 36 60 71 93 127 147 151 153 116 120 137 144 155 169 187 196 225 236
S p a in
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
c h 4 -14 -8 0 15 18 10 14 20 15 12 0 3 9 26 41 42 56 71 78 79
c o 2 6 14 17 31 17 17 3 3 0 2 -2 -11 -5 -2 9 15 8 22 21 16
s o 2 123 148 160 231 208 208 184 169 132 166 73 92 112 142 182 178 174 237 234 256
n o 2 32 28 27 44 37 32 27 28 23 25 16 21 28 42 60 63 60 86 94 103
NM V O C 210 219 212 261 241 215 205 206 189 173 150 151 152 170 222 218 219 265 278 288
CO 4 6 6 25 15 18 17 19 20 16 2 8 16 27 42 28 40 63 69 75
n h 3 99 91 105 129 123 115 120 137 130 119 72 75 81 91 114 110 131 129 129 128
GPI 7 44 49 56 71 96 93 98 125 129 135
GPI 3 54 64 68 102 87 85 71 67 52 64 29 34 45 61 84 85 81 115 117 125
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France
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
c h 4 -27 -18 -16 -15 -14 -13 -7 -9 -8 -12
c o 2 -23 -26 -25 -26 -27 -32 -35 -37 -37 -34 -35 -32 -35 -38 -43 -41 -38 -39 -34 -30
s o 2 -30 -40 -38 -42 -44 -52 -56 -54 -52 -43 -62 -50 -53 -57 -55 -54 -47 -48 -41 -44
n o 2 -23 -24 -24 -23 -21 -24 -29 -28 -26 -22 -26 -17 -17 -23 -21 -21 -19 -14 -14 -14
NMVOC -20 -11 -11 -16 -21 -22 -17 -16 -16 -16
CO 60 59 61 66 67 69 62 64 64 59 24 37 37 29 25 27 25 29 30 27
n h 3 19 33 34 27 28 29 34 39 39 39
GPI 7 -18 -8 -9 -13 -14 -14 -10 -8 -6 -7
GPI 3 -25 -30 -29 -30 -31 -36 -40 -40 -38 -33 -41 -33 -35 -39 -40 -39 -35 -33 -30 -29
Ireland
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
c h 4 372 401 401 414 405 393 396 368 357 327
c o 2 52 51 48 52 56 54 73 85 89 71 72 79 68 71 70 63 55 50 51 36
s o 2 86 66 38 39 52 58 84 111 107 122 86 105 107 110 143 135 131 168 190 173
n o 2 6 20 15 15 16 24 32 53 64 69 45 53 65 56 50 49 48 37 41 34
NMVOC 10 18 21 19 14 10 16 10 11 -11
CO 31 36 39 28 21 11 9 5 7 -6
NH, 391 438 447 444 431 416 390 340 339 311
GPI 7 144 162 164 163 162 154 149 140 142 123
GPI 3 48 46 33 35 42 46 63 83 87 87 67 79 80 79 88 82 78 85 94 81
Italy
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
c h 4 -23 -24 -26 -29 -28 -32 -34 -34 -31 -33 -37 -33 -29 -12 -3 5 -27 -24 -21 -22
c o 2 -9 -7 -9 -17 -17 -17 -21 -19 -16 -16 -17 -24 -17 -7 -6 8 -9 -5 -4 -8
s o 2 34 29 12 -2 -13 -17 -17 -10 -1 -8 -43 -40 -39 -26 -19 2 -3 -3 0 0
n o 2 -3 -3 -6 -14 -16 -15 -15 -11 -9 -7 -13 -8 -1 18 13 25 13 11 11 6
NMVOC 3 0 -5 -13 -19 -23 -25 -23 -21 -18 -20 -12 -3 17 23 39 6 3 1 -1
CO 0 2 2 -3 -6 1 -2 -2 -1 0 -6 2 11 31 40 62 35 34 32 31
n h 3 1 -4 -10 -9 -17 -17 -17 -19 -14 -19 -29 -28 -25 -11 -5 3 -15 -14 -14 -12
GPI 7 -23 -20 -15 1 6 21 0 0 1 -1
GPI 3 7 6 -1 -11 -15 -16 -18 -13 -9 -11 -24 -24 -19 -5 -4 11 0 1 2 -1
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Luxembourg
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
c h 4 -44 -46 -45 -43 -51 -49 -43 -39 -42 -41
co2 114 96 84 70 82 72 68 64 71 71 73 66 71 62 47 17 16 16 9 0
so2 -33 -34 -46 -52 -45 -41 -42 -40 -34 -36 -55 -51 -47 -46 -50 -63 -61 -66 -77 -75
n o 2 12 15 8 0 -1 -6 -8 -6 -4 -6 -14 -11 -8 -9 -16 -22 -15 -25 -29 -31
NMVOC -50 -48 -45 -42 -41 -43 -43 ^ 1 -45 -46 -52 -47 -48 -55 -47
CO 73 130 113 123 50 12 15 -4 -38 -38
n h 3 -9 -7 -5 -12 -15 -16 -14 -12 -15 -13
G P I7 -3 6 5 4 -12 -25 -21 -25 -35 -35
G P I3 31 26 16 6 12 9 6 6 11 10 1 1 6 2 -6 -23 -20 -25 -32 -35
The Netherlands
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
c h 4 -6 -9 -10 4 18 29 11 14 19 23 45 54 51 41 39 32 49 41 36 30
co2 0 5 -17 -12 0 6 2 7 9 24 25 17 17 16 5 7 17 18 17 15
so2 -57 -52 -57 -62 -61 -63 -62 -60 -55 -62 -72 -73 -71 -72 -72 -71 -68 -68 -70 -68
n o 2 -9 -2 -5 -7 0 5 1 4 9 8 2 4 3 -4 -6 -8 -4 -8 -12 -13
NMVOC -35 -37 -36 -25 -33 -29 -30 -33 -40 -42 -46 -42 -47 -49 -51
CO -42 -47 -48 -45 -46 -48 -50 -50 -53 -54 -55 -51 -57 -57 -58
n h 3 34 45 45 43 51 52 60 62 61 62 41 53 21 21 3 -13 -12 16 3 6
GPI 7 -5 -3 -9 -13 -18 -22 -16 -15 -19 -20
GPI 3 -22 -16 -26 -27 -20 -17 -20 -17 -12 -10 -15 -17 -17 -20 -24 -24 -19 -19 -21 -22
Austria
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
c h 4 14 18 14 10 19 13 8 7 12 14 5 7 4 -2 -2 -7 0 4 4 2
co2 -25 -13 -17 -22 -17 -18 -21 -20 -21 -20 -16 -19 -25 -29 -29 -31 -29 -22 -19 -24
so2 -24 -26 -29 -43 -44 -46 -52 -56 -62 -65 -77 -77 -81 -82 -81 -80 -78 -75 -76 -76
n o 2 -22 -20 -24 -28 -27 -26 -30 -34 -34 -36 -40 -38 -41 -47 -43 -46 -45 -38 -37 -35
NMVOC -4 -1 -5 -7 -3 -7 -7 -6 -3 -3 -13 -16 -25 -31 -33 -33 -29 -26 -26 -26
CO 32 35 27 23 28 31 37 33 35 33 8 12 7 2 3 -5 -1 8 6 -2
n h 3 -5 -3 -7 -9 -6 -7 -9 -11 -7 -3 -13 -9 -13 -19 -20 -24 -23 -22 -22 -24
GPI 7 -21 -20 -25 -30 -29 -32 -29 -24 -24 -26
GPI 3 -24 -20 -23 -31 -30 -30 -34 -37 -39 ^10 -45 -45 -49 -53 -51 -52 -51 -45 -44 -45
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1999
184
31
318
189
226
159
113
174
179
1999
-27
23
-12
66
-7
7
-35
2
26
1999
-34
-41
-64
-1
34
3
-42
-21
-35
980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
195 183 159 168 182 172 185 197 194
8 0 22 39 40 40 29 36 30 49 44 22 26 27 31 35 22 33 40
47 59 82 129 113 70 93 83 80 136 114 113 148 145 159 195 199 262 311
60 60 74 99 47 -1 5 7 5 6 133 131 127 133 149 157 157 175 184
55 72 96 109 122 127 137 135 156 162 171 172 220 212
117 124 128 143 152 143 147 152 144
170 150 146 136 122 136 128 129 129
129 123 124 130 137 144 144 167 173
38 40 59 89 67 36 42 42 38 64 97 89 100 102 113 129 126 157 178
980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
-30 -20 -7 0 -10 -20 -16 -19 -23
26 6 -4 -10 -19 -8 13 9 -4 -10 -7 -1 18 43 41 20 38 34 19
80 65 51 29 28 39 29 30 25 -5 -21 -22 -23 -15 -20 -35 -16 -13 -18
58 38 30 26 15 20 25 26 20 15 14 32 67 99 89 57 70 69 66
-29 -33 -36 -36 -23 -1 15 2 -9 -7 -7 -6
-44 -32 -23 -11 -17 -26 -16 -12 -14
-50 -36 -14 -5 -18 -31 -30 -27 -28
-25 -15 3 18 9 -6 3 4 -1
55 36 26 15 8 17 22 22 14 0 -5 3 21 43 36 14 31 30 22
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
-56 -54 -50 -37 -40 -42 -43 -46 -45
-37 -38 -37 -37 -42 -39 -37 -38 -39 -45 -50 -52 -47 -39 -36 -42 -40 -43 -40
-40 -44 -43 -45 -41 -50 -45 -52 -48 -64 -79 -81 -80 -73 -72 -71 -67 -77 -75
-14 -10 -1 1 -4 -1 2 3 0 -6 -25 -23 -19 2 8 0 -5 -8 -7
1 -4 -5 -2 2 29 28 24 25 20 27
-29 -25 -19 1 5 2 -1 -5 7
-56 -58 -61 -59 -46 -34 -34 -35 -39 -40 -38
-44 -42 -37 -21 -20 -23 -24 -28 -25
-30 -31 -27 -27 -31 -30 -27 -29 -29 -38 -52 -52 -49 -37 -33 -38 -37 -42 -41
United Kingdom 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
c h 4 30 19 23 27 7 17 43 44 33 31 23 27 33 23 13 19 19 -3 -9 0
c o 2 25 15 21 28 24 26 50 53 43 42 48 38 39 43 38 45 41 13 9 6
s o 2 52 39 42 50 61 73 116 129 143 140 75 91 115 113 95 98 88 38 36 14
n o 2 36 24 25 30 31 33 56 62 54 56 54 50 56 51 47 48 40 8 1 -1
NMVOC -9 -17 -13 -8 -3 -10 7 13 8 12 14 18 23 24 21 25 26 -1 -8 -12
CO -18 -22 -19 -16 -15 -16 -2 2 -3 3 -2 1 5 3 1 4 5 -15 -18 -16
n h 3 -37 -35 -33 -32 -33 -30 -33 -45 -45 -44
GPI 7 25 27 34 32 26 30 27 -1 -5 -8
GPI 3 38 26 30 36 38 44 74 81 80 79 59 60 70 69 60 64 56 20 15 6
Note: GPI 7 based on all seven pollutants
G PI 3 based on C 0 2, SO z and N 0 2 em ission figures
Em ission data (except C 0 2) from  E M E P (2002, es/gr/pt: 2000) 
C 0 2 em ission data from  C DIAC (2001)
GDP data from  Eurostat (2000)
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Table 31
Belgium
Manufacturing pollution intensity
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
s o 2 52 65 106 117 29 58
n o 2 69 58 92 110 112 113
NM VO C 90 24 84 51 43 44
M P I 2 60 62 99 113 71 86
Denmark
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
s o 2 -50 -40 -43 -46 -36 -44
n o 2 -45 -42 -43 -44 -43 -50
NM VO C -16 -17 -23 -23 -38 -51
M PI 2 -47 -41 -43 -45 -40 -47
Germany
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
s o 2 -3 -27 -41 -52 -60 -61
n o 2 -29 -33 -38 -36 -35 -30
NM V O C -62 -65 -67 -68 -63 -64
M PI 2 -16 -30 -39 -44 -47 -45
Greece
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
s o 2 235 260 248 282 324 400
n o 2 23 26 26 46 60 90
NM VO C 838 845 780 899 914 1076
M PI 2 129 143 137 164 192 245
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Spain
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
s o 2
n o 2
N M VO C
190
113
141
230
126
169
243
121
172
318
147
222
377
157
185
379
149
138
M PI 2 152 178 182 233 267 264
France
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
S 0 2 -48 -36 -40 -42 -32 -33
n o 2 -43 -44 -45 -43 -38 -42
NM VO C -38 -37 -39 -35 -31 -34
M PI 2 -45 -40 -42 -43 -35 -37
Ireland
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
s o 2 88 75 74 102 148 110
n o 2 16 2 -6 3 3 -4
NM VO C -41 -41 -65 -62 -65 -83
M PI 2 52 38 34 52 75 53
Italy
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
s o 2 -24 -18 -13 -24 -31 -25
n o 2 41 64 62 32 2 8
N M VO C -13 -15 -21 -40 -26 -32
M PI 2 8 23 24 4 -14 -9
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Luxembourg
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
s o 2
n o 2
NM VO C
178
434
249
245
482
573
274
504
851
310
545
1233
274
483
200
148
433
104
M PI 2 306 364 389 427 378 290
The Netherlands 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
s o 2
n o 2
NM VO C
-50
40
37
-52
39
44
-52
35
62
-49
29
18
-45
33
-2
-40
29
109
M PI 2 -5 -7 -8 -10 -6 -6
Austria
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
s o 2
n o 2
N M VO C
-69
-48
-44
-76
-57
-49
-82
-58
-49
-84
-61
-48
-85
-62
-79
-78
-57
-75
M PI 2 -58 -67 -70 -73 -73 -68
Portugal
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
s o 2
n o 2
N M VO C
209
86
1227
184
78
1180
227
98
1182
227
118
1316
263
132
1367
343
133
1225
M PI 2 147 131 163 173 197 238
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Finland
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
s o 2
n o 2
N M V O C
116
12
28
7
-20
53
-41
41
-31
37
-47
18
M PI 2 64 17 17 0 3 -15
Sweden
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
s o 2
n o 2
NM VO C
-79
-49
148
-80
-49
156
-83
-54
185
-79
-50
198
-80
-56
143
-81
-59
120
M PI 2 -64 -64 -68 -64 -68 -70
United Kingdom 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
s o 2
n o 2
NM VO C
4
9
-50
17
-2
-54
37
-2
-56
54
4
-53
47
14
-50
19
5
-49
M PI 2 6 8 18 29 30 12
Note: M PI 2 based on SOz and N 0 2 em issions by com bustion in m anufacturing sector
Em ission data from  E M E P (2002, es/gr/pt: 2000)
G DP data from  Eurostat (2001)
D ata on the G D P share o f  the m anufactoring sector:
All countries except Ireland and Luxem bourg: O ECD (2000)
Ireland— C entral Statistics O ffice, Ireland (2001)
Luxem bourg— Eurostat (2001)
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Appendix 2: Regression variables
Table 32 Taxes on production and imports
T axes on P roduction  and Im p orts / 
1980 1981 1982
G D P
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
be 12.36 12.45 12.68 12.83 12.45 12.20 11.87 12.30 12.12 12.15
dk 18.62 18.41 17.66 17.84 18.08 18.36 19.64 19.43 19.26 18.29
de 13.17 12.94 12.72 12.87 12.94 12.66 12.29 12.36 12.29 12.51
gr 10.27 10.73 11.82 12.57 12.63 12.77 13.98 14.57 13.68 12.37
es 6.56 7.19 7.61 8.29 8.77 9.38 10.47 10.50 10.63 10.59
fr 15.26 15.17 15.44 15.47 15.78 15.80 15.50 15.67 15.57 15.18
ie 16.78 17.44 18.11 18.91 18.98 18.38 17.81 17.43 17.32 17.12
it 9.30 8.97 9.26 9.83 9.98 9.58 9.92 10.29 10.81 11.11
lu 14.31 14.53 15.19 17.25 16.85 13.65 13.14 13.16 13.07 12.90
nl 12.06 11.61 11.74 11.82 12.15 12.13 12.64 13.30 13.23 12.44
at 16.02 16.12 15.93 15.93 16.64 16.50 16.26 16.41 16.28 16.19
P* 11.89 12.12 12.63 13.23 13.13 12.81 14.94 14.56 15.21 14.41
fi 13.37 13.65 13.59 13.57 14.24 14.37 14.74 14.83 15.35 15.52
se 13.45 14.23 14.03 15.20 15.77 16.45 16.78 17.28 16.40 16.21
uk 15.48 16.44 16.40 15.96 15.88 15.52 16.02 16.05 13.41 12.92
Data Source: Eurostat, New Cronos Database, 2001
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1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
12.23 12.13 12.13 12.41 12.73 12.30 12.68 12.81 12.86 12.91
17.60 17.27 17.14 17.44 17.96 17.79 18.09 18.43 18.92 18.90
12.46 12.56 12.66 12.95 13.34 13.00 12.76 12.69 12.61 12.90
14.04 14.76 15.53 14.90 14.46 14.34 14.56 14.52 14.51 14.24
10.39 10.43 10.96 10.26 10.66 10.46 10.57 10.91 11.57 11.80
15.13 14.72 14.56 14.70 15.00 15.16 15.61 15.78 15.60 15.51
16.15 15.72 15.53 14.70 15.34 14.81 14.75 14.65 14.17 13.96
11.36 11.95 11.90 12.78 12.46 12.49 12.47 12.74 15.51 15.58
13.10 13.06 13.86 14.18 14.30 13.94 14.26 14.26 13.92 14.02
12.35 12.40 12.75 12.92 12.92 12.85 13.23 13.48 13.65 13.78
15.87 15.72 15.84 16.00 15.93 15.78 16.04 16.37 16.19 16.05
14.37 14.35 15.21 14.38 15.08 14.95 15.02 14.95 15.49 15.29
15.14 15.22 15.03 14.83 14.52 13.95 14.50 14.64 14.53 14.70
17.16 17.74 16.31 15.62 14.94 14.37 16.54 16.31 16.67 17.52
12.82 13.54 13.36 13.22 13.23 13.54 13.59 13.68 13.89 13.90
Table 33 Fuel price
Price of High Sulphur Fuel Oil for Industrial Customers, US$ at 1995 prices
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
be 164.6 186.6 194.3 181.5 193.0 179.3 109.6 110.1 92.4 105.8
dk 195.1 231.1 217.0 201.2 199.9 174.7 103.1 96.4 84.0 84.3
de 184.2 215.6 202.6 188.8 193.8 193.1 116.7 109.2 96.4 107.3
gr 260.0 292.5 269.1 268.6 279.3 291.8 263.0 224.5 197.3 177.5
es 194.8 274.4 261.4 280.0 266.9 264.3 194.5 162.6 154.4 150.9
fr 174.6 201.1 204.2 208.5 209.9 201.3 138.1 129.7 109.6 112.3
ie 289.4 316.1 307.0 304.6 302.1 302.6 209.2 209.8 173.5 179.1
it 190.0 218.0 205.6 205.3 211.8 200.9 120.9 129.9 123.5 137.6
lu 213.2 201.9 194.3 195.8 202.8 196.5 117.7 125.1 100.9 107.5
nl 134.1 146.1 157.1 140.8 148.7 139.0 94.6 101.3 91.5 95.6
at 165.4 202.6 189.4 174.4 181.2 179.3 136.5 108.4 102.5 97.5
Pt 272.8 309.0 361.2 380.3 394.2 396.2 298.7 251.5 246.1 232.7
fi 120.7 133.7 129.1 128.2 128.9 128.8 87.2 88.3 87.1 93.2
se 220.4 254.1 278.7 277.8 295.6 292.6 184.0 194.8 168.7 188.3
uk 243.2 257.7 251.7 241.2 244.3 232.7 157.3 147.8 126.1 128.8
Data Source: International Energy Agency, Fuel Prices Database, April 2001 / July 2002
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1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
115.7 118.9 121.6 130.2 130.6 125.4 136.3 137.4 123.9 132.3
82.9 101.4 102.8 116.6 111.6 111.1 125.3 133.6 134.3 147.3
110.7 117.2 110.0 108.6 111.8 108.0 118.6 119.8 107.3 120.7
179.5 203.3 221.2 215.1 210.5 209.1 223.6 219.9 193.1 208.4
159.5 173.3 173.7 184.3 182.6 178.5 194.4 198.4 183.6 196.6
113.1 111.6 107.4 114.9 118.6 112.1 127.2 132.1 124.3 135.4
180.8 180.4 169.1 168.1 170.3 168.3 238.4 207.3 172.6 175.8
165.1 180.4 176.1 184.3 180.9 183.0 190.9 188.6 177.7 194.6
110.0 111.4 120.8 132.3 136.9 133.9 151.7 154.4 138.7 152.1
112.6 116.6 115.1 153.5 157.3 152.7 164.3 142.4 139.3 148.3
101.8 101.3 96.2 96.6 90.5 99.6 105.2 106.9 99.1 99.5
228.1 234.6 235.5 235.9 227.4 217.3 215.5 218.5 216.1 214.2
107.4 106.8 102.9 109.0 92.8 88.5 95.9 97.3 94.5 105.0
207.7 209.6 191.0 157.3 160.3 147.0 159.4 166.1 152.5 162.3
135.6 132.4 126.9 131.1 133.2 136.5 144.5 151.6 150.3 164.3
Table 34 Labour productivity o f  the manufacturing Sector
Labour Productivity, Manufacturing Sector (Thousand € at current prices)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
be 29.1 30.5 31.8 33.1 34.5 35.0 37.4 39.2 39.6
dk 24.7 26.5 28.3 30.2 32.0 32.9 34.9 37.3 41.9
de 23.8 25.2 26.6 28.1 29.5 31.9 32.8 34.3 35.9
g r 13.9 14.0 14.1 14.1 14.2 14.8 17.7 13.7 14.7
es 16.1 17.4 18.6 19.9 21.2 22.0 24.1 26.0 26.4
f r 28.2 29.5 30.8 32.1 33.4 33.4 35.7 38.2 40.4
ie 40.2 41.6 42.9 44.3 45.6 45.0 47.1 53.1 54.7
it 27.0 29.0 31.0 32.9 34.9 36.4 39.6 43.1 46.2
lu 31.2 33.0 34.8 36.6 38.4 37.3 41.6 42.2 48.0
nl 31.7 32.9 34.1 35.3 36.5 36.5 38.8 40.5 43.9
at 17.6 19.3 21.1 22.8 24.5 27.8 27.8 28.3 30.9
P* 9.3 9.5 9 .8 10.0 10.3 9.8 10.7 11.9 12.7
<1 25.1 27.7 30.2 32.7 35.2 37.8 40.7 46.3 46.2
se 13.4 16.6 19.7 22.8 25.9 34.4 34.9 36.5 37.6
uk 25.1 25.9 26.7 27.5 28.3 27.2 29.2 31.4 33.5
Note: Data in grey cells was extrapolated by linear projection
O riginal da ta  label "L abour productivity, level (at m arket exchange rate)" 
D ata Source: E urostat, New C ronos D atabase, 2001
Table 35 Pollution performance
Refer to GPI 3 indicator (table 30)
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1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
43.6 41.5 42.7 44.6 45.8 48.1
42.2 42.1 44.2 47.1 47.6 49.5
36.2 37.0 38.1 38.7 40.1 44.4
13.5 13.5 10.9 14.7 15.5 16.5
27.6 28.1 29.3 30.6 31.7 33.9
40.9 41.3 41.6 42.4 43.0 46.9
54.0 53.1 50.1 53.2 57.3 60.2
44.3 44.4 46.2 47.1 49.5 55.7
53.1 51.1 47.6 51.1 55.8 60.5
44.4 43.8 43.4 44.0 45.4 50.9
33.1 35.2 36.8 37.8 38.6 41.3
12.4 10.6 11.4 12.0 12.6 12.7
49.0 49.2 44.8 51.2 59.8 64.7
37.0 41.6 42.5 44.5 54.0 59.9
34.2 33.8 32.4 33.9 35.5 37.0
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
49.3 51.2 51.9 53.2 54.5
52.7 I g  5 3 .9 55.7 57.5 59.4
46.5 48.5 47.9 49.4 50.8
17.3 15.3 15.4 15.5 15.6
36.6 36.3 37.6 38.9 40.1
48.1 49.6 50.2 51.5 52.8
63.1 61.8 63.2 64.5 65.9
62.5 58.7 60.7 62.6 64.6
57.2 57.5 62.1 63.9 65.7
50.9 51.2 52.4 53.6 54.8
45.2 45.1 46.8 48.6 50.3
13.9 13.4 13.7 14.0 14.2
64.9 65.6 68.1 70.6 73.1
64.6 66.7 66.5 69.6 72.7
36.9 37.5 38.8 39.6 40.4
Table 36 Chemical industry production value at 1995prices
Chemical Industry Production Value at 1995 prices, millions of 1995 US$
________________ 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
be 12957 13080 13345 13897
dk 1849 2012 2090 2071
de 59869 59505 56959 61106
gr 1705 1668 1670 1797
es 15694 16021 15294 15421
fr 32708 33316 34001 35903
ie 828 952 911 1089
it 27125 26252 26217 27125
lu
nl 10742 11495 11145 12932
at 2041 2058 1983 2161
Pt 1730 1698 1891 1823fi 2460 2529 2430 2612
se 3508 3534 3570 3845
uk 23447 23419 23587 25349
14878 15389 15737 17004 18496
2237 2367 2516 2367 2533
64379 65325 64816 66416 70053
1942 2074 1970 1984 2134
16203 16585 16857 17130 17421
37728 38962 39282 40515 42845
1205 1376 1374 1487 1707
28801 29918 30441 31628 33653
14106 15210 15140 15420 16524
2504 2400 2631 2455 2734
1936 3295 3403 3617 3641
2744 2830 2817 2992 3220
3960 4001 3873 4303 4582
26972 27979 28467 30839 32432
Data source: 1980-1996: extrapolated from an production index (CEFIC, ESCIMO Database 2001)
1997-1999: CEFIC Facts &Figures 1998,1999,2000
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1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
19211 20437 20682 22930 22011 21949 23646 24463 27888 27418 29120
2604 2625 2649 2814 2861 3203 3523 3649 4169 4269 4846
70926 72739 73763 74927 72236 76455 76528 77692 81983 80760 85526
2258 2307 2191 2113 2201 2231 2475 2662 2781 2137 2321
18185 18185 18203 18130 17858 20385 20913 20967 22497 23036 25051
45129 45677 46408 48829 49377 52665 53305 54812 58797 59116 64413
1992 2050 2497 2929 3214 3843 4456 5284 10208 12587 19206
34281 34910 34107 34805 33932 35084 36167 36935 38351 37714 40197
17120 17521 16978 17080 17256 19107 20474 20382 21945 22131 23367
2835 2878 3022 2915 2818 3036 3278 3514 3628 3702 4083
3778 4032 3565 3307 2964 3004 2948 2992 3087 2977 3136
3402 3306 3134 3180 3266 3584 3683 3706 3824 3786 4132
4551 4467 5075 5611 5933 5875 6085 6531 6994 7143 7776
33957 33889 34838 35922 36736 38633 39616 40463 40236 39648 41138
Table 3 7 Chemical industry production value /  GDP at 1995prices
Chemical Industry Production Value at 1995 prices /  GDP at 1995 prices
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 198S 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
be 6.3% 8.4% 10.4% 11.9% 13.9% 14.2% 10.6% 9.4% 9.8% 10.4% 9.2%
dk 1.6% 2.2% 2.5% 2.5% 2.9% 3.0% 2.3% 1.8% 1.9% 2.0% 1.7%
de 4.3% 5.6% 5.9% 6.6% 7.6% 7.9% 5.6% 4.7% 4.8% 5.1% 4.3%
gr 2.0% 2.4% 2.4% 3.0% 3.5% 3.8% 3.2% 2.8% 2.7% 2.9% 2.5%
es 4.3% 5.5% 5.7% 6.8% 7.4% 7.5% 5.6% 4.6% 4.1% 4.1% 3.3%
fi­ 2.9% 3.6% 4.2% 4.8% 5.5% 5.6% 4.1% 3.6% 3.6% 4.0% 3.4%
le 2.4% 3.2% 3.1% 4.0% 4.7% 5.3% 4.0% 3.8% 4.0% 4.7% 4.0%
it 3.5% 4.1% 4.4% 4.6% 5.1% 5.3% 3.9% 3.3% 3.3% 3.3% 2.8%
1U
nl 3.6% 5.1% 5.4% 6.7% 8.1% 8.9% 6.5% 5.6% 5.8% 6.4% 5.4%
at 1.5% 1.9% 2.0% 2.2% 2.8% 2.7% 2.1% 1.6% 1.8% 1.9% 1.6%
Pt 3.5% 3.9% 4.8% 5.4% 6.4% 10.4% 7.7% 6.8% 6.0% 6.0% 5.1%fl 2.8% 3.2% 3.2% 3.8% 3.9% 4.0% 3.1% 2.7% 2.5% 2.5% 2.2%
se 1.6% 2.0% 2.4% 2.9% 3.0% 3.0% 2.2% 2.1% 2.1% 2.0% 1.7%
uk 2.5% 2.9% 3.3% 3.9% 4.5% 4.6% 3.9% 3.5% 3.2% 3.4% 3.1%
Data Sources: Production 1980-1996: extrapolated from an production index (CEFIC, ESCIMO Database 2001)
1997-1999: CEFIC Facts &Figures 1998,1999,2000 
GDP 1980-1996: OECD National Accounts/main aggregates 1960-1997 (1999)
1997-1999: W orld Bank, W ord Development Indicators (2002)
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1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
9.4% 9.5% 9.9% 9.2% 8.6% 9.3% 11.9% 11.5% 12.5%
1.8% 1.8% 2.0% 2.1% 1.9% 2.0% 2.6% 2.6% 2.9%
3.9% 3.6% 3.6% 3.6% 3.2% 3.4% 4.0% 3.9% 4.3%
2.2% 2.0% 2.3% 2.2% 2.1% 2.2% 2.4% 1.8% 2.0%
3.1% 2.9% 3.6% 4.1% 3.7% 3.7% 4.2% 4.1% 4.5%
3.5% 3.5% 3.8% 3.9% 3.5% 3.6% 4.3% 4.3% 4.8%
4.9% 5.2% 6.3% 6.9% 6.8% 7.5% 13.2% 15.3% 21.9%
2.7% 2.7% 3.3% 3.4% 3.3% 3.1% 3.4% 3.3% 3.6%
5.3% 5.0% 5.3% 5.5% 5.1% 5.2% 6.0% 5.9% 6.3%
1.7% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.4% 1.6% 1.8% 1.8% 2.1%
4.2% 3.3% 3.4% 3.3% 2.8% 2.8% 3.0% 2.8% 2.9%
2.4% 2.8% 3.7% 3.6% 2.9% 3.0% 3.2% 3.1% 3.4%
1.9% 2.1% 3.1% 2.9% 2.6% 2.6% 3.0% 3.1% 3.4%
3.1% 3.2% 3.7% 3.7% 3.6% 3.6% 3.2% 3.0% 3.0%
Table 38 Chemical industry employees (absolute terms)
Chemical Industry Employees (thousands)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
be 89.9 88.3 87.8 87.6 88.6 89.6 90.6 90.7 92.4
dk 22.6 22.6 23.4 22.6 24.2 25.3 25.7 26.2 51.2
de S68.0 565.0 559.0 549.0 550.0 557.0 567.1 571.8 575.3
gr 19.7 19.8 20.5 19.8 20.3 20.5 20.1 19.6 19.9
es 139.1 135.6 132.5 134.1 133.7 130.5 132.7 129.3 129.3
fr 297.4 285.1 280.4 275.2 274.0 272.3 269.3 267.6 265.6
ie 12.4 12.3 11.5 11.8 11.7 11.7 12.0 12.2 12.2
it
in
283.0 271.0 263.0 251.0 241.0 233.0 230.0 225.0 222.5
1U
nl 89.9 90.5 88.5 86.7 86.9 89.7 91.1 91.8 93.5
at 62.2 60.0 56.2 56.5 56.5 56.3 55.4 54.8 55.8
Pt 36.5 37.0 36.4 35.2 33.6 37.3 36.7 39.1 37.8fi 24.3 24.9 24.5 25.0 24.8 24.6 24.2 25.2 20.3
se 45.2 43.8 43.2 43.0 43.6 42.7 43.6 44.0 42.8
uk 401.8 365.5 350.3 330.2 329.1 324.4 314.8 308.7 314.4
Data source: Chemical industry employees: CEFIC, ESCIMO Database (2001)
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1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
95.3 96.2 98.9 98.5 97.4 94.2 93.1 92.7 93.7 95.0 97.2
51.7 52.1 52.8 52.9 52.3 51.7 54.2 54.7 57.1 58.9 65.6
582.0 591.9 716.7 654.8 608.7 570.0 535.9 517.5 500.5 484.6 556.4
20.6 20.6 20.0 18.6 19.1 19.2 19.2 19.0 18.6 17.5 18.6
135.7 133.9 133.3 131.0 124.9 121.8 120.2 120.8 122.5 121.4 120.8
264.4 266.4 263.3 259.5 249.7 250.1 246.3 242.9 242.1 236.5 236.0
12.9 13.8 15.0 15.3 15.9 16.5 18.3 19.7 21.0 18.9 19.4
220.0 217.0 215.0 207.5 200.0 193.0 191.0 189.7 189.0 188.4 172.7
93.6 94.0 93.5 91.2 84.8 81.8 80.4 78.6 79.0 79.1 81.7
56.8 56.6 54.1 52.2 49.9 49.1 48.8 45.0 44.0 42.0 44.4
33.4 30.2 28.3 30.0 27.6 26.4 26.4 25.7 24.5 27.2 24.4
19.9 19.7 19.0 18.7 18.2 17.7 18.0 18.0 18.1 18.0 16.1
42.0 41.7 39.7 37.0 31.5 31.9 33.5 35.5 35.5 34.5 32.6
318.5 303.6 278.2 267.8 257.9 250.6 255.6 249.7 242.4 251.6 224.3
Table 39 Chemical industry employees /  total workforce
Chemical Industry Employees / Total Workforce
YEAR__________1980 1981 1982 1983
be 2.43% 2.43% 2.45% 2.47%
dk 0.93% 0.94% 0.97% 0.93%
de 2.11% 2.10% 2.10% 2.09%
gr 0.57% 0.55% 0.57% 0.55%
es 1.19% 1.19% 1.18% 1.20%
fl­ 1.36% 1.31% 1.28% 1.26%
ic 1.06% 1.07% 1.00% 1.04%
it 1.28% 1.23% 1.19% 1.12%
lu
nl 1.83% 1.87% 1.87% 1.87%
at 1.90% 1.84% 1.74% 1.77%
P‘ 0.82% 0.83% 0.83% 0.81%fi 1.08% 1.09% 1.06% 1.08%
se 1.07% 1.03% 1.02% 1.01%
uk 1.58% 1.50% 1.46% 1.40%
Data sources: Chemical industry employees:
Total occupied population (1980-1997): 
Total occupied population (1998-1999):
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
2.50% 2.52% 2.53% 2.52% 2.53%
0.98% 1.00% 0.99% 1.00% 1.94%
2.09% 2.10% 2.11% 2.11% 2.11%
0.56% 0.56% 0.55% 0.54% 0.54%
1.22% 1.17% 1.09% 1.01% 0.98%
1.26% 1.26% 1.24% 1.23% 1.21%
1.05% 1.08% 1.10% 1.10% 1.10%
1.08% 1.03% 1.01% 0.98% 0.96%
1.87% 1.90% 1.89% 1.87% 1.87%
1.77% 1.76% 1.73% 1.71% 1.74%
0.79% 0.87% 0.88% 0.91% 0.86%
1.06% 1.06% 1.04% 1.08% 0.86%
1.02% 0.99% 1.00% 1.00% 0.96%
1.36% 1.32% 1.28% 1.23% 1.22%
CEFIC, ESCIMO Database (2001) 
Eurostat, New Cronos Database (2001) 
Linear projection of Eurostat data
1989
2.57%
1.97%
2 . 10%
0.56%
0.99%
1.19%
1.16%
0.95%
1.84%
1.74%
0.75%
0.84%
0.92%
1.20%
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1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
2.56% 2.62% 2.62% 2.62% 2.56% 2.52% 2.50% 2.51% 2.51% 2.56%
2.00% 2.04% 2.06% 2.07% 2.05% 2.12% 2.11% 2.16% 2.18% 2.40%
2.08% 1.96% 1.83% 1.73% 1.63% 1.54% 1.50% 1.47% 1.43% t.64%
0.55% 0.54% 0.50% 0.51% 0.50% 0.50% 0.49% 0.48% 0.45% 0.47%
0.94% 0.92% 0.92% 0.90% 0.88% 0.85% 0.84% 0.83% 0.79% 0.77%
1.19% 1.17% 1.16% 1.13% 1.13% 1.11% 1.09% 1.08% 1.04% 1.03%
1.19% 1.30% 1.32% 1.35% 1.36% 1.44% 1.48% 1.55% 1.32% 1.29%
0.93% 0.91% 0.89% 0.88% 0.87% 0.86% 0.85% 0.85% 0.84% 0.77%
1.81% 1.77% 1.71% 1.59% 1.54% 1.49% 1.43% 1.40% 1.37% 1.40%
1.70% 1.60% 1.54% 1.48% 1.45% 1.45% 1.34% 1.31% 1.24% 1.31%
0.67% 0.61% 0.65% 0.61% 0.59% 0.59% 0.58% 0.54% 0.58% 0.52%
0.84% 0.85% 0.90% 0.94% 0.92% 0.92% 0.92% 0.90% 0.87% 0.77%
0.92% 0.89% 0.86% 0.78% 0.79% 0.82% 0.87% 0.88% 0.85% 0.79%
1.13% 1.07% 1.05% 1.03% 0.99% 1.00% 0.97% 0.90% 0.93% 0.82%
Table 40 Chemical industry intra-EU exports (absolute)
In tra-E U  Chem ical Exports (million €)
 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 i m  1987 1988
he
dk
de
gr
es
fr
Data source CEFIC, ESCIMO Database (2001)
Note: Projected data points are marked in grey
1989
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1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
12338.8 12731.7 13098.5 14401.9 17402.8 20831.5 22086.6 19789.1 27101.1
1081.9 1150.8 1356.9 1330.4 2001.4 2297.0 2231.1 2626.0 2676.1
22518.5 22625.6 22906.3 21052.9 24809.0 31503.8 30986.6 32954.4 33352.6
173.1 171.7 180.6 171.9 179.2 242.3 209.2 199.2 215.5
2521.4 2566.2 2547.0 2449.2 3273.0 3880.2 4432.8 4917.6 5383.7
12783.5 13367.5 13897.7 13753.5 15875.0 19701.0 20105.1 22126.7 24147.6
5453.8 5416.6 5858.4 5769.7 6524.9 7718.5 8474.6 9516.3 9970.6
1886.1 2203.6 2675.9 2776.5 3739.2 4324.5 5512.0 7597 5 8204.3
13948.2 13565.0 13316.8 12049.0 13998.1 16520.7 18102.4 19565.7 19872.0
1575.6 1754.4 1747.6 1751.6 1978.3 2426.2 2481.3 2675.1 2804.4
462.7 430.0 419.8 399.4 532.2 640.5 618.0 735.4 758.2
534.7 546.1 571.7 574.0 718.6 1086.2 1037.2 1179.6 1289.2
1795.2 2069.4 2244.4 2346.8 2707.11 2862.9 3073.0 3283.2 3493.3
10666.1 11377.0 11501.0 12032.0 13752.8 15645.8 16487.5 18501.2 19494.0
Table 41 Chemical industry intra-EU exports /  GDP
Chemical Industry Intra-EU Exports / GDP
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
be 4.28% 4.47% 4.21% 4.98% 5.67% 5.88% 6.49% 6.51% 8.79%
dk 0.55% 0.61% 0.67% 0.71% 1.00% 0.98% 0.96% 1.25% 1.24%
de 1.02% 0.93% 0.84% 0.81% 0.91% 1.01% 1.04% 1.25% 1.26%
gr 0.14% 0.14% 0.13% 0.14% 0.14% 0.16% 0.13% 0.13% 0.14%
es 0.35% 0.34% 0.32% 0.38% 0.51% 0.54% 0.60% 0.70% 0.75%
fr 0.73% 0.79% 0.76% 0.81% 0.90% 0.99% 1.03% 1.26% 1.35%
it 0.34% 0.33% 0.35% 0.43% 0.49% 0.55% 0.55% 0.65% 0.68%
ie
lu
2.82% 3.37% 3.69% 4.18% 5.19% 5.09% 6.03% 7.62% % * m
nl 3.35% 3.30% 2.99% 2.85% 3.14% 3.20% 3.59% 4.17% 4.12%
at 0.67% 0.74% 0.67% 0.71% 0.76% 0.81% 0.85% 1.04% 1.08%
Pt 0.46% 0.39% 0.32% 0.35% 0.46% 0.47% 0.45% 0.55% 0.55%fi 0.27% 0.32% 0.39% 0.50% 0.56% 0.67% 0.65% 0.77% 0.81%
se 0.53% 0.61% 0.66% 0.94% i .03% m 0.96% 0.96% 1.10% -m m
uk 0.74% 0.79% 0.79% 0.94% 1.02% 1.09% 1.13% 1.13% 1.12%
Data source Exports:
GDP:
CEFIC, ESCIMO Database (2001)
1980-1996: OECD National Accounts/main aggregates 1960-1997 (1999) 
1997-1999: World Bank. Word Development Indicators (2002)
Chemical Industry intra-Eli exports in USS at 1995 exchange rates/GDP at 1995 constant prices, millions of USX 
Projected data points are marked in grey
1999
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Appendix 3: Regression Results
Table 42 Regression models on Cl production /  GDP, Ireland included
Fixed effects model
Dependent variable: prod_r 
Dataset Includes Ireland
xtreg prod_r tax fpr m_prod gdp gpl3 year2-year20, fe
Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs = 280
Group variable (i): country2 Number of groups = 14
R-sq: within = 0.5826 Obs per group: mln = 20
between = 0.2576 avg = 20
overall = 0.3245 max = 20
corr(u_i, Xb) =
F(24,243) = 
Prob > F =
14.75
0.0000
prod r Coef. Std. Err. t p*ltl [95% Conf. Int.]
tax -1.7294 0.1654 -10.4500 0.0000 -2.0553 -1.4035
fpr 0.5818 0.1120 5.2000 0.0000 0.3612 0.8024
m_prod 0.3145 0.1098 2.8600 0.0050 0.0982 0.5308
gpl3 0.2567 0.0825 3.1100 0.0020 0.0943 0.4191
year2 0.1470 0.0688 2.1400 0.0330 0.0116 0.2825
year3 0.2490 0.0695 3.5800 0.0000 0.1121 0.3858
year4 0.4382 0.0703 6.2300 0.0000 0.2998 0.5767
year5 0.5776 0.0723 7.9900 0.0000 0.4351 0.7201
year6 0.6445 0.0736 8.7500 0.0000 0.4994 0.7895
year7 0.6239 0.0838 7.4400 0.0000 0.4588 0.7890
years 0.5155 0.0891 5.7900 0.0000 0.3401 0.6910
year9 0.5245 0.0963 5.4500 0.0000 0.3348 0.7141
year10 0.5212 0.0938 5.5600 0.0000 0.3364 0.7060
yaar11 0.3425 0.0901 3.8000 0.0000 0.1651 0.5199
yaar12 0.3356 0.0885 3.7900 0.0000 0.1612 0.5099
year 13 0.3031 0.0930 3.2600 0.0010 0.1200 0.4862
year14 0.3769 0.0949 3.9700 0.0000 0.1901 0.5638
year15 0.3878 0.1005 3.8600 0.0000 0.1899 0.5858
year16 0.2769 0.1039 2.6700 0.0080 0.0723 0.4815
year17 0.2841 0.1022 2.7800 0.0060 0.0829 0.4854
year18 0.4467 0.1040 4.2900 0.0000 0.2417 0.6516
year19 0.4860 0.1087 4.4700 0.0000 0.2719 0.7002
year20 0.5513 0.1089 5.0600 0.0000 0.3369 0.7658
_cons -4.3992 0.8010 -5.4900 0.0000 -5.9770 -2.8214
sigma_u 0.41268
slgma_e 0.176188
rho 0.845827 (fraction of variance due to u j)
F test that all u_i=0: F(13, 243) = 88.76 Prob > F = 0.0000
Random effects model
Dependent variable: prod_r 
Dataset Includes Ireland
xtreg prod_r tax fpr m_prod gdp gpi3 year2-year20, re
Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs - 280
Group variable (I): country2 Number of groups = 14
R-sq: within = 0.5822 Obs per group: min = 20
between = 0.2711 avg = 20
overall = 0.338 max = 20
Random effects u j  -  Gaussian Wald chi2(23) 344.52
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
prod_r Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Int.]
tax -1.6833 0.1589 -10.5900 0.0000 -1.9948 -1.3718
fpr 0.5439 0.1076 5.0500 0.0000 0.3329 0.7548
m_prod 0.3346 0.1044 3.2100 0.0010 0.1300 0.5391
gpl3 0.2443 0.0794 3.0700 0.0020 0.0886 0.4000
year2 0.1504 0.0684 2.2000 0.0280 0.0163 0.2844
year3 0.2501 0.0690 3.6200 0.0000 0.1148 0.3854
year4 0.4362 0.0698 6.2500 0.0000 0.2994 0.5731
yaar5 0.5746 0.0717 8.0100 0.0000 0.4340 0.7151
year6 0.6396 0.0729 8.7800 0.0000 0.4968 0.7824
year7 0.6018 0.0819 7.3500 0.0000 0.4413 0.7622
yearS 0.4899 0.0867 5.6500 0.0000 0.3200 0.6597
year9 0.4943 0.0933 5.3000 0.0000 0.3114 0.6771
year10 0.4928 0.0910 5.4200 0.0000 0.3145 0.6712
year11 0.3156 0.0874 3.6100 0.0000 0.1442 0.4870
y earl 2 0.3104 0.0860 3.6100 0.0000 0.1417 0.4790
year13 0.2758 0.0901 3.0600 0.0020 0.0992 0.4525
year14 0.3505 0.0919 3.8100 0.0000 0.1704 0.5307
year15 0.3592 0.0971 3.7000 0.0000 0.1689 0.5496
year16 0.2472 0.1002 2.4700 0.0140 0.0507 0.4436
year17 0.2573 0.0987 2.6100 0.0090 0.0637 0.4508
year18 0.4190 0.1005 4.1700 0.0000 0.2221 0.6159
year19 0.4543 0.1047 4.3400 0.0000 0.2490 0.6596
year20 0.5214 0.1049 4.9700 0.0000 0.3157 0.7271
cons -4.3202 0.7853 -5.5000 0.0000 -5.8594 -2.7809
sigma_u 0.441206
sigma_e 0.176188
rho 0.862465 (fraction of variance due to u j)
Hausman specification test
Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2( 24) = (b-B)'[SA(-1 )](b-B), S = (S_fe - S_re)
=  1.88
Ho cannot be rejected.
Random effects model can be used safely.
prod_r FE RE Difference
tax -1.7294 -1.6833 -0.0461
fpr 0.5818 0.5439 0.0379
m_prod 0.3145 0.3346 -0.0201
gpl3 0.2567 0.2443 0.0124
year2 0.1470 0.1504 -0.0033
year3 0.2490 0.2501 -0.0012
year4 0.4382 0.4362 0.0020
year5 0.5776 0.5746 0.0030
year6 0.6445 0.6396 0.0049
year7 0.6239 0.6018 0.0221
yearS 0.5155 0.4899 0.0257
years 0.5245 0.4943 0.0302
year10 0.5212 0.4928 0.0284
year11 0.3425 0.3156 0.0269
year12 0.3356 0.3104 0.0252
year13 0.3031 0.2758 0.0273
year 14 0.3769 0.3505 0.0264
year15 0.3878 0.3592 0.0286
year16 0.2769 0.2472 0.0298
year17 0.2841 0.2573 0.0268
year 18 0.4467 0.4190 0.0277
year19 0.4860 0.4543 0.0317
year20 0.5513 0.5214 0.0300
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Auto-correlation: graphical approximation
Production value /  GDP: Residuals against lagged residuals
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Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test
Dataset Includes Ireland
prod_r(country2,t] = Xb + u[country2] + e[country2,t]
Test: Var(u) = 0
ch i2 (l) = 1726.62
Prob >  chi2 = 0.0000
Result: Within-unit correlation cannot be ruled out
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Random effects model corrected for autocorrelation
Dependent variable: prod_r 
Dataset includes Ireland
xtregar prod_r tax fpr m_prod gpi3 year2-year20
Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs = 280
Group variable (i): country2 Number of groups = 14
R-sq: within = 0.473 Obs per group: min = 20
between = 0.217 avg = 20
overall = 0.2646 max = 20
Wald chi2(24) = 604.71
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
prod_r Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Int.]
tax -0.4314 0.1429 -3.0200 0.0030 -0.7115 -0.1513
fpr 0.0304 0.0806 0.3800 0.7060 -0.1275 0.1883
m_prod 0.0893 0.0925 0.9700 0.3340 -0.0920 0.2706
gpi3 0.2147 0.0572 3.7500 0.0000 0.1025 0.3269
year2 0.2183 0.0254 8.6100 0.0000 0.1686 0.2679
yearS 0.3093 0.0342 9.0300 0.0000 0.2422 0.3764
year4 0.4619 0.0415 11.1400 0.0000 0.3806 0.5432
yearS 0.6031 0.0482 12.5200 0.0000 0.5086 0.6975
year6 0.6665 0.0532 12.5300 0.0000 0.5623 0.7708
year7 0.4080 0.0664 6.1500 0.0000 0.2779 0.5381
year8 0.2638 0.0733 3.6000 0.0000 0.1201 0.4075
year9 0.2439 0.0813 3.0000 0.0030 0.0845 0.4033
year 10 0.2871 0.0814 3.5300 0.0000 0.1275 0.4466
yea rll 0.1366 0.0806 1.6900 0.0900 -0.0214 0.2945
year12 0.1426 0.0806 1.7700 0.0770 -0.0153 0.3005
yearlS 0.1076 0.0857 1.2600 0.2090 -0.0604 0.2756
year14 0.2264 0.0886 2.5600 0.0110 0.0528 0.4000
year15 0.2351 0.0942 2.5000 0.0130 0.0504 0.4197
year16 0.1432 0.0982 1.4600 0.1440 -0.0491 0.3356
year17 0.1735 0.0969 1.7900 0.0740 -0.0166 0.3635
year18 0.3286 0.0992 3.3100 0.0010 0.1342 0.5230
year19 0.3092 0.1038 2.9800 0.0030 0.1058 0.5125
year20 0.4115 0.1044 3.9400 0.0000 0.2068 0.6161
cons -3.9102 0.5972 -6.5500 0.0000 -5.0807 -2.7397
rho_ar 0.92267 (estimated autocorrelation coefficient)
sigma_u 0.33916
slgma_e 0.07877
rho_fov 0.94882 (fraction of variance due to u j)
theta 0.58700
u[
co
un
try
2]
 + 
e[
co
un
try
2,
t]
Heteroskedasticity: graphical approximation
Production value /  GDP: Predicted values against residuals
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Table 43 Regression models on C l production /  GDP, Ireland excluded
Fixed effects model
Dependent variable: prod_r 
D ataset excludes Ireland
xtreg prod_r tax fpr m_prod gdp gpi3 year2-year20, fe
Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs = 260
Group variable (i): country2 Number of groups = 13
R-sq: within = 0.6863 Obs per group: min = 20
between = 0.2604 avg = 20
overall = 0.3434 max = 20
F(13,224) = 21.31
corr(u_i, Xb) = 0.0241 Prob > F = 0.0000
prod_r Coef. Std. Err. t P>lt| [95% Conf. Int.]
tax -0.9804 0.1381 -7.1000 0.0000 -1.2527 -0.7082
fpr 0.4990 0.0856 5.8300 0.0000 0.3304 0.6676
m_prod 0.3783 0.0822 4.6000 0.0000 0.2163 0.5402
gpl3 0.1256 0.0635 1.9800 0.0490 0.0006 0.2507
year2 0.1328 0.0530 2.5100 0.0130 0.0284 0.2372
year3 0.2229 0.0536 4.1600 0.0000 0.1172 0.3286
year4 0.3775 0.0543 6.9600 0.0000 0.2706 0.4845
year5 0.4996 0.0559 8.9400 0.0000 0.3894 0.6097
yearti 0.5620 0.0570 9.8600 0.0000 0.4497 0.6742
year7 0.4889 0.0650 7.5200 0.0000 0.3608 0.6170
yearS 0.3658 0.0692 5.2900 0.0000 0.2295 0.5021
year9 0.3627 0.0743 4.8800 0.0000 0.2163 0.5090
yearlO 0.3673 0.0722 5.0900 0.0000 0.2250 0.5096
y ea rll 0.1863 0.0697 2.6700 0.0080 0.0490 0.3236
y ea rl 2 0.1642 0.0686 2.3900 0.0170 0.0290 0.2993
y ea rl 3 0.1174 0.0719 1.6300 0.1040 -0.0242 0.2590
year14 0.1984 0.0731 2.7100 0.0070 0.0544 0.3424
year15 0.1915 0.0773 2.4800 0.0140 0.0392 0.3438
year16 0.0811 0.0798 1.0200 0.3100 -0.0761 0.2384
year17 0.0891 0.0792 1.1300 0.2620 -0.0669 0.2452
year! 8 0.2086 0.0804 2.5900 0.0100 0.0502 0.3671
y ea rl 9 0.2117 0.0841 2.5200 0.0130 0.0460 0.3775
year20 0.2568 0.0842 3.0500 0.0030 0.0908 0.4228
cons -5.4256 0.6006 -9.0300 0.0000 -6.6092 -4.2420
slgma_u 0.393214
sigma_e 0.130592
rho 0.900657 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
F test that all u_i-0: F(12,224) 164.23 Prob > F = 0.0000
Random effects model
Dependent variable: prod_r 
D ataset excludes Ireland
xtreg prod_r tax fpr m_prod gdp gpi3 year2-year20, re
Random-effects GLS regression 
Group variable (i): country2
R-sq: within = 0.6863
between = 0.2632
overall = 0.3456
Random effects u j  -  Gaussian 
corr(uJ, X) = 0 (assumed)
Number of obs =
Obs per group:
Wald chi2(23) = 
Prob > chi2 =
260
13
min = 20
avg = 20
max = 20
498.52
0.0000
prod_r Coef. Std. Err. z P>lz| [95% Conf. Int.l
tax -0.9840 0.1337 -7.3600 0.0000 -1.2460 -0.7219
fpr 0.4926 0.0832 5.9200 0.0000 0.3294 0.6557
m_prod 0.3825 0.0801 4.7800 0.0000 0.2255 0.5395
gpl3 0.1252 0.0621 2.0200 0.0440 0.0036 0.2468
year2 0.1335 0.0527 2.5300 0.0110 0.0303 0.2368
year3 0.2234 0.0533 4.1900 0.0000 0.1189 0.3279
year4 0.3777 0.0539 7.0000 0.0000 0.2720 0.4834
year5 0.4997 0.0555 9.0000 0.0000 0.3909 0.6086
year6 0.5617 0.0565 9.9400 0.0000 0.4509 0.6725
year7 0.4861 0.0638 7.6100 0.0000 0.3610 0.6112
year8 0.3624 0.0677 5.3500 0.0000 0.2296 0.4952
year9 0.3584 0.0726 4.9400 0.0000 0.2161 0.5006
yeaMO 0.3630 0.0706 5.1400 0.0000 0.2246 0.5014
year11 0.1825 0.0682 2.6800 0.0070 0.0489 0.3161
year12 0.1607 0.0672 2.3900 0.0170 0.0290 0.2924
year13 0.1136 0.0703 1.6200 0.1060 -0.0242 0.2514
year 14 0.1945 0.0716 2.7200 0.0070 0.0543 0.3348
year15 0.1873 0.0756 2.4800 0.0130 0.0391 0.3354
year16 0.0765 0.0780 0.9800 0.3260 -0.0763 0.2294
y ea rl 7 0.0851 0.0775 1.1000 0.2720 -0.0668 0.2370
year18 0.2046 0.0787 2.6000 0.0090 0.0504 0.3588
year 19 0.2073 0.0821 2.5200 0.0120 0.0464 0.3682
year20 0.2527 0.0824 3.0700 0.0020 0.0913 0.4141
cons -5.3939 0.6054 -8.9100 0.0000 -6.5804 -4.2073
sigma_u
slgma_e
rho
0.437398
0.130592
0.918154 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
Hausman specification test
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2( 24) = (b-B)'[SA(-1 )](b-B), S = (S_fe - S_re)
0.60
Prob>chi2 = 1.0000
Result: Ho cannot be rejected.
Random effects model can be used safely.
prod_r FE RE Difference
tax -0.9804 -0.9840 0.0035
fpr 0.4990 0.4926 0.0064
m_prod 0.3783 0.3825 -0.0042
gpl3 0.1256 0.1252 0.0004
year2 0.1328 0.1335 -0.0007
year3 0.2229 0.2234 -0.0005
year4 0.3775 0.3777 -0.0002
year5 0.4996 0.4997 -0.0002
year6 0.5620 0.5617 0.0002
year7 0.4889 0.4861 0.0029
yearS 0.3658 0.3624 0.0034
year9 0.3627 0.3584 0.0043
yearlO 0.3673 0.3630 0.0043
year11 0.1863 0.1825 0.0038
year12 0.1642 0.1607 0.0035
year13 0.1174 0.1136 0.0038
year 14 0.1984 0.1945 0.0038
year15 0.1915 0.1873 0.0042
year16 0.0811 0.0765 0.0046
y ea rl 7 0.0891 0.0851 0.0040
year18 0.2086 0.2046 0.0040
y ea rl 9 0.2117 0.2073 0.0044
year20 0.2568 0.2527 0.0041
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Auto-correlation: graphical approximation
Production value /  GDP: Residuals against lagged residuals
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Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test
Dataset excludes Ireland
prod_r[country2,t] = Xb + u[country2] + e[country2,t]
Test: Var(u) = 0
ch i2 (l) = 1791.12
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Result: Within-unit correlation cannot be ruled out
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Random effects model corrected for autocorrelation
Dependent variable: prod_r 
Dataset excludes Ireland
xtregar prod_r tax fpr m_prod gpi3 year2-year20
Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs = 260
Group variable (i): country2 Number of groups = 13
R-sq: within = 0.6263 Obs per group: min = 20
between = 0.1828 avg = 20
overall = 0.2487 max = 20
Wald chi2(24) = 688.13
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed) Prob > chl2 = 0.0000
prod r Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Int.]
tax -0.3531 0.1289 -2.7400 0.0060 -0.6058 -0.1004
fpr 0.1236 0.0751 1.6500 0.1000 -0.0236 0.2708
m_prod 0.1228 0.0810 1.5200 0.1300 -0.0360 0.2816
gpi3 0.1809 0.0507 3.5700 0.0000 0.0817 0.2802
year2 0.1954 0.0233 8.3900 0.0000 0.1498 0.2410
year3 0.2901 0.0310 9.3500 0.0000 0.2293 0.3509
year4 0.4327 0.0371 11.6800 0.0000 0.3600 0.5053
year5 0.5667 0.0428 13.2500 0.0000 0.4828 0.6505
year6 0.6294 0.0470 13.3900 0.0000 0.5373 0.7216
year7 0.4058 0.0591 6.8700 0.0000 0.2899 0.5216
yearS 0.2614 0.0651 4.0100 0.0000 0.1338 0.3891
year9 0.2440 0.0720 3.3900 0.0010 0.1030 0.3850
yearlO 0.2774 0.0715 3.8800 0.0000 0.1373 0.4175
yearH 0.1194 0.0703 1.7000 0.0890 -0.0183 0.2571
year12 0.1063 0.0699 1.5200 0.1280 -0.0307 0.2434
yearl 3 0.0646 0.0742 0.8700 0.3840 -0.0809 0.2101
yean  4 0.1766 0.0763 2.3100 0.0210 0.0270 0.3261
yearl 5 0.1774 0.0812 2.1900 0.0290 0.0183 0.3366
yean  6 0.0814 0.0845 0.9600 0.3350 -0.0842 0.2470
yean  7 0.0994 0.0836 1.1900 0.2350 -0.0645 0.2633
yean  8 0.2211 0.0852 2.6000 0.0090 0.0541 0.3880
yean  9 0.1931 0.0893 2.1600 0.0310 0.0181 0.3682
year20 0.2676 0.0895 2.9900 0.0030 0.0921 0.4430
cons -4.5274 0.5334 -8.4900 0.0000 -5.5729 -3.4820
rho_ar
slgma_u
slgma_e
rho_fov
theta
0.88245 (estimated autocorrelation coefficient)
0.34890
0.06892
0.96245 (fraction of variance due to u I) 
0.72683
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Heteroskedasticity: graphical approximation 
Production value /  GDP: Predicted values against residuals
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Table 44 Regression models on C l production in absolute terms, Ireland included
Fixed effects model
Dependent variable: prod_a 
D ataset includes Ireland
xtreg prod_a tax fpr m_prod gdp gpi3 year2-year20, fe
Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs = 280 Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs = 280
Group variable (i): country2 Number of groups = 14 Group variable (i): country2 Number of groups = 14
R-sq: within = 0.7166 Obs per group: min = 20 R-sq: within = 0.7151 Obs per group: min = 20
between = 0.8757 avg = 20 between = 0.8942 avg = 20
overall = 0.8644 max = 20 overall = 0.8833 max = 20
corr(u_i, Xb) = 0.4129
F(24,242) = 
Prob > F =
25.49
0.0000
prod_a Coef. Std. Err. t p»ltl [95% Conf. Int.]
tax -1.6644 0.1673 -9.9500 0.0000 -1.9940 -1.3348
fpr 0.5275 0.1143 4.6200 0.0000 0.3024 0.7526
m_prod 0.2300 0.1165 1.9700 0.0490 0.0005 0.4595
gdp 0.7558 0.1181 6.4000 0.0000 0.5233 0.9884
gpl3 0.2165 0.0842 2.5700 0.0110 0.0507 0.3823
year2 0.1104 0.0706 1.5600 0.1190 -0.0286 0.2494
year3 0.1935 0.0740 2.6100 0.0100 0.0476 0.3393
year4 0.3640 0.0785 4.6300 0.0000 0.2093 0.5186
year5 0.4907 0.0832 5.9000 0.0000 0.3267 0.6546
year6 0.5615 0.0834 6.7300 0.0000 0.3972 0.7258
year7 0.5942 0.0845 7.0300 0.0000 0.4278 0.7606
year8 0.5300 0.0887 5.9700 0.0000 0.3552 0.7048
year9 0.5575 0.0970 5.7500 0.0000 0.3665 0.7485
yearl 0 0.5556 0.0947 5.8700 0.0000 0.3691 0.7420
y ea rll 0.4211 0.0972 4.3300 0.0000 0.2296 0.6126
yearl 2 0.4174 0.0964 4.3300 0.0000 0.2275 0.6073
yearl 3 0.4036 0.1043 3.8700 0.0000 0.1980 0.6091
yearl 4 0.4533 0.1012 4.4800 0.0000 0.2540 0.6527
yearl 5 0.4818 0.1097 4.3900 0.0000 0.2658 0.6978
yearl 6 0.4075 0.1210 3.3700 0.0010 0.1692 0.6458
yearl 7 0.4217 0.1213 3.4800 0.0010 0.1827 0.6607
yearl 8 0.5727 0.1200 4.7700 0.0000 0.3364 0.8091
yearl 9 0.6152 0.1247 4.9300 0.0000 0.3695 0.8609
year20 0.6848 0.1259 5.4400 0.0000 0.4368 0.9329
cons -0.8167 1.9061 -0.4300 0.6690 -4.5714 2.9381
sigma_u 0.4938
sigma_e 0.1750
rho 0.8884 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
F test that all u_i=0: F(13, 242) = 88.91 Prob > F = 0.0000
Random effects model
Dependent variable: prod_a 
D ataset Includes Ireland
xtreg prod_a tax fpr m_prod gdp gpi3 year2-year20, re
Random effects u j  -  Gaussian 
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed)
Wald chi2(24) = 
Prob > chi2 =
698.610.0000
prod_a Coef. Std. Err. z P>|Z| [95% Conf. Int.]
tax -1.6658 0.1594 -10.4500 0.0000 -1.9782 -1.3533
fpr 0.5192 0.1091 4.7600 0.0000 0.3053 0.7330
m_prod 0.2982 0.1068 2.7900 0.0050 0.0888 0.5076
gdp 0.8766 0.0816 10.7400 0.0000 0.7166 1.0366
gpl3 0.2217 0.0809 2.7400 0.0060 0.0631 0.3802
year2 0.1313 0.0692 1.9000 0.0580 -0.0043 0.2669
year3 0.2214 0.0713 3.1100 0.0020 0.0817 0.3611
year4 0.3982 0.0740 5.3800 0.0000 0.2532 0.5432
year5 0.5300 0.0773 6.8600 0.0000 0.3785 0.6816
year6 0.5968 0.0780 7.6500 0.0000 0.4439 0.7497
year7 0.5871 0.0824 7.1300 0.0000 0.4256 0.7485
yearS 0.4975 0.0865 5.7500 0.0000 0.3280 0.6671
year9 0.5110 0.0935 5.4600 0.0000 0.3277 0.6944
yearlO 0.5098 0.0913 5.5800 0.0000 0.3309 0.6887
yearl 1 0.3547 0.0905 3.9200 0.0000 0.1773 0.5321
yearl 2 0.3511 0.0895 3.9200 0.0000 0.1757 0.5265
yearl 3 0.3258 0.0952 3.4200 0.0010 0.1391 0.5124
yearl 4 0.3878 0.0946 4.1000 0.0000 0.2024 0.5731
yearl 5 0.4051 0.1011 4.0100 0.0000 0.2071 0.6032
yearl 6 0.3110 0.1079 2.8800 0.0040 0.0996 0.5225
yearl 7 0.3249 0.1075 3.0200 0.0030 0.1141 0.5357
yearl 8 0.4808 0.1077 4.4700 0.0000 0.2698 0.6918
yearl 9 0.5180 0.1120 4.6200 0.0000 0.2984 0.7375
year20 0.5870 0.1127 5.2100 0.0000 0.3661 0.8078
cons -2.4940 1.4449 -1.7300 0.0840 -5.3259 0.3379
slgma_u 0.464342
slgma_e 0.175012
rho 0.875614 (fraction of variance due to u j )
Hausman specification test
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2( 24) = (b-B)'[SA(-1 )](b-B), S = (S_fe - S_re)
= 3.89
Prob>chi2 = 1.0000
Result: Ho cannot be rejected.
Random effects model can be used safely.
prod_a FE RE Difference
tax -1.6644 -1.6658 0.0014
fpr 0.5275 0.5192 0.0083
m_prod 0.2300 0.2982 -0.0682
gdp 0.7558 0.8766 -0.1208
gpl3 0.2165 0.2217 -0.0051
year2 0.1104 0.1313 -0.0209
year3 0.1935 0.2214 -0.0280
year4 0.3640 0.3982 -0.0342
year5 0.4907 0.5300 -0.0393
yearS 0.5615 0.5968 -0.0353
year7 0.5942 0.5871 0.0071
yearS 0.5300 0.4975 0.0325
year9 0.5575 0.5110 0.0465
yearlO 0.5556 0.5098 0.0458
yearl 1 0.4211 0.3547 0.0665
yearl 2 0.4174 0.3511 0.0663
yearl 3 0.4036 0.3258 0.0778
yearl 4 0.4533 0.3878 0.0656
yearl 5 0.4818 0.4051 0.0767
yearl 6 0.4075 0.3110 0.0965
yearl 7 0.4217 0.3249 0.0968
yearl 8 0.5727 0.4808 0.0920
yearl 9 0.6152 0.5180 0.0972
year20 0.6848 0.5870 0.0979
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Auto-correladon: graphical approximation
Production value in absolute terms: Residuals against lagged residuals
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Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test
Dataset Includes Ireland
prod_a[country2,t] = Xb + u[country2] + e[country2,t]
Test: Var(u) = 0
ch i2 (l) = 1714.78
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Result: Wlthin-unit correlation cannot be ruled out
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Random effects model corrected for autocorrelation
Dependent variable: prod_a 
Dataset Includes Ireland
xtregar prod_a tax fpr m prod gdp gpi3 year2-year20
Random-effects GLS regression 
Group variable (I): country2
R-sq: within = 0.6465
between = 0.8992
overall = 0.8789
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed)
Number of obs = 280
Number of groups = 14
Obs per group: mln = 20
avg = 20
max = 20
Wald chi2(25) = 267.47
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
prod a Coef. Std. Err. z P>lz| [95% Conf. Int.l
tax -0.4022 0.1393 -2.8900 0.0040 -0.6752 -0.1291
fpr 0.0054 0.0784 0.0700 0.9450 -0.1483 0.1591
m_prod 0.0672 0.0909 0.7400 0.4600 -0.1110 0.2455
gdp 0.7396 0.0759 9.7500 0.0000 0.5909 0.8883
gpl3 0.1452 0.0594 2.4500 0.0140 0.0288 0.2616
year2 0.1708 0.0282 6.0600 0.0000 0.1155 0.2261
year3 0.2385 0.0392 6.0900 0.0000 0.1617 0.3153
year4 0.3695 0.0486 7.6100 0.0000 0.2743 0.4646
year5 0.4935 0.0569 8.6800 0.0000 0.3821 0.6050
year6 0.5591 0.0608 9.1900 0.0000 0.4399 0.6783
year7 0.3672 0.0662 5.5500 0.0000 0.2375 0.4969
year8 0.2693 0.0720 3.7400 0.0000 0.1282 0.4105
year9 0.2685 0.0803 3.3400 0.0010 0.1111 0.4258
yeartO 0.3102 0.0805 3.8600 0.0000 0.1525 0.4679
year11 0.2036 0.0819 2.4900 0.0130 0.0431 0.3641
year! 2 0.2130 0.0823 2.5900 0.0100 0.0517 0.3743
year13 0.1949 0.0886 2.2000 0.0280 0.0213 0.3684
yearM 0.2831 0.0893 3.1700 0.0020 0.1081 0.4582
yearl5 0.3070 0.0957 3.2100 0.0010 0.1195 0.4945
year16 0.2505 0.1021 2.4500 0.0140 0.0503 0.4507
year! 7 0.2871 0.1018 2.8200 0.0050 0.0876 0.4865
year18 0.4291 0.1028 4.1700 0.0000 0.2276 0.6306
year! 9 0.4142 0.1076 3.8500 0.0000 0.2033 0.6251
year20 0.5173 0.1084 4.7700 0.0000 0.3048 0.7297
cons -0.2462 1.2263 -0.2000 0.8410 -2.6497 2.1572
rho_ar
sigma_u
sigma_e
rho_fov
theta
0.93563 (estimated autocorrelation coefficient)
0.34546
0.07722
0.95242 (fraction of variance due to u i) 
0.55585
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Heteroskedasticity: graphical approximation
Production value in absolute terms: Predicted values against residuals
1.09961 -  
-1.03031 -
at
* * *
1 \ 1 -i1*— t  
es
1.09961 -
_ V
-1.03031 - 1 1  1 1 1 
le
1.09961 - 0
0
_ 0
r #
-1.03031 - 1 1 1 1 1 
se
1.09961 -
-
4
-1.03031 -
7.10017 1 ' 11.146V 7.10017 1.1467
Xb
301
dk
i 1-------- 1-------- 1-------- r
gr
T 1-------- 1-------- 1-------- r
pt
*
7.i 6o1 7 ' ' 11.1467
Table 45 Regression models on C l production in absolute terms, Ireland excluded
Fixed effects model
Dependent variable: prod_a 
D ataset excludes Ireland
xtreg prod_a tax fpr m_prod gdp gpi3 year2-year20, fe
Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs = 260
Group variable (i): country2 Number of groups = 13
R-sq: within = 0.8538 Obs per group: min = 20
between = 0.7363 avg = 20
overall = 0.2149 max = 20
F(24,223) = 54.25
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.6049 Prob > F = 0.0000
p ro d a Coef. Std. Err. t p>ltl [95% Conf. Int.]
tax -0.2955 0.0961 -3.0800 0.0020 -0.4849 -0.1062
fpr 0.1622 0.0578 2.8100 0.0050 0.0484 0.2761
m_prod -0.0113 0.0568 -0.2000 0.8430 -0.1231 0.1006
gdp -0.1841 0.0656 -2.8100 0.0050 -0.3134 -0.0548
gpl3 -0.1324 0.0430 -3.0800 0.0020 -0.2172 -0.0477
year2 -0.0435 0.0352 -1.2300 0.2190 -0.1129 0.0260
year3 -0.0546 0.0376 -1.4500 0.1470 -0.1287 0.0194
year4 -0.0040 0.0406 -0.1000 0.9210 -0.0841 0.0760
year5 0.0507 0.0435 1.1700 0.2450 -0.0351 0.1365
year6 0.1271 0.0437 2.9100 0.0040 0.0411 0.2132
year7 0.2677 0.0433 6.1800 0.0000 0.1824 0.3531
year8 0.3455 0.0442 7.8200 0.0000 0.2584 0.4326
year9 0.4320 0.0476 9.0700 0.0000 0.3382 0.5258
yearlO 0.4522 0.0464 9.7500 0.0000 0.3608 0.5436
y ea rll 0.4848 0.0475 10.2100 0.0000 0.3912 0.5784
year12 0.4824 0.0472 10.2100 0.0000 0.3893 0.5755
year13 0.5189 0.0510 10.1700 0.0000 0.4184 0.6195
y earl 4 0.4838 0.0493 9.8100 0.0000 0.3866 0.5809
year15 0.5560 0.0534 10.4200 0.0000 0.4508 0.6611
yearl6 0.6217 0.0591 10.5100 0.0000 0.5052 0.7382
year) 7 0.6521 0.0594 10.9700 0.0000 0.5350 0.7693
year! 8 0.7018 0.0582 12.0600 0.0000 0.5871 0.8165
year19 0.7021 0.0602 11.6600 0.0000 0.5834 0.8208
year20 0.7664 0.0608 12.6100 0.0000 0.6466 0.8862
cons 11.7761 1.0276 11.4600 0.0000 9.7510 13.8012
slgma_u 1.4155
slgma_e 0.0834
rbo 0.9965 (fraction of variance due to u_ i)
F test that all u_i=0: F(12, 242) = 429.18 Prob > F = 0.0000
Random effects model
Dependent variable: prod_a 
Dataset excludes Ireland
xtreg prod_a tax fpr m_prod gdp gpi3 year2-year20, re
Random-effects GLS regression 
Group variable (i): country2
R-sq: within = 0.842
between = 0.7825
overall = 0.4634
Random effects u j  -  Gaussian 
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed)
Number of obs = 
Number of groups =
Obs per group:
Wald chi2(24) = 
Prob > chi2 =
260
13
min = 20
avg = 20
max = 20
990.85
0.0000
prod_a Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Int.]
tax -0.4841 0.1065 -4.5400 0.0000 -0.6929 -0.2753
fpr 0.2449 0.0648 3.7800 0.0000 0.1179 0.3719
m_prod 0.1061 0.0630 1.6800 0.0920 -0.0174 0.2295
gdp 0.0918 0.0661 1.3900 0.1650 -0.0377 0.2214
gpl3 -0.0694 0.0483 -1.4400 0.1510 -0.1641 0.0254
year2 -0.0043 0.0401 -0.1100 0.9140 -0.0829 0.0742
year3 0.0069 0.0423 0.1600 0.8710 -0.0761 0.0898
year4 0.0811 0.0452 1.7900 0.0730 -0.0075 0.1697
yearS 0.1506 0.0482 3.1300 0.0020 0.0562 0.2450
yearS 0.2226 0.0485 4.5900 0.0000 0.1276 0.3176
year7 0.3143 0.0490 6.4100 0.0000 0.2181 0.4104
yearS 0.3448 0.0504 6.8400 0.0000 0.2460 0.4436
year9 0.4090 0.0542 7.5500 0.0000 0.3028 0.5151
yearlO 0.4245 0.0527 8.0500 0.0000 0.3211 0.5279
year11 0.4074 0.0532 7.6500 0.0000 0.3030 0.5118
year12 0.4005 0.0529 7.5800 0.0000 0.2969 0.5041
year13 0.4161 0.0567 7.3400 0.0000 0.3050 0.5272
year14 0.4061 0.0554 7.3400 0.0000 0.2976 0.5146
y earl 5 0.4582 0.0596 7.6900 0.0000 0.3415 0.5749
year16 0.4813 0.0650 7.4000 0.0000 0.3539 0.6088
y earl 7 0.5069 0.0652 7.7700 0.0000 0.3790 0.6347
year18 0.5725 0.0643 8.9000 0.0000 0.4465 0.6985
year19 0.5737 0.0667 8.6100 0.0000 0.4430 0.7044
year20 0.6327 0.0672 9.4200 0.0000 0.5010 0.7643
cons 7.7243 1.0627 7.2700 0.0000 5.6415 9.8072
slgma_u 0.468225
slgma_e 0.083446
rho 0.969216 (fraction of variance due to u j )
Hausman specification test
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2( 24) = (b-B)'[SA(-1 )](b-B), S = (S_fe - S_re)
0.00
Prob>chi2 = 1.0000
Result: Ho cannot be rejected.
Random effects model can be used safely.
prod_a FE RE Difference
tax -0.2955 -0.4841 0.1885
fpr 0.1622 0.2449 -0.0827
m_prod -0.0113 0.1061 -0.1174
gdp -0.1841 0.0918 -0.2759
gpl3 -0.1324 -0.0694 -0.0631
year2 -0.0435 -0.0043 -0.0391
year3 -0.0546 0.0069 -0.0615
year4 -0.0040 0.0811 -0.0851
year5 0.0507 0.1506 -0.0999
year6 0.1271 0.2226 -0.0955
year7 0.2677 0.3143 -0.0465
yearS 0.3455 0.3448 0.0007
year9 0.4320 0.4090 0.0230
yearlO 0.4522 0.4245 0.0277
year11 0.4848 0.4074 0.0774
year12 0.4824 0.4005 0.0819
year13 0.5189 0.4161 0.1028
year14 0.4838 0.4061 0.0776
year15 0.5560 0.4582 0.0978
y ea rl 6 0.6217 0.4813 0.1404
year17 0.6521 0.5069 0.1453
year18 0.7018 0.5725 0.1293
year19 0.7021 0.5737 0.1284
year20 0.7664 0.6327 0.1338
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Auto-correlation: graphical approximation
Production value in absolute terms: Residuals against lagged residuals
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Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test
Dataset excludes Ireland
prod_a[country2,t] = Xb + u[country2] + e[country2,t]
Test: Var(u) = 0
ch i2 (l) =  1792.88
Prob > chi2 =  0.0000
Result: Within-unit correlation cannot be ruled out
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Random effects model corrected for autocorrelation
Dependent variable: prod_a
Dataset excludes Ireland
xtregar prod_a tax fpr m_prod gdp gpi3 year2-year20
Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs = 260
Group variable (I): country2 Number of groups = 13
R-sq: within = 0.7527 Obs per group: min = 20
between = 0.9025 avg = 20
overall = 0.878 max = 20
Wald chi2(25) = 311.99
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
p ro d a Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Int.]
tax -0.3629 0.1190 -3.0500 0.0020 -0.5960 -0.1297
fpr 0.1108 0.0707 1.5700 0.1170 -0.0278 0.2494
m_prod 0.1361 0.0731 1.8600 0.0630 -0.0072 0.2795
gdp 0.5557 0.0668 8.3100 0.0000 0.4247 0.6866
gpl3 0.0583 0.0501 1.1600 0.2440 -0.0398 0.1565
year2 0.1060 0.0256 4.1400 0.0000 0.0558 0.1562
year3 0.1575 0.0348 4.5200 0.0000 0.0892 0.2257
year4 0.2621 0.0423 6.2000 0.0000 0.1792 0.3450
year5 0.3643 0.0488 7.4600 0.0000 0.2685 0.4600
year6 0.4282 0.0513 8.3400 0.0000 0.3276 0.5289
year7 0.3276 0.0543 6.0300 0.0000 0.2211 0.4341
yearS 0.2628 0.0582 4.5200 0.0000 0.1488 0.3768
year9 0.2775 0.0643 4.3200 0.0000 0.1515 0.4035
yearlO 0.3053 0.0633 4.8200 0.0000 0.1812 0.4293
yearH 0.2205 0.0634 3.4800 0.0010 0.0962 0.3449
year12 0.2132 0.0630 3.3900 0.0010 0.0899 0.3366
year! 3 0.1966 0.0676 2.9100 0.0040 0.0641 0.3291
year14 0.2509 0.0671 3.7400 0.0000 0.1194 0.3823
year15 0.2737 0.0720 3.8000 0.0000 0.1326 0.4148
year! 6 0.2342 0.0771 3.0400 0.0020 0.0831 0.3853
year! 7 0.2599 0.0765 3.4000 0.0010 0.1100 0.4099
yearlS 0.3538 0.0764 4.6300 0.0000 0.2040 0.5036
year19 0.3339 0.0803 4.1600 0.0000 0.1766 0.4912
year20 0.4049 0.0802 5.0500 0.0000 0.2476 0.5621
cons 1.6437 1.0516 1.5600 0.1180 -0.4174 3.7048
rho_ar 0.81326 (estimated autocorrelation coefficient)
slgma_u 0.34824
sigma_e 0.07214
rho_fov 0.95885 (fraction of variance due to u j )
theta 0.79727
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Heteroskedasticity: graphical approximation
Production value in absolute terms: Predicted values against residuals
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Table 46 Regression models on C l employees /  total workforce, Ireland included
Fixed effects model
Dependent variable: empl_r 
Dataset Includes Ireland
xtreg empl_r tax fpr m_prod gdp gpi3 year2-year20, fe
Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs = 280
Group variable (i): country2 Number of groups = 14
R-sq: within = 0.2178 Obs per group: min = 20
between = 0.0003 avg = 20
overall = 0.0085 max = 20
F(23,243) = 2.94
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.202 Prob > F = 0.0000
empl r Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Int.]
tax -0.6088 0.1408 -4.3200 0.0000 -0.8861 -0.3315
fpr 0.0686 0.0953 0.7200 0.4720 -0.1191 0.2563
m_prod 0.0584 0.0935 0.6200 0.5330 -0.1257 0.2424
gpl3 0.0013 0.0702 0.0200 0.9850 -0.1369 0.1395
year2 -0.0173 0.0585 -0.3000 0.7670 -0.1326 0.0979
year3 -0.0226 0.0591 -0.3800 0.7030 -0.1390 0.0939
year4 -0.0162 0.0598 -0.2700 0.7870 -0.1340 0.1016
year5 -0.0101 0.0616 -0.1600 0.8690 -0.1314 0.1111
year6 -0.0112 0.0627 -0.1800 0.8580 -0.1347 0.1122
year7 0.0198 0.0713 0.2800 0.7820 -0.1207 0.1602
yearS 0.0220 0.0758 0.2900 0.7710 -0.1272 0.1713
year9 0.0368 0.0819 0.4500 0.6530 -0.1245 0.1982
yearlO 0.0101 0.0798 0.1300 0.9000 -0.1472 0.1673
y e a rd -0.0135 0.0767 -0.1800 0.8610 -0.1644 0.1375
year12 -0.0277 0.0753 -0.3700 0.7130 -0.1761 0.1206
year13 -0.0382 0.0791 -0.4800 0.6300 -0.1940 0.1177
year14 -0.0727 0.0807 -0.9000 0.3690 -0.2317 0.0864
y earl 5 -0.0889 0.0855 -1.0400 0.2990 -0.2574 0.0795
year16 -0.1027 0.0884 -1.1600 0.2460 -0.2768 0.0714
year17 -0.1089 0.0869 -1.2500 0.2110 -0.2802 0.0623
year18 -0.1184 0.0885 -1.3400 0.1820 -0.2928 0.0560
y earl 9 -0.1290 0.0925 -1.3900 0.1640 -0.3112 0.0532
year20 -0.1475 0.0926 -1.5900 0.1130 -0.3300 0.0349
cons 1.2490 0.6816 1.8300 0.0680 -0.0936 2.5917
slgma_u 0.424877
slgma_e 0.149931
rho 0.889265 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
F test that all u 1=0: F(13, 243) = 74.65 Prob > F = 0.0000
Random effects model
Dependent variable: empl_r 
Dataset Includes Ireland
xtreg empl_r tax fpr m_prod gdp gpi3 year2-year20, re
Random-effects GLS regression 
Group variable (i): country2
R-sq: within = 
between = 
overall =
0.2128
0.1189
0.1267
Random effects u j  -  Gaussian 
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed)
Number of obs =
Obs per group:
Wald chi2(23) = 
Prob > chi2 =
280
14
min = 20
avg = 20
max = 20
66.6
0.0000
em pljr Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Int.]
tax -0.5258 0.1362 -3.8600 0.0000 -0.7927 -0.2589
fpr -0.0084 0.0922 -0.0900 0.9270 -0.1892 0.1723
m_prod 0.1021 0.0892 1.1400 0.2520 -0.0727 0.2769
gpl3 -0.0284 0.0681 -0.4200 0.6770 -0.1619 0.1051
year2 -0.0106 0.0591 -0.1800 0.8580 -0.1264 0.1052
year3 -0.0202 0.0596 -0.3400 0.7340 -0.1371 0.0967
year4 -0.0202 0.0603 -0.3300 0.7380 -0.1384 0.0980
year5 -0.0162 0.0619 -0.2600 0.7940 -0.1375 0.1052
year6 -0.0212 0.0629 -0.3400 0.7360 -0.1444 0.1021
year7 -0.0250 0.0704 -0.3500 0.7230 -0.1630 0.1131
year8 -0.0299 0.0745 -0.4000 0.6880 -0.1759 0.1161
year9 -0.0247 0.0801 -0.3100 0.7580 -0.1817 0.1323
yearlO -0.0481 0.0782 -0.6200 0.5380 -0.2013 0.1051
yearl 1 -0.0687 0.0751 -0.9100 0.3600 -0.2160 0.0785
year12 -0.0794 0.0739 -1.0700 0.2830 -0.2243 0.0656
yearl 3 -0.0941 0.0774 -1.2200 0.2240 -0.2459 0.0576
yearl 4 -0.1270 0.0789 -1.6100 0.1080 -0.2817 0.0277
yearl 5 -0.1477 0.0833 -1.7700 0.0760 -0.3111 0.0156
yearl 6 -0.1643 0.0860 -1.9100 0.0560 -0.3328 0.0042
yearl 7 -0.1641 0.0847 -1.9400 0.0530 -0.3302 0.0020
yearl 8 -0.1753 0.0862 -2.0300 0.0420 -0.3442 -0.0063
yearl 9 -0.1940 0.0898 -2.1600 0.0310 -0.3700 -0.0179
year20 -0.2090 0.0900 -2.3200 0.0200 -0.3854 -0.0326
cons 1.4482 0.6728 2.1500 0.0310 0.1296 2.7668
sigma_u 0.33405
slgma_e 0.149931
rho 0.832331 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
Hausman specification test
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2( 24) = (b-B)'[SA(-1 )](b-B), S = (S_fe - S_re) 
10.58
Prob>chi2 =
Result: Ho cannot be rejected.
Random effects model can be used safely.
empl_r FE RE Difference
tax -0.6088 -0.5258 -0.0830
fpr 0.0686 -0.0084 0.0771
m_prod 0.0584 0.1021 -0.0437
gpl3 0.0013 -0.0284 0.0297
year2 -0.0173 -0.0106 -0.0067
year3 -0.0226 -0.0202 -0.0023
year4 -0.0162 -0.0202 0.0040
year5 -0.0101 -0.0162 0.0060
year6 -0.0112 -0.0212 0.0099
year7 0.0198 -0.0250 0.0447
year8 0.0220 -0.0299 0.0519
year9 0.0368 -0.0247 0.0615
yearlO 0.0101 -0.0481 0.0582
yearl 1 -0.0135 -0.0687 0.0553
yearl 2 -0.0277 -0.0794 0.0516
yearl 3 -0.0382 -0.0941 0.0560
yearl 4 -0.0727 -0.1270 0.0543
yearl 5 -0.0889 -0.1477 0.0588
yearl 6 -0.1027 -0.1643 0.0616
yearl 7 -0.1089 -0.1641 0.0552
yearl 8 -0.1184 -0.1753 0.0569
yearl 9 -0.1290 -0.1940 0.0650
year20 -0.1475 -0.2090 0.0614
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Auto-correlation: graphical approximation
Chemical industry employees /  total workforce: Residuals against lagged residuals
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Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test
Dataset includes Ireland
empl_rfcountry2,t] = Xb + u[country2] + e[country2,t]
Test: Var(u) = 0
ch i2 (l) = 1439.24
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Result: Withln-unit correlation cannot be ruled out
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Random effects model corrected for autocorrelation
Dependent variable: empl_r
Dataset Includes Ireland
xtregar empl_r tax fpr m_prod gpi3 year2-year20
Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs = 280
Group variable (I): country2 Number of groups = 14
R-sq: within = 0.1582 Obs per group: min = 20
between = 0.4245 avg = 20
overall = 0.2535 max = 20
Wald chi2(24) = 24.04
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2 0.4596
empl_r Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Int.]
tax -0.0656 0.1075 -0.6100 0.5420 -0.2763 0.1451
fpr -0.0189 0.0605 -0.3100 0.7540 -0.1374 0.0996
m_prod 0.1151 0.0701 1.6400 0.1010 -0.0223 0.2525
gpl3 -0.0065 0.0430 -0.1500 0.8800 -0.0907 0.0777
year2 -0.0176 0.0190 -0.9300 0.3520 -0.0548 0.0195
year3 -0.0353 0.0256 -1.3800 0.1690 -0.0855 0.0150
year4 -0.0492 0.0311 -1.5800 0.1140 -0.1101 0.0118
year5 -0.0531 0.0362 -1.4700 0.1420 -0.1240 0.0178
year6 -0.0581 0.0400 -1.4500 0.1460 -0.1366 0.0203
year7 -0.0819 0.0501 -1.6400 0.1020 -0.1801 0.0163
year8 -0.0939 0.0554 -1.7000 0.0900 -0.2024 0.0146
year9 -0.0835 0.0615 -1.3600 0.1740 -0.2039 0.0370
yearlO -0.0965 0.0616 -1.5700 0.1170 -0.2171 0.0241
yearl 1 -0.1161 0.0610 -1.9000 0.0570 -0.2357 0.0034
yearl 2 -0.1306 0.0610 -2.1400 0.0320 -0.2501 -0.0111
yearl 3 -0.1486 0.0649 -2.2900 0.0220 -0.2759 -0.0213
yearl 4 -0.1784 0.0671 -2.6600 0.0080 -0.3100 -0.0468
yearl 5 -0.2041 0.0714 -2.8600 0.0040 -0.3441 -0.0640
yearl 6 -0.2147 0.0745 -2.8800 0.0040 -0.3607 -0.0687
yearl 7 -0.2244 0.0736 -3.0500 0.0020 -0.3687 -0.0802
yearl 8 -0.2397 0.0753 -3.1800 0.0010 -0.3873 -0.0921
yearl 9 -0.2694 0.0788 -3.4200 0.0010 -0.4239 -0.1149
year20 -0.2860 0.0793 -3.6000 0.0000 -0.4415 -0.1305
cons 0.1883 0.4491 0.4200 0.6750 -0.6918 1.0684
rho_ar
slgma_u
slgma_e
rho_fov
theta
0.92779 (estimated autocorrelation coefficient)
0.28097
0.05970
0.95680 (fraction of variance due to u i) 
0.60087
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Heteroskedasticity: graphical approximation
Chemical industry employees /  total workforce: Predicted values against residuals
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Table 47 Regression models on C l employment /  total workforce, Ireland excluded
Fixed effects model
Dependent variable: empl_r 
Dataset excludes Ireland
xtreg empl_r tax fpr m_prod gdp gpi3 year2-year20, fe
Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs = 260
Group variable (i): country2 Number of groups = 13
R-sq: within = 0.241 Obs per group: min = 20
between = 0.1723 avg = 20
overall = 0.1459 max = 20
F(23,224) = 3.09
corr(u_i, Xb) = 0.1732 Prob > F = 0.0000
e m p lr Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Int.]
tax -0.3443 0.1588 -2.1700 0.0310 -0.6572 -0.0315
fpr 0.0247 0.0983 0.2500 0.8020 -0.1691 0.2185
m_prod 0.0779 0.0944 0.8200 0.4100 -0.1082 0.2640
gpl3 -0.0513 0.0729 -0.7000 0.4820 -0.1951 0.0924
year2 -0.0187 0.0609 -0.3100 0.7590 -0.1387 0.1013
year3 -0.0258 0.0616 -0.4200 0.6760 -0.1473 0.0957
year4 -0.0333 0.0624 -0.5300 0.5940 -0.1562 0.0896
year5 -0.0327 0.0642 -0.5100 0.6110 -0.1593 0.0939
year6 -0.0366 0.0655 -0.5600 0.5770 -0.1656 0.0925
year7 -0.0326 0.0747 -0.4400 0.6630 -0.1798 0.1146
yearS -0.0367 0.0795 -0.4600 0.6450 -0.1933 0.1200
year9 -0.0230 0.0854 -0.2700 0.7880 -0.1912 0.1452
yearl 0 -0.0488 0.0830 -0.5900 0.5570 -0.2123 0.1148
y ea rll -0.0749 0.0801 -0.9400 0.3510 -0.2327 0.0829
yearl 2 -0.0955 0.0788 -1.2100 0.2270 -0.2509 0.0598
yearl 3 -0.1102 0.0826 -1.3300 0.1830 -0.2730 0.0525
yearl 4 -0.1431 0.0840 -1.7000 0.0900 -0.3086 0.0224
yearl 5 -0.1657 0.0888 -1.8700 0.0630 -0.3407 0.0094
yearl 6 -0.1824 0.0917 -1.9900 0.0480 -0.3632 -0.0017
year! 7 -0.1905 0.0910 -2.0900 0.0370 -0.3699 -0.0112
yearl 8 -0.2068 0.0924 -2.2400 0.0260 -0.3889 -0.0247
yearl 9 -0.2150 0.0967 -2.2200 0.0270 -0.4054 -0.0245
year20 -0.2311 0.0968 -2.3900 0.0180 -0.4219 -0.0403
cons 1.0029 0.6903 1.4500 0.1480 -0.3574 2.3632
sigma_u 0.404797
slgma_e 0.150088
rho 0.879142 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
F test that all u_i=0: F(12,224) 75.93 Prob > F = 0.0000
Random effects model
Dependent variable: empl_r 
Dataset excludes Ireland
xtreg empl_r tax fpr m_prod gdp gpi3 year2-year20, re
Random-effects GLS regression 
Group variable (i): country2
R-sq: within = 0.2372
between = 0.4467
overall = 0.3322
Random effects u_i -  Gaussian 
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed)
Number of obs =
Obs per group:
Wald chi2(23) = 
Prob > chi2 =
260
13
min = 20
avg = 20
max = 20
73.28
0.0000
empl_r Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Int.]
tax -0.2624 0.1509 -1.7400 0.0820 -0.5581 0.0332
fpr -0.0459 0.0946 -0.4800 0.6280 -0.2313 0.1395
m_prod 0.1167 0.0911 1.2800 0.2000 -0.0618 0.2952
gpi3 -0.0808 0.0708 -1.1400 0.2540 -0.2197 0.0580
year2 -0.0122 0.0614 -0.2000 0.8420 -0.1325 0.1081
year3 -0.0230 0.0621 -0.3700 0.7110 -0.1447 0.0987
year4 -0.0364 0.0628 -0.5800 0.5620 -0.1595 0.0867
year5 -0.0378 0.0646 -0.5900 0.5580 -0.1645 0.0888
yearS -0.0458 0.0657 -0.7000 0.4860 -0.1746 0.0830
year7 -0.0745 0.0734 -1.0200 0.3100 -0.2183 0.0693
year8 -0.0857 0.0776 -1.1000 0.2690 -0.2379 0.0664
yeari) -0.0804 0.0829 -0.9700 0.3320 -0.2428 0.0821
yearlO -0.1030 0.0808 -1.2700 0.2020 -0.2613 0.0553
yearl 1 -0.1266 0.0780 -1.6200 0.1050 -0.2795 0.0263
yearl 2 -0.1442 0.0770 -1.8700 0.0610 -0.2950 0.0067
yearl 3 -0.1626 0.0804 -2.0200 0.0430 -0.3202 -0.0050
yearl 4 -0.1937 0.0819 -2.3700 0.0180 -0.3543 -0.0332
yearl 5 -0.2204 0.0864 -2.5500 0.0110 -0.3897 -0.0510
yearl 6 -0.2397 0.0891 -2.6900 0.0070 -0.4143 -0.0652
yearl 7 -0.2435 0.0886 -2.7500 0.0060 -0.4173 -0.0698
yearl 8 -0.2608 0.0900 -2.9000 0.0040 -0.4371 -0.0845
yearl 9 -0.2763 0.0937 -2.9500 0.0030 -0.4599 -0.0927
year20 -0.2889 0.0941 -3.0700 0.0020 -0.4733 -0.1045
cons 1.1856 0.6918 1.7100 0.0870 -0.1703 2.5414
sigma_u 0.329659
sigma_e 0.150088
rho 0.828307 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
Hausman specification test
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2( 24) = (b-B)'[SA(-1 )](b-B), S = (S_fe - S_re)
6.61
Prob>chi2 = 0.9997
Result: Ho cannot be rejected.
Random effects model can be used safely.
empl_r FE RE Difference
tax -0.3443 -0.2624 -0.0819
fpr 0.0247 -0.0459 0.0706
m_prod 0.0779 0.1167 -0.0388
gpi3 -0.0513 -0.0808 0.0295
year2 -0.0187 -0.0122 -0.0065
year3 -0.0258 -0.0230 -0.0028
year4 -0.0333 -0.0364 0.0031
yearS -0.0327 -0.0378 0.0051
yearS -0.0366 -0.0458 0.0092
year7 -0.0326 -0.0745 0.0419
yearS -0.0367 -0.0857 0.0491
yeari) -0.0230 -0.0804 0.0574
yearlO -0.0488 -0.1030 0.0542
yearl 1 -0.0749 -0.1266 0.0517
yearl 2 -0.0955 -0.1442 0.0486
yearl 3 -0.1102 -0.1626 0.0524
year14 -0.1431 -0.1937 0.0506
yearl 5 -0.1657 -0.2204 0.0547
yearl 6 -0.1824 -0.2397 0.0573
yearl 7 -0.1905 -0.2435 0.0530
yearl 8 -0.2068 -0.2608 0.0540
yearl 9 -0.2150 -0.2763 0.0613
year20 -0.2311 -0.2889 0.0578
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Auto-correlation: graphical approximation
Chemical industry employees /  total workforce: Residuals against lagged residuals
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Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test
Dataset excludes Ireland
empl_rfcountry2,t] = Xb + u[country2] + e[country2,t]
Test: Var(u) = 0
ch i2 (l) = 1267.51
Prob > chi2 =  0.0000
Result: Withln-unit correlation cannot be ruled out
312
Random effects model corrected for autocorrelation
Dependent variable: empl_r
Dataset excludes Ireland
xtregar empl_r tax fpr m_prod gpl3 year2-year20
Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs = 260
Group variable (1): country2 Number of groups = 13
R-sq: within = 0.2204 Obs per group: min = 20
between = 0.4597 avg = 20
overall = 0.2961 max = 20
Wald chl2(24) = 28.57
corr(uJ, X) = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2 = 0.2367
empl_r Coef. Std. Err. z P»M [95% Conf. Int.]
tax -0.0226 0.1128 -0.2000 0.8410 -0.2437 0.1985
fpr -0.0382 0.0649 -0.5900 0.5560 -0.1654 0.0890
m_prod 0.1334 0.0717 1.8600 0.0630 -0.0071 0.2740
gpl3 -0.0095 0.0439 -0.2200 0.8290 -0.0955 0.0765
year2 -0.0181 0.0200 -0.9000 0.3660 -0.0573 0.0211
year3 -0.0335 0.0269 -1.2500 0.2130 -0.0864 0.0193
year4 -0.0545 0.0325 -1.6800 0.0930 -0.1183 0.0092
year5 -0.0606 0.0378 -1.6000 0.1090 -0.1348 0.0136
year6 -0.0692 0.0419 -1.6500 0.0990 -0.1514 0.0130
year7 -0.1054 0.0527 -2.0000 0.0460 -0.2087 -0.0021
year8 -0.1203 0.0583 -2.0600 0.0390 -0.2345 -0.0061
year9 -0.1107 0.0645 -1.7200 0.0860 -0.2371 0.0157
yearlO -0.1277 0.0645 -1.9800 0.0480 -0.2541 -0.0013
yea rll -0.1496 0.0638 -2.3400 0.0190 -0.2748 -0.0245
yearl 2 -0.1718 0.0639 -2.6900 0.0070 -0.2971 -0.0464
yearl 3 -0.1934 0.0680 -2.8500 0.0040 -0.3267 -0.0602
yearl 4 -0.2263 0.0701 -3.2300 0.0010 -0.3637 -0.0889
yearl 5 -0.2561 0.0746 -3.4300 0.0010 -0.4023 -0.1099
yearl 6 -0.2724 0.0777 -3.5100 0.0000 -0.4247 -0.1201
yearl 7 -0.2849 0.0773 -3.6900 0.0000 -0.4364 -0.1335
yearl 8 -0.3050 0.0789 -3.8700 0.0000 -0.4595 -0.1504
yearl 9 -0.3266 0.0825 -3.9600 0.0000 -0.4884 -0.1648
year20 -0.3419 0.0830 -4.1200 0.0000 -0.5046 -0.1792
cons 0.1566 0.4646 0.3400 0.7360 -0.7539 1.0671
rho_ar
slgma_u
slgma_e
rho_fov
theta
0.92454 (estimated autocorrelation coefficient)
0.28804
0.05979
0.95870 (fraction of variance due to u i) 
0.61881
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Heteroskedasticity: graphical approximation
Chemical industry employees /  total workforce: Predicted values against residuals
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Table 48 Regression models on C l employment in absolute terms, Ireland included
Fixed effects model
Dependent variable: empl_a 
Dataset Includes Ireland
xtreg empl_a tax fpr m_prod gdp gpi3 year2-year20, fe
Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs = 280
Group variable (i): country2 Number of groups = 14
R-sq: within = 0.1463 Obs per group: min = 20
between = 0.8893 avg = 20
overall = 0.8614 max = 20
F(24,242) = 1.73
corr(u_i, Xb) = 0.8745 Prob > F = 0.0215
empl a Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Int.]
tax -0.5973 0.1483 -4.0300 0.0000 -0.8894 -0.3052
fpr 0.0894 0.1013 0.8800 0.3790 -0.1102 0.2889
m_prod 0.0011 0.1032 0.0100 0.9920 -0.2023 0.2045
gdp 0.2553 0.1046 2.4400 0.0150 0.0492 0.4614
gpi3 -0.0191 0.0746 -0.2600 0.7980 -0.1661 0.1278
year2 0.0300 0.0625 0.4800 0.6320 -0.0932 0.1532
year3 0.0444 0.0656 0.6800 0.4990 -0.0848 0.1737
year4 0.0701 0.0696 1.0100 0.3150 -0.0670 0.2072
year5 0.0957 0.0738 1.3000 0.1960 -0.0496 0.2410
year6 0.1028 0.0739 1.3900 0.1660 -0.0428 0.2485
year7 0.0834 0.0749 1.1100 0.2670 -0.0641 0.2308
year8 0.0541 0.0787 0.6900 0.4920 -0.1008 0.2090
year9 0.0678 0.0859 0.7900 0.4310 -0.1014 0.2371
yearlO 0.0575 0.0839 0.6900 0.4940 -0.1078 0.2227
yearl 1 0.0008 0.0862 0.0100 0.9930 -0.1690 0.1705
yearl 2 -0.0004 0.0854 0.0000 0.9960 -0.1687 0.1679
yearl 3 -0.0349 0.0925 -0.3800 0.7060 -0.2171 0.1472
yearM -0.0507 0.0897 -0.5700 0.5720 -0.2274 0.1260
year15 -0.0766 0.0972 -0.7900 0.4320 -0.2680 0.1149
yearl 6 -0.1108 0.1072 -1.0300 0.3020 -0.3220 0.1004
yearl 7 -0.1136 0.1076 -1.0600 0.2920 -0.3255 0.0982
yearl 8 -0.0967 0.1063 -0.9100 0.3640 -0.3061 0.1128
yearl 9 -0.0926 0.1105 -0.8400 0.4030 -0.3103 0.1252
year20 -0.0975 0.1116 -0.8700 0.3830 -0.3173 0.1224
cons 2.3401 1.6894 1.3900 0.1670 -0.9878 5.6680
sigma_u 0.8291
slgma_e 0.1551
rho 0.9662 (fraction of variance due to u j )
F test that all u_i=0: F(13, 242) = 67.29 Prob > F = 0.0000
Random effects model
Dependent variable: empl_a 
Dataset Includes Ireland
xtreg empl_a tax fpr m_prod gdp gpi3 year2-year20, re
Random-effects GLS regression 
Group variable (i): country2
R-sq: within = 0.1226
between = 0.9248
overall = 0.9064
Random effects u j  -  Gaussian 
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed)
Number of obs =
Obs per group:
Wald chi2(24) = 
Prob > chi2 =
280
14
min = 20
avg = 20
max = 20
135.45
0.0000
empl_a Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Int.]
tax -0.6970 0.1455 -4.7900 0.0000 -0.9822 -0.4118
fpr 0.1514 0.0996 1.5200 0.1290 -0.0439 0.3466
m_prod 0.1248 0.0967 1.2900 0.1970 -0.0647 0.3143
gdp 0.6596 0.0686 9.6100 0.0000 0.5251 0.7941
gpl3 0.0145 0.0740 0.2000 0.8440 -0.1304 0.1595
year2 0.0955 0.0639 1.4900 0.1350 -0.0297 0.2206
year3 0.1417 0.0656 2.1600 0.0310 0.0132 0.2703
year4 0.1988 0.0678 2.9300 0.0030 0.0660 0.3316
year5 0.2464 0.0706 3.4900 0.0000 0.1079 0.3848
year6 0.2470 0.0713 3.4600 0.0010 0.1072 0.3868
year7 0.1298 0.0757 1.7100 0.0870 -0.0186 0.2782
year8 0.0268 0.0795 0.3400 0.7360 -0.1290 0.1825
yeari) 0.0075 0.0857 0.0900 0.9310 -0.1606 0.1755
yearlO -0.0041 0.0837 -0.0500 0.9600 -0.1681 0.1598
yearl 1 -0.1344 0.0825 -1.6300 0.1030 -0.2961 0.0273
yearl 2 -0.1390 0.0815 -1.7000 0.0880 -0.2988 0.0208
yearl 3 -0.2035 0.0865 -2.3500 0.0190 -0.3729 -0.0340
yearl 4 -0.1767 0.0862 -2.0500 0.0400 -0.3457 -0.0078
yearl 5 -0.2305 0.0918 -2.5100 0.0120 -0.4105 -0.0506
yearl 6 -0.3253 0.0974 -3.3400 0.0010 -0.5163 -0.1344
yearl 7 -0.3365 0.0970 -3.4700 0.0010 -0.5266 -0.1463
yearl 8 -0.3001 0.0973 -3.0800 0.0020 -0.4909 -0.1093
year19 -0.3026 0.1013 -2.9900 0.0030 -0.5010 -0.1041
year20 -0.3125 0.1018 -3.0700 0.0020 -0.5120 -0.1129
cons -3.2607 1.2513 -2.6100 0.0090 -5.7132 -0.8081
sigma_u 0.344624
slgma_e 0.155115
rho 0.831539 (fraction of variance due to u j )
Hausman specification test
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2( 24) = (b-B)'[SA(-1 )](b-B), S = (S_fe - S_re) 
34.22
Prob>chi2 = 0.0808
Result: Ho cannot be rejected at 10 percent level.
Ho rejected at 1 percent level.
RE model cannot be used safely.
empl_a FE RE Difference
tax -0.5973 -0.6970 0.0997
fpr 0.0894 0.1514 -0.0620
m_prod 0.0011 0.1248 -0.1237
gdp 0.2553 0.6596 -0.4043
gpl3 -0.0191 0.0145 -0.0337
year2 0.0300 0.0955 -0.0655
year3 0.0444 0.1417 -0.0973
year4 0.0701 0.1988 -0.1287
year5 0.0957 0.2464 -0.1507
yeariS 0.1028 0.2470 -0.1442
year7 0.0834 0.1298 -0.0464
yearS 0.0541 0.0268 0.0273
year9 0.0678 0.0075 0.0604
yearlO 0.0575 -0.0041 0.0616
yearl 1 0.0008 -0.1344 0.1352
yearl 2 -0.0004 -0.1390 0.1386
yearl 3 -0.0349 -0.2035 0.1685
yearl 4 -0.0507 -0.1767 0.1260
yearl 5 -0.0766 -0.2305 0.1540
yearl 6 -0.1108 -0.3253 0.2146
yearl 7 -0.1136 -0.3365 0.2228
yearl 8 -0.0967 -0.3001 0.2035
yearl 9 -0.0926 -0.3026 0.2100
year20 -0.0975 -0.3125 0.2150
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Auto-correlation: graphical approximation
Chemical industry employees in absolute terms: Residuals against lagged residuals
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Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test
not possible, a s  this Is a fixed effects regression model
316
Fixed effects model corrected for autocorrelation
Dependent variable: empl_a
Dataset Includes Ireland
xtregar empl_a tax fpr m_prod gdp gpi3 year2-year20, fe
Fixed effects (within) regression Number of obs = 266
Group variable (i): country2 Number of groups = 14
R-sq: within = 0.0889 Obs per group: min = 19
between = 0.5572 avg = 19
overall = 0.4182 max = 19
corr(u_i, X) = 0.6196
F (23,229) 
Prob > chi2 =
0.97
0.5035
empl a Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Int.]
tax -0.0298 0.1115 -0.2700 0.7900 -0.2494 0.1899
fpr 0.0428 0.0583 0.7400 0.4630 -0.0720 0.1577
m_prod 0.1278 0.0825 1.5500 0.1230 -0.0347 0.2903
gdp 0.0476 0.0890 0.5300 0.5940 -0.1278 0.2229
gpl3 -0.0198 0.0486 -0.4100 0.6840 -0.1156 0.0760
year2 -0.0032 0.0268 -0.1200 0.9060 -0.0559 0.0496
year3 -0.0065 0.0388 -0.1700 0.8680 -0.0829 0.0699
year4 -0.0054 0.0491 -0.1100 0.9130 -0.1022 0.0914
year5 0.0067 0.0583 0.1100 0.9090 -0.1082 0.1216
year6 0.0238 0.0608 0.3900 0.6960 -0.0960 0.1436
year7 0.0328 0.0451 0.7300 0.4680 -0.0561 0.1218
year8 0.0377 0.0390 0.9700 0.3350 -0.0392 0.1145
year9 0.0762 0.0397 1.9200 0.0560 -0.0019 0.1544
yearlO 0.0871 0.0393 2.2100 0.0280 0.0096 0.1646
yeartl 0.0793 0.0354 2.2400 0.0260 0.0096 0.1490
yearl 2 0.0861 0.0349 2.4700 0.0140 0.0174 0.1548
yearl 3 0.0612 0.0338 1.8100 0.0720 -0.0054 0.1277
yearl 4 0.0252 0.0334 0.7600 0.4500 -0.0405 0.0910
yearl 5 0.0035 0.0308 0.1100 0.9100 -0.0571 0.0641
yearl 6 0.0050 0.0288 0.1700 0.8620 -0.0518 0.0618
year! 7 0.0029 0.0254 0.1200 0.9080 -0.0470 0.0529
year! 8 0.0077 0.0209 0.3700 0.7120 -0.0334 0.0489
yearl 9 
year20
0.0035
(dropped)
0.0157 0.2200 0.8260 -0.0275 0.0345
cons 3.0413 0.0971 31.3100 0.0000 2.8500 3.2327
rho_ar 
slgma_u 
sigma_e 
rho fov
0.929878 (estimated autocorrelation coefficient) 
1.07408 
0.056424
0.997248 (fraction of variance due to u j)
F test that all u_i=0: F(13, 229) = 12.01 Prob > F = 0.0000
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Heteroskedasticity: graphical approximation
Chemical industry employees in absolute terms: Predicted values against residuals
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Table 49 Regression models on C l employment in absolute terms, Ireland excluded
Fixed effects model
Dependent variable: empl_a 
Dataset excludes Ireland
xtreg empl_a tax fpr m_prod gdp gpi3 year2-year20, fe
Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs = 260 Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs = 260
Group variable (i): country2 Number of groups = 13 Group variable (i): country2 Number of groups = 13
R-sq: within = 0.1409 Obs per group: min = 20 R-sq: within = 0.0815 Obs per group: min = 20
between = 0.083 avg = 20 between = 0.9105 avg = 20
overall = 0.0129 max = 20 overall = 0.8888 max = 20
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.1787
F(24,223) = 
Prob > F =
1.52
0.0611
empl_a Coef. Std. Eit. t P»|t| [95% Conf. Int.]
tax -0.1354 0.1750 -0.7700 0.4400 -0.4803 0.2096
fpr -0.0427 0.1052 -0.4100 0.6850 -0.2501 0.1646
m_prod -0.0726 0.1034 -0.7000 0.4830 -0.2764 0.1312
gdp -0.0269 0.1195 -0.2200 0.8220 -0.2624 0.2087
gpl3 -0.1334 0.0783 -1.7000 0.0900 -0.2878 0.0210
year2 -0.0112 0.0642 -0.1700 0.8620 -0.1376 0.1153
year3 -0.0221 0.0684 -0.3200 0.7470 -0.1570 0.1127
year4 -0.0347 0.0740 -0.4700 0.6390 -0.1805 0.1111
year5 -0.0297 0.0793 -0.3700 0.7090 -0.1859 0.1266
year6 -0.0194 0.0795 -0.2400 0.8080 -0.1761 0.1373
year7 -0.0192 0.0789 -0.2400 0.8080 -0.1747 0.1362
year8 -0.0091 0.0805 -0.1100 0.9100 -0.1678 0.1496
yeari) 0.0254 0.0867 0.2900 0.7700 -0.1455 0.1963
yearlO 0.0219 0.0845 0.2600 0.7960 -0.1446 0.1884
yearl 1 0.0118 0.0865 0.1400 0.8920 -0.1587 0.1822
yearl 2 0.0099 0.0860 0.1100 0.9090 -0.1597 0.1795
yearl 3 -0.0098 0.0929 -0.1100 0.9160 -0.1930 0.1733
yearl 4 -0.0530 0.0898 -0.5900 0.5560 -0.2299 0.1240
yearl 5 -0.0682 0.0972 -0.7000 0.4830 -0.2598 0.1233
yearl 6 -0.0651 0.1077 -0.6000 0.5460 -0.2774 0.1472
yearl 7 -0.0660 0.1083 -0.6100 0.5430 -0.2794 0.1474
yearl 8 -0.0710 0.1060 -0.6700 0.5040 -0.2799 0.1379
yearl 9 -0.0691 0.1097 -0.6300 0.5290 -0.2853 0.1470
year20 -0.0680 0.1107 -0.6100 0.5400 -0.2863 0.1502
cons 6.2379 1.8719 3.3300 0.0010 2.5491 9.9268
sigma_u 1.0943
sigma_e 0.1520
rho 0.9811 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
F test that all u_i=0: F(12,223) = 72.61 Prob > F = 0.0000
Random effects model
Dependent variable: empl_a 
Dataset excludes Ireland
xtreg empl_a tax fpr m_prod gdp gpi3 year2-year20, re
Random effects u_i -  Gaussian 
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed)
Wald chi2(24) = 
Prob > chi2 =
95.29
0.0000
empl_a Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Int.]
tax -0.5142 0.1660 -3.1000 0.0020 -0.8396 -0.1888
fpr 0.1270 0.1040 1.2200 0.2220 -0.0769 0.3309
m_prod 0.1473 0.0994 1.4800 0.1380 -0.0476 0.3422
gdp 0.5820 0.0763 7.6300 0.0000 0.4325 0.7315
gpl3 -0.0116 0.0782 -0.1500 0.8820 -0.1648 0.1417
year2 0.0791 0.0676 1.1700 0.2420 -0.0534 0.2116
year3 0.1194 0.0701 1.7000 0.0880 -0.0179 0.2567
year4 0.1599 0.0730 2.1900 0.0290 0.0168 0.3030
yeari) 0.1990 0.0767 2.5900 0.0090 0.0487 0.3492
yeari) 0.2010 0.0776 2.5900 0.0100 0.0490 0.3531
year7 0.0897 0.0810 1.1100 0.2680 -0.0691 0.2485
yeari) -0.0041 0.0841 -0.0500 0.9610 -0.1690 0.1607
year9 -0.0176 0.0898 -0.2000 0.8440 -0.1936 0.1583
yearlO -0.0300 0.0875 -0.3400 0.7320 -0.2015 0.1415
yearl 1 -0.1501 0.0860 -1.7500 0.0810 -0.3187 0.0185
yearl 2 -0.1614 0.0852 -1.9000 0.0580 -0.3283 0.0055
yearl 3 -0.2249 0.0899 -2.5000 0.0120 -0.4011 -0.0488
yearl 4 -0.2092 0.0898 -2.3300 0.0200 -0.3851 -0.0333
yearl 5 -0.2664 0.0953 -2.8000 0.0050 -0.4531 -0.0796
yearl 6 -0.3553 0.1006 -3.5300 0.0000 -0.5524 -0.1581
yearl 7 -0.3664 0.1006 -3.6400 0.0000 -0.5636 -0.1692
yearl 8 -0.3356 0.1007 -3.3300 0.0010 -0.5330 -0.1382
yearl 9 -0.3324 0.1046 -3.1800 0.0010 -0.5375 -0.1273
year20 -0.3413 0.1052 -3.2400 0.0010 -0.5475 -0.1350
cons -2.5304 1.3151 -1.9200 0.0540 -5.1079 0.0471
sigma_u 0.333153
01 to 3 C 0.152001
rho 0.827702 (fraction of variance due to u j)
Hausman specification test
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2( 24) = (b-B)'[SA(-1 )](b-B), S = (S_fe - S_re)
43.77
Prob>chi2 = 0.0081
Result: Ho cannot be rejected at 10 percent level.
Ho rejected at 1 percent level.
RE model cannot be used safely.
empl_a FE RE Difference
tax -0.1354 -0.5142 0.3788
fpr -0.0427 0.1270 -0.1697
m_prod -0.0726 0.1473 -0.2199
gdp -0.0269 0.5820 -0.6088
gpl3 -0.1334 -0.0116 -0.1218
year2 -0.0112 0.0791 -0.0902
year3 -0.0221 0.1194 -0.1415
year4 -0.0347 0.1599 -0.1946
year5 -0.0297 0.1990 -0.2286
yeari) -0.0194 0.2010 -0.2204
year7 -0.0192 0.0897 -0.1089
yeari) -0.0091 -0.0041 -0.0049
yeari) 0.0254 -0.0176 0.0430
yearlO 0.0219 -0.0300 0.0519
yearl 1 0.0118 -0.1501 0.1619
yearl 2 0.0099 -0.1614 0.1713
yearl 3 -0.0098 -0.2249 0.2151
yearl 4 -0.0530 -0.2092 0.1562
yearl 5 -0.0682 -0.2664 0.1981
yearl 6 -0.0651 -0.3553 0.2902
yearl 7 -0.0660 -0.3664 0.3004
yearl 8 -0.0710 -0.3356 0.2646
yearl 9 -0.0691 -0.3324 0.2632
year20 -0.0680 -0.3413 0.2732
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Auto-correlation: graphical approximation
Chemical industry employees in absolute terms: Residuals against lagged residuals
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Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test
not possible, a s  this is a fixed effects regression model
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Fixed effects model corrected for autocorrelation
Dependent variable: empl_a
Dataset excludes Ireland
xtregar empl a tax fpr m_prod gdp gpi3 year2-year20, fe
Fixed effects (within) regression Number of obs = 247
Group variable (i): country2 Number of groups = 13
R-sq: within = 0.1032 Obs per group: min = 19
between = 0.3319 avg = 19
overall = 0.2169 max = 19
F (23,211) 1.06
corr(u_i, X) = 0.4294 Prob > chl2 = 0.3982
empl. a Coef. Std. Err. z P>lzl [95% Conf. Int.]
tax 0.0157 0.1168 0.1300 0.8930 -0.2146 0.2460
fpr 0.0192 0.0626 0.3100 0.7590 -0.1042 0.1426
m_prod 0.1321 0.0842 1.5700 0.1180 -0.0338 0.2980
gdp 0.0202 0.0928 0.2200 0.8280 -0.1627 0.2030
gpl3 -0.0245 0.0495 -0.4900 0.6220 -0.1220 0.0731
year2 -0.0013 0.0283 -0.0500 0.9640 -0.0571 0.0545
yearS 0.0009 0.0409 0.0200 0.9830 -0.0798 0.0815
year4 -0.0008 0.0515 -0.0200 0.9880 -0.1023 0.1007
year5 0.0136 0.0610 0.2200 0.8240 -0.1066 0.1338
year6 0.0340 0.0635 0.5400 0.5930 -0.0911 0.1591
year7 0.0413 0.0467 0.8800 0.3780 -0.0508 0.1333
yearS 0.0516 0.0404 1.2800 0.2030 -0.0280 0.1313
yeari) 0.0952 0.0410 2.3200 0.0210 0.0144 0.1760
yearlO 0.1057 0.0406 2.6000 0.0100 0.0256 0.1858
yearl 1 0.1003 0.0369 2.7200 0.0070 0.0275 0.1730
year! 2 0.1027 0.0363 2.8300 0.0050 0.0312 0.1742
yearl 3 0.0768 0.0353 2.1800 0.0310 0.0072 0.1464
yearl 4 0.0339 0.0343 0.9900 0.3240 -0.0337 0.1016
yearl 5 0.0096 0.0317 0.3000 0.7630 -0.0530 0.0721
yearl 6 0.0086 0.0303 0.2800 0.7770 -0.0512 0.0684
yearl 7 0.0035 0.0268 0.1300 0.8950 -0.0492 0.0563
yearl 8 0.0022 0.0218 0.1000 0.9180 -0.0407 0.0452
yearl 9 0.0037 0.0165 0.2300 0.8220 -0.0287 0.0362
year20 (dropped)
cons 3.4886 0.1110 31.4200 0.0000 3.2697 3.7075
rho_ar 0.922837 (estimated autocorrelation coefficient)
sigma_u 1.038654
slgma_e 0.056461
rho fov 0.997054 (fraction of variance due to u j)
F test that all uj=0: F(12, 211) = 13.4 Prob > F = 0.0000
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Heteroskedasticity: graphical approximation
Chemical industry employees in absolute terms: Predicted values against residuals
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Table 50 Regression models on Clinira-EUexports/GDP, Ireland included
Fixed effects model
Dependent variable: exp_r 
Dataset includes Ireland
xtreg exp_r_r tax fpr m_prod gdp gp!3 yearl 2-year19, fe
Fixed-effects (within) regression 
Group variable (i): country2
Number of obs = 126
Number of groups = 14
R-sq: within = 0.7985 Obs per group: min = 9
between = 0.2202 avg = 9
overall = 0.2314 max = 9
F(12,100) = 33.02
corr(u_i, Xb) = 0.1842 Prob > F = 0.0000
exp_r Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Int.]
tax -0.6433 0.3376 -1.9100 0.0600 -1.3132 0.0266
fpr 0.0828 0.1617 0.5100 0.6100 -0.2380 0.4036
m_prod 0.6074 0.2547 2.3800 0.0190 0.1021 1.1126
gpl3 0.3278 0.1013 3.2300 0.0020 0.1267 0.5288
yearl 2 0.0313 0.0456 0.6900 0.4940 -0.0592 0.1219
yearl 3 -0.0184 0.0479 -0.3800 0.7020 -0.1134 0.0766
yearl 4 0.0535 0.0556 0.9600 0.3390 -0.0569 0.1638
yearl 5 0.1555 0.0664 2.3400 0.0210 0.0237 0.2872
yearl 6 0.1802 0.0751 2.4000 0.0180 0.0312 0.3292
yearl 7 0.2054 0.0798 2.5700 0.0120 0.0470 0.3637
yearl 8 0.3448 0.0839 4.1100 0.0000 0.1783 0.5114
yearl 9 0.3962 0.0873 4.5400 0.0000 0.2231 0.5693
cons -7.3108 1.5355 -4.7600 0.0000 -10.3572 -4.2644
sigma_u 0.912755
sigma_e 0.119236
rho 0.983221 (fraction of variance due to u j)
F test that all u_i=0: F(13,100) 420.11 Prob > F = 0.0000
Random effects model
Dependent variable: exp_r 
Dataset includes Ireland
xtreg exp_r tax fpr m_prod gdp gpi3 year12-year19, re
Random-effects GLS regression 
Group variable (i): country2
R-sq: within = 
between : 
overall =
0.7978
0.2853
0.2948
Random effects u_i -  Gaussian 
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed)
Number of obs =
Obs per group:
Wald chi2(12) = 
Prob > chi2 =
126
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2( 24) = (b-B)'[SA(-1 )](b-B), S = (S fe - S re)
14 1.73
min = 9 Prob>chi2 = 0.9997
avg = 9
max = 9 Result: Ho cannot be rejected.
406.56
0.0000
aX Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Int.]
tax -0.6131 0.3285 -1.8700 0.0620 -1.2569 0.0308
fpr 0.0801 0.1580 0.5100 0.6120 -0.2295 0.3897
m_prod 0.7466 0.2305 3.2400 0.0010 0.2948 1.1984
gpl3 0.2965 0.0972 3.0500 0.0020 0.1059 0.4871
yearl 2 0.0327 0.0452 0.7200 0.4690 -0.0559 0.1213
yearl 3 -0.0255 0.0471 -0.5400 0.5890 -0.1179 0.0669
yearl 4 0.0394 0.0540 0.7300 0.4650 -0.0664 0.1453
yearl 5 0.1319 0.0633 2.0800 0.0370 0.0078 0.2560
yearl 6 0.1497 0.0708 2.1100 0.0350 0.0109 0.2885
yearl 7 0.1758 0.0757 2.3200 0.0200 0.0273 0.3242
yearl 8 0.3123 0.0794 3.9300 0.0000 0.1567 0.4678
yearl 9 0.3591 0.0818 4.3900 0.0000 0.1987 0.5195
cons -7.7228 1.5016 -5.1400 0.0000 -10.6659 -4.7797
sigma_u
sigma_e
rho
0.977267
0.119236
0.985332 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
Hausman specification test
Random effects model can be used safely.
e x p .r FE RE Difference
tax -0.6433 -0.6131 -0.0302
fpr 0.0828 0.0801 0.0027
m_prod 0.6074 0.7466 -0.1392
gpi3 0.3278 0.2965 0.0313
yearl 2 0.0313 0.0327 -0.0014
yearl 3 -0.0184 -0.0255 0.0071
yearl 4 0.0535 0.0394 0.0140
yearl 5 0.1555 0.1319 0.0236
yearl 6 0.1802 0.1497 0.0306
yearl 7 0.2054 0.1758 0.0296
yearl 8 0.3448 0.3123 0.0326
yearl 9 0.3962 0.3591 0.0371
322
Auto-correlation: graphical approximation
Intra-EU exports /  GDP: Residuals against lagged residuals
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Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test
Dataset includes Ireland
exp_r[country2,t] = Xb + u[country2] + e[country2,t]
Test: Var(u) = 0
c h i2 ( l)=  481.64
Prob >  chi2 =  0.0000
Result: Within-unit correlation cannot be ruled out
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Random effects model corrected for autocorrelation
Dependent variable: exp_r
Dataset Includes Ireland
xtregar exp_r tax fpr m_prod gpi3 year12-year19
Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs = 126
Group variable (I): country2 Number of groups = 14
R-sq: within = 0.7921 Obs per group: min = 9
between = 0.2639 avg = 9
overall = 0.2324 max = 9
Wald chi2(24) = 189.47
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
exp_r Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Int.]
tax -0.2414 0.2788 -0.8700 0.3860 -0.7878 0.3049
fpr -0.1554 0.1457 -1.0700 0.2860 -0.4411 0.1302
m_prod 0.4429 0.1859 2.3800 0.0170 0.0786 0.8073
gpl3 0.2646 0.1023 2.5900 0.0100 0.0641 0.4651
year12 0.0391 0.0276 1.4100 0.1580 -0.0151 0.0932
year13 -0.0063 0.0372 -0.1700 0.8660 -0.0793 0.0667
year14 0.0884 0.0469 1.8900 0.0590 -0.0034 0.1803
year! 5 0.1961 0.0563 3.4800 0.0000 0.0857 0.3066
year16 0.2297 0.0636 3.6100 0.0000 0.1050 0.3544
year17 0.2694 0.0675 3.9900 0.0000 0.1372 0.4017
year18 0.4086 0.0708 5.7700 0.0000 0.2698 0.5473
year19 0.4399 0.0737 5.9700 0.0000 0.2954 0.5844
cons -6.3250 1.2482 -5.0700 0.0000 -8.7714 -3.8786
rho_ar
slgma_u
sigma_e
rho_fov
theta
0.73350 (estimated autocorrelation coefficient)
0.78673
0.09592
0.98535 (fraction of variance due to u I) 
0.88073
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Heteroskedasticity: graphical approximation
Intra-EU exports /  GDP: Predicted values against residuals
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Table 51 Regression models on C l intra-EU exports /  GDP, Ireland excluded
Fixed effects model
Dependent variable: exp_r 
Dataset excludes Ireland
xtreg exp_r_r tax fpr m_prod gdp gpi3 year12-year19, fe
Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs = 117
Group variable ( i): country2 Number of groups = 13
R-sq: within = 0.7959 Obs per group: min = 9
between = 0.1886 avg = 9
overall = 0.2202 max = 9
F(12,92) = 29.9
corr(u_i, Xb) = 0.1171 Prob > F = 0.0000
exp_r Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Int.]
tax -0.0628 0.3738 -0.1700 0.8670 -0.8052 0.6795
fpr -0.0355 0.1699 -0.2100 0.8350 -0.3730 0.3019
m_prod 0.7640 0.2533 3.0200 0.0030 0.2608 1.2671
gpl3 0.3120 0.0987 3.1600 0.0020 0.1159 0.5081
year12 0.0201 0.0461 0.4400 0.6640 -0.0716 0.1117
year13 -0.0523 0.0490 -1.0700 0.2880 -0.1496 0.0450
y earl 4 0.0208 0.0569 0.3700 0.7160 -0.0923 0.1339
year15 0.0994 0.0680 1.4600 0.1470 -0.0357 0.2345
year16 0.1275 0.0765 1.6700 0.0990 -0.0244 0.2795
yaar17 0.1380 0.0808 1.7100 0.0910 -0.0225 0.2985
year18 0.2639 0.0860 3.0700 0.0030 0.0932 0.4346
year19 0.2947 0.0914 3.2300 0.0020 0.1133 0.4762
cons -8.8049 1.5716 -5.6000 0.0000 -11.9263 -5.6835
sigma_u 0.835871
slgma_e 0.115921
rho 0.98113 (fraction of variance due to u j )
F test that all u_i=0: F(12,92) = 332.82 Prob > F = 0.0000
Random effects model
Dependent variable: exp_r 
Dataset excludes Ireland
xtreg exp_r tax fpr m_prod gdp gpi3 year12-year19, re
Random-effects GLS regression 
Group variable (i): country2
within = 
between = 
overall =
0.7954
0.2207
0.2532
Random effects u j  -  Gaussian 
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed)
Number of obs =
Obs per group:
Wald chi2(12) = 
Prob > chi2 =
117
13
min = 9
avg = 9
max = 9
363.05
0.0000
e x p r Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Int.]
tax -0.0575 0.3611 -0.1600 0.8730 -0.7653 0.6503
fpr -0.0495 0.1664 -0.3000 0.7660 -0.3755 0.2766
m_prod 0.8563 0.2264 3.7800 0.0000 0.4125 1.3000
gpl3 0.2770 0.0948 2.9200 0.0030 0.0912 0.4627
year12 0.0216 0.0460 0.4700 0.6390 -0.0686 0.1118
year13 -0.0564 0.0484 -1.1600 0.2450 -0.1513 0.0386
year14 0.0130 0.0555 0.2300 0.8150 -0.0958 0.1218
year15 0.0851 0.0649 1.3100 0.1900 -0.0421 0.2123
year16 0.1080 0.0720 1.5000 0.1330 -0.0330 0.2491
year17 0.1207 0.0766 1.5800 0.1150 -0.0295 0.2710
year18 0.2449 0.0812 3.0200 0.0030 0.0858 0.4040
year19 0.2722 0.0853 3.1900 0.0010 0.1050 0.4393
cons -8.9116 1.5382 -5.7900 0.0000 -11.9265 -5.8968
sigma_u
sigma_e
rho
0.839644
0.115921
0.981296 (fraction of variance due to u j)
Hausman specification test
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2( 24) = (b-B)’[SA(-1 )](b-B), S = (S_fe - S_re)
2.82
Prob>chi2 = 0.9967
Result: Ho cannot be rejected.
Random effects model can be used safely.
e x p r FE RE Difference
tax -0.0628 -0.0575 -0.0053
fpr -0.0355 -0.0495 0.0140
m_prod 0.7640 0.8563 -0.0923
gp!3 0.3120 0.2770 0.0350
year12 0.0201 0.0216 -0.0015
year13 -0.0523 -0.0564 0.0041
year14 0.0208 0.0130 0.0078
year15 0.0994 0.0851 0.0143
year16 0.1275 0.1080 0.0195
year17 0.1380 0.1207 0.0173
year18 0.2639 0.2449 0.0190
year19 0.2947 0.2722 0.0226
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Auto-correlation: graphical approximation
Intra-EU exports /  GDP: Residuals against lagged residuals
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Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test
Dataset excludes Ireland
exp_r[country2,t] = Xb + u[country2] + e[country2,t]
Test: Var(u) = 0
ch i2 (l) =  401.57
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Result: Within-unit correlation cannot be ruled out
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Random effects model corrected for autocorrelation
Dependent variable: exp_r
Dataset excludes Ireland
xtregar exp_r tax fpr m_prod gpi3 year12-year19
Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs = 117
Group variable (i): country2 Number of groups = 13
R-sq: within = 0.7871 Obs per group: min = 9
between = 0.2374 avg = 9
overall = 0.2529 max = 9
Wald chi2(24) = 163.16
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
exp r Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Int.]
tax -0.0700 0.2955 -0.2400 0.8130 -0.6491 0.5091
fpr -0.3076 0.1634 -1.8800 0.0600 -0.6280 0.0127
m_prod 0.5311 0.1809 2.9400 0.0030 0.1766 0.8856
gpl3 0.2155 0.1019 2.1200 0.0340 0.0158 0.4151
year12 0.0348 0.0293 1.1900 0.2350 -0.0226 0.0921
year13 -0.0265 0.0395 -0.6700 0.5020 -0.1040 0.0509
year14 0.0727 0.0496 1.4600 0.1430 -0.0246 0.1699
year15 0.1644 0.0589 2.7900 0.0050 0.0489 0.2798
year16 0.1980 0.0657 3.0100 0.0030 0.0692 0.3268
year17 0.2315 0.0702 3.3000 0.0010 0.0940 0.3690
year18 0.3645 0.0741 4.9200 0.0000 0.2193 0.5097
year19 0.3859 0.0773 4.9900 0.0000 0.2345 0.5374
cons -6.1975 1.3189 -4.7000 0.0000 -8.7825 -3.6125
rho_ar 0.73317 (estimated autocorrelation coefficient)
slgma_u 0.68642
slgma_e 0.10974
rho_fov 0.97508 (fraction of variance due to u j)
theta 0.84454
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Heteroskedasticity: graphical approximation
Intra-EU exports /  GDP: Predicted values against residuals
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Table 52 Regression models on C l intra-EU export in absolute terms, Ireland included
Fixed effects model
D ependen t variab le: exp_a 
D a tase t In clu d es  Ireland
xtreg exp_a tax fpr m_prod gdp gpi3 year12-year19, fe
Fixed-effects (within) regression Num ber of obs = 126
Group variable ( i) : country2 Num ber of groups = 14
R-sq: within = 0.8618 Obs p e r group: min = 9
between 0.5749 avg = 9
overall = 0.5489 m ax = 9
F(13,99) = 47.51
corr(u_i, Xb) = 0.4815 Prob > F = 0.0000
e x p  a Coef. Std . ErT. t P»lt| [95% Conf. Int.]
tax -0.8553 0.3239 -2.6400 0.0100 -1.4979 -0.2126
fpr 0.1710 0.1545 1.1100 0.2710 -0.1356 0.4775
m _prod 0.2640 0.2581 1.0200 0.3090 -0.2482 0.7761
g d p 0.3876 0.1680 2.3100 0.0230 0.0543 0.7208
gpl3 0.1618 0.1059 1.5300 0.1300 -0.0484 0.3720
y e a r l  2 0.0338 0.0431 0.7800 0.4340 -0.0517 0.1193
year13 0.0462 0.0486 0.9500 0.3430 -0.0501 0.1426
y e a r l  4 0.0553 0.0525 1.0500 0.2940 -0.0488 0.1595
year15 0.2181 0.0650 3.3600 0.0010 0.0892 0.3470
year16 0.3392 0.0832 4.0800 0.0000 0.1741 0.5043
year17 0.3709 0.0879 4.2200 0.0000 0.1964 0.5453
y e a rlS 0.4881 0.0884 5.5200 0.0000 0.3127 0.6636
year19 0.5742 0.0957 6.0000 0.0000 0.3843 0.7642
c o n s 2.7773 3.0607 0.9100 0.3660 -3.2957 8.8504
sigm a_u
slg m a_ e
rho
1.15048
0.112519
0.990525 (fraction of variance due to u j )
F test that all u i=0: F(13,99) = 421.21 Prob > F = 0.0000
Random effects model
D ep en d en t variab le: exp_a 
D atase t Inclu d es  Ireland
xtreg exp_a tax fpr m_prod gdp gpi3 year12-year19, re
Random-effects GLS regression 
Group variable ( i) : country2
R-sq: within = 
between = 
overall =
0.859
0.666
0.6627
Random effects u_i -  Gaussian 
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assum ed)
Number of obs =
Obs per group:
Wald chi2(24) = 
Prob > chi2 =
126
14
min = 9
avg = 9
max = 9
621.86
0.0000
exp a Coef. Std. Err. z P»M [95% Conf. Int.l
tax -0.7852 0.3212 -2.4400 0.0140 -1.4146 -0.1557
fpr 0.1413 0.1533 0.9200 0.3570 -0.1592 0.4419
m _prod 0.5597 0.2307 2.4300 0.0150 0.1075 1.0119
g d p 0.5791 0.1389 4.1700 0.0000 0.3068 0.8514
gpl3 0.1668 0.1034 1.6100 0.1070 -0.0359 0.3695
year12 0.0353 0.0434 0.8100 0.4170 -0.0499 0.1204
y ea r 13 0.0171 0.0474 0.3600 0.7180 -0.0758 0.1100
year14 0.0361 0.0520 0.6900 0.4870 -0.0658 0.1381
year15 0.1673 0.0621 2.7000 0.0070 0.0457 0.2889
year16 0.2483 0.0754 3.3000 0.0010 0.1006 0.3960
y ear 17 0.2801 0.0804 3.4800 0.0000 0.1224 0.4377
year18 0.4006 0.0816 4.9100 0.0000 0.2405 0.5606
y ea r 19 0.4705 0.0868 5.4200 0.0000 0.3005 0.6406
c o n s -0.7433 2.6406 -0.2800 0.7780 -5.9189 4.4322
sigm a_u
s igm a_e
rho
0.973229
0.112519
0.98681 (fraction of variance due to u j )
Hausman specification test
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not system atic
chi2( 24) = (b-B)'[SA(-1 )](b-B), S  = (S_fe - S_re)
6.99
Prob>chi2 = 0.9026
Result: Ho cannot be rejected.
Random  effects model can be used  safely.
exp  ..a FE RE D ifference
tax -0.8553 -0.7852 -0.0701
fpr 0.1710 0.1413 0.0296
m _prod 0.2640 0.5597 -0.2957
g d p 0.3876 0.5791 -0.1915
gpl3 0.1618 0.1668 -0.0050
y e a r l  2 0.0338 0.0353 -0.0015
year13 0.0462 0.0171 0.0292
year14 0.0553 0.0361 0.0192
year15 0.2181 0.1673 0.0508
year16 0.3392 0.2483 0.0909
y e a r!  7 0.3709 0.2801 0.0908
y e a r l  8 0.4881 0.4006 0.0876
year19 0.5742 0.4705 0.1037
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Auto-correlation: graphical approximation
Intra-EU exports in absolute terms: Residuals against lagged residuals
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Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test
D atase t includes  Ireland
exp_a[country2,t] = Xb + u[country2] + e[country2,t]
T est: Var(u) = 0
c h i2 ( l)  =  1714.78
P rob  >  chi2  =  0.0000
Result: Wlthln-unlt correlation cannot be ruled out
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Random effects model corrected for autocorrelation
Dependent variable: exp_a
Dataset Includes Ireland
xtregar exp_a tax fpr m_prod gdp gpi3 year12-year19
Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs = 126
Group variable ( i) : country2 Number of groups = 14
R-sq: within = 0.8512 Obs per group: min = 9
between = 0.6649 avg = 9
overall = 0.6641 max = 9
Wald ch!2(25) = 275.35
corr(u_l, X) = 0 (assum ed) Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
e x p a Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Int.]
tax -0.2701 0.2748 -0.9800 0.3260 -0.8087 0.2685
fpr -0.1403 0.1439 -0.9700 0.3300 -0.4223 0.1418
m _prod 0.4481 0.1794 2.5000 0.0130 0.0964 0.7998
gdp 0.6429 0.1284 5.0100 0.0000 0.3913 0.8945
gpl3 0.1124 0.1125 1.0000 0.3180 -0.1081 0.3329
year12 0.0438 0.0273 1.6100 0.1080 -0.0097 0.0973
year13 0.0214 0.0383 0.5600 0.5760 -0.0536 0.0965
y ea rl 4 0.0711 0.0467 1.5200 0.1280 -0.0204 0.1626
y e a n  5 0.1993 0.0557 3.5800 0.0000 0.0901 0.3086
y e a n  6 0.2788 0.0659 4.2300 0.0000 0.1497 0.4079
y ea rl 7 0.3260 0.0704 4.6300 0.0000 0.1880 0.4639
y e a n s 0.4473 0.0719 6.2200 0.0000 0.3064 0.5882
y e a n  9 0.4889 0.0757 6.4600 0.0000 0.3406 0.6373
co n s -0.8741 2.2476 -0.3900 0.6970 -5.2792 3.5310
rho_ar
slgm a_u
sigm a_e
rho_fov
th e ta
0.75082 (estimated autocorrelation coefficient)
0.74342
0.10263
0.98130 (fraction of variance due to u I) 
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Heteroskedasticity: graphical approximation
Intra-E\J exports in absolute terms: Predicted values against residuals
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Table 53 Regression models on C l intra-EU export in absolute terms, Ireland excluded
Fixed effects model
Dependent variable: exp_a 
Dataset excludes Ireland
xtreg exp_a tax fpr m _prod gdp gpi3 year12-year19, fe
Fixed-effects (within) regression Num ber of obs = 117
Group variable ( i) : country2 Num ber of groups = 13
R-sq: within = 0.8919 O bs per group: min = 9
betw een = 0.3965 avg = 9
overall = 0.1229 m ax = 9
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.5225
F(13,91) = 
Prob > F =
57.77
0.0000
ex p  a Coef. S td . Err. t P>|t| T95% C onf. Int.l
tax 0.1137 0.2914 0.3900 0.6970 -0.4651 0.6926
fpr 0.0397 0.1324 0.3000 0.7650 -0.2234 0.3027
m _prod 0.2034 0.2095 0.9700 0.3340 -0.2129 0.6196
g d p -0.2517 0.1599 -1.5700 0.1190 -0.5694 0.0660
gpl3 -0.0410 0.0890 -0.4600 0.6460 -0.2178 0.1358
y e a rl 2 0.0286 0.0359 0.8000 0.4280 -0.0427 0.0999
y e a rl 3 0.0655 0.0410 1.6000 0.1130 -0.0158 0.1469
y e a rl  4 0.0062 0.0443 0.1400 0.8890 -0.0818 0.0942
y e a rl  5 0.1906 0.0542 3.5200 0.0010 0.0831 0.2982
y e a rl  6 0.4128 0.0697 5.9200 0.0000 0.2742 0.5513
y e a rl  7 0.4309 0.0731 5.8900 0.0000 0.2856 0.5762
y e a rl  8 0.4879 0.0727 6.7100 0.0000 0.3436 0.6323
y e a rl  9 0.5594 0.0787 7.1100 0.0000 0.4031 0.7157
c o n s 10.1631 2.6845 3.7900 0.0000 4.8307 15.4955
slgm a_u
s lgm a_e
rho
1.715486
0.090107
0.997249 (fraction of variance due to u _i)
F test that all u_i=0: F(12.91) = 522.79 Prob > F = 0.0000
Random effects model
Dependent variable: exp_a 
Dataset excludes Ireland
xtreg exp_a tax fpr m_prod gdp gpi3 year12-year19, re
Random -effects GLS regression 
Group variable ( i) : country2
R-sq: within = 
betw een = 
overall =
0.8816
0.6646
0.5828
Random effects u j  -  Gaussian 
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assum ed)
Number of obs =
O bs per group:
Wald chi2(13) = 
Prob > chi2 =
117
13
min = 9
avg = 9
m ax = 9
621.9
0.0000
exp  a Coef. Std. ErT. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Int.l
tax 0.0084 0.3143 0.0300 0.9790 -0.6076 0.6244
fpr 0.0198 0.1444 0.1400 0.8910 -0.2632 0.3028
m _prod 0.5687 0.2078 2.7400 0.0060 0.1614 0.9761
gd p 0.1930 0.1437 1.3400 0.1790 -0.0887 0.4747
gpi3 0.0409 0.0937 0.4400 0.6620 -0.1428 0.2247
y e a rl 2 0.0269 0.0395 0.6800 0.4970 -0.0506 0.1044
y e a rl 3 0.0155 0.0436 0.3600 0.7220 -0.0699 0.1010
y e a rl  4 -0.0055 0.0482 -0.1100 0.9100 -0.1000 0.0890
y e a rl  5 0.1303 0.0571 2.2800 0.0230 0.0184 0.2422
y e a rl  6 0.2742 0.0693 3.9600 0.0000 0.1385 0.4100
y e a rl  7 0.2920 0.0733 3.9900 0.0000 0.1484 0.4356
y e a rl  8 0.3705 0.0742 4.9900 0.0000 0.2250 0.5160
y e a rl  9 0.4244 0.0794 5.3500 0.0000 0.2688 0.5799
c o n s 3.2133 2.5025 1.2800 0.1990 -1.6915 8.1181
slgm a_u
s lgm a_e
rho
0.859034
0.090107
0.989117 (fraction of variance due to u j )
Hausman specification test
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not system atic
chi2( 24) = (b-B)'[SA(-1 )](b-B), S = (S_fe - S_re) 
40.24
Prob>chi2 = 0.0001
Result: Ho rejected at 99 percent level.
RE model cannot be used  safely.
ex p  a FE RE D ifference
tax 0.1137 0.0084 0.1053
fpr 0.0397 0.0198 0.0199
m _prod 0.2034 0.5687 -0.3654
g d p -0.2517 0.1930 -0.4447
gpl3 -0.0410 0.0409 -0.0819
y e a r l  2 0.0286 0.0269 0.0017
y e a r l  3 0.0655 0.0155 0.0500
y e a r l  4 0.0062 -0.0055 0.0117
y e a r l  5 0.1906 0.1303 0.0603
y e a r l  6 0.4128 0.2742 0.1385
y e a r l  7 0.4309 0.2920 0.1389
y e a r l  8 0.4879 0.3705 0.1174
y e a rl  9 0.5594 0.4244 0.1350
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Auto-correlation: graphical approximation
Intra-EU exports in absolute terms: Residuals against lagged residuals
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Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test
not possible, as this Is a fixed effects regression model
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Fixed effects model corrected for autocorrelation
Dependent variable: empl_a
Dataset excludes Ireland
xtregar exp_a tax fpr m_prod gdp gpi3 year12-year19, fe
Fixed effects (within) regression Number of obs = 104
Group variable ( i) : country2 Number of groups = 13
R-sq: within = 0.7621 Obs per group: min = 8
between = 0.6823 avg = 8
overall = 0.6167 max = 8
corr(u_i, X) = 0.6745
F (12.79) 
Prob > chi2 =
21.09
0.0000
exp_a Coef. SE z P»l*l [95% Conf. Int.]
tax 0.2926 0.2334 1.2500 0.2140 -0.1720 0.7571
fpr -0.2318 0.1517 -1.5300 0.1310 -0.5338 0.0702
m _prod 0.1113 0.1654 0.6700 0.5030 -0.2179 0.4405
gdp 0.1839 0.1981 0.9300 0.3560 -0.2105 0.5782
gpl3 -0.0627 0.1158 -0.5400 0.5900 -0.2931 0.1678
y e a rl 2 -0.1607 0.0276 -5.8100 0.0000 -0.2157 -0.1057
y e a rl 3 -0.2782 0.0309 -9.0000 0.0000 -0.3398 -0.2167
y e a rl 4 -0.3473 0.0434 -8.0100 0.0000 -0.4336 -0.2610
y e a rl 5 -0.2399 0.0357 -6.7200 0.0000 -0.3109 -0.1689
y e a rl 6 -0.1115 0.0315 -3.5400 0.0010 -0.1741 -0.0488
y e a rl 7 -0.1043 0.0302 -3.4600 0.0010 -0.1643 -0.0442
y e a rl 8 -0.0339 0.0239 -1.4200 0.1600 -0.0815 0.0137
year19 (dropped)
c o n s 6.4716 1.0399 6.2200 0.0000 4.4017 8.5414
rho_ar 0.659922 (estimated autocorrelation coefficient)
s igm a_u 1.334821
s igm a_e 0.065957
rho fov 0.997564 (fraction of variance due to u j )
F test that all u_l=0: F(12, 79) = 107.33 Prob > F = 0.0000
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Heteroskedasticity: graphical approximation
Intra-EU exports in absolute terms: Predicted values against residuals
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